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Abstract 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have long been an important source of corporate 
external growth and renewal. As a major entry mode of their globalisation strategy, 
the outward M&A of Chinese firms is still little understood by both scholars and 
practitioners. Little research has been done to explain the success and failure of the 
outward M&A of Chinese firms and, in particular, the post-acquisition integration 
process, which is a central part of M&A value creation.  
 
This research intends to fill the research gap by exploring the key success factors in 
the management of the post-acquisition integration process of the outward M&A of 
Chinese firms in developed economies. Three research questions are proposed: 
 What are the key factors in the management of post-acquisition integration by 
Chinese firms? 
 How and why do these factors impact on the post-acquisition integration process 
and on M&A performance? 
 How do the explanations of identified key success factors contribute to the theory 
building of post-acquisition integration in the outward M&A of Chinese firms and 
of those from other emerging economies? 
This study addresses these questions from an integrative perspective and raises 
research propositions by combining the process, organisational behaviour and 
strategic management schools of thought. A multiple-case study method is applied to 
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answer the research questions. 
 
By comparatively examining four outward M&A deals completed by leading Chinese 
firms from the manufacturing industry sector, this research contributes to the 
knowledge construct of the outward M&A of Chinese firms by identifying and 
explaining nine key success factors for the management of the post-acquisition 
integration process. The final integrative model indicates that the examination of the 
determinants of M&A integration should incorporate both the post- and 
pre-acquisition factors which influence the integration process by means of their 
impact on the formation of the integration approach.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this opening chapter is to provide an overview of this research project 
that explores a series of significant questions in the fascinating area of mergers and 
acquisitions. It starts with a presentation of the research background and then moves 
on to the research objectives and questions of this PhD. The theoretical framework 
and propositions used are then presented, followed by a general description of the 
research methodology. Finally, after a short explanation of the main terminology used 
in this thesis, this chapter ends with an overview of the structure of the whole thesis. 
 
1.2 Research background and rationale 
 
1.2.1 M&A phenomenon 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have long been an important source of corporate 
external growth and renewal. The past five M&A waves since the end of the 19th 
century provide witness to the increasing prevalence of this unique business 
phenomenon for firms to grow and gain new capabilities (Haspeslagh and Jemission, 
1991; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006). Despite the recent economic turndown 
having attacked the global economy severely and pulled the M&A volume down from 
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its 2007 peak of over four trillion US Dollars (Bloomberg, 2011), there is strong 
evidence that a sixth M&A wave has already started (Kolev et al., 2012; Bauer and 
Matzler, 2013). According to Dealogic, in 2013, the global M&A volume reached 
2.91trillion, 9% up on 2012 and the highest annual total volume since 2008 (Dealogic, 
2013). So far in 2014, global M&A has reached about 1.2 trillion by the end of April: 
the highest level since 2007 and 42% up on the previous year (Financial Times, 2014). 
 
While the majority of M&A involves firms within the same country, around one third 
of the M&A transactions completed in recent decades has involved firms with 
headquarters in different countries (Shimizu et al., 2004; Dealogic, 2013). 
Cross-border M&A (CBMA), or international M&A, which is widely used by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) as a growth strategy and a mode of entry into 
foreign markets (Bresman et al., 1999; Zander and Zander, 2010). It accounts for 
nearly 70% of foreign direct investment (FDI) worldwide and therefore constitutes the 
main channel through which MNEs undertake outward FDI (OFDI) (Peng, 2009; 
UNCTD, 2000; Zander and Zander, 2010).  
 
In recent years, MNEs from emerging economies (EMNEs), such as China and India, 
have increasingly undertaken outward M&A activities as the main strategy for their 
international expansion (Luo and Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 2012). As the largest 
emerging economy, China has achieved a dramatic increase on its outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) in the past decade along with its booming economy, 
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climbing to US $ 87.8 billion, which has made China the third largest OFDI source 
country around the world (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – 
UNCTAD, 2013). Among its increasing OFDI, China‘s outward mergers and 
acquisitions took the larger proportion of 49.4% and reached a new peak of USD 43.4 
billion (Xinhua, 2013).The 2011 Government Work Report pointed out that China will 
encourage firms of all types to expand their global presence, facilitate brands and 
enhance technological competitiveness through M&A in the manufacturing, services, 
infrastructure and energy sectors (China Daily, 2013). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that outward M&A has become the dominant internationalisation strategy of Chinese 
firms (Deng, 2012; Tan and Ai, 2010). Therefore, China represents an interesting 
setting for the exploration of the characteristics of the outward M&A of EMNEs. 
Moreover, the international M&A strategy adopted by Chinese acquirers is under the 
close scrutiny of other EMNEs (Child and Rodrigues, 2005).  
 
1.2.2 M&A success factors---the main unsolved puzzle in previous M&A research 
 
However, as a paradox of the popularity of M&A in general, in international context, 
and in emerging economies, about two thirds of the M&A do not manage to show the 
positive effects anticipated pre-acquisition (Schoenberg, 2006; Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006). In the cross-border context, it has been suggested that the majority 
of CBMA transactions are unsuccessful (Moeller et al., 2004). Cartwright and 
Schoenberg (2006) argued that the most likely reason for the lack of abatement of the 
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high rate of failure of M&A over the past two decades is that current research on 
M&A remains in some way incomplete. On the basis of a meta-analysis of 93 prior 
empirical studies on the determinants of M&A performance, King et al. (2004) 
concluded that the ―…existing empirical research has not clearly and repeatedly 
identified those variables that impact on an acquiring firm‘s performance… 
(p.196) ...post-acquisition performance is moderated by variables unspecified in 
existing research… (p.188)‖. Another meta-analysis conducted by Stahl and Voigt 
(2004) on the impact of cultural differences on M&A performance also reached a 
similar conclusion, arguing that ―a huge portion of variance remains unexplained‖. 
Despite the M&A phenomenon having encouraged substantial academic endeavours 
over the last half century, which have produced a substantial body of literature from 
different disciplines (Gomes et al., 2013), the key success factors and the reasons for 
the high failure rate of M&A transactions are still poorly understood (Stahl et al., 
2013). 
 
While previous attempts to explain the performance of M&A have mostly focused on 
financial and strategic factors, King et al. (2004) claimed that researchers may not 
have been looking at the ‗right‘ set of variables linked to M&A success, and suggested 
paying more attention to non-financial factors that are currently underrepresented in 
both theory and empirical research. In fact, both meta-analyses called for a greater 
recognition of the process and socio-cultural dimensions of M&A, so as to explore 
any unrevealed factors critical for M&A success (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; 
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Gomes et al., 2013; Stahl et al., 2013). 
 
Following these arguments, recent research aimed at explaining M&A success or 
failure focus more upon the combination of the process and socio-cultural dimensions 
(Stahl et al., 2013). The process perspective argues that, while factors such as strategic, 
organisational and cultural fit determine the synergy potential, the value of M&A is 
created in the post-acquisition integration phase because the extent to which that 
synergy potential is realised depends on the ability of the acquirer to effectively 
manage the integration process (Haspeslagh and Jemission, 1991; Stahl et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the post-acquisition integration process is deemed to represent the greatest 
hurdle in the pursuit of M&A success (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999 ). Accordingly, 
M&A researchers have more recently directed their focus upon the central part of 
M&A, which had been left adrift for years: the management of post-acquisition 
integration (Very et al., 2012; Weber and Tarba, 2013; Stahl et al., 2013). This stream 
of research responds to the suggestion made by King et al. (2004) and Stahl and Voigt 
(2004), that more organisational and socio-cultural dimensions should be involved 
into a process perspective, and seeks to explain M&A performance in terms of the 
impact that key factors have on the post-acquisition integration process. These factors 
include national and corporate cultural differences (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Ahammad 
and Glaister, 2011; Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Sarala and Varra, 2010; Varra et al., 
2012; Weber 1996; Weber et al., 2009, 2011), the levels of trust between the parties 
involved (Stahl et al., 2011; Stahl et al., 2012), the speed of integration (Angwin, 2004; 
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Homburg &Bucerius, 2005), the post M&A leadership (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 
2006; Nemanich& Keller, 2007; Vasilaki, 2011), human resource management 
practices (Ahammad et al., 2012; Gomes et al., 2012; Weber and Fried, 2011; Weber 
et al., 2012), the integration approach (Gomes et al., 2011; Almor et al., 2009; Ellis et 
al., 2012; Weber et al., 2011; Weber &Tarba, 2011; Weber et al., 2012), knowledge 
transfer (Junni, 2011; Junni and Sarala, 2013; Sarala and Varra, 2010; Varra et al., 
2012), and so on. Despite these advances, important research gaps and paradoxes 
remain that leave many unresolved questions – such as the roles played by culture, 
prior M&A experience and pre- and post-acquisition linkage – and under-researched 
areas – such as the roles played by power differences, integration speeds and levels of 
trust (Stahl et al., 2013).  
 
1.2.3 The outward M&A of Chinese firms – previous work and research gaps 
 
The increasing number of cases of EMNEs buying firms from developed countries 
has added a new layer of complexity of the CBMA puzzle. EMNEs use international 
M&A as a springboard to acquire strategic resources and reduce the institutional and 
market constraints at home (Luo and Tung, 2007). However, their post-springboard 
and post-acquisition phase can be strewn with difficulties generated by different 
obstacles such as lack of international experience, managerial competence or 
professional expertise (Luo and Tung, 2007). In other words, their unique 
characteristics, as acquirers from emerging economies, exacerbate the unsolved 
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difficulties in managing the post-acquisition integration phase. Therefore, it is 
significant to explore how EMNEs manage the post-acquisition integration process to 
create value in their outward M&A in developed countries. The existing research has 
produced little, if any, systematic evidence in this area, prompting calls for more 
relevant research (Birkinshaw et al., 2010). 
 
As a representative emerging economy, China has drawn global attention with many 
high-profile CBMA cases, especially those involving western developed countries, 
such as Lenovo‘s acquisition of IBM‘s PC division, Geely‘s acquisition of Volvo, etc. 
Amongst China‘s OFDI in 2012, outward M&A contributed USD 43.4 billion 
(MOFCOM, 2013). Based on the figures of 2012, China can claim to be the third 
largest source country in the global outward M&A league table (Statistical Bulletin of 
China‘s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2013). In contrast with the booming 
M&A activities of Chinese firms, the research on their outward M&A is still in its 
infancy, mostly concentrating on pre-acquisition decision-making issues, such as the 
motivation (Deng, 2007; Boateng et al., 2008) and underlying rationale (Deng, 2009; 
Rui and Yip, 2008) behind the international expansion of Chinese acquirers, as well as 
governmental level institutional facilitators and constraints (Luo et al., 2010; Tan and 
Ai, 2010; Yang, 2009; Chen and Young, 2010). In a recent study based on data 
collected from Chinese and Indian firms, Sun et al. (2012) developed a comparative 
ownership advantage framework to account for the internationalisation strategies of 
EMNEs in international M&A and explained their motivations, location choices, and 
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modes.  
 
Recently, several studies on the outward M&A of Chinese firms have been built to 
catch up with mainstream M&A research, placing their focus on the post-acquisition 
value creation phase. By comparatively examining two cases, Deng (2010) found that 
the acquiring firms‘ absorptive capacity in multiple dimensions is an important 
determinant of the outward M&A performance of Chinese firms. Based upon 
interview data collected from acquired firms, Liu and Woywode (2013) explore the 
Chinese light-touch integration approach to outward M&A in Germany and identify 
the reasons for this approach from both the cultural influence and learning 
perspectives. It is not surprising that, given the limited extent of the knowledge of the 
post-acquisition integration process of the outward M&A of Chinese acquirers, both 
studies are inductive research which adopts a case study strategy based upon 
interview-generated primary data. These studies have taken the first step towards 
revealing the key determinants of the post-acquisition integration and performance of 
the outward M&A of Chinese firms, and have drawn strategic implications for other 
EMNEs. Nevertheless, both studies have a limited construct, which fails to explore 
the EMNEs‘ M&A success enigma comprehensively. On the one hand, it is vital to 
explore whether mainstream theories and empirical findings are also applicable to the 
case of Chinese acquirers and, hence, whether they can provide implications for 
acquirers from other emerging economies (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). On the other 
hand, an exploration of the key success factors of the outward M&A of Chinese 
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acquirers may provide implications for mainstream research, which is still incomplete 
in this area (Birkinshaw et al., 2010; Stahl et al., 2013). Consequently, there is an 
urgent need to develop theories functional to the exploration of the key factors in the 
management of the post-acquisition integration phase of the outward M&A of 
Chinese firms.  
 
1.3 Research objectives and research questions 
 
In order to fill the research gap in relation to the post-acquisition value creation of the 
outward M&A of Chinese firms, the main objective of this research is to explore the 
key success factors in the management of the post-acquisition integration process in 
the outward M&A of Chinese firms in developed economies. Specifically, this main 
objective can be further divided into three sub-objectives. The first is to identify the 
key factors that can influence the post-acquisition integration process, and hence 
performance, of the outward M&A of Chinese acquirers. This objective will be 
reached by examining whether the propositions set up in accordance with the existing 
literature are appropriate for this research, and identifying the emerging factors drawn 
from a cross-case analysis. The second sub-objective is to examine how and why the 
key factors identified influence integration process and M&A performance of the 
Chinese acquirers. This objective will be achieved by a single and cross case data 
analysis of processes and results. The third sub-objective is to develop a model that 
can comprehensively explain the key success factors that influence the 
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post-acquisition integration process and performance of the outward M&A of Chinese 
firms. This model is also expected to generate implications for acquirers from other 
emerging economies and for mainstream M&A research, which is still waiting for the 
exploration of new determinants of M&A performance. This objective will be 
achieved in the concluding part of the discussion chapter, after the results have been 
presented. 
 
In accordance with the above research sub-objectives, the research question of this 
study also consists of three layers: 
 
1. What are the key factors in the management of post-acquisition integration by 
Chinese firms? 
 
2. How and why do these factors impact on the post-acquisition integration 
process and M&A performance? 
 
3. How does the explanation of the identified key success factors contribute to the 
theory building relating to post-acquisition integration in outward M&A by 
Chinese firms and by those from other emerging economies? 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
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Given the research aims and research questions, this study adopted an inductive 
research approach to build theory from an underdeveloped research area. A 
multiple-case study method was applied and four representative cases were chosen 
following a replication logic; these are: the YTO Group and Mc Cormick (France); 
the Nanyang CIJIAN Group and Way Assauto (Italy); CITIC HIC and Gadara Censa 
(Spain) and the TCL Group and Thomson (France). Semi-structured interviews with 
senior executives from both acquiring and acquired firms were conducted as the 
primary source of data collection, which were triangulated by a myriad of secondary 
data drawn from corporate annual reports, press releases, memoirs, internal memos 
and other documents. Most of the data were originally in Chinese. The data were 
transcribed and analysed in Chinese, but presented in English. The data analysis 
moved from single case analysis based on propositions to cross-case analysis 
following a pattern matching logic. The validity and reliability of the research are 
built into its design and analysis process, such as the use of multiple data sources to 
achieve construct validity, adopting a replication logic multiple-case study design to 
gain external validity and applying a pattern matching data analysis logic to achieve 
internal validity.  
 
1.5 Contributions 
 
This study contributes to the existing M&A literature and managerial practices in 
several ways. These contributions can be generally divided into three streams, 
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namely: 
 theoretical contributions to Chinese outward M&A research; 
 theoretical contributions to mainstream M&A research; 
 managerial contributions. 
 
First, this study contributes to the knowledge construct of the outward M&A of 
Chinese firms by exploring and explaining the key success factors in the management 
of the post-acquisition integration process, which is thought of as being the central 
part of the M&A value creation mechanism. Nine key factors were identified, and 
were constructed into an integrative model which can be used to explain key issues 
and processes in managing the post-acquisition integration of Chinese acquirers in 
developed economies. Not only do these efforts enrich the understanding of Chinese 
outward M&A by amplifying the existing research, but they also provide implications 
for acquirers from other emerging economies.  
 
Second, in addition to exploring whether mainstream theories and empirical findings 
can also be applied to the case of Chinese acquirers, this study also draws important 
findings that can provide implications for mainstream research. On the one hand, this 
study‘s results contribute to the existing knowledge of M&A scholars by revealing  
the outward M&A of EMNEs in developed economies. This research project finds 
that Chinese acquirers adopt a unique integration approach to help manage their 
post-acquisition integration process. This integration approach is generally consistent 
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with, but actually different from, the researchers‘ current perception and 
understanding of EMNEs‘ integration strategies. Within the scope of this novel 
integration approach, a unique cultural integration strategy is derived that can 
contribute to the current understanding of the cultural differences and cultural 
integration in EMNEs‘ outward M&A. On the other hand, the final model of this 
study indicates that, despite the value created in the post-acquisition integration 
process, the examination of the determinants of M&A integration should also 
incorporate those pre-acquisition factors which influence the integration process by 
means of their impact on the formation of the integration approach. The relationships 
between pre- and post-acquisition factors and the integration approach have never 
been clearly identified. The further exploitation of these relationships benefits our 
current understanding of the determinants of M&A performance. Finally, some 
emerging factors, such as acquirer attractiveness and home country advantage, may 
provide implications for mainstream research to identify new determinants of M&A 
success. 
 
Third, this study provides managerial contributions in several ways. Generally 
speaking, it identifies the key factors that potential Chinese acquirers should take into 
account in their post-acquisition integration process. Chinese acquirers ought to 
choose a suitable integration approach based on M&A motivations and specific 
pre-acquisition key factors, and consider post-acquisition key factors during their 
integration implementation process.  
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1.6 Terminology 
 
In this study, M&A refers to mergers and acquisitions. Very few M&A journal articles 
and books give a clear definition of this term. This thesis adopts the definition 
provided in Peng‘s (2009) Global Strategy. Acquisition refers to the transfer of assets, 
operations and management from one firm (the acquired firm or target) to another (the 
acquiring firm or acquirer), the former becoming a unit of the latter. Merger is the 
combination of the assets, operations and management of two firms to establish a new 
legal entity. Cross-border M&A (CBMA) is defined as M&A which involve an 
acquirer and a target firm whose headquarters are located in different home countries 
(Shimizu et al., 2004). The terms CBMA, international M&A and outward M&A 
are also used interchangeably throughout this thesis. In reality, less than 5% of all 
CBMA are mergers, so that M&A basically means acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2000). 
Consequently, akin to most mainstream M&A literature, the terms acquisition and 
M&A are used interchangeably in this study (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; 
Haleblian et al., 2009). 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters.  
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Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework and propositions based upon the review 
of the relevant existing literature, so as to support the answer to the research questions 
and objectives outlined in Chapter 1. Specifically, this chapter reviews the main 
research streams in the M&A area from a multidisciplinary perspective – the 
assessment of M&A performance, the existing literature relating to capability transfer 
and M&A performance, post-acquisition integration and integration approach – and 
then presents a review of the key success factors in the management of the 
post-acquisition integration process. Based on previous relevant work, a proposed 
framework is built and six propositions are generated based on that integrated 
framework.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the background to this research and reviews the existing literature 
relating to the outward M&A of Chinese firms. The background introduction starts 
from the economic changes that have taken place in China in recent decades and 
concludes with the current status of China‘s outward FDI and M&A. Based on 
archival evidence, chapter 2 presents an overall picture of China‘s outward M&A in 
the 21
st
 century and uncovers the crucial role played by the Chinese government in 
orchestrating its internationalisation activities and the long term implications of the 
competitiveness of Chinese acquirers in the global marketplace. It ends with a critical 
review of the current literature on the outward M&A of Chinese firms.  
 
Chapter 4 provides the methodology adopted for this research. It starts by identifying 
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the research philosophy and the inductive research approach. The research design 
involves selecting the multiple case study research strategy, selecting four cases from 
the manufacturing industry with a replication logic, building up a case study protocol, 
collecting the primary data by means of semi-structured interviews with senior and 
mid-level executives and collecting secondary data from documentation. The data 
analysis strategy, process and procedures are followed up. Finally, the validity and 
reliability of the research is justified and followed by a discussion of the author‘s 
experience in the conduct of a case study research on Chinese MNEs. 
 
Chapter 5 covers the single case study. Each section involves an in-depth single case 
report, which relies on theoretical propositions. Pattern matching is selected as the 
data analysis technique employed to analyse the interview data. Before explaining the 
propositions, a brief introduction to both the acquiring and acquired firms and to the 
transaction is presented, followed by an analysis of the motivations and rationale 
behind the M&A deal to support the data analysis. 
 
Chapter 6 provides the cross-case analysis and presents the results. The cross-case 
data analysis is mainly based on the propositions analysed in the single case study 
chapter. Nine key success factors, including three emerging factors, are identified in 
the cross-case analysis. The nine key success factors are divided into status and 
process factors. The unique integration approach adopted by Chinese acquirers is 
summarised based on the data analysis results. Finally, the relationship between the 
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integration approach and the nine key success factors is discussed and a newly 
developed model is introduced to explain the key factors influencing the 
post-acquisition integration process of the outward M&A of Chinese firms in 
developed economies. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis. The discussion section relates the results of this study 
to the previous literature. Both the theoretical and managerial contributions and 
implications are presented. After suggesting future research agenda, the final 
conclusions are drawn.  
 
Chapter 2 Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will develop the theoretical foundation and propositions based on a 
review of the relevant existing literature to support the answers to the research 
questions and objectives outlined in Chapter 1.  
 
The first section of this chapter will generally review the main research streams in the 
M&A field from a multidisciplinary perspective and identify the main research gaps. 
In the second section, based on the existing literature, the assessment criterion for 
M&A performance in the research will be identified. Based upon the selected 
performance assessment criterion, which is resource and capability transfer, the 
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literature regarding capability transfer and M&A performance will be reviewed in 
section three. Section four will review the literature on post-acquisition integration 
and explain the research gaps in the relevant area. The existing research in relation to 
the integration approach will be reviewed in section five. Section six will review the 
key success factors for the management of the post-acquisition integration process and 
build a proposed framework. Section six will set up propositions to guide the research. 
Section seven presents the chapter conclusions. 
 
2.1 M&A as a multidiscipline area 
M&A is of great practical significance in strategic management, financial economics 
and social terms. As a unique source of company renewal and growth, M&A is 
considered to be a multi-phase, multi-level and multi-disciplinary phenomenon 
(Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Gomes et al., 2013). In the last half century, the 
amount of research in M&A has seen a tremendous increase in various disciplines. 
This section is aimed at providing the bigger picture of M&A research through 
multiple theoretical lenses.  
 
There are different typologies of M&A in terms of research disciplines. In the first 
vital paper synthesising different theoretical perspectives, Larsson and Finkelstein 
(1999) argued that M&A had hitherto been studied through five theoretical lenses, i.e.: 
strategic management, economics, finance, organisational research, and human 
resource management. They built their integrative model on three of these five 
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theoretical lenses. Similarly, Birkinshaw et al. (2000) and Bauer and Matzler (2013) 
argue for four schools of thought on M&A, namely: financial economic, strategic 
management, organisational behaviour, and process. The former research built its 
conceptual framework on both organisational behaviour and process perspectives, 
while the latter‘s integrative and holistic model was developed by connecting the last 
three schools of M&A. Haleblian et al. (2009) reviewed M&A antecedents and 
moderating factors in determining different acquisition outcomes to provide a 
comprehensive review of the previous empirical research. They controlled the scope 
of their review through five disciplines, i.e.: accounting, economics, finance, 
management and sociology. It is worth noting that most of the multi-disciplinary 
research argues that the different research streams are not mutually exclusive, 
although they are only marginally informed by each other (Larsson and Finkelstein, 
1999; Bauer and Matzler, 2013). Based on the existing literature, this study considers 
M&A research to have been developed through three main disciplinary lines, namely: 
finance and economics, strategy, and process. This reduces the complexity of the 
theoretical lenses of the previous typologies (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Bauer 
and Matzler, 2013). 
 
According to the review of M&A literature on leading journals from 1992 to 2008 
carried out by Haleblian et al. (2009), the finance field has generated the largest 
proportion of empirical research on M&A in that period. It is clear that the financial 
economic literature has represented the most prominent stream in M&A research in 
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the past few decades (Bauer and Matzler, 2013). Finance scholars primarily focused 
on whether acquisitions created value to shareholders. They typically assessed the 
relationship between M&A activities and firm performance through changes in 
shareholder value, relying on stock market-based measures (Carper, 1990; Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Datta, 1991). The event study methodology is widely used in this field 
by investigating the share prices of the acquiring and acquired firms in a specific time 
frame focused around discrete events, such as announcement dates (Brown and 
Warner, 1985; Aktas, et al., 2007). 
 
Strategic management researchers have largely focused on the effects of 
pre-acquisition relatedness, including similarity and complementarity. They tried to 
find a link between the both parties‘ strategic attributes, or ‗strategic fit‘, and M&A 
performance, concentrating in particular upon the extent to which the business of the 
acquired firm could be related to that of the acquiring one (Datta and Puia, 1995; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Chatterjee et al., 
2009). Studies on CBMA also looked at the relationship between cultural distance, or 
‗cultural fit‘, and M&A success (Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Stahl and Voigt, 2008). 
Recent developments and extensions of this perspective also provided insights into 
M&A value creation mechanisms through the transfer of knowledge and other 
resources (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Capron and Piste, 2002; Bjorkman et al. 2007). 
 
The process school emphasises the important role played by the choice of 
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post-acquisition integration approach and by the acquisition integration process itself 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Scholars of the process perspective believe that, 
while factors such as strategic, organisational, and cultural fit determine the synergy 
potential of M&A, the extent to which that potential is realised depends on the ability 
of the acquiring firm to effectively manage the integration process. They believe that 
an efficient and effective post-acquisition integration phase is decisive for the success 
of M&A deals (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). While 
strategic scholars also argue that unsuitable decision-making during the 
pre-acquisition negotiation and post-acquisition integration processes can lead to 
inferior M&A performance, process scholars emphasise the role played by the 
integration process and approach. One key contribution made by the process 
perspective is its understanding of how different integration approaches may impact 
the realisation of synergy and M&A performance (Child et al., 1999; Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006; Weber et al., 2011). In recent years, the research done in this area 
has been directed at the socio-cultural and human resources issues involved in the 
post-acquisition integration phase (Stahl et al., 2013; Gomes et al., 2012; Teerikangas 
and Very, 2006; Weber et al, 2009, 2011). 
 
Despite M&A having been studied through multidisciplinary means over several 
decades, comprehensive literature reviews of M&A are very limited. Halebian et al. 
(2009) reviewed recent empirical studies of M&A by developing a framework which 
involved the antecedents, moderators and outcomes of M&A activities. Although their 
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review was based on multidisciplinary literature, the comprehensiveness of their study 
was limited by the constraints imposed by a narrow time frame, a limited set of 
journals, and the availability of quantitative empirical papers only. Being vital in 
exploring key success factors in the M&A process, the last point (focusing on 
quantitative papers only) particularly hindered the explanatory power of this review 
(King et al., 2004; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Stahl and Voigt, 2008). In a 
recent review of the critical success factors of the M&A process, Gomes et al. (2013) 
built a holistic explanatory framework which reflects the multidisciplinary nature of 
M&A. The comprehensiveness of this review was strengthened by broadening the 
time frame to cover two decades, and by using the Association of Business Schools‘ 
(ABS) Academic Journal Quality Guide to select the journals in which the reviewed 
papers had been published. In addition, this study also included some books which 
had had a significant impact on the M&A field, and which have received a large 
number of citations.  
 
Apart from the two recent works above, the interdisciplinary reviews of the M&A 
literature are mostly restricted to a specific theme, such as the impact of M&A on firm 
performance (Tuch and O‘Sullivan, 2007; Meglio, 2009), research methods adopted 
by previous M&A studies (Meglio and Risberg, 2010), theoretical perspectives and 
research findings on CBMA as a new market entry mode and diversification strategy 
(Shimizu et al., 2004), and how firms learn to carry out M&A (Barkema and Schijven, 
2008). It is clear that a comprehensive interdisciplinary review of the M&A literature 
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is a vast project that bewilders M&A scholars due to the complexity and 
multidisciplinary nature of the M&A activity. Instead of pursuing such a challenging 
achievement, the aim of this section is to provide an overall picture of past research 
on M&A as a multidisciplinary field.  
 
Despite M&A research having been conducted for near a half century through the 
development of different schools of thought, the empirical data reveals that there has 
been little variation in the failure rate of M&A over the time period of the research 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006). Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) argue that, in 
some ways, M&A research remains incomplete, which is supported by the two 
meta-analyses conducted by King et al. (2004) and Stahl and Voigt (2004). Both argue 
that post-acquisition performance is moderated by variables unspecified in the 
existing literature and call for a greater recognition of the process and organisational 
dimensions of M&A (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006)
1
. Responding to this call, this 
thesis adopts the process perspective and explores the key factors in the management 
of the post-acquisition integration process. In the next section, the assessment of 
M&A performance will be reviewed and discussed, before reviewing the literature 
related to the post-acquisition integration process.  
 
2.2 M&A performance assessment 
 
                                                             
1
According to very recent literature, such incompleteness in there searches on M&A success factors still exists, 
especially regarding lack of process and socio-cultural understanding (e.g. Weber and Tarba, 2013; Gomes, et al., 
2013; Stahl et al., 2013). 
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The multidisciplinary characteristics of M&A lead to there being little, if any, 
agreement on how to measure M&A performance, both within and across disciplines 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Tuch and O‘Sullivan, 2007; Zollo and Meier, 
2008; Stahl, et al., 2013). The choice of an appropriate acquisition performance 
assessment measure often differs between research. Finance and economics scholars 
use objective measurement methodologies that involve looking at stock market data 
and accounting figures from the short- to long-term time horizon (Datta 1991; 
Andrade et al., 2001). Strategic management and organisational behaviour scholars 
mostly use more subjective performance indicators, such as the degree of achievement 
of synergy, integration process efficiency, knowledge and capability transfer, and 
employee trust and attrition (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Schoenberg, 2006; Stahl, 
et al., 2013). 
 
In their defining paper that brought the M&A scholars‘ attention back to the 
performance measurement, Zollo and Meier (2008) review the empirical studies on 
M&A published in top management and finance journals between 1970 and 2006, and 
find that the largest proportion of researchers used the short-term event study method. 
They also found that the two most widely used subjective measurements of M&A 
performance were overall M&A performance (which represents synergy realisation or 
strategic objective realisation), and integration process performance. In recent years, it 
has gradually been accepted that empirical studies on M&A performance 
measurement need to be discriminated based upon the kind of performance that is 
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actually being measured (Tuch and O‘Sullivan, 2007; Zollo and Meier, 2008; 
Meglio& Risberg, 2010; Stahl, et al., 2013). Based on the level of analysis and the 
time horizon, Zollo and Meier (2008) construct a theoretical framework of the 
conceptual linkages between different performance measurement constructs. As is 
shown in Table 2.1, there are three levels of analysis. The first is the task level, which 
examines ―the degree to which the targeted level of integration between the two 
organisations has been achieved across all of its task dimensions in a satisfactory 
manner‖ (Zollo and Meier, 2008, p.56). The second is the transaction (acquisition) 
level, in which the measurement of performance is defined by the value generated by 
the complete transaction process. It encompasses all phases of the acquisition process 
and emphasises the creation of value. The third is the firm level, which focuses on the 
performance of the combined organisation, defined as ―the variation in firm 
performance that occurred during the period of relevance for the execution of the 
business plan connected to the acquisition‖(Zollo and Meier, 2008, p.59). The time 
horizon is categorised in short to medium term measurement, which covers the time 
from the completion of the deal to the initial impacts caused by the integration process, 
and long term measurement, which refers to the whole period of the post-acquisition 
implementation and the consequent creation or destruction of value. It is suggested 
that M&A research aimed at assessing the impact of any factor on M&A performance 
should specify the level of its performance analysis (Zollo and Meier, 2008; Stahl, et 
al., 2013)  
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Table 2.1 The classification of M&A performance measurement 
 
Source: Zollo and Meier (2008),p.59. 
 
―The measurement of M&A performance should be dependent on the rationale of 
M&A‖ (King et al., 2004, p.197). Different types of M&A rationale can lead to 
different M&A performance constructs. Chinese acquirers widely use outward M&A 
to gain resources and capabilities from developed countries (Deng, 2007, 2009; Luo 
and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008). Therefore, in this study, a short- to mid-term 
integration process performance, which primarily takes the form of resource and 
capability transfer, will be mainly used to assess M&A performance at the task level. 
Stahl et al. (2013) argue that it is necessary to consider multiple levels of analysis 
when measuring M&A performance, so as to understand the value creation 
mechanism throughout the M&A process. Zollo and Meier (2008) suggest that there is 
a path linking integration process performance to long-term firm performance via the 
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overall synergy realisation, which indicates that the resource and capability transfer 
could lead to the realisation of post-acquisition synergy and M&A success. Following 
this logic, this study will assess M&A performance at the task level (post-acquisition 
integration performance), acquisition level (synergy creation) and firm level 
(specifically the performance of the acquiring firm). In addition, according to 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), ―The heart of integration is the transfer and 
application of strategic capabilities‖ (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, p.106). 
Therefore, in this study, the assessment of the key success factors will be based upon 
the criteria of whether their impact can facilitate the resource and capability transfer 
and whether such transfer of resources and capabilities can lead to the creation of 
synergy and the future positive overall performance of the combined entity. In the 
next section, a review of the existing literature concerning the relationship between 
resource and capability transfer and M&A integration will be presented.  
 
2.3 Resource and capability transfer in M&A 
 
2.3.1 Process perspective of M&A– A resource-based view of value creation 
 
The resource-based view derives from Penrose‘s paper (1959), which first raised the 
conceptual idea of the firm as a combination of resources and capabilities embodied in 
an administrative framework. After this seminal work, the resource-based view of 
firm was put forward by Wernerfelt (1984) and subsequently developed and 
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popularised by Barney (1991). Porter (1985) encourage a focus upon the importance 
of the competitive advantage as the basis of firm performance. The essence of the 
resource-based view lies in its emphasis on resources and capabilities as the genesis of 
a firm‘s competitive advantage, because resources are valuable, rare, inimitable, and 
non-substitutable, and heterogeneously distributed across firms (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Wang and Ahamed, 2007).  
 
Building upon the resource-based view, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) contribute to 
how M&A can create value by suggesting a process perspective of M&A, which 
considers that the objective of M&A is to improve the competitive position of one or 
both parties by transferring resources and capabilities between them. They argued that, 
while the pre-acquisition analysis of strategic fit and organisational fit is important, it 
only indicates the value creation potential of an acquisition and its anticipated 
implementation difficulties. The value of M&A is created after the transaction, and it 
is the product of managerial actions over time. Following the process perspective of 
value creation in M&A, this study also considers that the value of an acquisition is 
created after the deal, in the post-acquisition integration phase, by transferring 
resources and capabilities between firms.  
 
According to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), the object of the process perspective is 
the vast majority of strategic M&A, which are intended to create value, as opposed to 
financial M&A, which concentrate on financial value capture and diversification. 
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Following this line of argument, this research also narrows down the outward M&A 
objectives of Chinese firms by focusing only on strategic asset seeking, while 
neglecting those firms that use outward M&A to seek diversification (as is the case of 
most financial institutions), and to meet the imperatives of the government (such as 
most natural resource seeking acquisitions).  
 
The existing literature uses terms such as ‗capability transfer‘ and ‗knowledge transfer‘ 
to convey the same meaning. In this research project, the term ‗resource and 
capability transfer‘ is used. It denotes the use of one party‘s resources (capabilities) by 
the other one (Bjorkman et al., 2007). These resources include both tools and 
processes, and mainly take the form of tacit or explicit knowledge-based resources. 
Following the conceptual framework of Bjorkman et al. (2007), this research does not 
propose that the transfer of resources and capabilities entails their perfect replication 
in the receiving party, but that it leads to a transformation and/or exploitation of 
resources by the recipient, which combines them with its existing resources.  
 
2.3.2 Literature review of resource and capability transfer in M&A 
 
The existing literature provides an insight into a number of important issues regarding 
capability transfer in international M&A, such as the relationship between capability 
transfer and M&A performance, how capability transfer contributes to the 
post-acquisition value creation process, how facilitators and obstructers impact 
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capability transfer, etc. 
 
The prior literature built a connection between the outcome of the resource and 
capability transfer and M&A success and emphasised knowledge/resources as key 
prerequisites for the successful completion of complex M&A endeavours. Capron et 
al. (1998) claims that resource redeployment happens frequently between M&A 
parties and is related to market failure of combined entities. Moreover, Capron (1999) 
finds that the extent of resource redeployment and capability transfer between the 
acquiring and acquired units is related and significantly influences a firm‘s 
performance. In another paper, Capron and Pistre (2002) find that the transfer of 
resources and capabilities from the acquiring to the acquired firm is associated with 
abnormal returns, while the reverse transfer of resources does not create value. These 
studies by Capron suggest that the transfer of resources and capabilities is generally 
crucial for M&A performance. Zollo and Singh (2004) suggest that knowledge 
codification, which is crucial for a successful knowledge transfer, strongly and 
positively influence the performance of M&A. These empirical studies emphasise the 
influence of knowledge transfer on acquisition performance. In a paper regarding the 
M&A performance measurement, Zollo and Meier (2008) consider knowledge 
transfer to be one of the important task level M&A performance measurements, 
exerting both a direct and an indirect influence on the overall M&A performance.  
 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) claim that the value creation of M&A lies in the 
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transfer of knowledge and capabilities, which contributes to the improvement of the 
firms‘ competitive advantage. Their arguments emphasise the unification of the 
post-acquisition integration process and the value creation process of M&A. This 
process perspective suggests that, while static factors – such as strategic and 
organisational fit – determine the synergy potential of M&As, the extent to which 
such potential can be realised relies on how effectively firms manage the 
post-acquisition integration process in an effective manner. Therefore, the proponents 
of the process perspective argue that M&A value creation and a firm‘s competitive 
advantage are achieved through capability transfer between the combined units in the 
post-acquisition integration process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Bresman et al., 
1999; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Empson, 2001; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Westphal 
and Shaw, 2005; Sarala and Vaara, 2010; Reus, 2012). For example, Ranft and Lord 
(2002) examine the capability transfer between and within the acquisition units and 
highlight the significance of both knowledge-based resources and knowledge transfer 
process for value creation in acquisitions. Bresman et al. (1999) identify facilitators 
and patterns of international knowledge transfer during the post-acquisition 
integration process. Similarly, Westphal and Shaw (2005) consider knowledge and 
capability transfer to be a key source of acquisition value creation, and developed a 
comprehensive model of both facilitators of and impediments to the post-acquisition 
knowledge transfer.  
 
There has been a recently emerging field of research on capability transfer in M&A 
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that focuses on socio-cultural and human related issues. These studies focus more on 
the link between socio-cultural/human resource factors and post-acquisition resource 
and capability transfer. Bresman et al. (1999) suggest that communication, visits and 
meetings are important predictors of knowledge transfer in international M&A. They 
also argued thatthe knowledge transfer patterns in the post-acquisition integration 
process change due to the emergence of a social community in the combined entity. 
Moreover, Empson (2001) takes into account the important role played by individuals 
in the knowledge transfer process and suggest that highly personal and subjective 
factors, such as employee perceptions, influence the knowledge transfer in M&A. 
Recently, some scholars made a series of contributions to the explanation of the 
process and mechanism by which cultural differences and culture integration affect 
the knowledge transfer in international M&A. Bjorkman et al., (2007) propose that 
cultural differences influence post-acquisition capability transfer through their impact 
upon social integration, absorptive capacity, and capability complementarity. 
Following their framework, Sarala and Vaara (2010) empirically analyse the impact of 
national and organisational cultural differences and cultural integration on capability 
transfer in an international M&A setting. Furthermore, in another empirical study, 
Vaara et al. (2012) find that both the organisational and national cultural differences 
are positively related with knowledge and capability transfer in international M&A.  
 
In some recent studies, scholars also find that some important characteristics of the 
actors in the capability transfer process, such as the absorptive capability of the 
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involved units, contribute to M&A performance. For example, Zaheer et al. (2010) 
argue that international acquisition with prior alliances perform better than those 
without alliance experience due to the creation of a partner specific absorptive 
capacity which can benefit the knowledge and capability transfer. Reus (2012) argue 
that the exploration and exploitation of knowledge affects M&A success while the 
exploration depends on the absorptive capacity of both the acquiring and acquired 
firms. Moreover, Junni and Sarala (2013) consider absorptive capacity to be a 
significant determinant of M&A knowledge transfer and empirically tested the 
antecedents of absorptive capacity. The influence of absorptive capacity was also 
explored in the context of EMNEs, or even Chinese EMNEs‘ outward M&As. The 
multiple case study of Deng (2010) suggest that the acquiring firms‘ absorptive 
capacity in multiple dimensions influences the performance of Chinese MNEs‘ 
outward M&A. Using a similar multiple case study research design, Liu and 
Woywode (2013) argue that the integration approach used by Chinese MNEs 
investing in Germany is attributed to contextual characteristics – such as the cultural 
influences and absorptive capacity – of the acquiring firm. However, these studies 
only focussed upon the impact of facilitators of capability transfer from an 
organisational learning perspective instead of exploring the key factors affecting the 
overall capability transfer process.  
 
To sum up, the existing literature provides insights into various issues in relation to 
resource and capability transfer in international M&A. However, these studies are 
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mostly built on empirical data drawn from cases conducted by MNEs from developed 
economies. Recent high-profile cases of Chinese firms acquiring companies from 
around the world – and specifically from developed economies – attracted the interest 
of both practitioners and scholars and called for more research and evidence in this 
area (Birkinshaw et al., 2010). Despite that firms may develop resources and 
capabilities endogenously, seeking crucial knowledge external is quicker and less 
costly because the process of internal resource development is a complex and slow 
one (Barney, 1991).This is particularly true for firms from China and other emerging 
economies, which are latecomers to the global market and wish to acquire and transfer 
resources and capabilities across borders by means of outward M&A (Luo and Tung, 
2007; Liu et al., 2010). They may use international M&A as a swift way to gain 
access to new knowledge unobtainable in the domestic markets, and hence broaden 
their resource base and decrease inertia so as to enhance their competitive advantages 
(Capron, 1999; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Deng, 2009). 
The existing research on the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A mainly focuses on the their 
motivations and underlying rationales (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng 2007, 2009; 
Hemerling et al., 2006; Rui and Yip, 2008; Wang and Boateng, 2007). To promote 
M&A research in China and other emerging economies, more research needs to be 
done to uncover the M&A performance determinants (Deng, 2010). Luo and Tung 
(2007) believe that post-acquisition integration is one of the biggest challenges faced 
by EMNEs in their international acquisitions. While some difficulties are common to 
all MNEs, the EMNEs‘ post-acquisition difficulties can be exacerbated due to their 
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lack of international experience and organisational expertise in handling these issues 
(Luo and Tung, 2007). To deal with these aspects and overcome the post-acquisition 
challenges, Chinese acquirers and other EMNEs have to be aware of what they need 
to focus on to manage the post-acquisition integration process, and plan ahead with 
clear objectives. Therefore, the following significant question is worth exploring: 
What are the key success factors that can influence Chinese firms‘ outward M&A to 
developed countries by transferring resources and capabilities in the post-acquisition 
integration process? This is one of the main questions that this research wishes to 
explore. It needs to be answered not only because of its practical importance, but also 
because of the theoretical significance linked to the uncovering of the value creation 
mechanism and variables moderating the Chinese and other EMNEs‘ outward M&A 
performance. This would fill the research gap which exists in the understanding of 
EMNEs‘ outward M&A, especially those towards developed countries (Birkinshaw et 
al., 2010), and may provide insights into underrepresented variables in the current 
theory and empirical research (King et al., 2004; Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Cartwright 
and Schoenberg, 2006). It is worth noting that this study only focuses on the 
post-acquisition integration process because this is where value is created (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison,1991). The key factors influencing the pre-acquisition decision making 
process are not considered in this research. In the next section, the literature relating 
to post-acquisition integration will be critically reviewed. 
 
2.4 Post-acquisition integration 
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2.4.1 M&A process 
 
To lay a foundation on the process perspective of M&A, the way in which the process 
aspects of acquisition are conceived of in the M&A literature needs to be considered 
(Gomes et al., 2013). To do so, a general review of the existing research concerning 
M&A phases is presented in this section. 
 
Researchers divide the M&A process into various phases (Calipha et al., 2010). A 
two-phase classification, which includes a pre-and a post-M&A phase, is most 
commonly used (Boland, 1970; Schweger and Weber, 1992; Gomes et al., 2013). 
Scholars adopting a three phase method usually divide the process of M&A into the 
phases of pre-M&A decision making, during M&A negotiation and post-M&A 
integration (Shimizu et al., 2004). Some studies divide the M&A process into more 
than three phases. For example, Carpenter and Sanders (2007) consider four phases 
for a M&A activity; these are idea, justification, integration and result appraisal. 
Parenteau and Weston (2003) define their four stages of the M&A process as strategy 
planning, candidate screening, due diligence and execution, and integration. Fery et al. 
(1969) attach four colourful names to their classification of the M&A phases, which 
are the courtship, the wedding ceremony, the honeymoon, and the post-honeymoon. 
Moreover, Farley and Schwallie (1982) considered a six-phase process and Kazemek 
and Grauman (1989) divided the M&A process into seven phases. Calipha et al. (2010) 
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provided a general review of the M&A phases and pointed out that the effort towards 
integration in the post-acquisition integration phase is critical to M&A performance.  
 
Although there are various classifications of the boundaries between the phases of the 
M&A process, most of them are not clearly defined (Gomes et al., 2013). This is 
particularly true for those dividing the M&A process into more than three phases. 
Even for those classifications that argue for three phases, the boundaries between each 
phase are not fully specified. In some cases, the sequence of these phases can be 
reversed (Gomes et al., 2013). For example, the negotiation between the top 
executives of the acquiring and acquired firms, which is normally informal, often 
starts even before the pre-acquisition decision-making phase. Therefore, most 
contemporary M&A research which adopts the process perspective identifies the 
boundary between the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition integration phases of the 
M&A process with the official announcement date regulated by law. Although there 
are always some marginal efforts to attempt to overcome and blur the distinction 
between these two phases in practice, the fact remains that, if ownership is not 
achieved, post-acquisition integration cannot really take place in earnest (Gomes et al., 
2013).  
 
Therefore, this study follows the trend of mainstream research on M&A integration 
and divides the acquisition process into two phases separated by the transaction 
completion date. The research question and research objective of this thesis focus on 
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the acquisition integration process, which lies in the post M&A phase.  
 
2.4.2 The post-acquisition integration process 
 
M&A can only create value after the completion of the transaction, which means 
during the post-acquisition integration process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Weber et al., 2009). A myriad of research and 
practical experiences repeatedly inform us that it is the post-acquisition integration 
process that represents the greatest hurdle to achieving synergies, creating value and 
attaining M&A success (Shrivastava, 1986; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Almor et 
al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2012; Puranam et al., 2003, 2006, 2009; Very 
et al., 2012). The post-acquisition integration process is fraught with difficulties, 
which can mainly be seen as consisting of two parts: one involves achieving the 
successful resource and capability transfer itself; the other concerns the creation of an 
atmosphere or of an organisational climate that can support the transfer of resources 
and capabilities (Haspeslagh and Jemison,1991). Both domestic and cross-border 
M&A often lead to an integration process that is more problematic than expected 
during the pre-acquisition process (Varra, 2003; Bjorkman et al., 2007). Despite there 
being a growing research interest in post-acquisition integration over the past decade 
(Ranft, 2006; Angwin, 2004; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Zollo and Singh, 2004; 
Puranam et al. 2006; Puranam and Srikanth 2007), the empirical findings on the 
relationship between post-acquisition integration and M&A performance are still 
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inconclusive (King et al., 2004; Almor et al., 2009).  
 
2.4.2.1 Definitions of the post-acquisition integration process 
 
Post-acquisition integration is generally acknowledged as the process of structurally 
and socio-culturally combining the acquiring and acquired firms (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Weber et al., 2011; Colman and Grogaard, 
2013). Few studies have attempted to directly define the term ‗integration‘(Schweiger 
and Goulet, 2000; Weber et al., 2009), although most M&A scholars believe that the 
integration process involves combining both the assets and personnel of two 
organisations (Weber et al., 2009; Viegas-Pires, 2013). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) 
define integration as ―an interactive and gradual process in which individuals from 
two organisations learn to work together and cooperate in the transfer of strategic 
capabilities‖ (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, p.106). Their definition has primarily 
outlined the conceptual idea that integration is a process that involves both human 
interaction and the transfer of assets.  
 
Birkinshaw, Bresman, and Hakanson (2000) propose a conceptual framework that 
combines both the process and organisational behaviour perspectives of M&A, 
arguing that the former is concerned with value creation through the transfer of 
resources and capabilities while the latter focuses on the employee satisfaction and 
shared identity of the combined entity. They thus suggest that the post-acquisition 
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integration process consists of two distinct and intertwined processes called ‗task 
integration‘ and ‗human integration‘. Birkinshaw et al. (2000) defined task integration 
as the ‗identification and realisation of operational synergies‘, and human integration 
as ‗the creation of positive attitudes towards the integration among employees on both 
sides‘ (Birkinshaw et al.,2000, p. 400). They suggested that an effective integration is 
a function of the two parallel processes of both task and human integration, which are 
not independent of one another. For example, the improvement of employee 
satisfaction may facilitate the transfer of resources and capabilities. Correspondingly, 
a well implemented task integration may foster a shared identity and bring about 
employee satisfaction.  
 
Before this seminal paper, Bresman, Birkinshaw and Nobel (1999) had already put 
forward the importance of both task integration and human integration in their Journal 
of International Business Studies (JIBS) Decade Award Winning paper by identifying 
the impact of achieving a socio community in the combined organisation on the 
knowledge transfer of CBMA. After these studies, the consensus among M&A 
scholars has been that post-acquisition integration has two different dimensions 
(Viegas-Pires, 2013). However, the terms used were not unified. ‗Human integration‘ 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000), ‗Social integration‘ (Bjorkman et al., 2007), and 
‗Socio-cultural integration‘ (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Stahl et al., 2011; Weber and Tarba, 
2013) are used to describe similar concepts, while ‗Task integration‘ (Birkinshaw et 
al.,2000), ‗Operational integration‘ (Bjorkman et al., 2007), and ‗Structural integration‘ 
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(Puranam et al., 2006; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007; Puranam 
et al., 2009) are labels used for the same idea. For example, Bjorkman et al. (2007) 
define social integration as ‗the creation of a shared identity, the establishment of 
trusting relationships and the absence of divisive conflicts between the members of 
the combining organisations‘ (Bjorkman et al., 2007, p.662). The corresponding term 
they used is ‗operational integration‘. Moreover, they also refer to social integration as 
informal integration, and consider operational integration as formal integration. 
Similarly, Stahl et al. (2011) define socio-cultural integration as ‗creating positive 
attitudes toward the new organization, developing a sense of shared identity and 
compatible values, and gaining commitment and motivation from acquired personnel‘ 
(Stahl et al., 2011, p. 583). In another vein, structural integration is defined as ‗the 
combination of formerly distinct organizational units into the same organisational unit 
following an acquisition‘ (Puranam et al., 2009, p.313), which is basically the same as 
the meaning of task integration and operational integration.  
 
Despite that the definitions above are rather loosely used in the literature (Weber et al., 
2009), both concepts are believed as the main element of post-acquisition integration. 
M&A researchers suggest that integration on both dimensions are needed for a 
successful integration (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Bjorkman et al., 2007), although 
practitioners may focus on either side. In this research, the term ―socio-cultural 
integration‖ and ―operational integration‖ are used to describe the two parallel 
processes of post-acquisition integration. 
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2.4.2.2 Socio-cultural integration and M&A performance  
 
Socio-cultural integration refers to the combining of groups of people with a shared 
culture, identity, and compatible values toward the newly formed organisation 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Shrivastava, 1986; Colman and Grogaard, 2013). It 
represents an important dimension of acquisition success from an organisational and 
human resources perspective (Bjorkman et al., 2007;Stahl et al., 2011).In addition to 
those studies that have focussed broadly on the process of socio-cultural integration 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Bjorkman et al., 2007), extensive research, especially in 
recent years, have sought to explain and understand M&A performance based upon 
the impact of socio-cultural factors. Such a stream of socio-cultural integration 
research in M&A has sought to explain the performance and under-performance of 
M&A in terms of the impact of different socio-cultural determinants on the 
post-acquisition integration process and M&A performance (Stahl. et al., 2013). These 
variables include cultural fit and cultural differences at both the national and corporate 
levels (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Weber et al., 1996; Weber and Tarba, 2012; Weber et al., 
2009; Weber et al., 2011; Reus and Lamont, 2009; Stahl and Voigt, 2008), trust 
between the acquiring and acquired firms (Stahl and Sitkin, 2010; Stahl et al., 2011; 
Stahl et al., 2012), human resource management practices (Weber et al., 2011; Weber 
and Tarba, 2010; Weber and Fried, 2011a, 2011b; Gomes et al., 2012), post M&A 
leadership (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006; Nemanich &Keller, 2007; Vasilaki, 2011; 
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Angwin and Meadows, 2009; Karaevli, 2007), integration speed (Angwin, 2004; Ellis 
et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2012), implementation of the post-acquisition integration 
process (Almor et al., 2009; Weber et al., 2011; Weber and Tarba, 2011; Weber et al., 
2012),and knowledge transfer (Junni and Sarala, 2011, 2013; Sarala and Varra, 2010; 
Varra, et al., 2012). 
 
Despite the recent huge advances in M&A research focusing on socio-cultural issues, 
important research gaps and paradoxes remain (Weber and Tarba, 2013). Areas such 
as the roles of power differences, speed, sensemaking and sensegiving processes, and 
trust remain to be explored further and studied more thoroughly (Stahl et al., 2013). In 
addition, and more importantly, there may be other underrepresented socio-cultural 
factors in both the existing theory and empirical research (King et al., 2004; Stahl et 
al., 2013). Therefore, the factors influencing the socio-cultural integration process 
require further exploration.  
 
2.4.2.3 Operational integration and M&A performance 
 
Operational integration refers to formal integration activities aiming at facilitating the 
effective functioning of the operations of the combined organisation. It is the process 
of transferring and sharing resources and capabilities that can create value from the 
M&A (Colman and Grogaard, 2013). The central issue of operational integration are 
the corresponding managerial decisions made in the post-acquisition phase of the 
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transaction (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Such decisions are primarily related to the level 
of integration (or degree of integration). Following previous works (Zollo and Singh, 
2004), this study defines the level, or degree, of integration as the extent to which the 
operational functions of the acquired firms are linked to, aligned with, or centralised 
in the equivalent functions of the acquiring firms.  
 
The existing empirical literature provides support for the key role played by the level 
of integration in the acquisition integration process and performance. Pablo (1994) 
examined how the different characteristics of acquisitions influence decisions relating 
to the level of integration. In Shanley‘s (1994) framework regarding the integration 
process, the organisational structure of the acquired firm changes once the transaction 
is closed. He finds that the level of such integration activity positively affects M&A 
performance. Capron (1999) has found that the extent of resource redeployment and 
knowledge transfer between two firms are significantly related, which suggests that a 
certain degree of integration is necessary for a successful M&A. In some recent 
studies published on Strategic Management Journal, the level of integration is also 
proven to be crucial for M&A performance. Using a framework built on 
knowledge-based view, Zollo and Singh (2004) suggest that an increasing level of 
post-acquisition integration strengthens the positive effect of knowledge codification, 
and significantly enhances M&A performance. Bauer and Matziler (2013) develop a 
comprehensive model of M&A success and argue that the degree of integration is a 
key variable for the M&A performance function.  
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It is worth noting that, having realised that a successful M&A integration process 
includes both operational and socio-cultural integration processes (Birkinshaw et al., 
2000), recent studies on the degree of integration have not merely focussed on this 
factor (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Bauer and Matziler, 
2013). Contemporary M&A researchers usually use the term ―integration approach‖ to 
indicate how firms manage the post-acquisition integration process by integrating 
both operational and socio-cultural dimensions (Gomes et al., 2013). Different 
integration approaches are adopted to balance the degree of operational and 
socio-cultural integration in post-acquisition integration processes.  
 
Some M&A scholars, such as Gomes et al. (2013), simply consider the integration 
approach as a key success factor in managing the post-acquisition integration process. 
However, such viewpoint may underestimate the complexity of the integration 
approach and its relationship with the other key factors influencing the 
post-acquisition integration process through their impact on either operational 
integration or socio-cultural integration. In fact, the integration approach may be 
determined by an aggregate of key success factors instead of a single factor by itself. 
For example, in a recent study on the trust dynamics in acquisitions, Stahl et al. (2011) 
consider integration approach to be the aggregate of all process variables, such as 
preservation of autonomy, multiculturalism, integration speed and communication 
quality. Therefore, this study will not consider the integration approach as a single 
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factor in the framework of key success factors. In section 2.5, a critical review of the 
literature on the integration approach will be presented, followed by the literature 
review of other key success factors for the management of post-acquisition integration 
and corresponding propositions in section 2.6.  
 
2.5 Managing the post-acquisition integration process – the integration approach 
 
There is no clear unified definition given for the term ‗integration approach‘. In fact, a 
considerable number of researchers use the terms ‗integration approach‘, ‗integration 
mode‘, and ‗integration strategy‘ to convey a similar meaning. This study considers 
integration approach and integration strategy as two distinct concepts
2
. Their 
distinction can be expressed by Gomes et al.‘s (2013) explanation: ―The integration 
approach therefore seems to matter, but as M&A are undertaken within different 
contexts and for different reasons, integration strategies need to reflect these 
differences‖ (Gomes et al., 2013, p. 22).  
 
A variety of frameworks and typologies of integration approaches have been 
developed in the past decades (Howell, 1970; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Schweiger et al., 1993; Weber et al., 2009; Gomes et 
al., 2011). The early research on the integration approach only focussed on the extent 
to which firms integrated their operational functions. For example, Howell (1970) 
                                                             
2In this research, integration mode is the same concept as integration approach. 
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suggested three integration approaches based on the different synergy potential of 
different business operational functions. Later work added more socio-cultural issues, 
such as the culture fit, into the understanding of the integration approach (Gomes et 
al., 2013). These two streams of thought were then merged together and argued that 
the term ‗integration approach‘ indicated joint operational and socio-cultural 
integration (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 
2004). 
 
Figure 2.1 Acquisition integration approach types by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). 
Source: Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), p. 145. 
 
The most famous and widely cited post-acquisition integration framework is 
Haspeslagh and Jemison‘s (1991) four integration approaches, namely Absorption, 
Symbiotic, Preservation and Holding. This four-type structure was arrived at by 
considering two dimensions of M&A. The first dimension – the strategic 
interdependence need – refers to the nature of the interdependence that needs to be 
established between acquiring and acquired firms to bring about the expected type of 
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strategic resource and capability transfer. In other words, it is concerned with whether 
the realisation of potential synergy is the strategic goal of the combined firm or not. 
The second dimension – organisational autonomy need – relates to the need to 
preserve the integrity of the acquired strategic resources and capabilities after the 
transaction. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) claim that distinctive needs for strategic 
interdependence and organisational autonomy can help to suggest specific approaches 
to be adopted by firms to integrate. Figure 2.1 shows the four acquisition integration 
approach types and their relationships with the strategic interdependence and 
organisational autonomy needs. 
 
Haspeslagh and Jemison‘s (1991) framework has received some empirical support 
from contemporary M&A scholars (Angwin and Meadows, 2009; Gomes et al., 2013). 
However, these approaches present shortcomings in relation to socio-cultural 
integration. For example, they fail to consider the effect of cultural differences at both 
the national and corporate levels (Weber et al., 2011), which is considered crucial for 
the success of M&A, and CBMA in particular (Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Stahl and 
Voigt, 2008). Recent studies have revisited this essential topic and added new 
elements to the integration approach framework of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), 
such as cultural dimension, synergy potential, cultural differences, etc. (Gomes et al., 
2011; Almor et al., 2009; Angwin and Meadows, 2009; Weber et al., 2009). A very 
recent research on the outward M&A of Chinese firms‘ towards Germany integrates 
synergy potential, cultural influences and learning perspective (Liu and Woywode, 
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2013). They suggest a unique integration approach supported by empirical evidence in 
the context of Chinese M&A in Germany called light-touch integration. This 
light-touch approach combines the preservation and symbiotic approaches and is 
determined by the synergy potential between China and Germany, cultural influences 
at both the national and organisational levels and the joint learning perspective. 
 
Contemporary M&A scholars believe that post-acquisition management is central to 
M&A performance (Very et al., 2012; Dagnino and Pisano, 2008). The term 
integration approach is used to indicate how firms manage the post-acquisition 
integration process by integrating both operational and socio-cultural dimensions 
(Gomes et al., 2013). The main objective and key challenge for the management of 
post-acquisition integration is to strike the right balance between achieving the 
adequate level of operational integration and minimising disruption to the acquired 
firms‘ resources and capabilities (Zollo and Singh, 2004). In other words, managing 
the post-acquisition integration process means managing both operational and 
socio-cultural integration at the same time. However, this balance is hard to achieve 
(Weber et al., 2011; Gomes et al., 2013). In order to achieve an effective 
post-acquisition integration, the senior management of the acquiring firm needs to 
intervene, to a certain extent, in the decision-making process of the acquired firm and 
impose on it rules, standards and routines. A high level of integration and its 
subsequent interventions may ultimately lead to a loss of autonomy of the acquired 
firm and affect the commitment and cooperation of the senior management of the 
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acquired firm with that of the acquiring one (Weber et al., 2011). Consequently, such a 
loss of autonomy may result in the disruption of the pre-existing resources and 
routines of both firms and lead to a decline in the performance of the combined entity 
(Zollo and Singh, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Very et al., 1997 ). This highlights a 
dilemma in the post-acquisition integration process: that the degree of operational 
integration needed to achieve synergies may ultimately result in the destruction of 
socio-cultural integration by the disruption of the routines, resources and capabilities 
of both firms, especially those of the acquired one (Puranam et al, 2003, 2006, 2009; 
Puranam and Srikanth, 2007;Weber et al., 2011; Gomes et al., 2013).  
 
This dilemma is particularly salient in M&A aimed at strategic asset transfer, such as 
the Chinese manufacturing firms‘ outward M&A towards developed economies. 
These acquisitions are usually partially motivated by the need to gain tacit 
knowledge-based resources, which are embedded and socially complex (Ranft and 
Lord,2002; Ranft, 2006; Bjorkman et al., 2007). Close interaction, and thus a high 
level of integration, would normally be required to transfer these resources and fully 
realise the potential synergy of the acquisition. However, the extent of integration 
required may ultimately lead to the destruction of the acquired firm‘s 
knowledge-based resources through the disruption of routines, dissolution of social 
ties and turnover of employees (Gomes et al., 2013).  
 
Therefore, the balance between operational and socio-cultural integration is hard to 
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strike due to the trade-off between the levels of integration: A high level of integration 
may cause socio-cultural problems that could destroy the value of the acquired firm 
and increase costs to an extent that could offset the M&A value (Weber et al., 2011). 
For example, Lubatkin et al. (1999) found that the level of integration is positively 
related to the top management turnover of the acquired firm; the loss of these senior 
executives would finally result in a lower M&A performance. Such a relationship 
between operational and socio-cultural integration explains the difficulty linked to the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process, and gives rise to the 
popularity of contingency approaches to post-acquisition integration that offer various 
of potential integration approaches and different synergy outcomes that can moderate 
the effects of the peculiarities of each case (Bjorkman et al., 2007; Gomes et al., 2013). 
The instances of firms from emerging economies buying firms from developed ones 
draw the attention of both scholars and practitioners, and call for more systematic 
theories and evidence in this area (Birkinshaw et al., 2010). The particular existing 
resources, strategic positions and institutional environments of Chinese firms may 
lead to distinct integration approaches compared with Haspeslagh and Jemison‘s 
(1991) mainstream typologies.  
 
Bjorkman et al. (2007) suggest that an integration approach consists of two elements: 
design and execution. The execution of a well-designed post-acquisition integration 
process which will enhance a firm‘s ability to acquire and assimilate new resources 
and capabilities while, at the same time, minimising interpersonal and intercultural 
65 
 
friction, is critical to achieving synergies and pursuing M&A success (Birkinshaw et 
al., 2000; Schweiger and Very, 2003, Bjorkman et al, 2007). Weber et al. (2011) has 
provided empirical support based on a large sample data on Israel‘s M&A in the 
high-tech industry and revealed a significant difference in the extent of the fit between 
the post-acquisition integration approaches that have been implemented and those that 
should be used by acquiring firms according to Haspeslagh and Jemison‘s (1991) 
integration approach model (Weber and Tarba, 2013). Similarly, in their research 
which adds national cultural dimensions, cultural differences and synergy potential to 
Haspeslagh and Jemison‘s (1991) model, Weber et al. (2009, 2011) suggest that the 
acquiring firms‘ failure to adopt and apply the ‗right‘ integration approach required in 
each particular case can explain their dismal M&A performance. Therefore, to provide 
guidance for future participants, it is essential to explore the ‗right‘ integration 
approach to be adopted by Chinese firms‘ in their outward M&A towards developed 
countries.  
 
In recent years, the significant role played by the integration approach in the success 
of the post-acquisition integration process and M&A performance received further 
emphasis by M&A scholars (Almor et al., 2009; Angwin and Meadows, 2009; Weber 
et al., 2009, 2011), despite most of these works being still based on the seminal 
integration approach typology developed by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). There is 
also a very recent paper by Liu and Woywode (2013) which concentrates on the 
integration approach of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A to Germany. Following the 
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advice of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), these studies are all based upon 
contingency approaches. As was stated in the previous section, this study will 
consider integration approach to be a combination of the key success factors for the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process, as opposed to a key factor by 
itself. Therefore, after identifying the key success factors, this study will also explore 
the characteristics of the Chinese firms‘ integration approach and its relationship with 
the other key success factors in the management of the post-acquisition integration 
process. In the next section, a review of the key success factors in the post-acquisition 
integration process will be presented and discussed, followed by the propositions of 
this research. 
 
2.6 Managing the post-acquisition integration process – the key success factors 
 
Historically, M&A scholars have dealt with key success factors separately, either in 
terms of pre-acquisition factors, which are normally emphasised by strategic 
researchers, or of post-acquisition factors, which are mostly focused upon by the 
supporters of process perspective (Weber, 2011; Gomes et al., 2013). Researchers 
have been looking for an explanation for M&A performance for decades. The 
disappointing results from their original focus on pre-acquisition variables led them to 
focus on the previously ignored post-acquisition integration phase, which is also the 
phase in which value is created (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Gomes et al., 2013). 
Although a number of antecedents that appear to determine post M&A performance 
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have indeed been uncovered, most studies have focused only on a single factor, or on 
a cluster of related factors, and have followed different theoretical frameworks 
(Haleblian et al., 2009).  
 
2.6.1 Comprehensive research on key success factors 
 
In order to explore a pluralistic and holistic framework for the key success factors in 
the management of the post-acquisition integration process, it would be helpful to 
build a proposed framework upon which research propositions can be set up for the 
purpose of this study (Siebers, 2011). In addition to empirical research focusing on a 
single factor, or a single aspect of operational or socio-cultural integration, some 
M&A scholars do try to provide a holistic view of the key success factors in the 
post-acquisition integration process through a more comprehensive framework or 
literature review. To help construct the proposed framework for this research project, 
these studies are reviewed in this section.  
 
In a recent study, Calipha et al. (2010) present a review of the literature on M&A, 
including those success factors which focus upon organizational and managerial 
issues, including criteria of selection, culture, size differences, diversification 
type/degree, strategic motive, etc. Despite most of the examined factors being in the 
pre-acquisition phases, post-acquisition success factors are also included, such as 
human resource management, operating managers and key staff, cultural integration 
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and avoidance of misunderstanding. Although the authors realised that their review 
was not comprehensive, and that some factors may still have faced the problem of 
lacking support, they still attempted to present a variety of literature representing both 
academic journals and some important practitioner-oriented books and articles 
(Calipha et al., 2010).  
 
In relation to considering the findings of M&A practitioners, Pautler‘s work (2003) 
seems to more closely link industry with academia. Pautler (2003) reviewed past 
business consulting literatures, which more narrowly concentrated on the M&A 
success problem, and identified some of the factors that business consultants consider 
to be key to leading mergers to success. His review also involved both the initial stage 
factors and those affecting post-acquisition integration. Moreover, he pointed out that 
integration and implementation should be more highly emphasised than should the 
initial aim setting. Cultural influences, integration planning, communication, manager 
incentives, retaining key staff, etc., were all considered to be key success factors 
based on the business consulting literature since the 1990s.  
 
In addition to the above two studies, which review the previous literature and 
synthesise the key success factors in the post-acquisition phase, Quah and Young 
(2005) designed their conceptual framework based upon the interactions of key 
success factors drawn from the strategic management and organizational behaviour 
literature, and suggest a phased approach to the exploration of the post-acquisition 
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management problem. These factors are the level of integration, timing of changes, 
post-acquisition changes, cultural influences, and employee behaviour. Drawing upon 
the post-acquisition management of four European M&A, they argued that a better 
post-acquisition management could be achieved if the integration phase was divided 
into stages, each with its defined objectives and actions. 
 
Similarly, Dagnino and Pisano (2008) focus on the human side of the integration 
phase between the acquiring and the acquired firms and build an analytical framework 
that reveals the main features of the success of M&A deals. They propose the 
coexistence of a set of distinctive factors, which are: the capability to obtain the full 
commitment of the integration teams; a leader whose personality is able to guide the 
changes in the acquiring firm‘s desired direction; the networking capabilities to 
enhance or reduce the permeability of the two firms boundaries; the communication 
skills and relational capabilities necessary to facilitate the interface activity between 
those individuals who are critical to the integration phase and the knowledge of (and 
the access to) the power centres necessary to obtain the legitimacy indispensable to all 
roles and actions. 
 
The existing body of knowledge on M&A research had been fragmented until Gomes 
et al. (2013) present a comprehensive literature review which synthesise the key 
success factors in both the pre- and post-acquisition phases by considering different 
perspectives on M&A. After a critical review of the relevant literature present in 
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leading journals and key books, they consider their research to be the first work to 
articulate the connections between the key success factors within the pre-acquisition 
and post-acquisition M&A stages. By comprehensively reviewing the key factors 
promoted by different disciplines concerned with M&A, this paper highlights the 
importance of the M&A process and proposes that connecting the key success factors 
in both the pre- and post-acquisition phases could better explain the M&A 
performance conundrum. With respect to the key success factors associated with the 
post-acquisition integration phase, Gomes et al. (2013) identified and discussed seven 
factors, which are: the different integration strategies, the post-acquisition leadership, 
the speed of the integration implementation, the post-acquisition integration team, 
communication, human resource management practices and the management of 
national and corporate cultural differences. Table 2.2 presents a summary of the key 
success factors in the post-acquisition integration phase resulting from the above 
comprehensive research. 
 
Albeit being still quite deficient and fragmented and not devoid of drawbacks, these 
studies show the efforts that have been made to synthesise the key success factors for 
the management of the post-acquisition integration of M&A (Haleblian et al., 2009; 
Gomes et al., 2013). For example, Calipha et al.‘s (2010) work is just a synthesis of 
the existing research which contains factors that ―are generally associated with M&A 
success‖ (Calipha et al., 2010, p. 1) and its aim was just ‗to present‘. Moreover, some 
of the key factors they presented were only supported by a single piece of literature, 
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which somewhat results in a lack of persuasiveness. Quah and Young‘s (2005) 
theoretical framework of the key factors influencing the post-acquisition management 
phase seems to lack comprehensiveness. It served their main argument that the 
subdivision of the post-acquisition management process into several phases, each with 
defined objectives and actions, could improve the chances of M&A success. Dagnino 
and Pisano‘s (2008) factors are specifically drawn from the socio-cultural perspective 
of the integration process. Pautler‘s (2003) synthesis covers both the pre- and 
post-merger phases, but it is merely drawn from the consulting literature, which 
somewhat limits its comprehensiveness. 
 
Compared with previous relevant works, Gomes et al.‘s (2013) research appears to be 
the most comprehensive so far, although its review of the issues of integration 
strategy suffers from a degree of confusion as it does not clearly define and 
distinguish the concepts of integration strategy, integration approach, and level of 
integration. Therefore, the proposed framework for this research will be mainly based 
upon the framework of Gomes et al. (2013), with some adjustments made according 
to other research in relation to the key success factors in the management of the 
post-acquisition integration process. 
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Table 2.2 Summary of the success factors in the post-acquisition phase identified in 
the research discussed above 
Calipha, Tarba, 
and Brock (2010) 
Pautler (2003) Quah and Young 
(2005) 
Dagnino and 
Pisano (2008) 
Gomes, Angwin, 
Weber, and Tarba 
(2013) 
1.Human resource 
management 
1.Early planning of 
the integration 
process 
1.Integration level 1.Obtaining the full 
commitment of the 
integration teams 
1.Different 
integration strategies 
2.Operating 
managers and key 
staff  
2.Communication 2.Post-acquisition 
changes 
2.A leader whose 
personality is able 
to guide the changes 
in the acquiring 
firm‘s desired 
direction 
2.Post-acquisition 
leadership 
3.Cultural 
integration 
3.Manager 
identification and 
incentives 
3.Timing of changes 3.The networking 
capabilities to 
enhance or reduce 
the permeability of 
the two firms‘ 
boundaries 
3.Speed of 
integration 
implementation 
4.Avoidance of 
misunderstandings 
4.Timing 4.Cultural influences 4.Communication 
skills to facilitate 
interface activity 
4.Post-acquisition 
integration team 
 5.Cultural sensitivity 5.Employee 
behaviour in the 
acquired firm 
5.The knowledge of 
the power centres 
necessary to obtain 
the legitimacy 
indispensable for all 
roles and actions 
5.Communication 
 6.Retention of key 
staff 
  6.Human resource 
management 
practices 
 7.Integration of 
systems 
  7.Management of 
national and 
corporate cultural 
differences 
 
2.6.2 A proposed framework for the key success factors in the management of 
the post-acquisition integration process 
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According to the above analysis, Gomes et al.‘s (2013) framework, which is based on 
the process perspective, represents the best synthesis to date of the key success factors 
in the management of the post-acquisition integration process. Therefore, the 
framework for this study will be built mainly upon this framework so as to support the 
research aim. In addition, the factors adopted from the frameworks of the other 
research discussed above will also be taken into consideration to fine tune the 
proposed framework for this study. For example, as mentioned in the last section, the 
integration approach (aka the integration strategy) is considered to be a combination 
of key factors that will not be listed in the framework. Accordingly, the level of 
integration, which is the main component of the integration approach, will be included 
as a key factor. Moreover, the post-acquisition leadership, the post-acquisition 
integration team, and human resource management practices will be synthesised into a 
single factor – namely, human resource related problems – so as to increase the 
exploration potential of the proposition by reducing the number of detailed terms.  
 
However, the framework of Gomes et al. (2013) also has its drawbacks and needs to 
be adjusted by the addition of extra dimensions. As explained in section 2.5.1, Gomes 
et al. (2013) subdivided the M&A process into pre-and post-acquisition phases, which 
is the same as this research. It is worth noting that their ‗post-acquisition key success 
factors‘ refer to key factors in the post-acquisition phase (the time period) whereas, 
according to the process perspective (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991), it is the 
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post-acquisition integration process that creates value. This implies that researchers 
should concentrate on all those key success factors that affect the process of the 
management of post-acquisition integration, as opposed to just the key factors that 
exist during the integration process, which can be called ‗process factors‘(Stahl et al., 
2011). The former can also include ‗status factors‘ which exist before the M&A deal 
but also affect the post-acquisition integration process, such as those related to the 
strategic fit and organisational fit of both parties. Combining status factors into this 
framework is a big advance on the existing understanding of the key success factors in 
the management of the post-acquisition integration process. This is also in line with 
Gomes et al.‘s (2013) primary future research suggestion, which was to reveal pre-and 
post-acquisition connections for the unravelling of the M&A performance riddle.  
 
By including both status and process factors, the framework is built on the 
combination of the process, organisational behaviour and strategic management 
schools. In fact, a few recent studies have shown that linking the pre- and 
post-acquisition stages may yield a better M&A performance (Weber et al., 2011; 
Weber and Tarba, 2011; Weber et al., 2012). These studies suggest that, if the national 
and corporate cultural differences are acknowledged by the acquiring firms before the 
M&A deal, and are taken into account in the choice of integration approach in the 
post-acquisition phase, the performance of M&A will be superior to those transactions 
that failed to consider pre-acquisition factors for post acquisition decisions (Weber 
and Tarba, 2013). Research on the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A has also provided 
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insights into this issue. From an organisational learning perspective, Deng (2010) 
argue that the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A are determined by the absorptive 
capability of the acquiring firm in terms of the effect of its antecedents, which are: the 
prior related knowledge, combinatory capabilities and implementation of strategy. 
Among these three antecedents, the prior related knowledge of the acquiring firm is 
considered to be a status factor of the pre-acquisition phase. Building upon the studies 
of both Deng (2010), and Weber and his colleagues in recent years, Liu and 
Woywode (2013) argue that the integration approach of the Chinese firms‘ outward 
M&A to Germany is determined by both national and corporate cultural differences 
and by the weak absorptive capacity of the acquiring firms.  
 
Drawing from the frontier research, this study also includes two pre-acquisition status 
factors – cultural differences and prior related knowledge – into the proposed 
framework. A proposed integrative framework is developed to explain the key success 
factors in the management of the post-acquisition integration process, as shown in 
Figure 2.2. The research propositions are then set up based on this integrated 
framework. In the next section, six propositions will be formulated on the basis of the 
review of the existing literature. 
 
Figure 2.2 The proposed integrative framework (Proposed key success factors to be 
set up in propositions)  
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P1: Prior related knowledge 
 
P2: Level of integration 
 
P3: Integration speed 
 
P4: Human resource related 
problems 
 
P5: Cultural difference 
 
P6: Integration process  
communication 
 
 
2.7 Propositions 
 
In this section, six propositions are formulated based on the framework shown in 
Figure 2.2. In addition to reviewing the relevant empirical literature, the factors to be 
explained in the propositions make particular reference to the research context of the 
Chinese firms‘ outward M&A to developed countries.  
 
2.7.1 Prior related knowledge 
 
The prior related knowledge is often considered to be the main antecedent of the 
acquiring firm‘s absorptive capacity. According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), a 
firm‘s absorptive capacity is mainly a ―function of the firm‘s level of prior related 
knowledge‖ (p. 128). Although some research argues for a broader conceptualisation 
Resource 
and 
capability 
transfer 
Synergy realisation 
&M&A success 
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of absorptive capacity, many studies in the related literature consider it to be on an 
equal standing with a firm‘s prior related knowledge or R&D spending (Junni & 
Sarala, 2013). Minbaeva et al. (2003) and Minbaeva (2007) argue that absorptive 
capacity includes both prior knowledge and the motivation of the organisational 
members, which affects the intensity of their effort to absorb knowledge from the 
partner. This argument is in line with Cohen and Levinthal‘s (1990) concept of 
absorptive capacity depending on the intensity of effort. Following this argument, 
Bjorkman et al. (2007) also define potential absorptive capacity as a combination of 
both motivation and ability on the receiving party to acquire capabilities from the 
other party. Considering that the main strategic intent of most Chinese acquirers is 
acquiring resources and capabilities from the acquired firm, the motivation for 
seeking and assimilating knowledge from the acquired firm could hardly be lacking. 
Therefore, the prior related knowledge of the acquiring firm is naturally the main 
determinant of its absorptive capacity.  
 
A firm‘s prior related knowledge has been identified as the knowledge base of the 
firm (Lane et al., 2001). ―Accumulated prior knowledge increase both the ability to 
put new knowledge into memory…and the ability to recall and use it‖(Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990, p.129). Firms need a certain level of prior related knowledge to 
understand, absorb and develop external technologies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In 
the context of M&A, and CBMA in particular, the extent of the prior related 
knowledge of the acquiring firms may determine the magnitude of the M&A effect on 
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knowledge acquisition (Deng, 2010). The acquiring firms need to possess and develop 
knowledge related to the target firms to understand their culture at both the national 
and corporate levels in order to foster the acquisition of knowledge (Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001). In addition, a high level of prior related knowledge can also help the 
acquiring firms to assimilate and integrate new knowledge from the acquired ones. 
Moreover, those acquiring firms with a solid prior related knowledge base are more 
likely to innovate based upon the knowledge and other resources acquired from their 
partners (Deng, 2010). 
 
Only a few research has provided insights into the prior related knowledge as a 
determinant of a firm‘ absorptive capacity in the context of M&A (Junni and Sarala, 
2013). Based on a longitudinal quantitative study, Ahuja and Katila (2001) uncovered 
a positive relationship between a firm‘s existing knowledge base and its subsequent 
innovation output. Bjorkman et al. (2007) proposed that both firms‘ absorptive 
capacity, which are determined mainly by the prior related knowledge and motivation 
of the receiving party, play a mediating role between cultural differences and 
capability transfer in CBMA. Their paper is a framework building article devoid of 
empirical data to be applied to their propositions. A recent paper on Chinese firms‘ 
CBMA also contributes to our understanding of prior related knowledge as a key 
success factor in M&A performance. Building on a two-case comparative study, Deng 
(2010) argues that the prior related knowledge of Chinese acquiring firms‘ is the main 
component of their absorptive capacity, and can determine their ability to gain 
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strategic assets through CBMA and achieve M&A success. Although its theoretical 
framework is limited in terms of comprehensiveness – e.g. it omits the influence of 
cultural differences – it provides preliminary empirical evidence to support the key 
role played by prior related knowledge in Chinese firms‘ outward M&A. 
 
The mainstream literature on absorptive capacity often measures prior related 
knowledge as a firm‘s research and development (R&D) intensity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990); however, some researchers suggest a broader definition and 
measurement. Some studies suggest that a firm‘s prior knowledge should be 
understood as the combined abilities of its employees in terms of their personal 
knowledge base, such as individual skills, personal competencies and educational 
backgrounds (Junni and Sarala, 2013; Minbaeva et al., 2003; Minbaeva, 2007; 
Szulanski et al., 2004). This study will adopt a broader concept of prior related 
knowledge by including both arguments.  
 
In addition, past M&A experiences could also be taken into account as a component 
of a firm‘s prior related knowledge (Liu and Woywode, 2013). This is particularly true 
of CBMA because they are more difficult to manage compared with domestic M&A. 
The extended literature considers past acquisition experiences to be a key variable of 
CBMA success (Hayward, 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Chatterjee, 2009), 
but this result is still not universally accepted. The controversy queries whether past 
acquisition experience can ensure superior performance. It has been argued that the 
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experience gained from previous M&A transactions can contribute to the success of 
subsequent ones (Papadakis, 2005). In spite of the fact that some experienced 
acquirers over-perform other firms involved in CBMA, the overriding argument put 
forward by M&A scholars is that acquisition experiences cannot be directly related to 
M&A performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004; 
Hayward, 2002). Hayward (2002) argue that acquisition experiences have the 
potential to provide understanding, but that most acquirers fail to realise it by focusing 
on the quantity instead of quality of acquisition experiences. He believe that superior 
performance in acquisitions came from the intervals between them and the 
performance and relatedness of prior ones, instead of from the past experience itself. 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) posit that not all experience is equally valuable and 
that only that gained from ‗similar‘ acquisitions matters. Other research suggests that 
serial acquisitions were more likely to perform better than isolated ones (Laamanen 
and Kei, 2008). However, Hayward (2002) counter this with highly related serial 
acquisition propositions. He suggest that the dynamic market changes would render 
void the benefit drawn from accumulated acquisition experiences, forcing acquirers to 
explore new skills and opportunities by developing the existing resources obtained 
from past acquisitions. Chatterjee (2009) also deny the relatedness and narrowness of 
the measurements of serial acquisitions and suggest an acquisition programme. The 
acquisition programme is defined as a serial of acquisitions relying on the same 
business logic. He suggest that M&A as part of an acquisition programme based upon 
a reasonable business logic had a better chance to succeed. He categorise 
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identification, negotiation, and integration as three processes that can lead to 
successful acquisition programmes and emphasis that integration will not become a 
problem as long as it is closely tied to the programme logic.  
 
In addition to the importance of R&D intensity and past M&A experiences, Colombo 
et al. (2007) suggest two kinds of knowledge that would be crucial to the acquiring 
firms. The first is the knowledge of the acquisition process, which comes from past 
acquisition experiences, as stated in the mainstream literature. The second is the 
knowledge of the target firm, which is related to the governance relationship with the 
acquired firm. They believe that, since it would provide opportunities to access inside 
information and help two firms to build a uniform organisational climate, the second 
source of prior knowledge, which had been neglected by most scholars, would have a 
significant impact on the post-acquisition integration process. The result of their 
empirical work prove that the prior knowledge of the acquired firm would positively 
affect merger performance through its impact on resource redeployment, as opposed 
to the building of the organisational climate. 
 
In brief, the existing literature suggests that the prior related knowledge of the 
acquiring firm in terms of R&D intensity, past M&A experiences and knowledge of 
the target firm is a key factor affecting M&A performance. Upon this basis, I propose:  
 
Proposition 1: the Chinese acquirers’ prior related knowledge is a key factor that 
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influences the post-acquisition integration process of their outward M&A. 
 
2.7.2 The level of integration 
 
When a combined organisation is formed through M&A, the well-established 
sequences, patterns and routines of the operational management of both parties get 
usually partially or completely changed during the post-acquisition integration phase 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In this case, the extent to which the operational 
functions of the acquired firms are linked to, or aligned with, the corresponding 
functions of the acquiring ones is debatable (Zollo and Singh, 2004). It has been 
argued that the degree of integration is a mixed blessing (Bauer and Matziler, 2013; 
Gomes et al., 2013). Some scholars find a positive effect of the level of integration on 
the realisation of the synergy potential and therefore on M&A success (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004). In order to exploit the potential synergies 
in the post-acquisition phase, a certain level of post-acquisition integration and 
resource reconfiguration is necessary (Gomes et al., 2013; Schweizer, 2005; Ellis et 
al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2012).This necessity is likely to be stronger when the acquiring 
firms need to obtain and transfer tacit knowledge-based resources, which is a 
challenging operation, to realise the anticipated benefits of M&A (Puranam et al., 
2003; Puranam et al., 2006). However, a high level of integration also prove to be 
very risky due to potential employee resistance and cultural clashes (Bauer and 
Matziler, 2013), and, in addition, it may also lead to a loss of autonomy of the 
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acquired firms, which may be detrimental to M&A performance (Chatterjee et al., 
1992). Moreover, a high level of integration also requires a substantial engagement of 
the acquiring firms‘ managerial resources and prior related knowledge (Gomes et al., 
2013). Therefore, the choice of the level of integration exposes a key dilemma in 
post-acquisition integration, that ―the extent of the integration needed to achieve 
synergies may ultimately result in the destruction of the acquired firm‘s 
knowledge-based resources through employee turnover, disruption of organisation 
routines, and dissolution of embedded ties in the acquired firm‖ (Gomes et al., 2013, 
p23).  
 
Despite the difficulty in striking the optimal level of integration, the empirical 
evidence shows that at least some degree of integration is decisive for M&A success 
(Chatterjee et al., 1992; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Bauer and Matziler, 2013). The 
previous literature provides empirical support to illustrate the key role that the level of 
integration plays in the post-acquisition integration process and M&A performance. 
Shanley (1994) found that the choice of the level of integration affecting the 
organisational structure of the acquired firm positively affects M&A performance. 
Pablo (1994) examined how the different characteristics of acquisitions influence the 
choice of integration level. Capron (1999) found that the extent of resource 
redeployment and of knowledge transfer that take place between two firms are 
significantly related, which suggests that a certain degree of integration is necessary 
for a successful M&A. In some recent empirical studies published in leading journals, 
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the level of integration is also proven to be critical for M&A performance. Based on 
the knowledge based view, Zollo and Singh (2004) suggest that increased levels of 
post-acquisition integration significantly enhance M&A performance through its 
impact on strengthening the positive effect of knowledge codification. In a recent 
paper relating an empirical test carried out on a sample of 106 SME transactions in 
three industries in Central Europe, Bauer and Matziler (2013) develop a 
comprehensive model of M&A success which combines both pre- and 
post-acquisition factors and argue that the degree of integration is a key variable of 
the M&A performance function.  
 
In brief, although the relationship between level of integration and M&A performance 
is not conclusive, it is generally accepted that the level of integration is a key factor 
influencing post-acquisition integration process and hence M&A success; thus, a 
certain level of integration is necessary. Therefore, this study proposes:  
 
Proposition 2: the level of integration is a key factor that influences the 
post-acquisition integration process of the Chinese firms’ outward M&A3. 
 
2.7.3 The speed of integration 
 
Although the time frame is an important dimension in corporate strategy and in 
                                                             
3
 Quantitative scholars normally use scales to measure the level of integration (Cording et al., 2008; Bauer and 
Matzler, 2013). Due to the qualitative nature of this research, the measurement of the level of integration will be 
based on the interviewees‘ cognition. 
85 
 
company competitive advantage, the speed of integration has not been studied much 
in the M&A context (Angwin, 2004; Homburg and Bucerius, 2005, 2006;Vester, 
2002; Ranft and Lord, 2002). The speed of integration refers to the time frame 
between closing the M&A transaction and achieving the desired degree of integration 
(Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). In recent years, the speed of integration has begun to 
gain standing as a key factor that can affect and determine M&A performance 
outcomes. However, whether a high speed of integration is generally beneficial to 
M&A integration and performance remains controversial (Stahl et al., 2013; Gomes et 
al., 2013). 
 
Vester (2002) claims that the speed of integration is a success factor in the 
post-acquisition integration process of the M&A of high-tech firms. He concludes that 
a rapidly and consistently moving integration is essential to the whole process and to 
M&A success. Some scholars have argued that a fast speed of integration would 
normally lead to a quick exploitation of potential synergies and to faster returns on 
investment (Angwin, 2004; Bauer and Matziler, 2013). A rapid integration can benefit 
from a business‘s momentum and from the early enthusiasm phase immediately 
following the transaction (Angwin, 2004). Furthermore, from an organisational 
behaviour perspective, a high speed of integration is more likely to keep in check the 
uncertainty among employees, especially those of the acquired firms (Angwin, 2004; 
Homburg and Bucerius, 2005, 2006). Recently, Homburg and Bucerius (2006) 
empirically tested the speed of marketing integration and suggest that it can influence 
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M&A performance by increasing the firms‘ marketing related performance because a 
high speed of integration tends to lower customer uncertainty. 
4
Using a case survey 
approach, Stahl et al. (2011) suggest that the speed of integration, as an integration 
process variable, is a major factor influencing the trust of the acquired firm‘s 
employees, which, in turn, will influence the socio-cultural integration outcomes and 
the post-acquisition performance. 
 
However, some scholars argue that the speed of integration may also represent a 
problem (Olie, 1994; Ranft and Lord, 2002). In a qualitative case study research, Olie 
(1994) suggest that a slow integration process may minimise the possibility of 
conflicts between the acquiring and acquired firms. Similarly, Ranft and Lord (2002) 
conclude that a slow speed of integration can help to build trust among employees and 
thus influence M&A performance. Other scholars argue for a moderate speed of 
integration or for the adoption of a contingency perspective to integration speed 
(Angwin, 2004). The contingency perspective suggests that, although speed of 
integration matters, it provides both costs and benefits only under specific conditions. 
There is no ‗right‘ speed at which to perform an integration process, but there may be 
times when a certain speed of action could be more suitable than others in the 
post-acquisition integration process (Gomes et al., 2013). For example, some 
advocates of the contingency approach argue for the influence of cultural fit (Bragado, 
1992) and the magnitude of internal and external relatedness between both parties 
                                                             
4
 However, this study is limited to marketing and sales integration, which limits its generalisability.  
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prior to the M&A (Homburg and Bucerius, 2005) to define the context for the setting 
of an appropriate integration speed (Stahl et al., 2013).  
 
Despite it being hard to find empirical evidence in support of the effect of different 
integration speeds at different times (Angwin, 2004), the key role played by such 
speed in the post-acquisition integration process has received support from a variety 
of M&A researchers in recent years. Although no relevant research has currently been 
done in the context of Chinese firms‘ CBMA, or even of EMNE‘s international M&A, 
it is still reasonable to make this proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: the speed of integration is a key factor that influences the 
post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms’ outward M&A5. 
 
2.7.4 Human resource related issues 
 
In recent years, human resource issues arising during the post M&A integration 
process have become a focal research topic among both M&A and HR researchers 
(Weber and Tarba, 2010; Gomes et al., 2013). Some crucial human resource related 
issues, such as top management team and post-acquisition integration team 
appointment, and key staff resistance and turnover, may prevent the combined 
                                                             
5 Quantitative scholars normally use scales to measure the speed of integration (Cording et al., 2008; Bauer and 
Matzler, 2013). Some studies suggest a 90-day or 100-day intense planning for a fast integration (Ashkenas and 
Francis, 2000; Angwin, 2004; Inkpen et al., 2000). Due to the qualitative nature of this research, the measurement 
of the speed of integration will be based on the interviewees‘ cognition.  
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organisation to manage the post-acquisition integration process in terms of the 
assimilation and exploitation of resources and capabilities.  
 
In the instance of M&A, the top management team has received sustained 
confirmation as a key factor for post-acquisition integration and M&A success 
(Angwin and Meadows, 2009; Schweiger et al., 1993; Vasilaki, 2011). The combined 
organisation needs to appoint a top management team capable of identifying and 
enacting the necessary and appropriate post-acquisition changes (Angwin and 
Meadows, 2009; Schweiger et al., 1993). Some major changes that normally take 
place in the post-acquisition integration process are: the elimination of those business 
units that have become redundant or economically less competitive, the combination 
of similar operational departments and the creation of new organisational ties 
(Schweiger et al., 1993; Gomes et al., 2013). Therefore, the acquiring firms need an 
adequate top management team to handle these organisational and cultural changes in 
the combined entity and achieve a successful implementation of the M&A process 
(Angwin and Meadows, 2009; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Vasilaki, 2011). A lack 
of decisions and actions on the part of the top level of the acquiring firms in managing 
post-acquisition changes and establishing strategic directions will eventually lead to a 
dismal M&A performance (Schweiger et al., 1993; Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006; 
Nemanich and Keller, 2007; Gomes et al., 2013).  
 
The empirical studies related to the consequences of top management change have 
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produced mixed results (Karaevli, 2007). Some studies have suggested a positive 
relationship between top management turnover and M&A performance (Anslinger et 
al., 1996) while have advocated the exact opposite (Hambrick and Canella, 1993; 
Krishnan et al., 1997). Although the empirical studies on how the turnover of the top 
management team of the acquired firms affects M&A integration and performance did 
not deliver consistent results, it is generally accepted that top management team 
change or prevention is both strategically and operationally significant for the 
post-acquisition integration phase (Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Krug and Nigh, 2001; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004; Gomes et al., 2013).  
 
Besides the top management team, which embodies the leadership in the M&A 
integration process, the attention of scholars has also extended to include the building 
of specific integration teams and the appointment of integration managers (Ashkenas 
andFrancis, 2000; Gomes et al., 2013). Being a multi-dimensional and socio-cultural 
embedded activity, the post-acquisition integration process is so complex that it 
requires the utmost attention of the top management team. Consequently, the top 
management‘s focus on the day to day operational business activities may be diverted. 
Such neglect of internal growth in the development stages of external growth may 
result in negative consequences (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Therefore, some 
scholars suggest the appointment of a specific integration implementation team for the 
post-acquisition integration phase (Dagnino and Pisano, 2008; Inkpen et al, 2000; 
Schweiger et al, 1993). Schweiger et al. (1993) suggest that such an integration 
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implementation team should be appointed before the end of the transaction. Inkpen et 
al. (2000) claim that the activation of an integration implementation team could 
contribute to the success of the post-acquisition integration process. Dagnino and 
Pisano (2008) suggest the involvement of operating managers and key staff in the 
post-acquisition team because this personnel is in possession of the day-to-day 
knowledge the firm needs to operate. Despite the importance of integration teams 
being acknowledged, there is still no empirical research pointing at who should be 
included in and who should lead the post-acquisition integration team (Dagnino and 
Pisano, 2008). 
 
In addition to the top management team building, the turnover and withdrawal of key 
staff is also a determining factor that may affect the transfer of knowledge in 
international M&A, especially when the main motive behind the M&A is the pursuit 
of technology (Zander and Zander, 2010). The existing literature suggests that 
identifying and retaining key staff is almost always significant for the preservation of 
the knowledge base of the acquired firm and for the creation of value from the M&A 
deal (Ranft and Lord, 2002; Ahammad et al., 2012). For example, a recent empirical 
study by Junni and Sarala (2013) argue that employee withdrawal harms the 
knowledge base and knowledge transfer within the combined entity by reducing the 
absorptive capacity in both the acquiring and acquired firm. 
 
These human resource related issues are particularly challenging for the transfer of 
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resources and capabilities in outward M&A conducted by EMNEs, and Chinese 
MNEs in particular. As they wish to maintain their identity and are subject to 
personnel changes, the employees of the acquired firms may have a relatively more 
negative reaction to the acquisitions than will those of the acquiring firms (Junni and 
Sarala, 2013). This could present tremendous post-acquisition integration challenges 
to acquiring firms from emerging economies as they normally lack sufficient 
experience and knowledge to handle these management predicaments (Luo and Tung, 
2007). The liabilities of foreignness also aggravate their difficulties. Some of the 
talents of the acquired firm may choose to leave due to stress, anxiety, uncertainty, 
absenteeism, socio-cultural conflict, or even lack of motivation (Stahl et al., 2013). 
Moreover, most EMNEs are still in their early stage of internationalisation and 
possess a relatively meagre talent pool compared with that of MNEs from developed 
economies. EMNEs could also find it hard to garner sufficient support from their 
home country‘s talent base, which leaves them in a situation of talent insufficiency 
(Luo and Tung, 2007).  
 
However, some scholars argue that the accelerated pace of cross-border human 
mobility is changing the traditional thinking with regard to the immobility of labour 
(Liu et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2013). Emerging economies such as China and India are 
experiencing a substantial level of international human mobility in terms of the return 
of well-educated and highly skilled migrants. Compared with domestic talents, these 
returning migrants have benefited from higher education in developed countries and 
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possess both adequate knowledge and appropriate language and cross cultural 
communication skills. Therefore, they hold an inherent advantage to compensate the 
potential drawbacks brought by the turnover and withdrawal of top management team 
and key staff and are more likely to augment the knowledge base of the acquiring firm 
and facilitate the process of resource and capability transfer in the post M&A 
integration stage. Following these arguments, it is reasonable to suggest that human 
resource related issues, such as potential top management team and key staff turnover 
and withdrawal, post-acquisition integration team building and the growing trend of 
returning migrants, may affect the post-acquisition integration process in the Chinese 
firms‘ outward M&A to developed countries.  
 
Proposition 4: Human resource related issues in the integration phase are a key factor 
that influences the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms’ outward 
M&A. 
 
2.7.5 Cultural difference  
 
In order to fully explain the poor fit between strategic variables and M&A 
performance, researchers have started to look at the role of culture in post-acquisition 
integration. The cultural distance hypothesis suggests that communication and 
coordination between organisations and groups tend to become more problematic 
when the cultural distance between them increases (Kogut and Singh, 1988). 
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Accordingly, a poor cultural fit between acquiring and acquired firms may impair 
post-acquisition integration and M&A performance (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Weber, 
1996; Morosini et al., 1998; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Weber et al., 2012; Weber and 
Tarba, 2012). Some recent studies suggest the use of cultural friction as a substitute 
metaphor of cultural distance (Shenka et al., 2008; Shenka, 2012). Compared with 
cultural distance, cultural friction focuses on the actual encounter of cultural systems 
within a power relations context, and emphasises the interaction and potential 
conflicts between entities (Shenka et al., 2008). This study adopts the organisational 
dimension of culture and defines culture as a set of beliefs, values and assumptions 
shared by the members of an organisation (Bjorkman et al., 2007; Sarala and Vaara, 
2010; Bauer and Matzler, 2013). Based upon this conceptualisation of culture, this 
study considers MNEs as ―cultural systems where beliefs, values and practices form 
specific configurations in particular parts of the corporation‖ (Sarala and Vaara, 2010, 
pp 1367).  
 
Cultural differences have been identified at multiple levels, such as national, industrial, 
organisational, and professional levels (Gomes et al., 2012). In M&A research, 
cultural differences are mostly treated at the national and corporate levels (Morosini et 
al., 1998; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Stahl et al., 2013). At the national level, research 
mostly looks at the detrimental effect on the performance of CBMA of the national 
cultural differences which exist between the acquiring and acquired units (Webber, 
1996; Barkema et al., 1996). At the organisational level, scholars normally probe into 
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issues related to organisational cultural differences shared and integrated in the 
combined entity (Chatterjee et al., 1992;Very et al., 1996). At both the national and 
organisational levels, it is generally believed that similarities in values and norms can 
build trust and facilitate the knowledge transfer between units, benefiting 
post-acquisition integration and performance (Weber et al., 2011; Bjorkman et al., 
2007; Sarala and Vaara, 2010). 
 
Although it is generally accepted that cultural differences at both the national and 
organisational levels have a relevant impact on M&A, and on international M&A in 
particular, the empirical research on the effects of cultural differences on M&A 
performance has produced mixed results. Some scholars argue that cultural 
differences are negatively associated with M&A performance (Datta, 1991; Chatterjee 
et al., 1992; Datta and Puia, 1995; Very et al., 1997; Lubatkin et al., 1998), while 
others have postulated the positive effect of national cultural differences (Weber et al., 
1996; Krishnan et al., 1997; Morosini et al., 1998; Vaara and Sarala, 2010; Vaara et al., 
2012; Junni and Sarala, 2013). The former position is mostly based upon the ground 
that cultural differences can lead to cultural collisions, which will hinder CBMA 
performance by increasing the integration cost. The latter can be explained by the 
synergies created by cultural differences. Such differences make it possible for the 
two parties to learn from each other and create value.  
 
The empirical results produced by research specifically linking cultural differences to 
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post-acquisition capability transfer also mixed. Some scholars argue that cultural 
differences may add value to international M&A by increasing the knowledge base of 
the acquiring firms, since acquired firms from more culturally distant countries are 
more likely to possess knowledge and resources different from those of the acquiring 
firms (Morosini et al., 1998; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). On the other hand, other 
researchers claim that cultural differences may hinder knowledge transfer because of 
the language barrier and of communication problems, thus increasing the likelihood of 
cultural incompatibility and decreasing the potential absorptive capacity of both 
parties (Bjorkman et al., 2007; Van Wijk et al., 2008; Vaara et al., 2012). This is 
particularly relevant to the transfer of tacit knowledge as the effective interpretation 
and assimilation of tacit knowledge require both parties to share common 
socio-cultural institutions (Li et al., 2013). 
 
In recent years, researchers in this field have been criticised for not paying sufficient 
attention to those factors that explain how cultural differences affect M&A (Stahl and 
Voigt, 2005; Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Sarala and Vaara, 2010). Moreover, some 
aspects of institution and context specific features may also affect the socio-cultural 
dynamics of international M&A. This is particularly crucial to the understanding of 
how cultural factors affect knowledge transfer in EMNEs‘ outward M&A to 
developed economies. Luo and Tung (2007) considered the reconciliation of national 
and organisational cultural differences to be one of the toughest challenges faced by 
EMNEs in the post-acquisition stage. On the one hand, other institutional 
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environment may become additional obstacles on top of national and organisational 
cultural differences. On the other hand, any sudden and radical foray into highly 
developed markets often exacerbates the difficulties for those EMNEs that lack the 
international experience and organisational expertise to handle these issues (Luo and 
Tung, 2007). Therefore, although cultural differences are generally believed to be a 
key factor in the management of the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese 
firms‘ outward M&A, it is also vital to explore how they affect capability transfer in 
the integration phase and what cultural integration strategy is adopted by Chinese 
acquirers 
 
Proposition 5: The management of cultural differences at multiple levels in the 
integration phase is a key factor that influences the post-acquisition integration 
process of Chinese firms’ outward M&A. 
 
2.7.6 Integration process communication 
 
Integration process communication is widely considered to be essential for a 
successful post-acquisition integration. The accuracy and intensity of communication 
play an overriding role in the integration process, especially in the early stages of the 
post-acquisition phase (Dagnino and Pisano, 2008), enabling the staff of the acquired 
firms to better understand the strategic intent and directions of the acquiring firms 
(Inkpen et al., 2000; Morosini,1998; Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991; Weber and 
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Tarba,2010). An ineffective and inefficient communication can undermine the 
commitment required for a successful post-acquisition integration (Schweiger and 
DeNisi, 1991). In addition, appropriate means of communication are  critical to 
bridge the cultural differences between the acquiring and acquired firms (Papadakis, 
2005). 
 
To ensure satisfactory integration in the post-acquisition phase, both the timing and 
frequency of the communication needs to be emphasised (Papadakis, 2005). From a 
human resource management perspective, the post-acquisition stakeholder uncertainty 
and anxiety needs to be adequately addressed immediately after the M&A by means 
of a variety of communication channels (Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991; Weber et al., 
2012; Gomes et al., 2013).A lack of timely communication with the employees of the 
acquired firms may result in the spreading of rumours and an increase in staff 
resistance (Papadakis, 2005). Moreover, increasing communication frequency could 
benefit post-acquisition integration by easing fears and creating a better workplace 
climate, mutual trust and an understanding of cultural differences (Nikandrou et al., 
2000; Appelbaum et al., 2000). For example, Bresman et al. (1999) find that the 
post-acquisition integration process is positively affected by the frequency of 
multiple-channel communication (taking the form, for instance, of technical meetings, 
extended visits and joint training programmes) through its effect on the knowledge 
transfer between firms. Their study also emphasise that communication effectiveness 
is also linked to the variety of communication methods (Weber and Tarba, 2010). 
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Some recent research has also suggested that over-communication should be avoided 
(Weber et al., 2012). Generally speaking, the M&A literature has confirmed the 
important role played by post-acquisition communication in managing the integration 
process. However, its relationship to the overall M&A performance has only recently 
been investigated (Weber and Tarba, 2010; Gomes et al., 2013). 
 
In a CBMA setting, integration process communication needs to be handled with 
particular care as national cultural differences, such as the language barrier, may add 
an extra degree of complexity to the communication process (Schweiger et al., 1993). 
Some scholars have argued that national cultural differences may affect the level of 
communication and its relationship with post-acquisition integration and with the 
overall M&A performance (Weber and Tarba, 2010). Although there is currently no 
research specifically exploring the role of communication in EMNEs‘ international 
M&A, and Chinese firms‘ outward M&A in particular, mainstream M&A literature 
supports considering integration process communication to be one of the key factors 
influencing the performance of CBMA conducted by Chinese acquirers. Therefore, 
this study proposes: 
 
Proposition 6: Communication in the integration phase is a key factor that influences 
the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms’ outward M&A. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
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In this chapter, the existing literature was reviewed, the research gaps were identified, 
a theoretical framework was constructed and some propositions were set up. In the 
first part of this chapter, the main research streams in the field of M&A were 
reviewed from a multidisciplinary perspective. Building on the gaps in the existing 
research, this thesis has adopted the process perspective to explore the key factors 
affecting Chinese firms‘ outward M&A. In the second part of this chapter, different 
assessments of M&A performance were reviewed. The assessment of the key success 
factors made in this study is based on the criteria of whether their impact can facilitate 
resource and capability transfer. In section three, the existing literature concerning 
resource and capability transfer in M&A was reviewed. M&A scholars have provided 
insights into various issues related to resource and capability transfer in international 
M&As, while very little research has been conducted on firms from emerging 
economies, such as China. This highlights another potential theoretical contribution of 
this thesis. According to the process perspective, M&A create value in the 
post-acquisition integration phase. Therefore, in the fourth section of this chapter, the 
literature on the post-acquisition integration process was reviewed. This revealed that 
the current research on post-acquisition integration places the integration approach on 
a different dimension from those of the other variables in the integration process 
because it can balance the degree of operational integration and socio-cultural 
integration. In part five, the literature on integration approach was reviewed. In part 
six, a holistic theoretical framework of the key success factors in the management of 
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the Chinese firms‘ post-acquisition integration was built. Six key factors were 
proposed, which are: prior related knowledge, level of integration, integration speed, 
human resource related issues, cultural difference management and integration 
process communication. Based on these factors, six propositions were set up.  
 
With regard to the following chapters, this study will present the background of this 
research in Chapter 3 and discuss the research methodology in Chapter 4. Then this 
study will identify the key success factors in the management of the post-acquisition 
integration process in Chinese firm‘s outward M&A in developed countries, and then 
examine how and why these factors influence this process and hence M&A success. 
The integration approach of Chinese acquirers will also be disclosed and linked with 
other key success factors. Finally, a new theoretical model will be developed. 
 
Chapter 3  Research background 
 
Introduction 
 
Based on the research questions and propositions that have been set up, this chapter 
describes and discusses the background of the research, and reviews the literature 
related to the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A. It includes both the macro and micro 
context of this research; the former involves the economic changes that have taken 
place in China in recent decades, whereas the latter comprises the current status of 
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China‘s outward FDI and M&A. By examining the recent archival evidence of 
Chinese outward M&A, this chapter reviews the main motivations underpinning 
outward M&A among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned ones and 
presents an overall picture of China‘s outward M&A in the last decade. In doing so, 
this chapter explores the crucial role played by the Chinese government in 
orchestrating internationalization activities and its long term implications on the 
competitiveness of Chinese firms in the global marketplace. 
 
A large proportion of this chapter is taken from a paper published by the author in 
Advances in Merger and Acquisitions (Tan and Ai, 2010). In addition to its main role 
of providing a research background for this whole project, this chapter makes its own 
contributions to M&A literature. These lie in its focus on the unique institutional 
context of China‘s outward M&A; in particular, on the role of the Chinese 
government. From an institutional perspective, this chapter argues that informal 
institutions and rules have contributed to the current fast expansion of M&A by China. 
However, this could have a detrimental effect on the long-term competitiveness of 
China as a nation and of Chinese firms as sustainable competitors.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: after a description of the status of China‘ inward 
FDI, outward FDI and outward M&A, I will then explore the M&A activities 
conducted in the last ten years and analyse the administrative process involved in 
managing outward M&A in China, hence highlighting the crucial role played by the 
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Chinese government. Finally, a critical review of the current literature on the M&A of 
Chinese firms will be presented. 
 
3.1 China‟s inward FDI, outward FDI and M&A: An overview 
 
The encouragement of FDI has constituted a significant part of China‘s economic 
reform process. With its rise over the last three decades, China‘s economy has 
attracted more FDI than those of all other developing countries. In 2012, China 
attracted FDI of USD 121 billion, second only to the US, establishing its total 
accumulated inward FDI stock at around USD 830 billion (IFLR, 2014). During the 
last decade, China‘s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has also flourished. Its 
total accumulated OFDI has reached USD 531.94 billion, placing China in 
13thposition in the world (Statistical Bulletin of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, 2013). In 2009, when global recession negatively impacted on the world 
economy and reduced overall OFDI, China‘s OFDI totalled USD 48 billion, making it 
the 6
th
 largest OFDI source country worldwide (UNCAT, 2010). In 2012, China‘s 
OFDI climbed to USD 87.8 billion, scattered over 179 countries and areas, and 
engaged with around 20,000 enterprises overseas (MOFCOM, 2013). Of all the 
accumulated Chinese OFDI, an increasing amount was the result of outward M&A, 
totalling USD 42.6 billion at the end of 2009 (Thomson Reuters, 2010). Amongst its 
OFDI in 2012, outward M&A contributed USD 43.4 billion (MOFCOM, 2013). 
Based on the figures of 2012, China can claim to be the third largest source country in 
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the global outward M&A league table (Statistical Bulletin of China‘s Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment, 2013). 
 
Figure 3.1 China‘s inward FDI, outward FDI flows, and outward M&A total annual value (in 
million USD) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2008); UNCTAD (2014). 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2008); Statistical Bulletin of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). 
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3.2 China‟s outward M&A in the 21st Century 
 
Given that China has been characterised as a market system with socialist 
characteristics, it is obviously significant – and also represents a research gap – how 
the Chinese government (central and local) impacts on China‘s outward M&A (Tan 
and Ai, 2010). Drawing from an institutional perspective and based on archival data, 
section 3.3 and 3.4 intend to provide a detailed look at the way in which the Chinese 
government regulates the outward M&A activities conducted by Chinese firms and to 
establish the long term impact this may have on firm competitiveness.  
 
China‘s outward M&A has experienced a dramatic change over the last ten years. We 
can divide this into two periods as follows:  
 
1999- 2004: Initial development as a result of China’s “Zou Chu Qu” (Go Global) 
policy 
China‘s ―Zou Chu Qu‖ (go global) policy was first declared in 1999 and then 
formalized in the 10
th
 Five-Year Plan in 2001 as an official endorsement of active 
OFDI and outbound M&A (Voss et al., 2008). 2001 was also the year in which China 
joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which gave China the chance for acloser 
integration with the global economy. At this stage, the amount of M&A transactions 
was initially rather low, indicating that Chinese firms were not going all out to engage 
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in outward M&A. Instead, following the policy direction of the Chinese 
government,they started to consider the global market to be a part of their business 
marketplace. The China Merger and Acquisitions Yearbook (2003) referred to 2002 as 
the ―Yuan Nian‖ (the first year of an era) of China‘s M&A. As a result of the ―Zou 
Chu Qu‖ (go global) policy and of China‘s accession to the WTO, significant changes 
took place in both the domestic and overseas markets. Several liberalisation steps 
were taken by the Chinese government to help companies invest abroad, such as 
removing the repatriation requirement for overseas profits made by Chinese acquirers 
and simplifying the approval process of outward M&A (See Appendix 2 for details). 
Against this background, the total annual value of outward M&A increased from less 
than USD 500 million in 2000 and 2001 to more than USD 1,000 million in the next 
three years (See Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1: China‘s outward M&A in annual value and number of deals 
YEARS ANNUAL VALUE IN MILLION 
USD 
NUMBER OF DEALS 
1987 0 1 
1988 16.5 4 
1989 202.1 6 
1990 60.3 3 
1991 3.2 2 
1992 572.7 12 
1993 484.7 28 
1994 307 19 
1995 249.1 13 
1996 451.4 17 
1997 798.8 30 
1998 1276.2 23 
1999 101 13 
2000 470 35 
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2001 452.435 22 
2002 1046.51511 35 
2003 1646.524 73 
2004 1125.11 59 
2005 5278.97 58 
2006 14904.291 61 
Source: UNCTAD (2008) 
 
Among the instances of China‘s outward M&A during this period, TCL‘s acquisition 
of Thomson‘s Television Division and SAIC‘s acquisition of Ssangyong, both taking 
place in 2004, gained wide attention. The TCL-Thomson case was initially considered 
as a market- and technology-seeking M&A. However, it turned out that TCL did not 
obtain Thomson‘s market channels in Europe and North America as planned, and that 
the acquired old generation technology was deemed to be no longer valuable due to 
the technological upgrades occurring in the TV sector, i.e. the replacement of cathode 
tube TVs by the new generation of flat screen ones (Deng, 2010). In the 
SAIC-Ssangyong Motor‘s case (worth USD 500 million), the Chinese acquirer 
overestimated the brand value of the target and wrongly predicted the direction of the 
global automotive market. The large air displacement SUVs, which were Ssangyong‘s 
mainstay product, were not well received by the market in an increasingly 
energy-saving conscious era. On top of this, SAIC was not well prepared to deal with 
the South Korean trade unions. It had to withdraw from Ssangyong in 2009 after 
suffering huge losses over the years. Therefore, 2004 was nicknamed the year of ―Da 
Yue Jin‖ (the giant leap) of Chinese overseas M&A (Zheng, 2009).  
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2005-present: The blossoming of China’s outward M&A 
 
Lenovo‘s acquisition of IBM‘s PC division ushered in a breath-taking period of 
Chinese outward M&A with global implications. Administratively, the examination 
and approval procedures of outward M&A activities were further simplified, more 
supporting policies were developed, with some powers being transferred to provincial 
authorities. The total annual value of outward M&A jumped to USD 5 billion in 2005 
and never dropped below this threshold thereafter. Despite the challenging economic 
environment resulting from the global recession, Chinese acquirers still completed 
298 instances of overseas M&A in 2009, the highest annual number by then 
(Thomson Reuters, 2010). That year ended with the largest M&A by a Chinese 
automotive manufacturer: Geely‘s acquisition of Volvo from Ford, totalling USD 1.8 
billion.  
 
There are two reasons behind the fast expansion of China‘s outward M&A since 2005. 
First, the ‗visible hand‘ of the government. In addition to direct financial support from 
the government, the further easing of administrative control over the process of 
outward M&A played a significant role. For example, in the first half of 2009, two 
regulations were published that further simplified the approval process of overseas 
M&A. Second, the pressure to go international consequent to China‘s opening of its 
domestic market. Removing entry barriers to foreign investors in accordance with 
WTO rules meant a fiercer competition for Chinese indigenous firms. Chinese 
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enterprises, especially non-SOEs, which ―lack domestic political protection‖ (Voss, et 
al. 2008, page 16), speeded up their outward M&A to improve their competitive 
advantage both at home and abroad. Limited liability companies contributed 32% of 
outward M&A in 2005 and the percentage of SOEs dropped (Investment in China, 
2007). This picture was reversed a couple of years later due to the effect of the 2008 
global financial crisis. Non-SOEs were strongly influenced by the financial tsunami 
while SOEs stayed firm thanks to state support. The Statistical Bulletin of China‘s 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment (MOFCOM, 2009) showed that SOEs accounted 
for 69.6% of the Chinese OFDI stock at the end of 2008 (See Figure 3.2) and nine out 
of the ten acquirers in the influential outward M&A by Chinese enterprises were 
SOEs (See Table 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2: Chinese OFDI stock distribution at the end of 2008 
 
69.60%
20.10%
6.60%
1% 2.70%
SOE
LLC
PLC
PRIVATE
OTHERS
109 
 
Sources: 2008 Statistical Bulletin of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (By MOFCOM) 
 
Table 3.2: Ten largest outward M&A by Chinese companies from 2008 to 2010 
Date Bid Value in 
100millionUSD 
Chinese Bidder Target Name Target Nation 
12/12/2007 39.5 National Grid National 
Transmission Corp 
Philippines 
01/02/2008 145 CHINALCO Rio Tinto Plc UK 
21/08/2008 20 Sinopec& 
PetroChina 
Petro-Tech Peruana US 
07/07/2008 25 CNOOC Awilco Offshore 
ASA 
Norway 
Sept 26 2008 20 Sinopec Tanganyika Oil Canada 
June 11 2009 13.86 China Minmetals 
Corporation 
OZ Minerals Australia 
June 22 2009 10.2 PetroChina SPC Singapore 
June 24 2009 66 SUNING LAOX Japan 
June 25 2009 72.4 Sinopec Addax Swiss 
July 19 2009 13 CNOOC& 
Sinopec 
Angola Oil US 
Source: China Mergers and Acquisitions Yearbook (2008, 2009, and 2010) 
 
3.3 The role of the government in China‟s outward M&A 
 
The Chinese government manages China‘s outward M&A through varying policies 
and approval procedures applied to different types of enterprises. In this chapter, we 
have divided Chinese companies into the following categories as a function of their 
ownership and administration authority: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
non-state owned ones (non-SOEs), comprising share-issuing public companies and 
private companies. SOEs include central enterprises (owned directly by the central 
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government) and local ones (owned by provincial and metropolitan governments) (see 
Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3: Categories of Chinese companies based on ownership and level of administration 
authority 
 
 
Approval procedures and supporting policies 
 
In a typical outward M&A case, Chinese investors need to register with and get 
approval from three governmental authorities: The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), which is in charge of the planning, supervision and 
harmonization of China‘s economy; The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which 
examines the merit of the proposed M&A, and the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE), which is responsible for the examination of the sources and the 
remittance of foreign exchange involved. Chinese acquirers should firstly register 
with and get approval from the SAFE, then apply for ratification from the relevant 
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National Development and Reform Commission (at the national or provincial level) 
and finally apply to the MOFCOM (at the national or provincial level) for certification 
before they are allowed to remit overseas. Investors also need to obtain ratification 
from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
if the proposed acquisition involves state-owned properties (including SOEs and those 
non-SOEs in which government holds a certain percentage of shares). The detailed 
approval procedures are stated in Appendix 1. 
 
The role of the Chinese government in outward M&A is based on the socialist 
ideology that affirms that the State should macro-control the economy and grab the 
lifeline of each industry by exerting its control over large SOEs (Schüller and Turner, 
2007). Thus the government established a series of bureaucratic hurdles in the last 
century. Although those regulatory barriers were gradually removed following the 
―Zou Chu Qu‖ (go global) policy and China‘s accession to the WTO, the approval 
procedures are still complex and unclear to many. 
 
However, this interventionist policy also has its merits. Since every overseas 
acquisition has to be recorded by the NDRC and individual enterprises are not 
allowed to sign any legally binding documents before the approval of the NDRC, the 
Chinese government can supervise these proposed M&A cases in light of some 
‗hidden rules‘ which may be beneficial to investors. For example, competition among 
Chinese acquirers is not encouraged and a situation in which two Chinese enterprises 
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bid against each other to acquire the same target never occurs (People‘s Daily, 2010). 
This kind of protectionism lessened the competition between Chinese firms. Having 
said that, discrimination does exist between SOEs and Non-SOEs in the form of 
‗hidden rules‘. As stated above, Chinese investors need to get approval from the 
SAFE, NDRC and MOFCOM before they are allowed to remit funds overseas. There 
are indeed written regulations and policies for these examinations but the relevant 
factors for examination are not clear to all. Whether an overseas M&A project can be 
approved or not depend on the subjective judgment of corresponding government 
officers to a certain extent. Moreover, the protocol to be followed for approval is 
time-consuming. A few months are a very good result for private enterprises that have 
no strong governmental relationships (i.e., ―Guanxi‖ in Chinese). Acquirers from 
other countries may have already concluded the acquisition before their Chinese 
competitors have even qualified to dispatch fund abroad. Faced with such 
disadvantages due to administrative burdens, some enterprises have chosen to keep 
their foreign exchange overseas and, in turn, use them in outward M&A. This kind of 
‗illegal‘ operation may lead to the imposition of penalties from the governmental 
authorities, but investors are ready to risk paying these penalties as they are often 
much less costly than those arising from the complex approval and administrative 
procedures (China Economic Weekly, 2007). 
 
Things become much easier for large SOEs. Not only can they usually pass the 
examination quickly and smoothly, but also benefit from specifically designated 
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policies. For example, according to one government policy, most SOEs can receive 
special loans from state owned non-commercial banks, such as the Export-Import 
Bank of China, to help them accomplish outbound M&A that are in line with state 
targets. Another example is the risk management and investment consultancy that the 
CECIC provides to key overseas projects encouraged by the state. By contrast, 
non-SOEs do not benefit from this kind of preferential policies. 
 
The influence of the Chinese government on outward M&A can also be reflected in 
the issue of corporate governance and in the outcome of outward M&A. Since the 
state is the largest shareholder of publicly listed share-issuing enterprises, it is 
possible for these SOEs to conduct outward M&A in accordance with the state need 
and infringe against the interests of minority shareholders, which gives rise to a 
principal-principal conflict (Su, et al, 2008). Chen and Young (2009) confirm the 
existence of principal-principal conflicts in the Chinese SOEs based on an empirical 
study using event study methodology. They find that the outcomes of cross-border 
M&A are negatively related to the government ownership. Su et al. (2008) also 
suggests that the increase of government ownership positively relates to the 
ineffectiveness of acquirers‘ corporate governance.  
 
In addition to the Chinese government‘s influence, outward M&A by Chinese 
acquirers may also be affected by the governments of the host countries. Zhang et al. 
(2011) suggested that the likelihood of Chinese acquirers‘ M&A completion is higher 
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if the host country is a developed economy and has a better institutional quality. They 
also claimed that Chinese acquirers are less likely to complete outward M&A if they 
are SOEs. However, whether the ownership structure of a Chinese acquirer can affect 
the outcome of a completed M&A deal is still not clear.  
 
3.4 Discussion about the current status of China‟s outward M&A 
 
The phenomenal rise of China‘s outward M&A in the 21st century is a fascinating 
story for a developing country with a per-capita GDP that is less than one tenth that of 
its more industrialised counterparts. While China is currently going through a stage of 
fast industrialization with huge demands for capital injection and is still a large 
recipient of inward FDI, the speeding up of its outward M&A of recent years has been 
intriguing. There are many different views on China‘s massive outward M&A (e.g., 
Chen and Young, 2009; Hirt and Orr, 2006; Wang and Boateng, 2007). Based on the 
above description of the government‘s key role in orchestrating China‘s outward 
M&A activities, we argue that the reason for China to fast forward and become a 
significant capital source country (while other emerging economies, such as the other 
BRICs, are not at a comparable stage) lies in China‘s unique institutional context. The 
discriminatory policy adopted by the Chinese government to support SOEs in pursuit 
of key M&A targets overseas testifies to the inseparable relationship between 
government and SOEs in this country. It highlights the important role played by 
informal rules (such as those ‗hidden rules‘ mentioned earlier) and informal 
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institutions in a society where formal rules and formal institutions are experiencing 
modernization and internationalization as part of China‘s integration into the global 
market. While formal rules and formal institutions are supposed to be inherently better 
than informal ones (North, 1990), what happened in China raises serious issues of 
increased transaction cost for business and its negative implication to the sustainable 
competitiveness of Chinese SOEs in the global market in the long term. More 
efficient business organizations such as non-SOEs could also suffer due to the fact 
there is no level playing field created along China‘s increasing internationalization. 
Put simply, China‘s long term national competitiveness could be in jeopardy should 
such discriminatory policies and informal institutions continue to function at the 
expense of formal ones.  
 
While principal-principal conflict has been identified as an issue for Chinese acquirers 
(Su, et al, 2008), there is a lack of recognition of the principal-agent conflict given the 
close relationship between the state and SOEs. Managers, as agents of state assets, can 
be replaced or transferred by government bureaucrats as they see fit. Thus managers 
are motivated to pursue short-term results at the expense of the firm‘s long term 
interest to keep their jobs and seek promotion. This short- vs long-termism can 
contribute to the failure of China‘s outward M&A activities.  
 
To conclude, the increasing number of cases that sees developing country 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) buying assets from developed countries through 
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M&A calls for more systematic evidence in this area. As a typical and representative 
developing country, China has already drawn the world‘s attention with several 
high-profile cross-border M&As in recent years. Supported by the largest foreign 
exchange reserve of the world, Chinese state-controlled companies are well positioned 
to buy up ailing Western companies or strategic assets in resource-rich countries as 
part of its drive to expand its outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). By 
examining the recent evidence of Chinese outward M&A, this chapter argues that the 
crucial role played by the Chinese government is behind the extraordinary expansion 
of China‘s outward M&A activities over recent years. However, China‘s long term 
competitiveness is at stake if the informal rules and institutions continue to 
overshadow the proper working of the formal institutions. 
 
In fact, according to the statistics of Chinese government, the overall OFDI and 
outward M&A performed rather negatively (Beijing News, 2010). The top biggest 
outward M&A deals were accomplished by large state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
which represent state owned assets. The continuous overseas losses in SOEs‘ OFDI 
caused dissatisfaction among the public as well as in the Chinese government. After 
years of deliberation, the importance of overseas assets has been confirmed by the 
central government. To this end, the <Interim Administrative Measures for the 
Supervision and Administration of the Overseas Assets of Central Enterprises> was 
formally promulgated by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) on 29
th
 June 2011. This regulation encompassed the 
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supervision of the decision-making of SOEs‘ OFDI, the administration of the 
enterprises abroad, the administration of the major events of enterprises abroad, the 
monitoring of overseas state-owned assets, and the legal responsibility of the persons 
in charge. Most media paid attention to this regulation due to its provisions for the 
accountability of the responsible persons. However, the author was attracted by its 
emphasis on the administration of the enterprises abroad. It considers11 categories of 
rules, which is the largest number among these issues. Although these rules, most 
focus on finance and accounting aspects, such as internal control and risk 
management, they still seem to indicate that the Chinese government was also worried 
about the management of overseas units and realized the significant role that the 
post-acquisition phase played in the performance of the Chinese firms‘ CBMA. 
 
The problematic practitioner‘s performance calls for more systematic academic 
research in this field, which is still quite lacking. A detailed literature review of the 
outward M&A of Chinese firms will be presented in the next section. 
 
3.5 Literature review on China‟s outward M&A 
 
Despite there being an increasing academic interest in China‘s OFDI in recent years 
(Alon and McIntyre, 2008; Buckley et al., 2008; Deng, 2004 and 2007; Morck et al., 
2008; Voss et al., 2008), including its outward M&A (Chen and Young, 2009; Deng, 
2009 and 2010; Hirt and Orr, 2006; Luedi, 2008; Schüller and Turner, 2007; Woodard 
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and Wang, 2004), research on this subject is still in its early stages. The existing 
research on China‘s outward M&A has mostly focussed upon its strategic motivations 
and underlying rationale (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng 2007, 2009; Hemerling et 
al., 2006; Rui and Yip, 2008; Wang and Boateng, 2007). What is lacking or absent 
from the existing research is an examination of the other issues with respect to 
China‘s outward M&A, such as valuation, post-M&A integration, knowledge transfer 
and organisational learning, and, performance appraisal (Birkinshaw et al., 2010). 
This section concentrates on the literature review of the Chinese firms‘ outward 
M&A.  
 
Dunning (1977 and 2006) put forward two main drivers for companies involved in 
outward M&A: asset augmentation and exploitation. Extensive literature argues that 
several issues motivate MNEs to invest abroad by means of various entry modes, 
including M&A: the pursuit of natural resources, markets, strategic assets and 
technology, diversification, efficiency theory and so on (Dunning, 1993; Buckley and 
Ghauri, 2002; Hopkins, 1999). Whatever drove a firm initially, its ultimate aim is to 
enhance its competitive advantage (Deng, 2004, 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007; Chen and 
Young, 2009). 
 
The motivations of Chinese acquirers‘ are proved to be generally in line with those 
listed above, yet present several distinctive features (Deng, 2004; Buckley et al., 
2008). First, the pursuit of natural resources is the primary motivation for many of 
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China‘s outward M&As. Although China is known to be a large country with 
abundant natural resources, it still needs to source energy and resources from other 
countries due to its enormous consumption and high growth rate. Therefore, it has 
long been a critical plan of the Chinese government to source a stable supply of 
natural resources by means of outward M&A activities, notably undertaken by SOEs 
(Taylor, 2002). More recently, its rapidly growing GDP and its huge foreign exchange 
reserve have helped Chinese firms to invest in natural resources overseas. Luedi (2008) 
assesses China‘s outward M&A from 1995 to 2007 and finds that the natural 
resources seeking M&A take the largest proportion in both the number of deals and 
the total deal value. Deng (2007) also argues that the reason why Chinese MNEs have 
acquired foreign assets through outward M&A lies in its need for strategic resources. 
There are eight deals in the category of natural resources seeking among the ten 
largest Chinese outward M&A in recent years, including the largest case so far: 
CHINALCO‘s acquisition of part of Rio Tinto Plc for a total value of USD 14.5 
billion. 
 
Second, strategic asset seeking is becoming ever more important. Strategic assets are 
identified as such resources and capabilities which are unique and valuable for a 
company, and are able to contribute to the company‘s competitive advantage and 
superior performance (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). These specialised resources and 
capabilities are hard to create and imitate. Strategic asset seeking FDI has grown 
rapidly over the last three decades (Dunning, 1998; Deng, 2007, 2012) and M&A are 
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considered to be the most effective way to gain fast access to strategic assets 
(Hombug and Bucerius, 2005; Wesson, 2004). This is particularly true for Chinese 
MNEs, which are newcomers to the international market and control very limited 
strategic assets. They have to seek superior resources and capabilities overseas, 
mostly from developed counties, due to the backwardness of indigenous companies 
(Nolan, 2001; Luo and Tung, 2007; Deng, 2009). In order to enhance their 
competitive advantage both at home and abroad, Chinese firms need to engage in 
strategic asset seeking FDI by way of M&A (Deng, 2007). Some research categorises 
this type of motivations as a strategic intent perspective to interpret the rationale 
behind the motivation of Chinese MNEs (Rui and Yip, 2008). The Chinese 
government has been particularly keen to improve the international competitiveness 
of Chinese SOEs and turn them into global players (Schüller and Turner, 2007). For 
example, the Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation (SAIC) acquired 
Ssangyong Motors in July 2004 in a deal roughly worth USD 500 million. This is the 
first overseas M&A by a Chinese automotive manufacturer, which provided other 
Chinese firms with a good learning base for the acquisition of manufacturing skills, 
in-house design capabilities and the establishment of an internationally recognised 
brand. Shortly after, Nanjing Automotive‘s acquisition of the British Rover company 
was regarded to have further strengthened the Chinese automotive industry‘s 
competitiveness in car manufacturing (Tan and Ai, 2010).  
 
Third, diversification also plays an important role in the drive for outward M&A. 
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Mainstream financial theory postulates that non-systematic risk can be eliminated 
through diversification (Treynor, 1961; Sharpe, 1964). Outward M&A is an effective 
way to reduce financial and operational risks through geographical diversification 
(Seth, 1990). This is because outward M&A can diversify non-systematic risk by 
arbitrage on different exchange rates, tax regimes, etc. On this front, some Chinese 
banks and insurance companies, such as the China Investment Corporation (CIC) and 
the China International Capital Corporation (CICC), have already invested in overseas 
financial institutions and markets to diversify their product portfolios and contain risk 
(Luedi, 2008). 
 
Other motivations are also believed to be behind the outward M&A activities of 
Chinese MNEs, such as seeking market expansion, access to Western brands, or an 
effect of globalization (Martin, et al 1998; UNCTAD 2000). For example, companies 
such as ZTE, Huawei and Haier invested overseas through M&A to gain access to 
new international markets. Similarly, TCL‘s purchase of Schneider Electronics was 
also aimed at penetrating the European market and avoiding possible charges of 
dumping (Buckley et al., 2008). Another good example is Lenovo‘s acquisition of 
IBM‘s PC Division, which extended Lenovo‘s brand awareness worldwide.  
 
Table 3.3 Differences in the main motivations of outward M&A of Chinese SOEs and Non-SOEs 
SOEs Non-SOEs 
 Natural resource seeking 
 Increasing international competitiveness 
 Maintaining domestic leading positions 
 Strategic asset seeking 
 Access to new markets 
 Seeking technologies  
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 Diversification  
 Seeking efficiency  
Source: Deng (2004), Schüller and Turner (2007) 
 
However, when examining any actual cases, the distinction between the above 
motivations is not always clear-cut (Deng, 2004) or, putting it another way, there may 
be multiple motivations behind any individual M&A decision. Despite various M&A 
aims having been pursued by Chinese firms, their primary motivation for those who 
do not have to meet the need of the state is the acquisition of strategic assets 
(UNCTAD, 2006; Deng, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). This 
study follows Deng‘s (2009) idea of strategic assets by using Amit and Schoemaker‘s 
(1993) definition: ―the set of difficult to trade and imitate, scarce, appropriable and 
specialized resources and capabilities that be stow the firm‘s competitive advantage‖ 
(Amit and Schoemaker,1993, p. 36). According to the resource-based view, a firm‘s 
strategic assets determine its competitive advantage and performance (Barney, 1991). 
Most Chinese firms use outward M&A to access and source strategic assets to 
improve their competitive advantage and compensate their competitive disadvantage 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Rui and Yip, 2008; Deng, 2007, 2009). In this research, 
the term ‗strategic assets‘ will be used with the same meaning of ‗resources‘ and 
‗capabilities‘, which determine a firm‘s competitive advantage and performance 
(Barney, 1991). Moreover, this study divides resources into tangible and intangible 
ones; in turn, intangible resources can be divided into tacit-knowledge based 
resources and explicit-knowledge based ones (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996).  
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Given that the pioneers and the majority of China‘s outward M&A are conducted by 
Chinese SOEs, which are incentivised and managed differently from the typical firms 
in a market economy (Child, 1994), it is doubtful whether the mainstream theories 
and empirical findings from Western countries can be applied to the case of Chinese 
firms. It is clear that the current state of research on the outward M&A activities of 
Chinese firms is primarily focused on its motivations. Nevertheless, the central theme 
of M&A, the value creation riddle, is still left adrift (Very et al., 2012). Mainstream 
M&A researchers believe that the value of M&A is created in the post-acquisition 
integration phase because the extent to which that synergy potential is realised 
depends on the ability of the acquirer to effectively manage the post-acquisition 
integration process (Haspeslagh and Jemission, 1991; Stahl et al., 2011). For Chinese 
acquirers, post-acquisition integration can be particularly difficult due to their lack of 
international experience, managerial competency and professional expertise (Luo and 
Tung, 2007). Despite the theoretical importance and practical difficulties, very little 
research has placed its focus on the Chinese acquirers‘ post-acquisition integration 
process (Deng, 2011; Liu and Woywode, 2013), leaving an important research gap. 
This study will fill this gap by exploring and explaining the key success factors in the 
management of post-acquisition integration in the outward M&A of Chinese firms. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
124 
 
This chapter achieves two aims. First, it provides the background to the research by 
analysing the current status of China‘s outward M&A, with a particular focus on the 
role of the government as the most significant institutional factor. Second, it reviews 
the current literature on Chinese firms‘ outward M&A and points out the research 
gaps for future studies. This study will fill some of these gaps. In the next chapter, the 
methodology of this research will be presented.  
 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the research methodology. After identifying the 
research gaps and setting up the research propositions, this chapter follows the 
sequence of Saunders et al.‘s (2009) ‗research onion‘ (Figure 4.1) and starts by 
identifying the research philosophy and explaining the research approach used in this 
thesis. Then the research design is explained and justified. The research design 
involves choosing a multiple case study research strategy, selecting the cases, building 
the case study protocol, collecting the primary data by means of semi-structured 
interviews and collecting secondary data from documentation. The data analysis 
strategy, process and procedures follow. Finally, the validity and reliability of the 
research is justified, followed by a discussion of the author‘s experience in conducting 
a case study research on Chinese MNEs. 
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Figure 4.1  The research ‗onion‘ 
Source: Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A., 2009 (p.108) 
 
4.2 The Research Philosophy 
 
The research philosophy provides the underpinning of the whole research; from the 
research approach and strategy to the methods chosen as part of the research strategy. 
It includes relevant assumptions about how the author views the world. The 
philosophical attitude of a researcher determines his/her knowledge perception and 
the process of knowledge creation. For example, a researcher who is concerned with 
facts, such as the resources needed in a manufacturing process, is likely to have a 
view on the way research should be conducted different from that of a researcher who 
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is concerned with the feelings and attitudes of workers towards their managers in that 
same manufacturing process. These two researchers may adopt considerably different 
research strategies and methods, as well as different views on the relative relevance of 
the pieces of evidence collected. Saunders et al. (2009) suggest that the important 
issue is not whether a research should be philosophically informed, but how the 
researcher applies the research philosophy in practice and reflects on the philosophical 
choices.  
 
4.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
 
Two major ways of considering a research philosophy are its ontological and 
epistemological foundations. It is necessary to explicitly state both since the 
differences in these two philosophical concepts have a great impact on the way in 
which a researcher views the whole research process. 
 
Ontology refers to a researcher‘s view of the nature of reality or beings. It is 
concerned with the structure of existence and reflects how researchers make sense of 
the world (Crotty, 1998). There are two ontological positions: objectivism and 
subjectivism. Objectivism holds the position that social entities exist in a reality 
external to the social actors that are concerned with their existence. This view 
emphasises the structural aspects of management and assumes management to be 
similar in all organisations. The aspects of the structure in which management 
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operates may differ, but the essence of the function is very much the same in all 
organisations. Insofar as management does differ in organisations, it does so as a 
function of its different objective aspects. Conversely, subjectivism holds that social 
phenomena are shaped by the perceptions and consequent actions of the social actors 
that are concerned with their existence. What is more, this is a continuous process in 
that, through the process of social interaction, social phenomena are in a constant state 
of revision.  
 
Epistemology is concerned with a researcher‘s view of what should be accepted as 
knowledge in a field of study. The central debate of epistemology lies in the nature of 
knowledge and focuses on whether the social context should be studied according to 
the same principles (Bryman, 2012). The epistemological stance affirms the 
importance of the use of an appropriate research methodology to generate and build 
new knowledge. There are two major different researcher stances on epistemological 
positions, which embrace either positivism or interpretivism. Positivism is an 
epistemological view that considers the world to exist objectively and externally, 
independent of social actors; thus, its properties should be measured through objective, 
empirical and analytic methods, instead of placing any great reliance on human 
feelings (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Bryman, 2012). Those researchers who take the 
positivist stance prefer to use observable social reality and, from their research, tend 
to produce results based upon causality and law-like generalisations, such as those 
sought by natural scientists (Remenyi et al., 1998; Saunders et al., 2009). Conversely, 
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interpretivism advocates that the world exists internally and should be subjectively 
viewed and measured. It emphasises the human beings‘ roles of social actors and 
distinguishes between research conducted on human objectives and that involving 
other ones. Interpretivism requires researchers to grasp and understand subjective 
realities and meanings of social actions. Interpretivists view the subject meaning in 
social science as people and institutions are varied from on to another. The multiple 
faces of reality require a different logic of research procedure. When taking the 
interpretative philosophy stand, it is impossible to replicate or generalise research 
findings, but the researcher can provide interesting examples, coming up with 
surprising new findings (Bryman, 2012).  
 
4.2.2 Philosophical underpinning: Positivism 
 
The main aim of this research is to uncover key factors in the management of the 
post-acquisition integration of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A and explain how these 
factors impact on post-acquisition capability transfer. As stated in the last chapter, 
although previous research has developed various key success factors of M&A, the 
variables most commonly used in empirical research to predict acquisition 
performance still fail to explain the variance in post-acquisition performance. In this 
case, it is clear that more theoretical development is needed to shed light on those 
factors that may contribute to post-acquisition performance (King et al., 2004; 
Bjorkman et al., 2007; Gomes et al., 2013). This need for the development of a new 
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theory or for the verification of existing theory becomes particularly urgent when 
considering the outward M&A of Chinese firms. Therefore, the main objective of this 
research is to develop a new theory relating to the key success factors in the 
management of the post-acquisition integration of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A.  
 
Despite CBMA being a complex and socially constructed phenomenon, building a 
theory regarding its key success factors requires the author to remain external to the 
data collection process in order to minimise any alteration of the substance of the 
collected data (Saunders et al., 2009). Although contextual description can serve as a 
necessary first step of the research, it cannot lead to a generalisable theory on its own 
(Welch et al., 2011). In order to define a new theory or verify the existing ones in this 
field, a highly structured methodology will be used to facilitate replication. 
Researchers should use the observable social reality and aim at producing results 
linked to causality and law-like generalizations, akin to those produced by natural 
scientists. The theorising process in this research requires objectivity in the 
ontological position and independence from the social actors. Therefore, positivism 
fits the nature of this research. Table 4.1 shows the details of the philosophical 
orientation of this research.  
 
Table 4.1 Detailed philosophical orientation in this research 
Dimension Positivism 
  
Ontology External, objective and 
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independent of social actors 
Epistemology Only observable phenomena can 
provide credible data and 
evidence. Focus on causality and 
law-like generalizations. Reduce 
phenomena to simplest elements 
Axiology Research is undertaken in a 
value-free way. The researcher 
is independent of the data and 
maintains an objective stance 
Nature of the research process Objective search for generalities 
or causal links 
Study outcome Explanation in the form of 
testable propositions and 
cause-effect relations 
  
 
4.3 The research approach 
 
Before designing a research, a research approach needs to be identified and justified. 
There is the deductive approach, which is characterised by the testing of hypotheses 
drawn from theory, and the inductive approach, by which researchers develop a theory 
based upon the results of data analysis (Saunders et al., 2009). Identifying a research 
approach is an important component of the research design, and a crucial antecedent 
for the selection of a research strategy (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
 
This study adopts the inductive approach since it intends to address the research 
question by building a theory for an undeveloped research field instead of testing an 
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existing theory. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) advocated that researchers using 
theory building should justify their research approaches because of the implicit 
assumption that‖ theory building from cases is less precise, objective, and rigorous 
than large-scale hypothesis testing‖ (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p.26). Based on 
their arguments, the inductive approach adopted in this research is justified by the 
importance of the research question and by the fact that no existing research has 
addressed it before, as stated in detail in the first chapter. In this case, it is clear that 
more theoretical development is needed to shed light on the factors that contribute to 
the post-acquisition performance of the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A in developed 
economies. 
 
However, it should be noted that the inductive approach adopted in this research is 
combined with some elements of the deductive approach, as a proposed theoretical 
framework and propositions are developed by reviewing the existing literature. Then, 
the applicability of these propositions is tested by means of the data collection and 
analysis process. Therefore, this research can be viewed as a combination of elements 
from both the inductive and deductive approaches (Saunders et al., 2009). Following 
the suggestion made by Child et al. (2012), this study also takes to heart Langley‘s 
(1999) insistence that ―we should not have to be shy about mobilizing both inductive 
(data-driven) and deductive (theory-driven) approaches iteratively or simultaneously 
as inspiration guides us‖(p. 708). Therefore, this research uses both theory and data to 
build theory. 
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4.4 The research design 
 
The research design helps researchers to turn their research questions into research 
projects (Robson, 2002). It is influenced by the author‘s research philosophy and 
approach. Saunders et al. (2009) considered the research design to be a combination 
of three layers of the ‗research onion‘, i.e. the research strategy, research choices and 
time horizons. Based on the research question, objective, philosophy, and approach, a 
qualitative multiple-case study with a strong explanatory element is applied in this 
study. 
 
4.4.1 The case study strategy 
The research strategy is guided by the research question and objective (Saunders, et 
al., 2009). The case study strategy provides a rich and empirical description of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within a real life context by using a variety of 
data sources (Yin, 2002; Robson, 2002). It is also the prevailing research strategy for 
the undertaking of qualitative research in international business (Marschan and Welch, 
2004). This study adopts case study as its research strategy for the following reasons. 
First, case study is an increasingly popular research strategy for theory building as it 
can create propositions and theoretical constructs from empirical data sources. 
Theories can be developed by recognising patterns in the relationships identified 
within and across cases, or the rationale underlying these relationships. Moreover, 
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theory building from cases is considered to be one of the best bridges connecting 
qualitative data and deductive research as it concentrates on building constructs and 
theoretical propositions. Building a theory from a case study can be viewed as being 
complementary to mainstream deductive research since it provides accurate 
propositions and theories based upon ample empirical data. These theories can be 
tested by deductive researchers using quantitative data. In other words, inductive 
researchers build a theory from cases and deductive researchers test that theory by 
using data (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Therefore, building a theory from a case 
study is the most popular and appropriate strategy in management studies (Yin, 2002; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This research is intended to build a 
theory (a mid-range theory) in an under-developed research field in cross-border 
M&A (King et al., 2004); thus, the case study strategy is the most appropriate to 
answer the research question and achieve the research objective. 
 
The second reason of choosing a case study as the research strategy is the importance 
of the research context in this study. One of the main contributions of this research is 
its emphasis on context, since it concentrates on the CBMA phenomenon involving 
acquirers from a representative emerging economy and, moreover, involving their 
M&A activities in developed economies. Case studies can provide in-depth insights 
into organizational knowledge and practice, especially when cross-cultural and 
cross-border issues are involved (Flick, 2009; Ghauri, 2004). Yin (2002) suggests case 
studies to be the preferred research strategy in those instances in which the focus is on 
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contemporary phenomena within their social context. He believes the boundary 
between the focal phenomenon and the real life context not to be clearly evident 
within case studies. Therefore, it is an appropriate strategy to get a rich understanding 
of the research context and of the processes being enacted. Haleblian et al., (2009) 
suggest using in-depth interview and case study techniques to develop a deeper 
understanding of the cognitive and behavioural decision-making processes that form 
the basis of M&A and affect M&A outcomes. In recent years, the value of a case 
study strategy based on qualitative evidence in research on Chinese firms‘ outward 
M&A has been increasingly recognised. A considerable proportion of the most 
influential studies in this area have relied on this strategy (Rui and Yip, 2008; Deng 
2007; Deng 2009; Deng 2011). The case study strategy is deemed to be the most 
appropriate for this study not only because of its ability to provide in-depth insights 
into the phenomenon, but also for its potential to achieve a rich understanding of the 
cross-border and cross-cultural context. 
 
Moreover, case studies are usually used in exploratory and explanatory research since 
they have a considerable ability to generate answers to questions of ‗how‘, ‗why‘ and 
‗what‘ (Yin, 2002; Saunders, et al., 2009). This is in line with this study‘s research 
questions. Consequently, an explanatory case study is suited as this research‘s strategy. 
Besides, case study is preferred when the researcher has little control over the actual 
behavioural events, as is the situation in this research. 
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To sum up, the case study research strategy, which provides a rich description of 
contemporary phenomena within a real life context, is suitable for this study not only 
because of its strong aptitude in theory construction, but also due to its status of 
highly preferred strategy when ‗how‘, ‗why‘, and ‗what‘ questions are posed, when 
the research concentrates on a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context, 
and when the researcher has little control over events. 
 
4.4.2 Multiple case study design 
 
This study takes an embedded view which considers the specific M&A event in a case 
as the unit of analysis, without paying special attention to any subunit. This research 
adopts a multiple-case study design instead of single case study. Single case studies 
are usually employed to observe and analyse a significant phenomenon under extreme 
or unique circumstances. The rationale for conducting a single case study implies the 
case being critical, unique, representative, or revelatory (Yin, 2002). Although single 
case studies can provide substantial richness and depth, multiple-case studies are often 
seen to unearth more compelling evidence and produce more robust results since they 
enable comparisons that clarify whether an emergent finding is simply idiosyncratic to 
a single case or consistently replicated in several ones (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). Propositions in multiple-case studies can be investigated based on ample 
empirical data, which can build more precise relationships and constructs. Pauwels 
and Matthyssens (2004) suggest that only switching from single to multiple-case 
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studies can create more theory driven variance and divergence in the data.  
 
Although multiple-case studies are likely to deliver more robust overall results and 
generate more compelling theories, their theoretical sampling is considered to be more 
complicated. The logic behind theoretical sampling is different from that used in 
surveys. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) consider theoretical sampling similar to 
multiple experiment sampling, which involves choosing samples based upon how 
likely they are to provide theoretical insights, instead of selecting them randomly 
from a given population. In this case, cases are selected based upon theoretical 
considerations such as replication, rival replication, extension of theory, etc. This is in 
line with Yin‘s explanation of the ‗replication‘ logic. Yin (2002) argue that the 
underlying logic behind the use of multiple-case studies is the same as the one used in 
multiple experiments. In a multiple-case study, each case must be carefully selected to 
serve a specific purpose, which is either predicting a similar result, namely literal 
replication, or predicting a contrasting result for predictable reasons, namely 
theoretical replication. Based on Yin‘s (2002) arguments, literal replication logic is 
used in the design of this research. If all cases generate similar results, as predicted, 
they will have provided compelling support for the theoretical propositions. Each 
individual case study consists of a whole study in which convergent evidence is 
sought regarding the facts and conclusions of the case. Conclusions of each cases are 
then used as the information that needs replication in other individual cases. Summary 
reports of both individual cases and multiple cases should be produced based on the 
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results. For each individual case, the report should indicate how and why a particular 
proposition was demonstrated or not. The cross-case report should indicate the extent 
of the replication logic and why certain cases were predicted to yield specific results, 
whereas other cases, if any, were predicted to yield contrasting ones (Yin, 2002). 
 
4.4.3 Case selection 
 
Following the replication logic of a multiple-case study, this research focuses upon 
four cases. The number of cases is a reflection of the number of case replications 
needed in this research (Yin, 2002) and of the need to also take into account 
theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Taking further cases has a low 
marginal utility since the marginal contribution of each additional case is decreasing. 
On the other hand, the cost of conducting case studies should be considered as well, 
not only in terms of finances, but also of time. Additionally, securing access is also a 
kind of cost involved in the conduction of case studies. This is particularly true in this 
research, for contextual reasons that will be stated in detail in the data collection 
section
6
. Given the comprehensiveness of a CBMA integration process, the time 
required and the costs involves in a qualitative case study, four cases are considered to 
be an adequate number and the highest that could be handled.  
 
Yin (2002) suggests that prior knowledge of the outcome is a prerequisite in the 
                                                             
6To the best knowledge of the author, there is currently no internationally academic publication on Chinese firms‘ 
outward M&A using more than three cases in the research. 
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selection of cases. Having performed research on Chinese firms‘ outward M&A in the 
past few years, the author had accumulated some prior related knowledge in this field
7
; 
this aided his judgment on the potential exemplary outcomes and on the likeliness of 
achieving literal replications across cases.  
 
The four cases selected for this research projects are: the YTO Group‘s M&A with 
McCormick in France, the Nanyang CIJIAN Group‘s M&A with Way Assauto in Italy, 
CITIC Heavy Industries‘ M&A with Gandara Censa in Spain and TCL‘s M&A with 
Thomson in France. The rationale and criteria behind the selection of these cases were 
borne out of the following considerations: Firstly, although there are distinct 
motivations for Chinese firms‘ outward M&A, the pursuit of strategic resources is 
considered to be the most important, apart from meeting government driven 
imperatives (Deng 2007, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008). In line with the mainstream 
literature regarding the rationale of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A, the four cases were 
selected because the main rationale behind all their M&A was the pursuit of strategic 
resources and capabilities. However, M&A made by SOEs cannot be simply reduced 
to deals made to meet government objectives. As discussed in Chapter three and 
compared with non-SOEs, SOEs could avail themselves of both financial and 
administrative support by the Chinese government in the pre-acquisition phase 
through a variety of discriminatory policies. However, the differences between SOEs 
and Non-SOEs in the post-acquisition phase are still not clear. In order to enhance the 
                                                             
7
Tan and Ai, 2010; Ai and Tan, 2012; Sang et al., 2014. 
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potential for generalisation, both SOEs, such as CITIC Heavy Industries and the YTO 
Group, and Non-SOEs, such as TCL and the Nanyang Cijian Group, are included in 
this study. Moreover, all the acquiring firms selected are high-profile and leading 
firms in their respective industries, which can effectively dismiss the notion of 
conducting M&A for opportunistic reasons while announcing a strategic intent motive 
(Rui and Yip, 2008). Secondly, based on Birkinshaw et al.‘s (2010) suggestion, 
concentrating only on cases involving acquired firms from developed economies is 
deemed to be part of the potential contribution of this research. Accordingly, the home 
countries of the acquired firms in the selected cases are all developed western ones. 
Thirdly, all four cases made their M&A deals at least one year before the first 
interview data collection, which allows that sufficient time had elapsed for the 
implementation of their post-acquisition integration strategies (Angwin, 2004; Gomes 
et al., 2013). Finally, the basic underlying rationale for the case selection was 
replication logic. All cases were chosen due to the prior expectation of analogous 
outcomes. After collecting and analysing the data, if literal replication were to be 
found in all cases, sound overall results could be expected. Table 4.2 shows the 
similarities and differences between cases with regards to the case selection criteria. 
 
Table 4.2 Case selection criteria and variance of cases based on theoretical sampling  
 YTO and 
McCormick 
TCL and 
Thomson 
Cijian and 
Way Assauto 
CITIC and 
Gandara Censa 
Time of 
M&A 
07/03/2011 01/2004 31/03/2011 23/02/2011 
Status of the 
acquiring 
First tractor 
manufacturer in 
The biggest 
Consumer 
One of the 
biggest 
One of the biggest 
players in the 
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firm within 
the industry 
China. Number 
one in market 
share. 
electronics 
company in 
China. 
Number one 
in the TV 
industry for 
years. 
vehicle shock 
absorber 
producers in 
China. 
Number one 
in market 
share. 
heavy equipment 
manufacturing 
industry; Number 
one mining 
machinery and 
cement equipment 
manufacturer 
Motivation 
of M&A 
Strategic intent. 
Seeking 
technology, 
market, and 
brand. 
Strategic 
intent. 
Seeking 
technology, 
market, and 
brand. 
Strategic 
intent. 
Seeking 
technology 
and market. 
Strategic intent. 
Seeking 
technology, 
market, and 
geographical 
positioning. 
Location of 
acquired firm 
France France Italy Spain 
Ownership 
structure 
SOE Non-SOE Non-SOE SOE 
     
 
4.4.4 The case study protocol 
 
Yin (2002) suggests that researchers develop a case study protocol before conducting 
their case study research; this is particularly essential in multiple-case studies. A case 
study protocol is much more than a questionnaire. It provides researchers with 
guidelines for the collection of data from each case and is considered to be a 
significant tool to increase the reliability of a case study research. According to Yin 
(2002), a generic case study protocol contains an overview of the project, covering: 
both the research objective and questions; the theoretical framework, propositions, 
etc.; the data collection procedures, including the field work plan, site visit details, 
preparation and procedural reminders, etc.; the detailed case study questions and the 
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case report guide. A case study protocol not only helps researchers to stay on the right 
path during the data collection process in a complex multiple-case study, but also 
forces them to consider some issues beforehand – such as how to complete the case 
study report – which helps them avoid disastrous outcomes in the long run (Yin, 
2002). The detailed case study protocol for this research is shown in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3 Case study protocol  
1. Introduction to the case study and purpose of protocol 
1.1 Research questions:  
1. What are the key factors in the management of post-acquisition integration by 
Chinese firms?  
 
2. How and why do these factors impact on the post-acquisition integration 
process and M&A performance? 
 
3. How do the explanations of the identified key success factors contribute to the 
theory building for the post-acquisition integration in outward M&A by Chinese firms 
and by firms from other emerging economies? 
 
1.2 Propositions: 
Proposition 1: The Chinese acquirers’ prior related knowledge is a key factor that 
influences the post-acquisition integration process of their outward M&A. 
 
Proposition 2: The level of integration is a key factor that influences the 
post-acquisition integration process of the Chinese firms’ outward M&A. 
 
Proposition 3: The speed of integration is a key factor that influences the 
post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms’ outward M&A. 
 
Proposition 4: Human resource related issues in the integration phase are a key factor 
that influences the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms’ outward M&A. 
 
Proposition 5: The management of cultural differences at multiple levels in the 
integration phase is a key factor that influences the post-acquisition integration process of 
Chinese firms’ outward M&A. 
 
Proposition 6: Communication in the integration phase is a key factor that influences 
142 
 
the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms’ outward M&A. 
 
2. Data collection procedures 
2.1 Name of firms to be contacted and contact persons 
YTO-Mr Zheng(Director of executive office);  
CITIC-Mr Luo (Director of executive office);  
Nanyang CIJIAN-Mr Zhao (CEO and President);  
TCL-Mr. Li (Vice-CEO) 
2.2 Data collection plan 
Time period and length of each interview (See table 4.6) 
2.3 Preparation prior to interview 
Documents to be reviewed (See table 4.5) 
 
3. Case study questions 
Background questions; Questions by propositions; Supplementary questions (See 
table 4.4) 
 
4. Outline of the individual case study report 
4.1 Brief background of the case 
4.2 M&A deal descriptions 
4.3 Factors influencing the integration process of M&A by propositions 
 
4.5 Data collection 
The data collection overlapping with the data analysis is considered to be a main 
feature and advantage of a case study strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989). Unlike other 
research strategies, such as experiments and surveys, case studies present the 
opportunity to use different data sources that can cover a wide range of evidence. 
Using multiple sources of evidence, which is often referred to as ‗triangulation‘, can 
lead to more convincing and accurate findings; hence, it is the main principle 
underlying the data collection method of this study (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
2002). The triangulation of data sources can help to increase the validity and 
reliability of the research design, as well as to avoid internal and external bias 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Pauwels and Matthyssens, 2004).  
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Different sources of evidence – such as interviews, documents, observation, archival 
data, questionnaire, etc. – can be tapped in the data collection process of case studies 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990; Yin, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009). Although not all of 
these sources of evidence will be relevant to all case studies, the combination of 
different sources of data should be pursued due to their high complementarity. This 
research relies mainly on two sources of evidence: interviews and documentary data. 
Semi-structured interviews are considered to be the main means for the collection of 
the primary data of this research, while documentation is the major source of 
secondary data. The details about the data collection will be presented in the 
sub-sections below.  
 
Collecting data from multiple sources is important in this research not only for 
triangulation purposes, but also due to the imbalance which exists in the different 
types of data available for each respective case. For example, while there is a high 
degree of saturation with regard to interview data, there is only a moderate amount of 
external documentary data pertaining to the Nanyang Cijian Group‘s M&A with Way 
Assauto. The main reason for this is because the price of the deal was not divulged as 
the industry is unpopular to the public and media. Besides, the Nanyang Cijian Group 
is neither a listed company nor an SOE. Therefore, the attention it received from the 
public and the media was relatively low. On the contrary, TCL‘s M&A with Thomson 
features only a moderate level of interview saturation, while the availability of 
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external documentation is very high. This is mainly because the deal is over ten years 
old and a large proportion of the parties involved have since left the firm. Moreover, 
since it was a failed M&A, some of the senior executives did not wish to talk too 
much about this unsuccessful affair. However, TCL‘s case was very high-profile, and 
has been explored by many scholars in China, so there is an ample availability of 
secondary data in relation to it. Therefore, the combination of these different sources 
of data not only helps to cross-check the validity of the findings but is also a 
prerequisite for the establishment of a sound comparison across different dimensions 
under the constrains of limited financial resources and data access. 
 
4.5.1 Primary data: the semi-structured interviews 
 
Interviews are one of the most significant data collection techniques in social science, 
and are particularly important as a source of information in case studies (Easterby et 
al., 2008; Yin, 2002). The nature of the interviews should be consistent with the 
research questions, objectives and strategy. Interviews are a highly efficient way to 
gather rich empirical data when the phenomenon under scrutiny is infrequent and 
embedded in a real life context. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest  that, when 
case study research incorporates multiple cases and move away from everyday 
phenomenon to intermittent strategic phenomenon such as M&A, interviews usually 
became the prevailing primary data source. 
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According to the most prevailing typologies, interviews can be categorised as 
unstructured (or in-depth), semi-structured, and structured interview (Saunders, et al, 
2009). Structured interviews are also referred to as ‗quantitative research interviews‘ 
since they are often used to collect quantitative data. Conversely, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews are also called ‗qualitative research interviews‘ (King et al., 
2004). Based on the research questions and objectives of this study, qualitative 
research interviews were employed. In unstructured interviews, there is no 
predetermined list of questions to follow, although the interviewer needs to have a 
clear idea of the aspects to be explored. The main purpose of an unstructured 
interview is to explore relevant issues in a broad manner, so that the interviewees are 
given the opportunity to talk freely about events, and the conversations are often very 
flexible. Semi-structured interviews require the researchers to prepare a list of 
questions to be covered, although the order of such questions may vary depending on 
the flow of the conversation. The specific questions may vary as a function of the 
specific firm context and of the roles of the interviewees. On the other hand, 
complementary questions may also be required if the discussion shifts to relevant 
related areas that the interviewer had not previously considered (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 
2002; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
Compared to unstructured ones, semi-structured interviews occupy a methodological 
middle ground by providing a line of questions to follow while allowing the 
interviewees to talk freely. By providing a guideline, the set of questions helps the 
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interviewer to steer the conversation towards the main objectives of the research. 
Open-ended questions have the potential to provide a large volume of rich data, and to 
create an open conversation framework which can be enriched by a two-way 
communication based on a set of questions. In a semi-structured interview, the 
interviewees are often encouraged to feel free to share relative opinions, which helps 
the researchers to explore the interviewees‘ response to different issues in an 
interactive and flexible fashion. 
 
Considering that the research topic of this study is CBMA, an extremely complex and 
multi-phase event, unstructured interviews would have provided ample opportunities 
to conduct meandering conversations. However, semi-structured interviews would not 
only afford the freedom to open up the complexity of events and research questions, 
but would make it possible to steer the conversations within the scope of the key 
themes. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were considered to be the most 
appropriate data collection technique for this study.  
 
The specific context of each case was also another significant reason behind the 
selection of semi-structured interviews to be the data collection technique for this 
research. As stated earlier in this chapter, the acquiring firms in this study are all 
leaders in their respective industry sectors. Top executives in such high-profile 
companies hold a high social status, and often follow extremely hectic schedules. The 
people at the top of the ‗pyramid‘, have some common characteristics that point at 
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semi-structured interviews as the most suitable means for extracting reliable evidence 
from them. Chinese top executives are good at making public speeches since they 
have been exercising this skill in their careers leading up to their current positions. 
Nevertheless, their being expert public speakers does not imply that they are good at 
freely sharing their personal opinions in front of strangers. In most cases, their 
speeches are drafted by secretaries and they always express views that are in 
accordance with these documents or even closely follow the speech drafts. This is 
mainly because of the traditional Chinese philosophy of ‗circumspection‘, which 
makes people in top positions very cautious about everything, including making 
mistakes. Consequently, if unstructured interviews were to be used to collect evidence 
from top executives, it would be very difficult to ensure that the information provided 
reflected their personal opinions instead of just echoing the themes of their public 
speeches, as they would be able to talk freely and easily switch to ‗speech mode‘. 
Conversely, in semi-structured interviews, the executives‘ speech patterns can be 
disrupted by questions raised by interviewers, forcing them to reorganise their 
thoughts to answer specific questions and themes. Under these circumstances, the 
information provided will most likely represent their true opinions and the data 
collected will be more reliable.  
 
On the other hand, it would have been highly problematic to ask the top executives of 
these leading Chinese firms to dedicate several hours to in-depth interviews, 
particularly with PhD students and junior faculty members. Semi-structured 
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interviews offset this issue by adjusting the question lists and steering the 
conversation to key themes. Therefore, this research employed semi-structured 
interviews for the collection of its primary data.  
 
4.5.1.1 Interviews conducted 
 
As shown in the case study protocol, the main aim of the interviews was to gather 
information on the key factors in the management of the post-acquisition integration 
of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A and on how these factors impact on the 
post-acquisition capability transfer. In this instance, the ideal interviewees would be 
the persons who had been in charge of the formulation of the post-acquisition 
integration strategies, such as the top executives in both the acquiring and acquired 
units, and those who had been involved in the implementation of such strategies, such 
as senior managers in specific positions. Some middle level staff, which had been 
involved in most integration processes or had played important roles in the 
post-acquisition integration, were also included as potential interviewees. This 
interview strategy has been proven to be appropriate for research conducted in China 
(Adler et al., 1989)  
 
To gather evidence from top executives and middle managers in both acquiring and 
acquired firms, 24 interviews were conducted. Tapping numerous highly 
knowledgeable informants from various hierarchical levels and viewing the 
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phenomenon from different perspectives can mitigate the potential for bias of 
impression management (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007)
8
. At least two top 
executives were interviewed for each firm, including some CEOs/presidents, who had 
been the main architects of the post-acquisition integration strategies. Most of the 
interviews were conducted face to face while others were conducted by telephone
9
. 
The interview data were mainly collected at the headquarters of the four firms during 
two research trips in China between the 25
th 
of May and the 26
th
 of June 2012, and 
between the 12
th
 August and the 27
th
 of September 2012. After some site visits and 
initial data analysis, the telephone interviews were conducted, between May and July 
2013, to verify the original data and collect additional information. The interviews 
were all conducted individually. For each of the interviewees, the face to face 
interviews lasted one to two hours. Additional open-ended conversations were also 
conducted to contextualise and verify the formal interviews. A ‗cascade‘ interview 
technique was used: working up from the middle management to the senior managers, 
then to the vice CEOs, and finally to the CEOs and presidents of the acquiring firms. 
Such a sequence of interviews helped to generate holistic maps of cases in a limited 
time period (Xiao et al., 2013).Due to location constraints, the CEOs of two of the 
acquired firms were interviewed by telephone. It was not possible to approach the 
Spanish CEO of the acquired CITIC HIC company, whereas his interpreter and 
                                                             
8Impression management is a goal-directed conscious or unconscious process in which people attempt to influence 
the perceptions of other people about a person, object or event; they do so by regulating and controlling 
information in social interaction (Piwinger and Ebert 2001, pp. 1–2). 
9 Most interviews with the personnel of the acquired firms were conducted by telephone because it would have 
been very costly in time and money to travel to the various countries to conduct face to face interviews. This would 
have been particularly challenging for a Chinese researcher who needs different visas to enter into different 
countries. 
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secretary were both interviewed face to face. All interviewees were given the option 
of individual anonymity, but some chose not to avail themselves of it. All interviews 
were conducted in Chinese, and the specific interview dates and interviewees are 
summarised in Table 4.7. In order to verify the accuracy of the interview data, some of 
the interviewees were asked to check the written interview reports. Feedback was 
provided where it was considered feasible to do so. The specific information 
regarding interviewees is summarised in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 Details of interviewees 
Firm Management level Job titles of interviews 
Firm A Top management General manager; General manager 
(Acquired firm)
a
; Chief technology officer 
(Acquired firm)
a
; Secretary of the Board
b
. 
 Middle management Director of the General office; Anonymous 
(A department manager);Assistant toGeneral 
manager
b
. 
Firm B Top management General managerb; Vice general manager; 
General manager (Acquired firm)
a
. 
 Middle management Anonymous; Secretary of the general 
manager; Director of the General office 
(Acquired firm)
a
. 
Firm C Top management General manager; Vice general manager; 
Anonymous. 
 Middle management Director of the General officeb; Anonymous; 
International affairs secretary; The secretary 
of the general manager of the acquired firm. 
Firm D Top management 
Middle management 
Vice CEO
b
; Anonymous (Acquired firm). 
Secretary of general office; Executive office 
director 
a
. 
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a
Interviewed through telephone calls in 2013. 
b
Interviewed again through telephone calls. 
 
The list of interview questions was based on the propositions set up in Chapter two, 
with the addition of some background and factual data gathering questions. There 
were also some optional supplementary questions which could be asked at the end of 
each interview depending on the information gathered. The sequence of questions 
could be customised; adjusted sets of questions were put to the informants according 
to their roles. A detailed interview question guide is shown in Table 4.5 in both 
Chinese and English. The wording and phrasing of the Chinese version was 
deliberately crafted so that the questions could be thoroughly understood by the 
interviewees while not leading their responses (Yin, 2002). Back translation is the 
technique most commonly used to check the accuracy of translation in survey and 
interview questionnaires. All interview questions were back translated by my 
supervisor, a bilingual speaker of Chinese and English, to ensure the accuracy of 
translation of the interview questions (Brislin, 1970). 
 
Table 4.5 Open-ended questions in Semi-structured interviews 
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Background questions: 
1. Please elaborate your position and role in this company. How long have you been in 
this position and has it changed before? 
2. Can you please list and elaborate on your company‘s recent major cross-border 
M&A activities? 
3. What are the motivations and aims of this M&A? 
4. According to the current situation, have these aims been fulfilled? Or was the 
company on course to achieving its aims before the M&A? 
5. How do you perceive the overall performance in the acquisition as well as in any 
other dimensions? (You may answer this question from the point of view that you consider 
to be significant. e.g., sales volumes, market share or profits, knowledge acquisition, 
strategic objectives) 
 
General questions: 
6. What do you think of the importance of the post-acquisition integration phase? 
Why? 
7. How do you perceive the management of the post-acquisition integration? Have 
you even been involved in it in your daily work? How?  
8. What do you think are the key success factors in the management of the 
post-acquisition integration? 
 
Questions by propositions: 
 
9. What do you think of the importance of prior related knowledge (e.g. knowledge 
about the related industry/firms, acquired firms, and some of the resources and capabilities 
within the acquiring firm.) in the management of the post-acquisition integration? Please 
elaborate and explain why (PROPOSITION1).  
10. What do you think of the integration (implementation) speed and level of 
integration? (Integration here includes market/sales information system, sales force 
structure, product/brand portfolio, etc.) Please elaborate and explain why (PROPOSITION 
2&3). 
11. What do you think of the role played by senior/middle managers in handling the 
post-acquisition integration? Was there any top management team turnover (retainment) 
and employee resistance? Please elaborate and explain why (PROPOSITION4) 
12. Did your company put together a specific integration team organised by top 
managers for the management of the post-acquisition integration? Please elaborate and 
explain why. (PROPOSITION4) 
13. What do you think of the relevance of communication between acquiring and 
acquired companies during the integration process? Please explain your answer (with 
examples). (PROPOSITION6) 
14. What do you think of the relevance of cultural differences between the acquiring 
and acquired companies? Please elaborate and explain why. (PROPOSITION5) 
15. Has your company even been subjected to interventions by government authorities 
from either the home or host countries in the post-acquisition integration phase? Please 
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elaborate and explain the reasons. (PROPOSITION5) 
16. What do you think of the importance of the degree of social integration in the 
combined organisation? Please elaborate and explain the reasons. (PROPOSITION5) 
 
Supplementary questions: 
17. What do you think are the other aims of the management of the post-acquisition 
integration in the achievement of a successful M&A? 
18. What other factors do you think should be considered in the management of the 
post-acquisition integration phase? Why? 
19. Have you ever been faced with any problems or difficulties after the M&A deals? 
Please elaborate and explain why. 
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Background: 
1. 请问你在贵公司的工作经历是怎样的？目前担任什么职务，具体承担的工作
任务是什么？ 
2. 你能简要的介绍一下贵公司所进行的海外并购活动吗？ 
3. 当初要进行这项并购的动机和目的是什么？ 
4. 就目前的情况来讲，这些目的达到了吗？或着正在逐渐的达到吗？ 
5. 你觉得此次并购的效果如何？成功了吗？可以从你看重的角度来理解成功与
否，比如销售额，利润，市场占有率，获取的无形资产，或者是公司战略计划的执行
等。 
 
General questions: 
6. 你觉得并购交易达成后，母公司针对两个公司的融合所需要进行的管理工作
对于并购成功与否是否重要？ 
7. 你是如何理解并购完成后对企业的整合和管理工作的？在你的实际操作中有
没有进行这方面的工作？是如何来进行的？ 
8. 你觉得在并购后整合和管理方面，有哪些关键因素是对整个并购的成败有影
响的？为什么？ 
 
Questions by propositions: 
9. 你是否在整合过程中发现公司有一部分已有的知识（例如对相关行业的了解，
对被收购的公司业务的了解，或公司已有的一些管理能力等）对于此次并购整合有帮
助？如果有，请详细说明，并解释原因。(PROPOSITION1) 
10. 你认为是否应该在完成并购后马上进行整合？（还是说应该等一段时间来让
双方互相了解。）为什么？整合的程度如何？(PROPOSITION2&3) 
11. 你们对被并购公司的员工是怎么处理的？对中层经理以及高级经理呢？这
样做是出于什么样的考虑？(PROPOSITION4) 
12. 你们是否有建立一个专门负责并购后整合的管理团队？请详细解释并说明
原因。(PROPOSITION4) 
13. 你觉得并购后两个公司在各个方面的沟通是否对整个企业的整合起到关键
的影响呢？请详细解释并说明原因。(PROPOSITION6) 
14. 在整合过程中是否遇到一些因为文化差异而产生的问题呢？比如语言，国外
的法律制度，外国人不同的文化，等等。你们又是如何处理的呢？(PROPOSITION5) 
15. 整合过程中是否有受到两国政府机构不同程度的影响？如果有，是如何影响
的？(PROPOSITION5) 
16. 公司是否有意识的试图在并购后建立一个和谐的融洽的企业氛围，试图加强
与被收购企业的沟通，使得双方能够在结构和氛围上都融为一体？如果没有，你觉得
这样做会对并购的成功有帮助吗？有哪些行为可以促进融洽企业氛围的构建？
(PROPOSITION5) 
 
Supplementary questions: 
17. 你认为还有那些东西是并购后整合所需要追求的？为什么？ 
18.你认为还有哪些因素是整合过程中需要考虑的？为什么？ 
19. 企业并购后整合过程中还出现过哪些问题？或者说困难。 
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4.5.1.2 Recording interview data  
 
Recording interview data soon after it has been gathered is deemed essential to control 
bias and produce data reliable for research. Whenever permission is granted, the use 
of an audio recorder is the prevailing way in which interview data are recorded. It 
provides a more accurate interview rendition than other methods (Yin, 2002). The 
interview data collected by audio recorder can be played back by the researchers and 
it allows for the use of direct quotes in the case reports. Recording verbal information 
instead of taking notes allow the interviewers to concentrate on the content and 
context of the interview. This is particularly helpful for researchers conducting 
semi-structured interviews since it gives them time to think about what is being said 
and raise specific questions related to the information provided by the interviewees. 
Moreover, non-verbal cues, such as facial expressions and postures, can also be 
picked up by interviewers who do not need to record all the information by taking 
written notes (Ghauri, 2005; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the interviews conducted in this research were mainly documented by 
means of an audio recorder. Specifically, a digital audio recorder was adopted to 
partly compensate for one of the most serious drawbacks linked to the use of 
recorders in interviews, i.e. interviewees ‗focusing‘ on the recorder instead of 
concentrating on the interview itself. Compared to traditional tape recorders, digital 
one are much smaller, and tend to ‗attract‘ interviewees attention less, effectively 
reducing the potential stress caused to interviewees by talking into a relatively big 
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machine. During most interviews, a digital audio recorder and an audio recorder 
application on the interviewer‘s mobile phone were used simultaneously so as to 
largely counteract another disadvantage of audio recorders: the risk of technical 
problems. In addition, compared with using two digital audio recorders, using a smart 
phone as a secondary recorder can also reduce the pressure on interviewees, as mobile 
phones area common commodity in most people‘s daily lives and they are used to 
talking into them. It should be noted that audio recording is rather frowned upon in 
Chinese culture (Xiao et al., 2013). The interviewees were asked whether they would 
agree to it. Although some interviewees were reluctant, most did, which largely 
increased the reliability of the collected interview data
10
. 
 
Although this research adopted digital audio recording as the main way of 
documenting the interview data, note taking was also used as a complementary 
recording method. Some scholars suggest that taking notes during interviews and 
compiling a full interview record immediately after the interview can be used as a 
back-up if an audio recorder fails to work (Robson, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009); 
however, this researcher considers note taking to be an important complementary 
approach to interview documentation. Although audio recorders capture all verbal 
information, including tones and hesitations, some significant non-verbal cues, such 
as facial expressions and postures, may be missed without the aid of note taking 
during interviews. Contextual data, such as the time and location of the interview, 
                                                             
10
The reason of such a high rate of acceptance for audio recording could be attributed to the way in which the 
author obtained access to the interviewees, which was by being introduced to the CEOs/presidents of the firms by 
high local government officials.  
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were also recorded by note taking. Moreover, taking notes during the listening process 
can help interviewers to maintain their concentration (Ghauri, 2005). In those cases in 
which interviewees refused to be audio recorded, notes were taken during the 
interviews and a record was written up immediately after.  
 
A small proportion of the interviews were conducted by telephone. Telephone 
interviews provide researchers with the opportunity to contact participants with whom 
it would be impractical to conduct face to face interviews due to their locations. In 
this research, telephone interviews were mainly used to collect interview data from 
some of the participants from the acquired firms. These interviewees were spread 
among different countries, so it would have been expensive and time consuming to 
conduct face to face interviews, especially for a Chinese researcher who would have 
needed different visas to enter into these countries. Therefore, although there are a 
number of difficulties associated with collecting qualitative interview data by 
telephone, such as establishing trust and controlling the interview pace, telephone 
interviews were is still a helpful way in which to enrich the interview data of this 
research. In addition, efforts were made to compensate for the disadvantages of the 
telephone interviews. For example, telephone interviews have been criticised for 
providing unreliable data when the interviewees were less willing to engage in 
discussion due to the lack of establishment of trust and personal contact (Saunders et 
al., 2009). In this study, all telephone interviews were conducted during the very late 
stages of the data collection, when the credibility of the interviewer had been already 
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established with these interviewees by means of recommendations and introductions 
by their colleagues who had previously been involved in face to face interviews; thus, 
personal contact and trust had been established before the interviews even took place. 
 
4.5.1.3 Interviewing competency and data quality issues 
 
Saunders et al. (2009) suggest that, in semi-structured interviews, interviewers need to 
develop and demonstrate competencies in some areas so as to enhance the quality of 
the data collected. These areas include the use of appropriate language, listening and 
questioning skills, location selection, etc. Building a sound interviewing competency 
and paying special attention to relevant interview issues can help researchers to 
improve the reliability of the interview data as well as the validity of the research. 
 
The value and reliability of the information collected through semi-structured 
interviews may be limited should the researcher fail to gain the trust of the 
interviewees or be unable to build sufficient personal credibility (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008; Saunders et al., 2009). The credibility of the interviewer and the trust of the 
participants were firmly established at the beginning of or even before the interviews 
since all firms in this study were accessed from the top down. In other words, both the 
access and the establishment of trust started from the top executive level so that all the 
other interviewees were introduced by or under the permission of the top executives 
of their respective firms. Therefore, an implied trust was established between 
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interviewer and interviewees based on that of the top executives. Additionally, before 
each interview, the interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and were informed that 
the data collected would only be used for the research linked to the author‘s PhD 
project and academic publications (and mostly in English), so that their wariness and 
anxiety could be effectively appeased. This was particularly relevant for the top 
executives of these leading Chinese firms, to increase their sense of security and 
enable them to provide accurate information and genuine perceptions in a way they 
could or would not if, for instance, they were talking to the press.  
 
A researcher should be able to read between the lines and understand not only what is 
said but also what is meant (Siebers, 2011). In fact, the latter is widely considered to 
be more significant (Ghauri, 2005). In the Chinese context, real meanings are usually 
hidden deep among the words, especially in conversations with top executives. In this 
case, it was essential that the researcher immediately understand the true meanings 
expressed by the interviewee, to be able to formulate further pertinent questions about 
the issues mentioned. These abilities were already well developed and possessed by 
the author due to his work experience as an officer in Chinese local government. 
Having previously been in contact with many top managers and government officers, 
the author was able to capture and interpret the meanings behind the words of the 
people in this social hierarchy, which strongly increased the reliability of the data 
acquired through the interviews.  
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Attentive listening skills are another essential element of interview competency. 
Although the exploration and probing of explanations and meanings is necessary for 
conducting semi-structured interviews, the interviewer should also be a very good 
listener, giving the interviewees sufficient time to develop their responses. Possessing 
good listening skills also requires the interviewers to avoid projecting their personal 
views into the conversation, while not implying that they should be passive (Robson, 
2002; Ghauri, 2005; Saunders et al., 2009). During the interviews, the author tried to 
acknowledge what was being conveyed by the interviewees by means of both eye 
contact and body language, such as nodding. This has been proven to be very useful to 
help make the interviewees feel more at ease because it instils the impression of the 
interviewer listening attentively and showing approval. It is considered to be 
particularly useful in interviewing Chinese middle managers who have seldom been 
involved in academic interviews and may, to a certain extent, be lacking in 
confidence. 
 
The suitability of the location may also affect an interview or even influence the data 
quality. An convenient and comfortable interview location which can insulate 
interviewees from distractions can help them to relax and to concentrate on delivering 
their information (Siebers, 2011). In this study, most face to face interviews were 
conducted in the meeting rooms of the acquiring firms or in the interviewees‘ offices. 
The atmosphere deriving from ‗talking in their personal space‘ provided the 
participants with an adequate sense of safety and alleviated any feelings of stress.  
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Special attention was also paid to the sequence of the interviews in any specific case 
in this research. Generally speaking, middle managers were interviewed before top 
executives. This was mainly because top executives could only allocate a limited 
amount of time to their interviews. The Presidents and/or CEOs of large Chinese firms 
are not only in charge of the operation of the whole company, but also take on certain 
political roles or political duties, which makes their schedules very busy. The 
interviews conducted with these people needed to be highly efficient due to the 
limited interview time allocated. In the meantime, the evidence and arguments of top 
executives were extremely valuable and insightful. They were able to answer most 
‗why‘ questions that could not be answered by the middle managers. Therefore, the 
interviewer needed get the most out of the conversations with the top executives in a 
limited time frame. In this case, the author started by interviewing the middle 
managers. On the one hand, the practice honed the interviewer‘s ability to probe the 
questions and reconstruct what had been said. On the other hand, some issues which 
could not be deeply dissected by middle managers due to their positions, such as some 
‗why‘ questions and strategic issues, were specifically emphasised in the 
conversations with the top executives. 
 
4.5.2 Secondary data 
 
Secondary data can be either qualitative or quantitative and is widely used as part of 
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case studies in management and business research. Research that uses secondary data 
usually has an inherent advantage over that that only gathers primary data (Saunders 
et al., 2009). The secondary data in this study were mainly of a qualitative 
documentary nature and were collected from numerous internal and external sources 
which covered both the background to the CBMAs and the whole acquisition process, 
from the pre-to the post-acquisition stage. Qualitative data can provide great insight 
into complex social processes that quantitative data cannot easily reveal and are in 
line with the aim and design of this research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Some 
secondary quantitative data were also obtained, but only for qualitative research 
purposes.  
 
The collection of the documentary data lasted practically throughout the whole 
research, from March 2010 to October 2013. This implies that the data collection 
overlapped the data analysis, which is a key element and an advantage of case study 
based research (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Documentary data are significant to almost all case study topics for corroborating and 
augmenting the evidence obtained from other sources. If the documentary data from 
different sources contradicts or is not consistent with the primary data collected 
through the interviews, further inquiries need to be made. Moreover, documentary 
data can not only provide researchers with background and prior related knowledge 
relating to the cases, but can also enable the researcher to make inferences from the 
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documentation. These inferences can be further corroborated and explored by means 
of interviews and may bring about interesting emerging findings. However, 
over-reliance on documentary data should be avoided in case study based research. 
Researchers need to bear in mind that all documentation is written for specific 
purposes and specific audiences (Yin, 2002).  
 
The documentary data in this research include both printed materials – such as books, 
journals, newspapers, top managers‘ memos, important speeches by CEOs, strategic, 
annual and media reports, government reports and websites, and case studies on these 
firms –and non-printed materials – such as video-biographies, TV programmes, etc. 
Some internal documentation data collected from the headquarters of firms, such as 
the companies‘ strategic and acquisition reports, are valuable and are not accessible by 
the public. Such documentation was carefully studied by the author before moving on 
to the next interview so that some detailed information was also adopted and explored 
to enrich the data set. Government policies, reports, and websites provided reliable 
data on the firms‘ external institutions, while corporate annual reports, websites, and 
newsletters proved valuable to analyse the firms‘ internal institutions. Books, journals, 
newspapers, portals and major business websites were also crucial sources of 
documentary data. These sources included the China Mergers and Acquisitions 
Yearbook, China Daily, China Business Weekly, Sina Finance, Netease Finance, 
Tencent Finance, Wall Street Journal, Xinhua net, etc. The relevant documentation 
obtained through these sources required systematic searches. Moreover, these 
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documentary data were collected based on the awareness that all documents, 
especially materials from the media, were written for specific purposes and audiences 
other than those of the case studies (Yin, 2002). To prevent the author to be misled by 
false information, all the relevant information obtained from portals and major 
business websites was carefully cross-checked for reliability. In addition, previous 
academic and practical studies in Chinese relevant to the cases in this study were also 
collected as important secondary documentation. The main source of these data were 
the Wanfang DATA and CNKI databases. Although most of the documentary data 
mentioned above was derived from printed sources, there were also non-printed 
materials, such as the video biography of TCL and of its president Mr Li, as well as 
some TV news items about acquisition activities and interviews with CEOs. Table 4.6 
summarises the relevant secondary data used in this study. 
 
In addition to documentary data, site observations also provided useful information 
for the case study, especially relating to context. Between June and September 2012, 
the author visited the headquarters of three of the acquiring firms. Specific date and 
other information is listed in table 4.7.  
 
Table 4.6 Main secondary data  
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1. Central and local governmental reports, studies, and statistical data, rules on the 
examination of the outward M&A of Chinese firms, and regulations and policies on 
outward FDI and M&A. 
 
2. Studies and reports by institutions and departments such as the Central Bureau of 
Statistics, MOFCOM, SAFE, World Bank, and WTO.  
 
3. Company websites, company documents and reports such as M&A and strategy 
reports. 
 
4. Press interviews, official websites, portal websites, and major business websites 
such as Sina Finance, Netease Finance, Tencent Finance, Wall Street Journal, etc. 
 
5. Books, journals, newspapers such as the China Mergers and Acquisitions 
Yearbook, China Daily, China Business Weekly. 
 
6. Textbooks, journals, theses and other published materials directly or indirectly 
related to the research field. 
 
7. Non-printed materials, such as video biographies, interviews, special TV 
programmes on relevant persons and activities. 
 
4.5.3 Summary of the data collection  
The data collection of this study rested on two pillars. Multiple sources of data and 
data collection methods were applied. The primary data was collected through 
semi-structured interviews. The secondary data was sourced from copious internal and 
external documentation. One of the major contributions of this research rests in the 
data collection part, which gained access to the senior executives of the acquiring 
firms. At least two top executives of each firm were interviewed, including several 
CEOs/Presidents, who were the main designers of the CBMA deals and of the 
post-acquisition integration strategies. The ample interview data from these leaders 
helped the researcher gain an in-depth insight into the strategic and organisational 
knowledge of the firms, and fully answer the relevant ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions 
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(Adler et al., 1989; Yin, 2002). Table 4.7 summarises the data collection details 
including interview number, site visit time, documentation collection and research 
period. 
 
Table 4.7 Data collection summary 
 YTO and 
McCormick 
TCL and 
Thomson 
Cijian and 
Way Assauto 
CITIC and 
Gandara 
Censa 
Research  
period 
Mainly between 
February 2012 
and June 2013 
Mainly 
between 
February 
2012 and 
June 2013 
Mainly 
between 
February 
2012 and 
June 2013 
Mainly 
between 
February 2012 
and June 2013 
Document 
collection 
Books, journals, 
newspapers, 
press interviews, 
company 
websites, portal 
websites, 
company 
documents and 
reports, and 
some 
non-printed 
materials 
Books, 
journals, 
newspapers, 
press 
interviews, 
company 
websites, 
portal 
websites, 
company 
documents 
and reports, 
and some 
non-printed 
materials 
Books, 
journals, 
newspapers, 
press 
interviews, 
company 
websites, 
portal 
websites, 
company 
documents 
and reports, 
and some 
non-printed 
materials 
Books, 
journals, 
newspapers, 
press 
interviews, 
company 
websites, portal 
websites, 
company 
documents and 
reports. 
Site visit Tour of 
headquarters on 
07/06/2012 and 
08/06/2012 
Face to face 
interviews 
conducted in 
the Beijing 
Branch on 
27/08/2012 
Tour of 
headquarters 
in Nanyang 
on 
27/06/2012 
Tour of 
headquarters on 
11/06/2012 
Interviews 
conducted 
Five face to face 
interviews 
conducted in 
Three face to 
face 
interviews 
Four face to 
face 
interviews 
Seven face to 
face interviews 
conducted in 
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June 2012 and 
two telephone 
interviews 
conducted in 
June 2013 
conducted in 
August 2012 
and one 
telephone 
interview 
conducted in 
June 2013 
conducted in 
June 2012 
and two 
telephone 
interviews 
conducted in 
June 2013 
June 2012 
Interview 
length 
(each) 
One to two 
hours 
One to two 
hours 
One to two 
hours 
One to two 
hours 
Total 
Interviews 
24    
 
4.6 Data analysis 
 
Yin (2002) defines data analysis as ―examining, categorising, tabulating, testing, or 
otherwise recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address the initial 
propositions of a study‖. Being the heart of theory building from case studies, the 
analysis of case study evidence is one of the most difficult and least codified parts of 
the case study process. Most academic publications that use the case study strategy 
place more emphasis on the research design and data collection methods, while 
allocating little space to the discussion of analysis. This leaves a huge chasm 
separating the data from the results and findings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2002). 
However, several key features of data analysis can be identified and are discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
4.6.1 Data analysis strategies: relying on theoretical propositions 
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Before selecting an analytical tool, the first priority is to adopt a general analytic 
strategy. This strategy can help researchers to more efficiently and effectively 
manipulate and use tools to analyse the data fairly and produce compelling analytical 
conclusions. Yin (2002) introduced three general analytic strategies: relying on 
theoretical propositions, setting up frameworks based on rival explanations, and 
developing case descriptions. This study adopted the first and most preferred strategy 
proposed by Yin, namely relying on theoretical propositions. 
 
The main rationale for choosing this analytic strategy is because propositions are 
reflections of the research questions and objectives, and the original design of the case 
studies in this research was based on theoretical propositions. On the one hand, 
propositions can help researchers to concentrate on the crucial data in the massive 
data set. This is particularly significant in the research of complex, contextual and 
process-based CBMA phenomena. On the other hand, propositions can help to 
organise the entire case study and encourage alternative explanations and emerging 
themes. In case studies answering ―how‖ and ―why‖ questions, theoretical 
propositions are considered particularly useful in guiding the case study analysis (Yin, 
2002).  
 
4.6.2 Analytical technique: Pattern matching 
 
The chosen data analysis involves a number of specific analytical techniques that Yin 
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(2002) suggested to be applicable to qualitative analysis. These analytical techniques 
reflect how the deductive perspective that underpins them influences the processes for 
analysing qualitative data (Saunders et al., 2009). Among them, this study adopts the 
pattern matching analytical technique.  
 
Pattern matching refers to predicting a pattern of outcomes based on theoretical 
propositions to explain some expected findings (Yin, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009). In 
the use of this technique, the researcher should develop a framework before collecting 
and analysing the data, and then test the adequacy of this framework as a means to 
explain the findings (Yin, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009). To explain a phenomenon is to 
stipulate a presumed set of causal links, which may reflect critical insights into 
existing theories or lead to the building of new theories (Yin, 2002).  
 
Six propositions were set up in Chapter 2 based on previous relevant literature. The 
four cases will be individually analysed following each proposition. If the pattern of 
the data matches the prediction of the proposed framework, the explanation will be 
validated; If one or more outcomes that have not been predicted by the propositions 
will be arrived at, an alternative explanation will be sought (Yin, 2002; Saunders et al., 
2009). In addition, this study will also follow Eisenhardt‘s (1989) suggestion of 
moving from case to cross-case analysis. After analysing each individual case, the 
analysis of each proposition will be undertaken across all four cases. The single case 
reports are in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the cross case analysis and the results of 
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the study. 
 
4.6.3 Analytical processes and procedures 
 
The data analysis process starts with the transcription of the raw data. The process of 
transcribing audio recorded interview data is time consuming since both the words 
spoken by the interviewee and the way in which they were articulated are significant 
for the research. Some non-verbal information, such as facial expressions and gestures, 
were recorded by hand during the interview while others, such as tones and pauses, 
need to be noted in the transcription. Due to the nature of semi-structured interviews, 
the questions asked by the interviewer were also transcribed. In order to ensure the 
accuracy of the data transcribed, all the audio files were played back three times. 
Transcription and understanding errors were corrected through this process, which is 
also known as data cleaning (Saunders et al., 2009). The recorded interview data were 
originally in Chinese. The huge differences that exist between the written and spoken 
Chinese language made the transcription process even more difficult. The data were 
transcribed and analysed in Chinese. 
 
Once the interview data has been transcribed, it is generally considered to be an 
unreduced form of display, which is hard to analyse due to its massive amount and 
downright disorder. In this case, Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that the 
process of doing analysis start with summarising and simplifying the collected data, 
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also called data reduction, and follow with data display, conclusion drawing and 
verification. Their arguments are in accord with those of Saunders et al.‘s (2009) 
typology of the qualitative data analysis process, which consists in the summarising, 
categorisation and structuring of meanings through the use of narrative. The logic 
underlying their data analysis processes emphasise the researcher‘s interaction with 
the data in order to comprehend, summarise and integrate the data drawn from 
different sources, identify key patterns or themes, develop theories based on those 
patterns and draw and verify conclusions (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Saunders et al., 
2009).  
 
As an analytical procedure widely used to deal with textual material ranging from 
interview to documentary data, content analysis by means of the thematic analysis of 
text is applied in the data analysis process (Bryman, 2012). In order to minimise 
participant observation biases (Xiao et al., 2013), all primary data was collected and 
firstly analysed by the author, while the supervisor played the role of ―devil‘s 
advocate‖ in the data analysis process so that he could remain more objective with 
regard to the evidence instead of becoming immersed in case details (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Both the interview and documentary data in this research were analysed 
through the application of thematic text analysis. The documentary data were used to 
support and triangulate the interview data. Specifically, on the one hand, the 
documentary data played an important role in setting up the research context and 
providing the background for this research with relevant figures and textual materials. 
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On the other hand, the documentary data can support and justify the interview data by 
means of triangulation to achieve more accurate answers to the research questions. As 
the collection of the documentary data covered the whole research period, it provided 
the author with related knowledge prior to conducting the interviews; thus, the 
triangulation process could even be implemented prior to the data analysis process. 
 
In addition to undertaking the data analysis manually, researchers can also use 
computer aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), such as Nvivo, to code 
and categorise the large amount of data collected from both open-ended interviews 
and documentation. Nowadays, some researchers use such software as an aid in the 
content analysis process. The author chose not to use Nvivo for this research for two 
main reasons. First, most of the data collected in this study were in Chinese. Many 
Chinese expressions have the same or similar meanings; thus, the author would have 
had to go through them one by one to revise them before using Nvivo to code or 
categorise. However, the process of distinguishing expressions with similar meanings 
is, to a certain extent, akin to the actual coding process, which made the use of Nvivo 
virtually redundant. Second, the greatest benefit linked to the use of CAQDAS is 
usually derived in empirical studies that are aimed at achieving insights from the word 
usage and frequency patterns in the data, which is not the case of this research. 
Therefore, all the data in this study were analysed manually. 
 
Based on the above discussion of the data analysis process and in accordance with 
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Eisenhardt‘s (1989) suggestion of moving from within case analysis to cross case 
analysis, this study first saw the individual case analyses being performed based on 
the theoretical propositions; in this process, each case was considered as a stand-alone 
entity. The author followed Yin‘s (2002) data analysis procedure, starting from the 
transcription of raw data. All primary data were transcribed and analysed in Chinese 
because the interview data were originally collected in Chinese. The transcribed data 
was then content-analysed through the summarising, categorising, and structuring of 
meanings using narrative. Next, individual cases were analysed based on the 
theoretical propositions; according to these, the first order coding was structured 
based on both relevance and frequency
11
.The findings for each case were compared 
with the propositions. These propositions were then revised if needed. For example, 
―cultural differences‖ was revised to become ―cultural differences and cultural 
integration‖. Individual case analyses typically produce individual case reports; thus, 
through the process of data comprehension, summarising, integration, categorisation 
and structuring, individual case reports were written based on the theoretical 
propositions.  
 
After finishing the individual case analyses, the cross-case analysis was conducted to 
search for patterns. The search for patterns in data is considered to be the key theme 
of data analysis in case studies. Patton and Appelbaum (2003) claim that the ultimate 
goal of case studies is to build theory by uncovering patterns, determining meanings 
                                                             
11
The first order codes are broad conceptual categories driving the research. They were coded according to their 
Chinese meanings. 
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and constructing conclusions. This study follows Yin‘s (2002) pattern matching logic: 
if the predicted patterns of outcomes based on theoretical propositions coincide with 
empirically built patterns, the results can help to strengthen the internal validity of this 
study (Yin, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009). Following pattern matching logic, the author 
iteratively sought patterns across cases by a cyclical reading and re-reading of 
empirical data to come to the findings, with representative quotations drawn from the 
interview data provided to support the analysis. These quotations were translated by 
the second author before being back translated by a bilingual native English speaker 
to ensure consistency. A careful review and equivalence check was conducted by the 
author (Douglas & Craig, 2007). 
 
Although this study adopted a data analysis strategy of reliance on theoretical 
propositions, it still valued the unique patterns and emerging themes of each case 
before seeking common patterns across cases (Yin, 2002). Some general and 
supplementary interview questions were deliberately designed to explore emerging 
themes, such as ―8. what do you think are the key success factors in the management 
of the post-acquisition integration‖, ―18. what other factors do you think should be 
considered in the management of the post-acquisition integration phase? Why?‖, ―19. 
have you even been faced with any problems or difficulties after the M&Ａ deals? 
Please elaborate and explain why‖. In the data analysis process, emerging key issues 
and themes were coded based on both relevance and frequency. In addition, this study 
also adopted Eisenhardt‘s (1989) suggestion of finding emerging patterns in the cross 
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case analysis. All emerging patterns drawn from individual case studies were prepared 
for pattern matching in the cross-case analysis; after this, the identified emerging 
patterns were included in the final model. Patton and Appelbaum (2003) argue that 
tying emerging patterns to the existing literature can enhance the internal validity and 
the theoretical level of the theories built by means of case studies. In this case, the 
themes emerging from the data were compared with the existing literature. The 
comparison of emerging concepts or themes with the extant literature involved 
identifying similarities and divergences (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Explaining the post-acquisition value creation process and the relationships between 
these key success factors is even more difficult than identifying the key factors and 
patterns. The author relied on both deductive and inductive reasoning processes to 
explain and structure the final model (Patriotta et al., 2013). For example, during the 
analytical process, the author tried to take an absorptive capacity perspective as an 
intermediary to explain the transfer of capabilities from the acquired firms to the 
Chinese acquirers. Two scanned sketches are provided in appendix 3 to demonstrate 
the iteratively analytical process. 
 
Finally and based on the themes and relationships emerged from the data, the 
theoretical framework was illustrated and informed by discussing the four cases with 
the purpose of obtaining insights into the key factors in the management of the 
post-acquisition integration of Chinese firms‘ outward M&As and into how these 
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factors affect the post-acquisition integration process and M&A performance. This 
study developed very precise patterns, which helped to reduce the possibility of 
over-leniency in confirming pattern matches (Yin, 2002).  
 
4.6.4 The quality of the data analysis 
 
In order to achieve a high quality of data analysis, the data were analysed based on the 
following principles: First, all the evidence was given attention. The analysis showed 
that it sought as much relevant evidence as was available and that the interpretations 
covered all of this evidence. Second, the most relevant aspects of the case studies 
were emphasised and given the most attention. Finally, the expert knowledge of the 
author in this study field was provided for the readers. 
 
4.7 Research design justification 
 
The quality and creditability of a qualitative research cannot simply be ensured by 
output control. ―All you can do is reduce the possibility of getting the answer wrong‖ 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p. 156). Therefore, validity and reliability have to be built into 
the research design and analysis process. Pauwels and Matthyssens (2004) suggest 
that the validity of a research can be achieved by carefully crafting the research design, 
data collecting methods, data analysis strategy and procedures. This was done in this 
research and stated throughout this chapter. 
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Yin (2002) believes that the criteria for judging the quality of research designs 
deserves more explicit attention and suggests performing more complex tests than the 
standard ones that deal with the concepts of validity and reliability. In this case, he 
recommends four tests for establishing the quality of empirical social research: 
construct, internal and external validity, and reliability. Table 4.8 summarises the case 
study tactics used in this study to enhance the validity and reliability of the research. 
 
Table 4.8  Case study tactics for research design justification 
Tests Case study tactic 
 
 
Construct validity Using multiple sources of evidence; 
Establishing a chain of evidence; 
Having key informants review draft 
case study reports 
Internal validity Performing pattern matching; 
Addressing rival explanations 
External validity Using replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
Reliability Using a case study protocol; 
Developing a case study database 
  
Source: Yin (2002) 
 
Construct validity refers to the establishment of correct operational measures for the 
research. The construct validity problem in case studies can be identified in the 
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criticism levelled at researchers conducting case studies of always failing to develop 
sufficiently operational measures and using subjective judgments to collect data (Yin, 
2002). This issue was counteracted by using multiple sources of evidence and sending 
individual case reports to key participants for reviewing and checking.  
 
Internal validity should be addressed in explanatory case studies due to the question 
of whether a relationship is of causal or just of a spurious nature. This study used 
different means to increase the internal validity of the various research processes. For 
example, in the data collection phase, both face-to-face interview and documentary 
data were collected to allow for triangulation and, in the data analysis process, a 
pattern matching logic was applied. These approaches were all helpful in dealing with 
the overall problem of making inferences and in substantially improving the internal 
validity of the research (Yin, 2002). 
 
External validity is also called generalisation, which refers to whether and to what 
extent the research results can be generalised beyond the immediate case study 
(Saunders, et al, 2009). Although case studies cannot provide statistical generalisation 
as can survey-based research, they can provide analytical generalisation, by which the 
research can generalise a particular set of results to a broader theory (Yin, 2002; 
Pauwels and Matthyssens, 2004). By using replication logic in its cross-case analysis, 
this study can, to a certain extent, provide generalisation within the research context. 
A lack of statistical generalisability does not preclude case studies from having a 
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strong explanatory contribution to offer (Welch, et al., 2011). 
 
Reliability refers to the extent to which a research can arrive at the same findings if 
conducted by different scholars following the same data collection techniques and 
analysis procedures (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008; Saunders, et al, 2009). This study 
addressed reliability issues through the whole research design and data analysis 
processes. In addition, a case study database was developed to allow other 
investigators to repeat this research or conduct others based on the evidence. Setting 
up a case study database which combines both interview and documentation data can 
significantly increase the reliability of a case study (Yin, 2002). 
 
4.8 Role of the researcher 
 
Researcher reflexivity is the process whereby researchers report on the personal 
beliefs, values, and biases that may shape their inquiry during the research (Creswell 
and Millier, 2000). In a qualitative study, researchers should acknowledge and 
describe any entry beliefs and biases and suspend them as the study proceeds. This is 
an important way in which the validity of a research can be improved (Creswell and 
Millier, 2000).  
 
Human values are the guiding motive of all human action (Heron, 1996). The role that 
a researcher‘s own values play in all stages of the research process is fundamental to 
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its credibility and reliability (Saunders et al., 2009). Axiology refers to a study‘s 
judgements about value. The philosophy adopted in this research was positivism. 
Accordingly, the axiology used suggests that the research was undertaken in a 
value-free way, and that the researcher was independent of the data and maintained an 
objective stance. For example, the primary data was mainly collected by means of 
interviews, rather than questionnaires, because the former method was more in tune 
with the research design, and not because the researcher valued personal interaction 
with the respondents more highly than the views they would have expressed through 
questionnaires. Similarly, during the data analysis process, the researcher attended to 
all the evidence, and the interpretations accounted for all of this evidence. In the 
writing up stage, sufficient evidence was displayed without researcher bias. 
 
4.9 Chapter Conclusion  
 
This chapter introduced the methodology of the study. A multiple case study method 
was applied and four representative cases were chosen following a replication logic. 
Semi-structured interviews were selected and conducted to be the source of the 
primary data, which was triangulated against a myriad of documentary data. The data 
analysis moved from individual case analyses based on theoretical propositions to a 
cross-case analysis following a pattern matching logic. Validity and reliability were 
built into the research design and analysis process. The triangulation of multiple data 
sources helped to achieve construct validity. External validity was achieved by 
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adopting a replication logic design in the various case studies; internal validity was 
achieved by applying pattern matching and the development of a case study database 
enhanced the reliability of the study. China‘s unique institutional context required the 
author to have special abilities in conducting the case study research and helped him 
to gain experience in interviewing senior executives of Chinese MNEs.  
 
Chapter 5 – Individual case reports 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces four individual case study reports. Each single case analysis 
takes up one section and is organised based on the propositions set up in Chapter 3. 
Each section starts with an introduction to both the acquiring and acquired firms and 
then moves on to a brief description of the transaction. Next, the strategic intents of 
the Chinese acquirers are discussed before moving on to the analysis of the key 
success factors for the management of the post-acquisition integration process.  
 
5.1 Individual case report: YTO Group‟s acquisition of McCormick 
 
5.1.1 Introduction and background 
 
5.1.1.1 Introduction to the YTO Group 
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The YTO Group Corporation, also known as the China Yituo Group Corporation, is a 
leading Chinese agricultural and construction machinery manufacturer. It was 
established in 1955 and was previously called the China First Tractor & Construction 
Machinery Corporation. It is located in Luo Yang city, Henan province, which is in 
the centre of China and well-known for its agriculture, total population, total 
cultivated area and Shaolin Temple. On the 23
rd
 of March 2008, the state-owned 
Luoyang Asset Management Company transferred 67% of the YTO Group‘s shares to 
the China National Machinery Industry Corporation (also known as Sinomach) for 
free. As atypical SOE, the YTO Group became a subsidiary of Sinomach, the largest 
machinery manufacturer in China, following the guidance, support, and directives of 
the Chinese government (YTO official website, 2013).  
 
Since its founding in 1955, the YTO Group has evolved into a comprehensive 
enterprise dealing with manufactured goods and the supply of agricultural, 
construction and power machinery, vehicles, and parts. It produced the first tractors, 
road rollers, and cross-country trucks in China. Its best-known products, such as the 
‗Dong fang hong‘ series crawler tractors, have become iconic for most Chinese, who 
perceive them to represent the old era. The YTO brand has won the Chinese Top 
Brand and Recommended Export Brand awards. A considerable proportion of its main 
production portfolio – high power wheel tractors, crawler tractors, agricultural 
construction machinery and so on – occupies the number one slot in the domestic 
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market. The primary products of the YTO Group are also popular with customers 
from around the world. Through its international marketing network, the YTO 
Group‘s products are sold in over one hundred countries and regions globally (YTO 
official website, 2013). In 2010, before the acquisition, the YTO Group‘s annual sales 
revenue totalled 14.5 billion CNY, 19.8% higher than the 12.1 billion CNY it had 
achieved in 2009 (Xinhua, 2011). For convenience of analysis, Table 5.1 lists the YTO 
Group‘s profile and some details about its M&A activity.  
 
Table 5.1 The acquiring firm‘s profile and M&A activities 
 
 YTO Group Corporation 
Time of M&A 07/03/2011 
Core business Agricultural, construction and power 
machinery, vehicles, and parts. 
Industry status  First tractor manufacturer in China. 
Number one slot in the internal market. 
Motivation of M&A Strategic intent. Seeking technology, 
markets, and brands. 
Name and location of 
acquired firm 
McCormick France Corporation (France) 
Ownership structure SOE 
Annual revenue before the M&A in 
CNY 
14.5 billion 
 
Price of M&A in CNY 70million(roughly) 
Sources: Annual reports, corporate documents and interview data. 
 
5.1.1.2 Introduction to McCormick 
 
The McCormick France Corporation was a professional manufacturer of transmission 
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systems for tractors founded in the 1950s and located in Saint Dizier in the 
north-eastern Champagne Province of France. Before being acquired by the YTO 
Group, McCormick was a subsidiary of the Italian ARGO Group. McCormick‘s main 
production was transmission systems for tractors ranging from 90 to 230 HP and in 
three varieties: synchronizer, partial power and full power gearboxes. McCormick‘s 
production technology met the prevailing mainstream international standards 
(McCormick, 2013). 
 
Since 2003, for various reasons, McCormick had been gradually going downhill. By 
2009, its accumulated losses amounted to over 15 million Euros. In 2005, the 
company had implemented a plan to reduce its workforce from 712 to 250. On the 
7
th
of December 2010, McCormick announced bankruptcy liquidation. Two Chinese 
agricultural machinery producers, the YTO Group and Foton Lovol International 
Heavy Industry Co. Ltd, made a bid for McCormick in the French Chaumont 
commerce court; YTO placed the winning bid with an investment volume of 8million 
Euros.  
 
5.1.1.3 The M&A activity 
 
On the 7
th
 of March 2011, the YTO Group Corporation successfully completed its 
acquisition of McCormick France S.A.S.. The deal was worth 8 million Euros (11.19 
million US dollars). From 8am on the 8
th
 of March 2011, McCormick France was 
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formally renamed YTO France SAS. The new company had an equity capital of 
20million Euros and was the wholly owned subsidiary of First Tractor, the listed part 
of the YTO Group Corporation
12
. YTO France SAS occupied 20 hectares, 60,000 
square metres of which was built up area. It would produce hydraulic transmission 
systems for the Chinese market and enlarge its production scope by setting up a new 
assembly line which would produce tractors for the European market. A new 
European-based R&D centre was also to be established at YTO France SAS in the 
near future (Sinamach, 2013). 
 
This was the first time a Chinese agricultural machinery firm had acquired a 
world-class agricultural machinery company. As part of the contractual agreement, the 
YTO Group would retain McCormick‘s erstwhile 206-strong workforce and expand 
its production scale in France to create 400 more jobs by 2015 (ChinaDaily, 2011). 
This acquisition saw the YTO Group inheriting not only all of McCormick‘s tangible 
assets, including industrial buildings, processing and IT equipment, R&D labs, etc., 
but also its intangible assets, such as the transmission system technology. The YTO 
Group aimed to build ―one base and two centres‖ in France, namely; a European 
manufacturing base, a European R&D centre and a European regional marketing 
management centre. 
 
5.1.2 A strategic intent M&A 
                                                             
12
The FIRST TRACTOR COMPANY LIMITED was established on May8th, 1997 and was listed on the Hong 
Kong Limited Stock Exchange on June 23rd, 1995. 
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This acquisition was not only in line with the ―Go Global‖ strategy of the Chinese 
government, but was also a significant step in the implementation of the YTO Group‘s 
internationalisation strategy. In other words, the underlying rationale of the 
motivations behind the acquisition was the YTO Group‘s strategic intent. 
 
Specifically, there were two main motivations for this acquisition. The first and most 
important one was to obtain advanced technology. At the time of the acquisition, most 
Chinese produced wheeled tractors were equipped with mechanical transmission 
systems, which severely limited their power output. Although a few of the leading 
companies in the industry were capable of producing high-powered power-shift 
tractors, all power-shift gearboxes were imported from abroad. In September 2010, 
the YTO Group produced the first partial power-shift tractor, the ―Dong fang hong 
2004‖, to generate over 200 HP. This was the first power-shift tractor completely 
manufactured by a Chinese firm, despite the technology being used still not being the 
most advanced, compared with global market leaders. McCormick had an edge in the 
technical aspects of its transmission systems for high-powered tractors and the 
technological standards of its products met global mainstream standards. In this case, 
on one hand, the acquisition of McCormick enriched the YTO Group‘s production 
line and, on the other hand, provided the acquiring firm with the advanced technology 
it needed to upgrade and update its production methods and know-how (Cnfol, 2013). 
Moreover, the deal could also help the YTO Group to attain a larger share of China‘s 
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high-end tractor market. It is much more cost-efficient to acquire a company that 
holds a technological advantage than it is to develop said technology endogenously, 
considering the innovative capacity of most Chinese firms (Fu & Gong, 2011). 
 
The second main motive behind this acquisition descended from the YTO Group‘s 
regional strategic layout. According to Mr Zhao, the YTO Group‘s president and CEO, 
the McCormick acquisition was seen as a ‗bridgehead‘ into the European market. 
Following the ―one base and two centres‖ strategy, the YTO Group could assemble 
and manufacture tractors under its ―Dong fang hong‖ brand in France. In addition, the 
products of this French subsidiary could be distributed directly in the European 
market, which would bypass some of the trade barriers set up by the EU trade laws. 
This would provide the YTO Group with an important inroad into the European 
market. 
 
Therefore, on the one hand, through its acquisition of advanced technology, the YTO 
Group could expand its share of the domestic high-end tractor market. On the other 
hand, the French subsidiary‘s ‗bridgehead‘ position could help the acquiring firm to 
circumvent various trade obstacles in the European market. 
 
5.1.3 Factors influencing the integration process 
 
5.1.3.1 Prior related knowledge  
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Although the YTO Group did not have any experience of outward M&A before the 
McCormick deal, its previous international exposure had helped this Chinese 
agricultural machinery giant to accumulate useful knowledge that played an important 
role in its post-acquisition integration. For example, the Yituo International Economic 
and Trade Co., LTD (YTO IET) is a subsidiary of the YTO Group which is in charge 
of all export and import businesses and runs overseas construction projects. Most of 
the middle managers involved in the acquisition had had working experience in this 
subsidiary, which provided the YTO Group, and especially the management staff 
involved in these businesses, with useful knowledge on doing business with people 
from different socio-cultural backgrounds. The staff members in possession of this 
knowledge played an important role in the M&A. For example, one informant, who 
was on the board that took charge of the management of foreign subsidiaries, had 
previously been the manager of YTO IET‘s European department No. 4. Moreover, 
the YTO Group had overseas offices, spare parts centres and assembly factories in 
America, Asia and Africa, which underpinned its production sales in over 100 
countries and regions throughout the world, which helped the YTO brand win the 
Chinese government‘s Recommended Export Brand award. This background provided 
the YTO Group with the knowledge of how to use different resources to support its 
overseas operations. Therefore, although the YTO Group lacked acquisition 
experience, as do most Chinese acquirers, its accumulated experience and knowledge 
of international business provided it with a strong support base for the management of 
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this international M&A, besides its integration with foreign partners.  
 
In addition to the knowledge gained through previous international ventures, the YTO 
Group achieved competency through its cooperation with well-established MNEs 
around the world. At the end of the 1980s, the YTO Group bought and assimilated 
FIAT‘s medium-high power wheeled tractor technology and platform, which became 
the technological source for the products of most Chinese wheeled tractor 
manufacturers. In the next 20 years, the YTO Group developed a variety of products 
and know-how based on technology from Italy and held its position as the industry 
leader among Chinese agricultural and construction machinery manufacturers. In 
recent years, YTO has also consistently bought advanced equipment from western 
countries such as Switzerland and Germany to broaden and deepen its production 
lines. The knowledge gained from global giants helped the YTO Group to build its 
competence  and potential capacity to compete in foreign markets. 
 
YTO‘s prior related knowledge was not only derived from its cooperation with 
leading MNEs around the world, but was also evident in its R&D capability. YTO 
currently employs a R&D team made up of over 2,000 professionals and experts in a 
state-of-the-art technology R&D centre consisting of 11 advanced laboratories. As 
China‘s first and leading agricultural and construction machinery manufacturer, YTO 
has been the domestic industry‘s forerunner in terms of R&D capabilities. Since the 
establishment of the Chinese National Tractor Research Institute (CNTRI) in 1994, 
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the R&D capabilities of the YTO Group have been further strengthened
13
. The ratio of 
R&D spending/revenue has remained above 3% since 2009 (Finance and Investment, 
2012). 
 
Its domestic led R&D capability has provided the YTO Group with sufficient ability 
to assimilate and integrate advanced technology from target firms. McCormick‘s main 
technology and products were power-shift transmission systems able to meet 
prevailing mainstream international standards; however, its products were designed 
specifically for its previous parent company, Argo, and could not be installed in 
tractors produced by other firms. This required any acquiring firm who wished to 
assimilate their products and technology to possess adequate R&D capabilities. By the 
time of the acquisition, most Chinese wheeled tractors were still equipped with 
mechanical or hydraulic transmission systems, which severely limited their power. 
The YTO Group was the only Chinese tractor producer that owned endogenously 
developed power-shift transmission technology
14
. In this case, the YTO Group was 
the only firm that had sufficient R&D capability to assimilate McCormick‘s 
technology and products. One YTO Group senior executive stated: 
 
―Although there were other firms which could have afforded to acquire the 
French target, they would have found themselves in trouble afterwards, as 
                                                             
13
CNTRI is also the state level quality control laboratory. All tractors made in China need to pass the CNTRI 
examination to get onto the market. 
14 However, YTO's independently developed power-shift transmission technology was less competitive than the 
mainstream average in the global market. 
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they did not possess the capabilities necessary to assimilate the technology 
and carry on with the R&D. If we hadn‘t possessed our own power-shift 
transmission technology, McCormick would have been useless to us even if 
we had bought it‖. 
 
After the acquisition announcement, two tractor models manufactured by the YTO 
Group were delivered to France to evaluate how the French power-shift transmission 
and the Chinese tractors could be combined. Supported by its strong R&D capabilities, 
the YTO Group had already assimilated McCormick‘s advanced technology on certain 
key components and applied it to its main products, which had a yearly sales volume 
in the tens of thousands. The CTO of YTO France SAS stated: 
 
―The level of our products has been highly improved by combining our 
existing technology with McCormick‘s advanced technology on 
transmissions. The first batch of products using transmissions from our 
French subsidiary will gradually come onto the market in 2013. There is also 
another line of products based on two party technology which is currently in 
the debugging phase and will come onto the market next year‖. 
 
In addition to its prior knowledge at the organisational level, the accumulated 
individual knowledge and experience were also significant for the integration of the 
YTO Group‘s outward M&A. The prior related individual knowledge did not simply 
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develop out of the accumulation of past experiences, but also by investing time and 
effort in activities aimed at improving the potential absorptive capability of 
individuals and the firm accordingly (Stahl et al., 2013). The YTO Group paid special 
attention to both selecting employees with strong prior related knowledge and 
improving the potential related knowledge of key staff. Due to his professional 
knowledge in the overall technological process of the French subsidiary, the former 
general technologist of First Tractor was appointed as the first president of YTO 
France SAS. Similarly, the position of CTO of YTO France SAS was occupied by a 
state level engineer who had successfully assimilated the advanced technology and 
integrated it within existing products. Furthermore, all Chinese senior managers of the 
French subsidiary were fluent English speakers and used English as their working 
language. However,  
 
―Only being able to speak English is not sufficient to work with the French as 
their English abilities are even weaker than ours, especially for lower level 
employees and some middle managers. Translators could hardly convey all 
your meanings to them. Therefore, we are now studying primary French to 
help communication‖. (The general manager of YTO France SAS) 
 
To sum up, there was no doubt that the acquiring firm‘s prior related knowledge at 
both the organisational and individual levels was an important factor influencing the 
integration of the outward M&A by the YTO Group.  
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5.1.3.2 Degree/Level of integration 
 
The degree of integration, which refers to the extent to which firms will integrate their 
operations, is deemed to be a crucial factor in the post-acquisition success of the YTO 
Group‘s M&A of McCormick. In order to maintain a harmonious organisational 
climate so as to gradually and smoothly assimilate, combine and exploit the 
technology of the acquired firm, the YTO Group opted for a low degree of operational 
integration and paid special attention to socio-cultural integration.  
 
Accordingly, the organisational structure and operational system of the combined 
entity were built on the original system of the acquired firm. All middle managers and 
a vice president were French employees retained from McCormick. French managers 
were given autonomy in most aspects of the day to day operational management. 
Formal functional integration was very limited. Although a certain degree of formal 
integration was necessary, changes in the formal structure of the acquired firm were 
carefully controlled within a certain range. This was evidenced by a series of 
integration motives made by the YTO Group, including retaining the French 
management team, keeping the French based information system, reserving the 
former performance appraisal system, recovering the previous management control 
system
15
, persisting in the old compensation system, avoiding the recruitment of 
                                                             
15This management control system had been used by Mc Cormick for years but had been abandoned before the 
acquisition. After the acquisition, the YTO Group decided to reuse this system.  
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Chinese workers in the French subsidiary, etc. Moreover, the Chinese executive 
expatriates did not proactively involve themselves in the day to day operation of the 
firm. One of the senior executives of YTO France SAS said: 
 
‗We are not involved in (the day to day operation) that much. We use the 
French ERP system to help the production and management. We are not 
experts in either this system or managing the French staff. The day to day 
production management is mainly handled by the French vice general 
manager. Most production operations follow pre-existent rules and routines. 
They deal with the production while we mainly focus on decision-making 
and R&D.‘ 
 
Nevertheless, delegating the day to day management power to French staff did not 
imply that the Chinese acquirer failed to assert its control over the acquired firm. In 
fact, Chinese executives took charge of the decision-making on strategic issues and 
certain major operational activities, such as procurement and R&D. Although the 
Chinese top executives reserved the power to make these decisions, they were 
relatively cautious and always showed respect towards French culture when a problem 
involved socio-cultural issues. Their decisions and decision-making processes were 
largely affected by the overall integration strategy of the firm, which was to maintain 
a harmonious organisational climate. Mr. Zhao stated: 
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―We‘ve been making a great effort to encourage a harmonious climate in the 
acquired firm, such as trying to adapt to the ―French style‖ in terms of 
operational management. For example, we didn‘t take the liberty to ask 
French employees for overtime work as we do in China. When there was the 
need to work overtime, we would inform the trade union in advance. Even 
then, some workers might still refuse our request for overtime work. This is 
fine, but it is completely different to the situation in China.‖ 
 
5.1.3.3 Integration implementation speed 
 
The integration speed of this acquisition can be generally described as ―fast entry, 
slow change‖ and ―step by step‖16. Different business units experienced distinct 
modes and speeds of integration based upon their particular strategy positions and 
specific circumstances. 
 
Since McCormick was a bankrupt company prior to being acquired by the YTO 
Group, a rapid organisational change was essential to restart the production lines. A 
senior executive of the YTO Group explains: 
 
―This was a bankrupt company that urgently needed our help. We needed to 
inject money to save it before it reached a dead end.‖ 
                                                             
16This is in line with Angwin's (2004) argument for a contingency approach of integration speed. 
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Immediately after the deal had been announced, the YTO Group sent 5 senior 
executives to help its French subsidiary to resume production by using the YTO 
Group‘s purchasing advantage both at home and abroad. Under these circumstances, 
proceeding slowly could have caused operational uncertainty and given rise to 
rumours. For example, during the process of production resumption, YTO France 
SAS faced some challenges with regard to its supply chain. Although this was to be 
expected when restarting a bankrupt company over a short period of time, some 
employees from the acquired firm still complained about the limited workload. A 
YTO Group top executive shared his thoughts: 
 
―Some employees came to complain about the bad situation due to such low 
levels of workload, even with full payment. We then had to explain to them 
about the supply chain difficulties and promise to solve them as quickly as 
possible.‖ 
 
Despite the need for a fast entry in the very early stages of the acquisition, the pace of 
the organisational change and business unit integration slowed down along with the 
business operation of the acquired firm. In this phase, operational integration was 
controlled at a relatively low pace. The YTO Group did not wish to impose control 
over the target firm through an array of formal integration mechanisms, such as 
management style, processes and routines. The operational management change in the 
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target firm was more akin to a renewal of its own past management system. Chinese 
senior executives aimed at maintaining a steady operation of the French subsidiary 
and integrate the two organisations ‗step by step‘ (as stated by the general manager of 
YTO France SAS). The reason for this integration speed control can be explained in 
two ways: 
 
First, based on the company‘s strategy, the most critical issue in this stage was R&D 
integration. R&D integration was swift and consistent from the very beginning of the 
post-acquisition integration phase. Among the top executives of the French subsidiary 
appointed by the YTO Group, three out of five were R&D and technology specialists. 
These included the current CTO and former CEO of YTO France SAS. Mr. Wang. Mr 
Wang had been involved in the whole acquisition process and had been stationed in 
France from the negotiation phase. After the acquisition, five technical engineers 
came to join Mr. Wang‘s team, working on the integration of R&D. The technology 
assimilation and R&D integration made significant progress in a relatively short 
period. The advanced technology of McCormick in certain key components of 
power-shift transmissions had been applied to the main YTO products within one year 
from the acquisition. In addition, a new product line based on the integrated 
technology of both the Chinese and French systems would come on the market on 
2014. 
 
Second, when considering socio-cultural issues, a rapidly imposed operational 
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integration might result in acculturation stress, which could have led to hostility and 
resistance from the French employees. In order to create conditions more favourable 
to R&D integration, the Chinese acquirer chose to implement the operational 
integration gradually to minimise integration problems and culture related challenges. 
For example, the YTO Group planned to transfer the production line of some low 
value-added components of transmissions from France to China in the future, so as to 
significantly reduce the labour cost. This plan was listed in the strategy report of YTO 
Group in the early phase, but it had still not been implemented two years after the 
acquisition. The main consideration was to avoid generating stress and distrust in 
French employees, who may have worried about losing their jobs. 
 
The speed of integration could be affected by socio-cultural contexts. Accordingly, 
socio-cultural integration itself also proceeded moderately. The underlying rationale 
was similar: a slow socio-cultural integration would help build trust among employees 
and solve culture-related problems in a relaxed atmosphere. Therefore, although the 
speed of the implementation of integration was crucial, an ‗adequate speed‘ could not 
be defined simply. The speed of the YTO Group‘s acquisition of McCormick could be 
categorised into fast entry, rapid R&D integration, modest operational integration and 
slow socio-cultural integration. However, integration speed issues were also 
embedded in distinct contexts and influenced by different issues such as the host 
institution and integration strategy of the acquirer. One of the top executives of YTO 
Group related: 
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―Integration speed is important, but the adequate speed may be different in different 
cases.‖ 
 
5.1.3.4 Key staff turnover and management team building 
 
The turnover of key staff had always been considered to be a key factor in the 
management of acquisition integration in this case. The YTO Group was aware of the 
significance of the turnover of the acquired firm‘s employees and other potential 
human resource related problems – such as employee resistance, stress and 
uncertainty related to job security, etc. – after the M&A. A series of steps were taken 
to avoid and solve these problems. As agreed in the contract, all previous French 
employees were retained, including general employees, middle managers and senior 
managers. The YTO Group did not post any Chinese workers to its French subsidiary, 
which helped to reduce the potential anxiety and uncertainty among local workers. 
One YTO Group senior executive explained: 
 
―We sent around ten staff members there, five were at the executive level and 
the rest were all technical engineers. No Chinese workers were sent over to 
work with the local employees. This was aimed at containing any distrust 
towards us on the part of the French workers, because they knew that China 
had an advantage in terms of labour cost and feared being replaced by 
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Chinese workers. In the tractor assembling stage, we may deploy Chinese 
labour to help but this would not happen during the first three years from the 
M&A.‖ 
 
Management team building was also emphasised in the integration phase. 
Immediately after the takeover, the YTO Group created a powerful executive team for 
its French subsidiary headed by a former vice president, who was in the top hierarchy 
of the parent firm. One senior manager from the YTO Group explained:  
 
―He was from the very top level and had extensive power. Hence he would 
have the ability to utilise YTO Group resources to support the operation of 
the French subsidiary. This appointment was based on strategic 
considerations.‖ 
 
With such a top level president, the executive committee played a major role in 
managing day to day operations and formulating strategies. Mr. Zhao, the YTO Group 
president emphasised the authority and independence of the French subsidiary‘s 
executive committee: 
 
―Executives from the parent firm are not allowed to directly make requests to 
and command the French subsidiary. All directives must be conveyed through 
the French Project Office. Otherwise, several different requests from different 
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parent firm vice presidents might cause confusion. With the help of a high 
level president, this structure helps to maintain the French subsidiary‘s 
independence.‖ 
 
Before being acquired by the YTO Group, McCormick was the subsidiary of the 
Italian company Argo; consequently, all former top executives had been Italian. After 
the takeover, a French former senior manager was appointed as vice president of the 
subsidiary. He took charge of purchasing, inventory, production and of the day to day 
operational management of each department. Placing French people in executive 
positions gave this firm an even more French ―colour‖ than it had had operating under 
the Italians. All middle managers, including the heads of departments, were now 
French. This helped to maintain the face and routines of the day to day operation and 
management familiar of local employees, which effectively contributed to reduce  
the potential stress of French employees.  
 
The retention of key general staff was also important to acquisition integration, and 
especially to knowledge and R&D integration. Some employees, especially skilful 
technologists, had already left McCormick when it had gone bankrupt. Their 
individual skills and know-how were no longer available to the acquired firm, which 
meant that there were holes in the firm‘s overall knowledge base. The CTO of YTO 
France SAS explained: 
―The technology transfer from people was very limited. When this firm had 
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gone bankrupt, most technologists and research staff had chosen to look for 
other jobs. When we acquired the firm, there were only few technologists left, 
which made the transfer of knowledge from previous employees extremely 
difficult. Fortunately, the French are very good at filing. We have clear 
archival data and a computer database containing all variety of project 
development details. With the strong foundation of our own R&D knowledge, 
it was not difficult to assimilate this. Nevertheless, I have to say it would 
have been much better if more of the former technologists and research staff 
could have been retained‖. 
 
In addition to the crucial role played by French employees, Mr. Zhao particularly 
emphasised the importance of the Chinese staff working in the French subsidiary: 
 
―They are the ―carriers‖ of YTO‘s culture, as well as of Chinese culture; they 
work on the frontline of integration; they are the disseminators of YTO‘s 
spirit and have an important contribution to make in ensuring that the firm 
operates in a harmonious climate and at a steady pace.‖ 
 
5.1.3.5 Cultural differences and cultural integration 
 
In the case of CBMA, cultural differences had always been considered to be one of 
the most crucial and critical factors for acquisition integration and performance. Most 
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executives of the YTO Group realise the important role of cultural issues. Mr. Zhao 
said: 
―The true essence of integration is cultural integration. All others are 
secondary.‖ 
 
The nature of the outward M&A by Chinese firms into Western developed countries 
involves the existence of huge cultural distances. For example, most Chinese are used 
to working overtime. Working overtime without payment and complaining is a part of 
Chinese national culture, which is a kind of embodiment of the diligent character of 
Chinese people. This is particularly true in SOEs such as the YTO Group. The 
organisational culture of SOEs intensifies this phenomenon: Working overtime is 
considered to be a sign of a good attitude, which is an incentive for most employees to 
not leave work on time, even when they are not actually required or do not need to 
work overtime. There is also another unwritten rule that makes most SOE employees 
not leave work earlier than their supervisors. The author‘s face to face interview with 
Mr. Zhao was initially scheduled for a Saturday afternoon, but was finally conducted 
on a Sunday morning in his office, which is evidence of this strong cultural influence. 
Conversely, the French are known for their love of holidays and leisure time, and the 
number of French annual holidays is also the envy of people from countries all around 
the world. Accordingly, most French employees are not generally in favour of 
working overtime. One senior manager of the YTO Group stated: 
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―We respect their culture and habits, including the length of daily working 
hours and their attitude towards working overtime, which is completely 
different from that of Chinese employees. Chinese employees, including us, 
work overtime unconditionally and consider work to be the first priority. You 
cannot expect a similar attitude from the French, since they work for a better 
life and care about their personal feelings. Working is always considered 
secondary. Sometimes, French engineers can take over two months to finish a 
job that would take Chinese ones two weeks.‖ 
 
Differences in values and norms may result in further difficulties in the development 
of trust. Confronted with such huge cultural differences, the YTO Group chose to take 
an attitude of great tolerance when dealing with culture related issues and the Chinese 
staff kept an understanding, forbearing, and open-minded attitude. One of the YTO 
Group‘s senior executives revealed: 
 
―We should compromise. We need to follow local regulations and respect 
their culture. There can be many culture clashes during the integration phase. 
For example, over the last year, some YTO Group senior managers came to 
visit the French subsidiary while the French employees were on vacation and 
were not received properly. In China, we would all consider this unacceptable, 
but it is fine over here.‖ 
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By adopting such an attitude, most cultural problems were solved by the Chinese 
acquirers‘ great cultural tolerance. In China, a request for a pay rise often implies that 
the employee is very dissatisfied with the salary. In SOEs such as the YTO Group, pay 
rise requests cannot even be made because everyone knows that the government has a 
sophisticated wage system. With their open-minded attitude, Chinese executives in the 
French subsidiary understand pay rise requests by French employees and can handle 
them properly. One senior manager in YTO France SAS said:  
 
―They do it regularly. It‘s part of the culture. Every French company has to 
deal with this problem. It doesn‘t mean we did anything wrong.‖ 
 
The CTO of the French subsidiary stated: 
 
―We respect their culture and customs. When we find that they do something 
outside of our expectations, the first response is to understand whether it‘s a 
cultural issue. For example, sometimes they spend half an hour taking coffee 
during working hours. This is unusual in China, while the French do it 
regularly at work, regardless of whether their boss is Chinese or Italian, 
which means that it is a part of the culture.‖ 
 
In addition to taking a modest and open-minded attitude and adopting a high level of 
cultural tolerance, the YTO Group also took measures to ease cultural differences 
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from the perspective of the French employees. Most common staff members in France 
are not familiar with the Chinese parent firm, Chinese culture or even China‘s current 
socio-economic status. The YTO Group believes that good communication and a 
mutual cultural understanding are essential to minimise potential cultural barriers, 
thus they took steps to improve the quality of communication and change the French 
people‘s perception of both Chinese culture and the acquiring firm. In March 2012, 
the France-2 television channel came to the YTO Group‘s headquarters to shoot a 
documentary. This provided the French employees with a good opportunity to 
appreciate the current situation of China and of their Chinese parent firm. One of the 
senior managers in YTO France SAS shared his thoughts: 
 
―The reception of this film was very good. Most French people did not 
expect their parent firm to be so big and powerful, with so many plants, 
equipment and laboratories.‖ 
 
Moreover, the YTO Group‘s top executives employed some social integration 
mechanisms to express their regard and care for their French employees so as to bring 
the two parties closer. For example, over Christmas, Mr. Zhao sent electronic greeting 
cards to the French employees on behalf of the parent firm. When some of the French 
employees retired, the executive staff invited them to dinner at French restaurants and 
gave them gifts from China. One of the executives in the French subsidiary stated: 
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―They were moved, and they really liked this facet of the Chinese culture.‖ 
 
Despite the obstacles raised by cultural distance, in some aspects, cultural differences 
can have a positive effect on the acquisition integration. Mr. Zhao said:  
 
―Since the launch of the ―Open Up‖ policy, we have already learned a lot 
from western countries, including most management theories and systems. 
However, we didn‘t get to the heart of the knowledge acquired. This is 
mostly because of cultural differences. After the acquisition, we tried to learn 
the rules and regulations, mechanisms, etc. from the French subsidiary‘s 
management system. We found that what they used was also based on 
mainstream western management systems, while they gave it a French 
twist… such as an emphasis on being dedicated, earnest, rule-following. 
Learning from their management system requires us to learn from the French 
culture. Integration of management also means integration of culture.‖ 
 
The Chinese employees also became acquainted with the positive aspects of French 
culture on their short visits and joint training programmes in France. In their reports, 
most highlighted the positive influence of some aspects of French culture and stated 
that they were deeply impressed. One of the senior managers said: 
 
―The French staff are very professional. They fight for their basic rights and 
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interests such as pay rises and holidays, but they also work seriously and 
passionately. I was impressed by their passion for work and life.‖ 
 
Another senior manage stated: 
 
―Although they don‘t work as efficiently as we do, their attitude towards 
work is very positive. Their methodical approach impressed me very much.‖ 
 
Symmetrically, the positive aspects of Chinese culture, such as its emphasis on 
efficiency and diligence, also influenced the French employees. They were also 
interested in learning more about Chinese culture. Some of the French staff learned to 
write Chinese characters and spent the Chinese Spring Festival with their Asian 
colleagues. The high cultural tolerance upheld by the YTO Group and the efforts 
made by the Chinese staff in cultural integration helped to create a harmonious 
organisational climate in the French subsidiary. One French manager said: 
 
―We are very well coordinated with our Chinese boss. Although we need 
more time to improve communication and inter-cultural understanding, so far 
so good. I am very satisfied with working here.‖ (YTO, 2013) 
 
5.1.3.6 Communication during integration 
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The YTO Group realised the key role played by good communication with its French 
partners even before the deal was made. They believed that good communication 
could provide their French employees with a better understanding of China and of 
their new Chinese owner. Educational videos were used to help target firm employees 
to understand the past and current status of this historically rich SOE. One senior 
manager in the YTO Group said: 
 
―They showed a keen interest in our history because they also had a history 
of more than 100 years… Most common people in most countries have one 
common feature, which is that they are not really aware of other countries‘ 
conditions and cultures. Therefore, it is relevant for us to make them aware of 
our past and current status, show our goodwill and express our attitude and 
our willingness to be responsible for the future of the firm.‖ 
 
Another executive of YTO France SAS stated: 
 
―Like common people from other countries, most French employees are good, 
honest and genuine. They don‘t usually think that their company will 
short-change them. However, they may be easily affected by opinions and 
views from the media or other channels. For example, they may become 
stressed and anxious if the media implies that Chinese firms will erode their 
job opportunities.‖ 
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Under these circumstances, the YTO Group had to take a series of steps to facilitate 
communication and improve its quality during the integration phase. An important 
way of communicating with employees is through the trade unions, which present 
many features distinct from those found in China. The trade unions in the French 
subsidiary participate in both the day to day operational management and in the firm‘s 
strategic decisions. They have the right to ask questions to the general manager on a 
monthly basis. This is a good opportunity to expand the communication between 
Chinese executives and common employees. One YTO Group top executive said: 
 
―I think it (i.e. letting the trade unions participate in the day to day 
management and strategic decisions) is good for the firm‘s future 
development.‖ 
 
Although the YTO Group understood the importance of communication during 
integration and had taken steps to facilitate it, most of their actions were still passive 
to a certain extent. In the early stages of the post-acquisition integration phase, a small 
scale demonstration was staged by French employees, who surrounded the office 
building. The reason behind this demonstration was that they did not know and 
wished to be informed about the future plan of the firm because of a period of low 
workload. This situation was easily defused through explanation made directly by the 
general manager. He recalled: 
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―That was due to something that had gone wrong with our supply chain: a 
gear wheel, a component of the transmission, had been in short supply due to 
the 2011 Japanese earthquake and we had faced some challenges in the 
process of finding alternative suppliers. They accepted my explanation and 
we finally resolved the issue.‖ 
 
Delayed or poor communication may result in information asymmetry and 
unnecessary misunderstandings. This event caused the YTO Group to realise the 
importance of communicating in a timely and proactive manner, towards which it 
took a series of measures. On the one hand, the executive level of the French 
subsidiary was to hold weekly meetings with the managers of each department and 
communicate with trade unions representatives on a weekly basis. On the other hand, 
the executives of the parent firm decided to set up a support department in China to 
increase the quality and efficiency of communication with and management of the 
French subsidiary.  
 
In the cross border context, effective communication can be particularly difficult to 
achieve since the culture, and especially the language issue, adds an extra layer of 
complexity to communication in the integration process. Either parties could not 
communicate with the other using its first language, although the Chinese senior 
managers in the French subsidiary did make an effort to learn French. English was 
212 
 
used as the working language at the managerial level, while communication with most 
employees could only be achieved with the help of an interpreter. The CTO of the 
French subsidiary said: 
 
―Their (common employees‘) English abilities were very limited, including 
those of the technologists. We didn‘t communicate much except during 
meetings. Graphs and blueprints helped a lot in communicating with the 
technologists.‖ 
 
Even between middle and senior managers, the quality of communication could not be 
guaranteed due to the variable English language skills among individuals. Language 
has always been an obstacle to effective communication. One senior executive in the 
French subsidiary said: 
 
―We were definitely aware of the existence of the language barrier. I recall an 
interesting incident that took place during a meeting: the French manager‘s 
answer was completely disconnected to the Chinese manager‘s question 
because of the language barrier. Besides improving our English, we sought 
other ways of solving the communication problem, such as using more 
PowerPoint and structure charts to break through the language barrier.‖ 
 
All in all, communication was a key factor and had long been a problem for this 
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integration process. 
 
5.2 Individual case report: the Nanyang CIJIAN Group‟s M&A with Way 
Assauto 
 
5.2.1 Introduction and background 
 
5.2.1.1 Introduction to the CIJIAN Group 
 
The CIJIAN Group, also known as the NanYang CIJIAN Auto shock absorber Co., 
Ltd., is the largest automobile shock absorber manufacturer and OEM supplier in 
China. The company was set up in 1951 and became a specialized shock absorber 
producer designated by the former National Ministry of Machine Industry in 1982. It 
produces shock absorbers for high- and mid-range cars as well as passenger carriages 
and heavy duty vehicles. Its main customers include Chinese car manufacturing giants 
such as FAW-Volkswagen, SVW, Chery, Geely, etc. In addition, it supplied the shock 
absorbers for military vehicles used in the Military parade for China‘s 50th National 
Day. In the three years between 2010 and 2013, the CIJIAN Group has occupied the 
top slot in the domestic market with the highest sales ratio. Presently, the annual 
shock absorber output of the CIJIAN Group has reached 30million, which indicates 
that the company has become the largest automobile shock absorber manufacturing 
base in Asia. The CIJIAN Group is also one of the leading firms in the industry in 
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terms of R&D capabilities. It runs a shock absorber academic research centre in 
Beijing and engages many specialists, including members of the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering. They annually invest over 5% of their total sales revenue in R&D 
investment, which enables them to be one of the Chinese National High-tech 
Enterprises (Nanyang Cijian official website, 2013). Table 5.2 shows the CIJIAN 
Group‘s company profile and relevant details about its M&A activities.  
 
Table 5.2 The acquiring firm‘s profile and M&A activities  
 NanYang CIJIAN Auto shock absorber 
Co., Ltd. 
Time of M&A 31/03/2011 
Core business Shock absorbers for high-and mid-range 
cars, as well as military vehicles. 
Industry status  One of the biggest vehicle shock absorber 
producers in China, holding the largest 
internal market share. 
Motivation of M&A Strategic intents. Seeking technology and 
market. 
Name and location of 
acquired firm 
Way Assauto (Italy) 
Ownership structure Non-SOE 
Annual revenue before the M&A in 
CNY 
0.544 billion 
Price of M&A in CNY 150 million 
Sources: Annual reports, corporate documents and interview data. 
 
5.2.1.2 Introduction of Way Assauto 
 
Way Assauto lies in the north-western Italian city of Asti. It has more than 105 years 
of history and used to be Europe‘s largest and the world‘s third car shock absorber 
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manufacturer. This former giant had high-end customers around the world, including 
world-class premier car manufacturers such as Ferrari and Mercedes. In the 1980s, it 
had over 3,000 employees and produced shock absorbers for all the vehicles produced 
by the Fiat Group. From 1996 to 2006, Way Assauto was the European shock absorber 
manufacturing base of ArvinMeritor, which was listed in the Fortune Global 500. In 
its over 100 years of operation, the company had accumulated world-class R&D 
capabilities and a first-rate distribution network in Europe (HC360, 2011).  
 
However, Way Assauto had concentrated too much of its business in Europe, so it 
failed to address customers in emerging markets such as those from Asian countries. 
With the financial crisis, it could not keep up with the pace of the car manufacturers, 
which led to a severe decline in its business. In 2010, an Italian court declared that 
Way Assauto would have to be auctioned off (HC360, 2011).  
 
5.2.1.3 The M&A activity 
 
On the 31
st
 of March 2011, the CIJIAN Group successfully completed its acquisition 
of Way Assauto by two round bidding. All assets, including brands, equipment and 
technology were acquired by CIJIAN for 150 million Yuan. The new company was 
named ‗New Way Assauto‘ (Rootinhenan, 2013). 
 
According to the CIJIAN Group‘s acquisition report, its new Italian subsidiary will 
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focus upon its R&D unit. In the meantime, part of the production lines has also been 
retained and products made in Italy still use the Way Assauto brand. The rest of the 
production lines will be shipped to China in order to improve the equipment of the 
parent company (Dahe.cn, 2011).  
 
5.2.2 A strategic intent M&A 
 
This acquisition is also a strategic intent M&A. The strategic intents of the CIJIAN 
Group are embedded in the three motivations given for this deal: the seeking of 
technology, equipment and market. In order to improve its competitiveness and 
compete with its rivals in both the domestic and overseas markets, the executive level 
of the CIJIAN Group considered R&D capabilities to be the most significant aspect 
that needed to be enhanced in the current stage. Although it possessed the highest 
R&D capabilities with regard to its domestic competitors, the CIJIAN Group felt 
under intense pressure from foreign competition entering the Chinese market through 
international joint ventures. Mr. Zhao, the president and CEO and the CIJIAN Group, 
said: 
 
―Shock absorbers are particular car components which can influence both a 
vehicle‘s comfort level and safety. In this case, shock absorber manufacturers 
need to pay specific attention to the relevant technology and improve the 
quality of their products.‖ 
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At the strategic level, the CIJIAN Group aims to improve its industry status within the 
Chinese market and make an inroad into overseas ones. At present, the major 
competitors of the CIJIAN Group in the domestic market are international joint 
venture companies with partners from Germany, Japan and Korea. Most of these 
rivals have accumulated over 100 years of experience in the production of vehicles 
and components, with strong R&D capabilities as well as advanced equipment. Not 
just to counter the potential pressure from its home market competitors, but also to 
maintain its leading position in the Chinese market and to seek opportunities to 
expand its business in the global market, the CIJIAN Group needs to improve its 
competitiveness both in terms of R&D capacity and production line equipment. The 
acquisition of Way Assauto was a good opportunity to compensate its competitive 
disadvantage, as the Italian company had world class R&D unit and production lines. 
In addition, a new Italian subsidiary may help to build the CIJIAN Group‘s European 
distribution channels and bypass the trade barriers set by the EU. Therefore, Mr. Zhao 
considers the motivations behind this acquisition to be ―first, technology and R&D 
capability; second, production line equipment; third, market.‖ 
 
5.2.3 Factors influencing the integration process 
 
5.2.3.1 Prior related knowledge  
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The CIJIAN Group considers its prior related knowledge to be a key factor which can 
influence the post-acquisition integration process of its outward M&A activities. Such 
prior related knowledge is mainly measured in terms of the R&D capacity of the 
acquiring firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tsai, 2001). Before the acquisition, the 
CIJIAN Group was already one of the leading domestic shock absorber manufacturers 
in terms the high level of its R&D speed and quality. Its annual R&D expenses have 
been consistently at over 5% of its total sales revenue, which is a top level ratio in the 
Chinese car component manufacturing industry (NYDT, 2010). In light of the CIJIAN 
Group‘s strategic intent, the chief motivation behind this acquisition lies in the 
acquisition of the advanced technology and R&D capacity of the target firm. 
Accordingly, the transfer of knowledge and R&D resources is one of the most 
important issues to be addressed. The prior related knowledge, in terms of the 
acquiring firm‘s R&D strength, has a significant impact on this process. On the one 
hand, the existing R&D capabilities can influence the knowledge transfer process 
from the acquired unit to the parent firm through its impact on the identification of 
resources. On the other hand, the acquiring firm‘s technology and R&D capabilities 
can lay solid foundations for the assimilation and integration of the acquired unit‘s 
technology. For example, as stipulated in the acquisition contact, part of the Way 
Assauto‘s production lines was to be transported to China as resource redeployment. 
The reassembly and debugging of the equipment was rapidly accomplished based on 
the solid foundations of the CIJIAN Group‘s technologists. The redeployment was 
essential to enable the combined organisation to enlarge its domestic market share 
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since those production lines represent a powerful asset for the development of the 
Chinese market. One CIJIAN Group senior executive said: 
 
―We didn‘t encounter too many difficulties in the technology transfer. We 
have almost obtained and assimilated all their core technology just by 
studying the documentation and blueprints, even without any direct coaching 
from the Italian engineers.‖  
 
In addition to identifying and assimilating key knowledge-based resources, the 
CIJIAN Group‘s R&D capabilities also enabled the combined entity to rapidly apply 
Way Assauto‘s advanced knowledge and facilities to its existing products. This was 
aimed at improving the competitiveness of these products over a relatively short 
period. One senior executive from the acquired firm said: 
 
―Our engineers can recognise the technology differences and identify the 
advantages and drawbacks of the Italian technology.‖ 
 
Furthermore, the CIJIAN Group‘s new R&D centre in Italy was formally put into 
operation in December 2012 (MOFCOM, 2012). However, by July 2013, several new 
products had already been launched on the Chinese market mainly thanks to the 
efforts of the domestic R&D division. The fast release of these new products can 
partly be attributed to the existing ability of the acquiring firm in terms of R&D and 
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production capabilities.  
 
In addition to the R&D aspects, the CIJIAN Group‘s previous international exposure 
also greatly influenced the post-acquisition integration process of this outward M&A. 
Although the CIJIAN Group did not have any experience in either international or 
even domestic M&A, its previous international business experiences had supplied it 
with useful knowledge to deal with transnational regions and cross cultural issues. 
Before this M&A deal, the CIJIAN Group‘s prevailing international business model 
involved import and export. Most of its equipment, including assembly lines, 
automatic welding lines, high frequency quenching machines, etc. had been imported 
from Germany. Although most of its products were sold on the Chinese market, the 
CIJIAN Group exported to many countries and regions around the world, such as 
Russia, the United States, Iran and so on. Furthermore, the CIJIAN Group had a 
wealth of experience in the OEM business, which helped it accumulate experience 
and knowledge of production and manufacturing techniques, as well as in doing 
business with foreigners.  
 
5.2.3.2 Degree/level of Integration  
 
During the post-acquisition integration process, the CIJIAN Group noticed that the 
degree of integration significantly influenced the M&A performance. The top 
management of the acquiring firm did not intervene in the decision-making process of 
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the day-to-day management team. They considered that the local management team 
would know the acquired firm better than Chinese expatriates in terms of both the 
day-to-day work routines and the organisational culture. Accordingly, although some 
employees left Way Assauto after its bankruptcy liquidation, the CIJIAN Group 
managed to retain the existing Italian management team. In fact, all the departmental 
managers of the acquired firm are Italian. There is only a limited Chinese staff 
(including executives) working in Italy. This highly localised management team is 
given a high degree of autonomy to make the day to day operational management 
decisions in most departments of the acquired firm. Apart from the vertical 
management of the financial department, only a small portion of operational 
management aspects, such as supply chain and market distribution, have been truly 
integrated at the operational integration level. Despite the CIJIAN Group putting a 
stronger emphasis on the integration of the supply chain and market distribution, the 
degree of such integration is still controlled at a relatively modest level. The CEO of 
New Way Assauto, who is an expatriate from the Chinese headquarters said: 
 
―Strategic decisions are generally made by us (the Chinese top executives), 
while the day to day operations are all handled by the Italian managers. Any 
major operational activities, such as the manufacturing input (procurement) 
and output (marketing) need to have my approval.‖ 
 
Although the integration of the supply chains and market distribution, through which 
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synergies are likely to be achieved by reducing costs, is considered to be the most 
commonly focused functional integration area by Asian acquirers, and by Chinese 
acquirers in particular (Cogman & Tan, 2010; Liu & Woywode, 2013), the CIJIAN 
Group does not completely integrate these core units. Instead of a deep integration of 
supply chains, the CIJIAN Group redeploys its resources by sourcing low cost 
component and part suppliers for its Italian subsidiary. As a senior executive put it: 
 
―Procurement integration does not equate to the complete integration of the 
two firms‘ supply chains. It is more like the headquarters giving its subsidiary 
a hand.‖ 
 
Besides the modest integration of procurement and marketing, a similar degree of 
integration is also enacted in the R&D units. Despite its strategic emphasis on R&D 
integration, the CIJIAN Group does not employ formal integration mechanisms, such 
as changing structures and routines or posting long term expatriates. The integration 
of the R&D departments is primarily facilitated through various social integration 
mechanisms, such as short term visits, joint training programmes, meetings, etc. A top 
executive from the acquired firm said: 
 
―Sending long term expatriates to Italy may cause ‗maladjustment‘ among 
both Chinese and Italian employees.‖ 
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His claim hints at part of the rationale behind the CIJIAN Group‘s various degrees of 
integration in different departments. A high level of integration usually involves an 
interactive process in which the employees of both parties need to learn to work 
together. High degrees of interaction and cooperation of employees with distinct 
socio-cultural backgrounds naturally increases the potential for conflicts which could 
be harmful for the climate of the combined organisation and result in a poor 
acquisition performance. Conversely, without sufficient integration, resource 
redeployment and exploitation would not be attainable, and synergies could hardly be 
achieved (Puranam et al., 2009; Gomes et al., 2013). Considering its strategic intent, 
the CIJIAN Group adopted a relatively modest level of integration in those aspects 
that had synergy potential, such as procurement, and that were at the core of its 
strategic intent, such as R&D, while leaving high levels of autonomy to the Italian 
management for the running of the day to day operations.  
 
5.2.3.3 Integration implementation speed 
 
The significant role played by integration speed is also evident in the CIJIAN Group‘s 
acquisition of Way Assauto. Some top executives from both acquiring and acquired 
firms summarised the characteristics of the integration speed as ‗slow and gradual‘. 
Nevertheless, ample evidence suggests that, while the overall pace was relatively 
restrained, certain key functional aspects of the integration proceeded rapidly. 
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The significance of the R&D integration was emphasised by almost all interviewees. 
Accordingly, the integration of technology-based resources and R&D units was 
initiated immediately after the M&A deal was announced. The fast integration of the 
R&D units was embodied in two aspects. First, the setting up of a new R&D centre 
was rapidly implemented. Second, the acquisition and assimilation of Way Assauto‘s 
intangible assets also got under way as soon as the acquisition was complete.  
 
The European R&D centre, which is based on Way Assauto‘s existing department, 
was launched immediately after all acquisition contracts and procedures had been 
settled. The swiftness in setting up the R&D centre in Italy was a result of the 
strategic position of the Italian subsidiary. According to Mr. Zhao, the CEO and 
president of the CIJIAN Group, the acquired firm was seen as a combination of an 
R&D centre and a shock absorber manufacturing plant. The information provided by 
other informants implied that, in the early stages of the acquisition, the major asset of 
the acquired firm was the European based R&D centre, rather than the plant. This was 
in line with the acquiring firm‘s strategic intent: acquiring technology-based strategic 
resources was their first priority.  
 
Although this R&D centre was not officially put into operation until the end of 2012, 
R&D integration had been carried out from the very beginning in terms of knowledge 
transfer and R&D staff interactions. The late announcement of the setup was mainly 
linked to the tangible part of the R&D centre building as well as some delays in 
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bureaucratic procedures with the Chinese governmental authorities. There was no 
doubt that the CIJIAN Group had rapidly sought technology from its Italian 
subsidiary and had applied it to its existing products in order to improve their 
competitiveness. In fact, several new products, which benefited from the integration 
of the technology of the acquiring and acquired entities, had already been launched on 
the Chinese market by June 2013.  
 
In addition to R&D integration, the other rapidly implemented operational integration 
was that of the manufacturing units. Immediately after the acquisition announcement, 
the CIJIAN Group had started to integrate the manufacturing lines by relocating part 
of the acquired firm‘s production lines to China. Six full production lines covering 
from welding to assembling, which is a complete manufacturing process, had been 
left in Italy to retain the acquired firm‘s manufacturing capabilities. Such resource 
redeployment had also been undertaken rapidly. One senior executive explained the 
fast integration of R&D as well as that of the manufacturing lines:  
 
―(We aimed to acquire advanced manufacturing equipment, technology and 
R&D capabilities, thus）…the first two actions we took after the acquisition 
were to transfer patented technology and build an R&D centre, as well as 
transfer part of the manufacturing lines to China.‖ 
 
Apart from the rapidly implemented integration of R&D and manufacturing lines, the 
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speed of other aspects of operational integration was deliberately kept at a modest 
pace. In fact, the CIJIAN Group adopted a relatively slow speed for both the 
operational (formal) and socio-cultural (informal) integration. For example, despite 
the CIJIAN Group having put a strong emphasis on the integration of the supply chain 
and market distribution, the speed of the integration had still been relatively low. By 
March 2013, the acquired firm was still in the preparatory phase of its market 
distribution. Market integration had been put aside for over a year after the acquisition. 
In a telephone interview given in April 2013, the CEO of New Way Assauto said: 
 
―We are now still in the preparatory phase of market distribution. The 
acquired firm‘s products had not started selling until half year ago (the end of 
2012). The CIJIAN Group put us on life support for over a year. So far, only 
30,000 units have been sold. However, we have already taken quite a few 
orders and are developing a series of new products. I believe that we can 
gradually increase our sales volume.‖ 
 
Accordingly, supply chain and marketing integration proceeded slowly as it was not 
needed until the acquired firm was able to recover its production lines and have its 
own orders to prepare.  
 
A complete socio-cultural integration could have hardly been achieved in a short 
period of time (Teerikangas & Very, 2006). Socio-cultural integration was deliberately 
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kept at a slow pace. Although certain social integration mechanisms, such as visits 
and joint training programmes, were employed, the CIIJIAN Group chose to keep a 
degree of separation between the two different cultural dimensions in day to day 
activities by using these mechanisms gradually instead of heavily and rapidly to 
pursue total cultural integration. The culture related issues are presented and analysed 
in detail in section 5.2.3.5.  
 
In brief, the CIJIAN Group considered the speed of integration to be one of the key 
factors in its post-acquisition integration process. Drawing from its acquisition 
motivations, the CIJIAN Group employed a contingent integration speed. It integrated 
rapidly in strategically relevant areas such as R&D and manufacture, while adopting a 
slower speed for general operational and socio-cultural integration. 
 
5.2.3.4 Staff turnover and management team building 
 
In this acquisition staff turnover in the acquired firm was considered to be a critical 
factor exerting a decisive influence on post-acquisition performance. On the one hand, 
any acquisition, and especially one by a firm from an emerging economy, may be a 
source of uncertainty among local employees, leading to the departure of key staff 
members who usually possess valuable individual skills and knowledge and have the 
option to change jobs. This can leave holes in an acquired firm‘s knowledge base and 
hamper the exploitation of those synergies which may be achieved by combining and 
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redeploying resources. Although the CIJIAN Group realised the importance of key 
personnel, it failed to retain some technicians after the acquisition. Consequently, the 
Chinese acquirer had to seek new technical experts from Italy and Germany to 
complement their R&D team. On the other hand, the withdrawal of existing key 
personnel might damage the organisational climate of an acquired firm by increasing 
the remaining employees‘ resistance, stress and uncertainty about their job security. 
Therefore, the CIJIAN Group took various measures aimed at retaining key 
employees, such as improving the quality of rewards, publicising its erstwhile 
performance, promising production expansion, etc. 
 
In addition to the turnover of the acquired firm‘s key staff, the careful selection of 
Chinese expatriates was also a concern of the CIJIAN Group. Posting Chinese 
expatriates to Italy did not only require the selection of personnel with a high level of 
adaptability to work in a different institutional environment with colleagues from 
distinct socio-cultural and language backgrounds, but could also lead to increased 
anxiety and uncertainty about their job security in the local employees, which could 
harm the organisational climate and be the potential cause of conflicts. In order to 
minimise this risk, the CIJIAN Group adopted a policy of short or medium term 
expatriations instead of long term ones. In fact, only a few Chinese executives and 
translators work in Italy on a day-to-day basis. One CIJIAN Group executive said: 
 
―We periodically swap the work places of specific staff members to enhance 
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mutual learning. As we have the same manufacturing lines in China and Italy, 
technicians from either country transfer to the other to work and train every 
so many months.‖ 
 
Moreover, the turnover of the existing management team was also crucial for CIJIAN 
Group‘s post-acquisition integration. The strategic decision-making in the acquired 
firm is controlled by the New Way Assauto board, within which Chinese executives 
outnumber Italian ones. Despite the Chinese acquirer firmly holding strategic 
authority, the erstwhile Italian general manager was appointed as vice general 
manager, the post of second in command, to directly control the day to day 
operational activities. In addition, all the Italian middle management was retained. By 
constructing such a management structure, the existing operational management 
resources and day to day routines were successfully retained in the acquired firm 
without hampering the organisational climate. At the same time, the CIJIAN Group 
still holds absolute control over the subsidiary in terms of the redeployment of 
resources and pursuit of potential synergies. Mr. Zhao related: 
 
―We retained the managers of almost all the important departments, such as 
marketing, R&D, etc. The existing Italian employees were familiar with the 
facilities and routines and, more importantly, they were familiar with the 
management style of their old Italian managers.‖ 
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5.2.3.5 Cultural differences 
 
The CIJIAN Group always considered the enormous cultural differences existing 
between the acquirer and acquired firms to be a key factor that could strongly 
influence post-acquisition performance. Mr Zhao specially emphasised the role played 
by cultural differences and integration in the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A: 
 
―We believe that the first and foremost reasons for the failure of most 
Chinese MNEs to achieve success in their outward M&As, especially those 
in developed countries, are cultural differences and integration.‖ 
 
Being well aware of the relevance of cultural related issues and of the existence of 
enormous cultural differences, the CIJIAN Group has been dealing with great care 
with cultural integration within the combined entity. Its cultural integration strategy is 
based on two aspects: understanding and respect. The CEO of New Way Assauto said: 
 
―We need to face up to the differences between the two cultures. There is no 
need to deliberately require the Italians to accept our culture, and vice versa. 
The best way to solve this problem is by means of mutual understanding in 
the course of day to day work and through communication.‖ 
 
Any initiator who develops an understanding of his partner and actively invites said 
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partner to get to know him will effectively promote mutual understanding. The 
CIJIAN Group, being the acquiring firm and holding a higher position of power in 
this relationship, chose to deal with culture related problems with a high degree of 
tolerance even before they could truly understand their partners. Building on this high 
level of cultural tolerance, the CIJIAN Group implemented measures to further 
understand Italian culture by taking into consideration its various aspects, such as 
food, religion, the way of doing things, etc. For example, the Chinese executives have 
tried to acquaint themselves with Italian culture by visiting the local employees‘ 
homes and dining with them, as was highlighted by Mr Zhao.  
 
In addition to striving to learn and understand Italian culture and to reduce the cultural 
asymmetry, the CIJIAN Group also actively promotes the understanding of the 
Chinese way of thinking in the Italian employees. One executive of the acquiring firm 
said: 
 
―In fact, a large proportion of cultural conflicts occur because of 
misunderstanding.‖ 
 
The evidence suggests that most Italian employees did not understand Chinese culture 
at all at the beginning of the acquisition. The CIJIAN Group‘s active communication 
policy effectively helped the Italian employees to understand their partner‘s reasons 
for doing things, which could reduce the likelihood of conflicts caused by cultural 
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differences. For example, some Italian staff, who initially disliked and showed 
resistance against specific stiff rules, understood and accepted the Chinese rationale 
after being told an ancient story by their Chinese general manager. 
 
An important foundation of mutual understanding is mutual respect. Receiving 
respect from local employees is much harder than showing respect. This is 
particularly true for Chinese acquirers buying assets from developed economies as, in 
most cases, employees from western developed economies are, to a certain extent, 
prejudiced against Chinese firms. One CIJIAN Group top executive explained: 
 
‗Initially, most of them (the Italian employees) believed Chinese firms to be 
rich buyers devoid of technology and management skills.‘ 
 
In this case, the CIJIAN Group chose to allay any misconception of Chinese technical 
inferiority among Italian employees by demonstrating the competency of their 
technicians and engineers. During the transfer of the production lines to China, the 
Chinese engineers executed the installation and trial run procedures without any direct 
guidance by Italian technicians, which (in the words of a vice CEO of the CIJIAN 
Group) ―greatly impressed‖ the employees of the acquired firm. When the Italian 
engineers travelled to China to visit the parent firm, the Chinese R&D staff would 
pose some technological challenges for them to solve in cooperation with the Chinese 
team. This was done deliberately to show the Italians the R&D competency of the 
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Chinese, to change the attitude of the Italian employees towards their acquirers and to 
enhance the appeal of the acquirer. In turn, this helped the CIJIAN Group to gain a lot 
of respect and facilitated the establishment of a harmonious organisational climate. 
 
Moreover, the CIJIAN Group also managed to win respect by sensibly vetting the 
quality of its expatriates. All expatriates were carefully selected taking into account 
their prior related knowledge and were trained appropriately. Before visiting Italy, 
Chinese employees received a systematic training, which included English, personal 
quality, etiquette, local culture, etc. The CIJIAN Group believes the image of a firm to 
be the aggregate of the images of its employees. One top executive explained: 
 
―If our Chinese employees show their competencies and capabilities, the 
―superiority complex‖ of some Italian personnel can be overcome so that 
they become convinced of your value and respect you from the heart.‖ 
 
Once the attitudes of some Italian staff towards their Chinese bosses had changed 
from arrogance to respect, mutual understanding could be much more easily achieved. 
Accordingly, any potential cultural conflicts could be easily solved and the 
organisational climate would be naturally improved, which in turn would positively 
impact the post-acquisition integration of the combined entity. 
 
5.2.3.6 Communication 
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A better understanding of cultural differences could be and would need to be 
supplemented by effective communication during the post-acquisition integration 
process. The CIJIAN Group has always considered communication to be one of the 
key factors influencing post-acquisition performance. On the one hand, effective 
communication allows for the more efficient transfer and processing of organisational 
resources and knowledge. On the other hand, communication can strengthen 
socio-cultural connections between partners and build trust and a harmonious 
organisational climate in the combined firm. 
 
The CIJIAN Group clearly identified the communication problems that could have 
emerged, and was well aware of the extra degree of communication difficulty added 
by cultural differences, time zone differences and language problems. One CIJIAN 
Group executive stated: 
 
―They (the Italian employees) don‘t speak English. Most of them don‘t know 
much about the outside world, especially China.‖ 
 
This information asymmetry caused by cultural or language issues could likely result 
in misunderstandings and stress among Italian employees who are in a relatively 
lower hierarchical position and need a greater sense of job security. For example, staff 
from the acquired firm may resist actively transferring knowledge to their Chinese 
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colleagues because of fear of losing their jobs.  
 
Due to the significant role played by communication and the potential difficulties it 
could face, a series of measures were taken by the CIJIAN Group to facilitate the 
formation of effective intra-unit communication. First, interpreter quality is crucial for 
communication as it affects the level of articulateness with which information can be 
transferred and the Italian employees‘ perception of the parent firm. The interpreter 
for the Italian subsidiary‘s CEO has been studying and working in Italy for many 
years. He was also appointed as the director of the General Affairs department due to 
his professional skills and Chinese-Italian background.  
 
Moreover, the CIJIAN Group emphasises the role to be played by Chinese executives 
as mediators between the acquiring firm and its Italian employees, while deliberately 
restricting communication opportunities between Chinese and Italian lower level 
employees. The involvement of top executives implies that the headquarters attach 
great importance to communication with the Italian staff, which could enhance the 
latter‘s sense of identity and security. Communication among lower level employees 
could hardly be effective due to the restrictions imposed by the language barrier. 
Moreover, over-communication and day-to-day contact may generate a higher 
potential for cultural conflicts, which could negatively influence the post-acquisition 
integration process. In this case, despite the CIJIAN Group running the same 
manufacturing lines in both China and Italy, which would allow technicians to work 
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together, visits and joint training programmes were chosen to avoid the potential 
drawbacks brought by over-communication and cultural differences. 
 
In addition, another way in which the CIJIAN Group improves the quality of 
communication is by publicising the facts and reasons for both strategic and practical 
issues to reduce Italian employees‘ confusion, stress, and distrust. On the one hand, 
the employees‘ sense of ownership can be stimulated when they are informed about 
new future plans, task changes, employees‘ responsibilities, etc.; this lays a strong 
foundation for the realisation of effective communications. On the other hand, 
although an acquired firm‘s staff might hold different views on certain operational 
issues, and communication maybe hampered by differences, they can be persuaded if 
reasonable rationales are provided. For example, the trade union representatives of 
New Way Assauto raised a case in favour of expanding the production scale and 
increasing the recruitment of local employees. A detailed explanation given by the 
Chinese CEO and ranging from the current European economic background to the 
acquiring firm‘s comparative advantage and detailed future strategy effectively 
removed the distrust of the Italian employees and facilitated the subsequent 
communication. 
 
5.3 Individual case report: CITIC Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.‟s M&A with 
Gandara Censa 
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5.3.1 Introduction and background 
 
5.3.1.1 An introduction to CITIC Heavy Industries Co., Ltd (CITIC HIC) 
CITIC HIC was set up in 1956 under the name of Luoyang Mining Machinery Plant. 
It was merged with the CITIC Group by initiative of the Chinese government and 
renamed CITIC Heavy Machinery Company Ltd. After undergoing restructuring in 
2008, it finally became CITIC Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. On the 6
th
 of July 2012, 
CITIC HIC was successfully listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
 
After over 60 years of development, CITIC HIC has become a significant domestic 
and global supplier of mining, cement and metallurgical equipment. It produces over 
200,000 tons of quality equipment annually, including grinding mills, scrubbers, 
crushers, kilns, coolers, hoists, reducers, steam turbines, and compressors. It is now 
the largest mining machinery manufacturer and the second largest manufacturing 
equipment producer in China. 
 
Technological innovation is at the core of CITIC HIC‘s strategy, thanks to which it 
has become the State Level Innovative Enterprise and High-tech Enterprise. It holds 
dozens of technological patents and owns a national level enterprise based technology 
centre which ranks within the top 10 of 887 centres around the country (CITIC HIC 
official website, 2013). It also runs a state key laboratory and a post-doctoral research 
station. 
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CITIC HIC is also one of the first 50 ―international operating enterprises‖ accredited 
by the Chinese government. It emphasises a globalisation strategic layout and is 
building up its global distribution and service network. Apart from the Spanish firm 
that it acquired, CITIC HIC also has offices in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, India 
and South Africa. In 2011, CITIC HIC‘s overseas order accounted for 10.79% of its 
total orders, which is a relatively large proportion compared to that of its domestic 
competitors (China Economy.cn, 2012). Table 5.3 shows the profile of CITIC HIC 
and relevant details about its acquisition of Gandara Censa.  
 
Table 5.3 The acquiring firm‘s profile and M&A activities 
 CITIC Heavy Industries Co., Ltd 
Time of M&A 23/02/2011 
Core business Produces over 200,000 tons of quality 
equipment annually, including grinding 
mills, scrubbers, crushers, kilns, coolers, 
hoists, reducers, steam turbines, and 
compressors. 
Industry status  One of the biggest players in the heavy 
equipment manufacture industry; number 
one mining machinery and cement 
equipment manufacturer. 
Motivation of M&A Strategic intent. To seek technology, 
markets and geographical positioning. 
Name and location of 
acquired firm 
Gandara Censa (Spain) 
Ownership structure SOE 
Annual revenue before the M&A in 
CNY 
65 billion 
Price of M&A in CNY Not disclosed  
Sources: Annual reports, corporate documents, and interview data. 
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5.3.1.2 An introduction to Gandara Censa 
Gandara Censa was a manufacturer of heavy industrial equipment, catering to the 
mining, cement and energy (renewable) sectors. As one of the very few global 
manufacturers producing large mining mills of over 9 meters, over a period of 45 
years, Gandara Censa had earned its global reputation through advanced 
manufacturing technology and quality products. It was a sub-contractor of some of the 
world‘s best known mining equipment suppliers such as Metso, FLSmidth, Polysius, 
etc. It was also one of the global competitors of CITIC HIC in the production of large 
mill cylinders. The company operated a manufacturing plant in Vigo and exported 
almost all its products to global customers (CITIC HIC official website, 2013). 
Affected by the recent global financial crisis, Gandara Censa had experienced a large 
decrease in its orders. Under these circumstances, its previous shareholders decided to 
sell the company as a whole (CITIC HIC official website, 2013).  
 
5.3.1.3 The M&A activities 
 
After some interactive site visits in both China and Spain and a year of negotiations 
and due diligence process, CITIC HIC completed its acquisition of the Spanish-based 
heavy equipment manufacturer Gandara Censaon the 23
rd
 of February 2011.The 
amount involved in this acquisition was not disclosed. CITIC HIC promised this 
acquisition would not result in any lay-offs or reductions in salary and welfare (CITIC 
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HIC official website, 2013). The acquisition of Gandara would provide CITIC HIC 
with a strong foothold in Europe, which would also give CITIC HIC easier access to 
customers in Europe, South and North America, and Africa (CITIC HIC official 
website, 2013). 
 
5.3.2 A strategic intent M&A 
 
In order to improve the firm‘s competitiveness and compete with its rivals in both the 
domestic and overseas markets, CITIC HIC has long been devoted to expand its 
global market. It considers internationalisation as a process of utilising global 
resources, including marketing, natural and, most importantly, technological resources. 
Accordingly, CITIC HIC clearly defined this acquisition as a strategic intent M&A. 
The Chinese acquirer was mainly motivated by the achievement of geographical 
benefits and market penetration through this outward M&A. Pursuit of technology 
considerations were also a motivation behind this acquisition. 
 
Gandara Censa‘s location was an important reason for CITIC HIC wanting to go 
ahead with the acquisition. The factory is located in an industrial district less than 20 
miles from Vigo harbour, a large international shipping port suited for the 
transportation of heavy machineries. The acquisition of a manufacturing base can not 
only solve overseas transportation problems by dramatically reducing the related costs, 
but also open up distribution channels to South America and Africa, with their 
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abundant natural resources. A European-based manufacturing base also represents a 
useful supplement for the business expansion of CITIC HIC‘s overseas subsidiaries 
and offices. 
 
In addition to geographical strategic layout considerations, this acquisition could also 
fulfil CITIC HIC‘s need to enter overseas markets, besides acquiring advanced 
technology and manufacturing techniques. With a European-based manufacturing 
centre, CITIC HIC would have a larger comparative advantage when competing for 
orders which require EU standards. This would help the Chinese acquirer to overcome 
the technical obstacles to gaining entrance to the European market and dramatically 
increase its future overseas business potential. Gandara Censa‘s world leading 
technology and manufacturing techniques on large mills could also be used to 
improve the acquirer‘s production and techniques. Moreover, it would exactly meet 
CITIC HIC‘s need to expand its capacity. In this case, Mr Ren, the CEO and president 
of CITIC HIC, considered the motivations behind this acquisition to be: 
 
―First, to achieve a geographical strategic layout and seek overseas markets; 
then to seek technology and manufacturing techniques. The rest (of the 
motivations) are all subordinate.‖ 
 
5.3.3 Factors influencing the integration process 
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5.3.3.1 Prior related resources 
 
The CITIC HIC‘s prior related resources are considered to be a key factor influencing 
the post-acquisition performance of their foreign acquisition. Such prior resources are 
clearly evident in its current performance and industrial status, overseas business 
experiences and R&D intensity.  
 
As the largest mining machinery manufacturer and the second largest manufacturing 
facility producer in China, CITIC HIC has earned a reputation both at home and 
abroad over the last 60 years. It was also one of the global competitors of Gandara 
Censa in the production of large mill cylinders (CITIC HIC official website, 2013). In 
fact, its comprehensive strength was better than that of the target firm, a situation that 
differs from some other well-known cases, such as Lenovo‘s acquisition of IBM PC. 
When the previous major shareholders of Gandara Censa considered selling off the 
firm for investment withdrawal, CITIC HIC attracted their interest with its rapid 
development in recent years, and especially its positive performance in the difficult 
situation arising after the 2008 financial crisis. Most importantly, this deal was 
supported by most Gandara Censa stakeholders who are closely related to the 
post-acquisition integration phase of this acquisition, such as the Spanish management 
team, general employees, trade unions and local government. They believed that this 
company could have a better future under the operation of the Chinese acquirer. The 
trust of these key stakeholders laid a solid foundation for a smooth post-acquisition 
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integration process and had a positive impact on the future acquisition performance.  
 
Apart from CITIC HIC‘s performance and industrial status, its past international 
exposure is also a valuable resource for the post-acquisition management. Despite 
CITIC HIC not having any outward M&A experience, it had accumulated ample 
international business knowledge through its prior overseas business. Before the 
acquisition, CITIC HIC had already started to build its global distribution and service 
network by setting up subsidiaries in Brazil and Australia. It also had overseas offices 
in Canada, Chile, India and South Africa. In 2011, CITIC HIC‘s overseas order 
portfolio accounted for 10.79% of total orders, which was a relatively large proportion 
compared to its domestic competitors
17
. Its past international business experience 
helped CITIC HIC to accumulate relevant knowledge in dealing with cross cultural 
and cross border problems, which successfully enriched its knowledge base for the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process.  
 
In addition, its strong R&D capabilities also benefits CITIC HIC in terms of the 
transfer of technological knowledge and resources. Gaining Gandara Censa‘s 
specialised technology and manufacturing techniques on large mills is one of the main 
motivations behind this acquisition. The strong R&D intensity not only helps CITIC 
HIC to clearly identify the valuable and complimentary resources of the target firm, 
                                                             
17
This figure steadily increased after the acquisition. By mid-2013, CITIC HIC had overseas 
orders for over 3 billion CNY (China.com, 2013).  
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but also provides it with the necessary capacity to successfully assimilate and 
integrate latter‘s technology. Moreover, the robust prior R&D capabilities also 
facilitate the learning process, reducing the need for frequent interactions in the 
transfer of explicit knowledge, which could minimise any potential conflicts caused 
by the deeper integration of the two parties. One CITIC HIC executive commented: 
 
―It (the knowledge transfer) is not a big problem. Our core technicians have 
visited the acquired firm several times to learn their advanced techniques and 
technology. If we find something useful, we can definitely absorb it.‖ 
 
5.3.3.2Degree/level of integration 
 
CITIC HIC believes that the level of integration is a crucial issue that greatly 
influences post-acquisition performance and M&A success. The integration level 
adopted in the day-to-day operations is very low compared to traditional M&A 
transactions. In fact, CITIC HIC is not at all involved in the acquired firm‘s day to day 
operational management; all existing Gandara Censa management teams were left in 
place to retain the original management style. There are even no permanent Chinese 
expatriates working in the acquired firm. The CITIC HIC CFO said: 
 
―We use localisation management and keep their routine way of doing work.‖ 
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CITIC HIC realised that Gandara Censa‘s business and operational model should not 
be changed after the acquisition. On the one hand, its own operational system and day 
to day routines had existed for many years and had proved to be suitable for the firm. 
The decrease in profits in recent years did not really result from issues in the 
day-to-day operations but had more to do with strategic aspects. On the other hand, it 
would be unrealistic to significantly intervene in the day to day operations of the 
acquired firm because the Chinese acquirer not only lacks suitable local talent to 
appoint as expatriate managers, but is also not confident in handling the potential 
cultural conflicts which are likely to occur during the day to day interactions between 
employees from different socio-cultural contexts. 
 
Nevertheless, CITIC HIC also understands that a certain degree of integration is 
necessary to combine and redeploy resources. Completely no changes at all could also 
cause uncertainty and rumours to thrive since most employees of the acquired firm 
actually expect the post-acquisition changes which can be seen in most M&A cases 
(Gomes et al., 2013). Despite giving local management team a high level of autonomy, 
CITIC HIC still adopted formal integration on certain functions. Apart from the 
system integration, such as in accounting, and the financial integration, which can be 
observed inmost M&A, formal integration mainly concentrates on target setting, 
performance appraisal criteria, purchasing by invitation to bid, etc. 
 
In other words, integration mostly took place between the acquired firm‘s 
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management team and their Chinese executives at headquarters. One CITIC HIC 
executive said: 
 
―There is barely any direct contact between the mid-level management here 
(at headquarters) and that of the Spanish subsidiary. We (the executives) 
contact them directly.‖ 
 
The interaction between the Chinese executives and the acquired firm‘s management 
team mainly focuses on two aspects. First, the strategic decisions are all made by 
Chinese executives; second, all major operational activities, such as procurement, 
marketing and investment, need to be authorised by the acquiring firm. For example, 
the decision-making right to invite for bids lays with the headquarters; all major 
investments decision are made in China, while the Spanish subsidiary only takes 
charge of specific projects. Moreover, although the acquired firm has a very high level 
of autonomy in day to day operations, the headquarters also has in place a strict 
monitoring mechanism to manage risk and make sure the operation of the subsidiary 
follows the acquirer‘s strategic intent. Therefore, the degree of integration at the 
management level is kept relatively modest, so that even the executives in both 
acquiring and acquired firms do not work at the same site. Mr Ren emphasises the 
importance of consistency in the implementation of the corporate strategy in both the 
acquiring and the acquired firm. Given that the management team of the acquired firm 
has not changed, the crucial issue for integration at the management level is to transfer 
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the strategic intent of the acquiring firm to the acquired firm‘s management team. 
 
Compared with that at the management level, the degree of integration at the 
employee level is even lower. Apart from specific short or middle term visits and 
training programmes for technicians aimed at exchanging technological resources, the 
Chinese employees have barely any contact with their Spanish colleagues. On the 
other hand, regular visits are made by particular employees of the acquired firm, such 
as heads of departments and trade union representatives, to the headquarters in China. 
These visits and meetings are intended to deepen the Spanish employees‘ 
understanding of the acquirer in terms of strength and friendship; this helps to reduce 
the levels of stress and uncertainty of the acquired firm‘s employees. The low level of 
interaction and integration achieved through the visits and joint training programmes 
controls the relationship between employees of the acquiring and acquired firms at a 
distance. Keeping such a distance aids in avoiding the potential cultural conflicts that 
usually arise in highly integrated M&A (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Gomes et al., 2013) 
and gives the two parties the space necessary to build a suitable degree of mutual trust 
prior to them becoming more deeply integrated.  
 
5.3.3.3 Speed of integration  
 
Despite some of the interviewees not having a clear conceptual idea about the 
influence of integration speed on the acquisition performance, the evidence suggests 
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that the speed of integration was intentionally controlled by CITIC HIC and was 
crucial for the post-acquisition integration process.  
 
Integration proceeded with different paces at the various organisational levels 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000). Formal functional integrations were implemented rapidly to 
maintain the acquired firm‘s business momentum. As CITIC HIC accords a high level 
of autonomy to the acquired firm‘s management team, the key aspect of operational 
integration naturally focuses on the management level. Immediately after the 
acquisition, CITIC HIC imposed a set of its own top management decision-making 
systems to the acquired firm. One major change was that the existing Gandara Censa 
shareholders, who were financial investors, would henceforth entrust all strategic 
decision-making powers to the professional management level and deal only with 
accounting and financial duties. By contrast, the Chinese acquirers took the strategic 
decision-making powers back from the managers of the subsidiary and integrated the 
performance appraisal criteria of the acquired firm into its own system. This change 
was implemented promptly within the first 20 days after the acquisition.  
 
Such a fast integration of top management decision-making system is consistent with 
the main motivation behind this acquisition, which envisaged the Spanish subsidiary 
becoming a crucial asset of the strategic layout of CITIC HIC‘s internationalisation 
strategy. It was important for the Chinese acquirer to make sure that the operation of 
its Spanish subsidiary would be in line with the headquarters‘ strategy. This was also a 
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crucial source of potential synergies: the acquirer would use the resources of the 
acquired firm to get orders that could not hitherto be bagged due to technological or 
marketing constrains and feed the acquired firm with more orders and cheaper 
suppliers by redeploying its global resources. Mr Ren pointed out: 
 
―We started to build a healthy management control mode (at the management level) 
immediately after the acquisition. We defined what could be dealt with by the Spanish 
managers and what decisions would have to be made by us. It is strategically vital to 
have a strong oversight on the management team of the acquired firm. So far, this 
management control mode has been proven to be very effective.‖ 
 
In addition to the rapid integration of the strategic management system, the integration 
of the technology and manufacturing techniques was also implemented within a short 
period after the acquisition. The complementarity of each firm‘s technological 
resources was a critical source of synergy, so a fast implementation of 
technology-based knowledge transfers would have a positive impact on the 
acquisition performance. Since such integration took the form of visits and joint 
training programmes, instead of employees from different socio-cultural backgrounds 
working together, the possibility of any potentially uncomfortable feeling arising 
during the post integration process was dramatically reduced. The Spanish general 
manager stated: 
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―Our staff enjoys the trips to China and also welcomes the visits of our 
Chinese colleagues.‖ 
 
5.3.3.4 Staff turnover 
 
CITIC HIC understood the significant role that staff turnover could play in the 
post-acquisition integration phase. In order to maintain and sustain the business 
momentum and create a harmonious organisational climate for integration, CITIC 
HIC retained the entire staff of the acquired firm, including its existing management 
team. Although the retention of all the employees would mean missing the 
opportunity to cut labour costs through the acquisition, it helped to reduce the levels 
of discomfort and distrust among the employees of the acquired firm and greatly 
boosted their morale. Moreover, the retention of key staff members also ensured the 
completeness of the acquired firm‘s knowledge base. This was particularly true of the 
tacit knowledge that is embedded in the practices of employees (Kogut & Zander, 
1993). The evidence suggests that the Spanish subsidiary performed well and 
smoothly after the acquisition, which may partially be attributed to the retention of its 
existing workforce.  
 
Among all retained employees, the crucial role played by the Spanish management 
team was repeatedly emphasised by all CITIC HIC executives. The CITIC HIC CFO 
said: 
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―It would have been impossible for us to either completely change or follow 
the operational business model of the acquired firm. Therefore, we needed to 
retain its management team and implement our strategy through it.‖ 
 
The existing Gandara Censa management team was made up of professional managers, 
most of whom had doctoral degrees. The fit of this team had been directly reviewed 
by the Chinese executives during the due diligence and negotiation process of the 
acquisition. In fact, the management team‘s characteristics were one of the key 
reasons why CITIC HIC judged this acquisition to be feasible. The Chinese acquirer 
clearly realised it would be almost impossible to find suitable Chinese expatriates 
competent enough to form the management team of the Spanish subsidiary due to the 
complexity of a series of required knowledge including in institutions of the host 
country, language, industrial professional, etc. The only possible adequately suited 
management team would be the existing one. However, the main motivation behind 
the acquisition also required the managers of the acquired firm to strictly adhere to the 
acquirer‘s strategic intent and intended global strategic layout. Therefore, the existing 
Spanish management team would have to prove to be suitable strategy executors for 
their Chinese bosses. Mr Ren related the crucial role played by the management team 
in this acquisition: 
 
―The localisation of the management team was vitally important…Had we 
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not been satisfied with the Spanish management team before the acquisition, 
we would not have acquired the company.‖ 
 
5.3.3.5 Cultural differences and cultural integration 
 
In this case, culture related issues, such as cultural differences and cultural integration, 
are deemed to be a critical factor which can strongly influence post-acquisition 
performance. As it is widely accepted that cultural differences at multiple levels have 
a significant influence on acquisition performance through their impact on the 
post-acquisition process (Gomes et al., 2012), CITIC HIC had placed great care in 
dealing with culture related problems by means of specific cultural integration 
strategies.  
 
At the general employees‘ level, potential cultural conflicts were successfully avoided 
by reducing day to day contact. CITIC HIC did not post any long term expatriates to 
work in the acquired firm, so as to keep direct contact between Chinese and Spanish 
employees to a minimal level. Keeping a certain distance and implementing a low 
degree of interaction can, to a large extent, cut the negative impact of cultural 
differences and help the combined firm to integrate in a harmonious organisational 
climate which can smooth out and facilitate the transfer of resources. One CITIC HIC 
top executive said: 
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―Cultural conflicts are rarely seen as there are actually no Chinese employees 
involved in the operation of the Spanish subsidiary. At the general employee 
level, cultural integration does not exist. For the employees of the acquired 
firm, it‘s little more than a change in the major shareholder.‖ 
 
Therefore, ―It is the employees at the management level that have the maximum 
exposure to cultural differences‖ (CFO of CITIC HIC). In fact, the Chinese acquirer‘s 
integration, including cultural integration, with the Spanish management team had 
begun even before the acquisition had taken place. During the due diligence process, 
the CITIC HIC executives had carried out a thorough evaluation of the existing 
Gandara Censa management team, which included an estimation of the cultural 
integration possibilities and of the optimal degree of cultural integration. Based upon 
the interaction experiences made during the evaluation process, the CITIC HIC 
executives found that the Spanish management team showed a good understanding 
and acceptance of both Chinese culture and of the organisational culture of the 
acquiring firm. This was also an important prerequisite for CITIC HIC making up its 
mind to complete the acquisition.  
 
The actual cultural integration process in the post-acquisition phase proved the 
correctness of the pre-acquisition forecast concerning the cultural fit of the Spanish 
management team. Despite Chinese executives having reserved to themselves the 
strategic decision-making rights and having amended the performance appraisal 
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measures of the management teams of the acquired firm, the Spanish managers, who 
had been used to a different professional culture, willingly accepted, rather than 
opposed, the arrangement. In China, there is an ill-defined sense of ‗Zhu ren weng‘ 
(sense of ownership). Chinese employees are already taught that they are the ‗owners 
of their enterprises‘ when they are in primary school. This phenomenon can be 
partially explained by China‘s socialist (communist) ideology and system. Unlike 
Chinese staff members, who do not have a clear cut awareness of the roles played by 
shareholders and employees, the Spanish managers‘ professional culture allowed them 
to clearly identify the authority of the majority shareholder. Accordingly, they showed 
a strong executive ability in the implementation of corporate strategy and would not 
express any reluctance towards integration mechanisms such as changes in strategic 
decision-making powers and in performance appraisal criteria.  
 
In addition to the positive effect exerted by the Spanish managers‘ professional culture 
on post-acquisition integration, the management level organisational culture of 
Gandara Censa was also in line with the Chinese acquirer. From the point of view of 
national cultural specifics, the Chinese generally believe that the Spanish have a lower 
degree of diligence compared to them. Nevertheless, the organisational culture of the 
acquired firm endowed its Spanish management team with hard working 
characteristics similar to those of its Chinese acquirer. For instance, the general 
manager of the acquired firm is a workaholic who places work over family life. The 
secretary of the Spanish CEO said: 
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―He is a true workaholic whose home is located very far from the company‘s 
headquarters. He does not usually go home during the weekdays because he 
always works overtime. His wife once complained to me about this. This is 
more typically a Chinese state of affairs than a Spanish one.‖ 
 
Such an organisational culture consistency greatly facilitated the cultural integration 
between Chinese and Spanish executives, positively promoting the effective 
implementation of corporate and integration strategies in the post-acquisition 
integration process.  
 
Despite the organisational cultural consistency in certain cultural specifics, there were 
still cultural differences at multiple levels which could cause conflicts during the day 
to day interactions between executives. CITIC HIC believes that misunderstandings 
based on cultural differences are quite normal in outward M&A in western developed 
countries, and adopts a highly tolerant stance in dealing with the relevant problems. 
One CITIC HIC executive said: 
 
―Misunderstandings are inevitable. Misunderstandings even occur in our 
communication with Chinese managers, much less to say foreign managers who have 
different linguistic and socio-cultural backgrounds. The most significant asset in 
solving these problems is a tolerant mentality.‖ 
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Building on its high cultural tolerance, CITIC HIC adopted a restrained attitude in 
dealing with all problems that may have involved cultural specifics. Such a tolerant 
mentality laid a solid foundation for the cultural integration and maintenance of a 
harmonious organisational climate, thus indirectly benefiting the redeployment of 
resources within the combined organisation. 
 
CITIC HIC also adopted various socio-cultural integration mechanisms to foster 
mutual understanding. For instance, every six months, the employee representatives 
of the acquired firm would travel to China for short term visits and joint training 
programmes. These cultural integration mechanisms not only promoted quality and 
effective communications between units, but also helped to build mutual 
understanding and respect. The Spanish employees‘ perception of the Chinese 
acquirer could be easily improved after seeing first hand ‗real‘ Chinese socio-cultural 
institutions. The general office director of CITIC HIC said: 
 
―The way most Spaniards view China is still based on an impression dating 
over 20 years. They may be aware of China‘s economic development in 
recent decades, but still have no idea of modern China‘s real socio-cultural 
environment. Inviting them to visit China helps them to get to know the 
headquarters, Chinese culture and our organisational culture.‖ 
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Another CITIC HIC executive said: 
 
―They (the Spanish visitors) showed great interest in and respect for our 
culture. They attended the flag-raising ceremony with us and also asked to 
wear our uniform and company badge. This is a strong signal that they 
respect and are willing to accept our culture.‖ 
 
5.3.3.6 Communication 
 
Communication during the post-acquisition strategy implementation process was a 
key factor that could influence the M&A performance in CITIC HIC‘s acquisition of 
Gandara Censa. The quality of the communication between Chinese and Spanish 
employees could be significantly affected by potential socio-cultural barriers, such as 
language issues and cultural differences. In this case, encouraging communication 
between general staff members would not be a wise approach to facilitating 
post-acquisition integration, because improving the communication quality between 
all employees would be too costly. Accordingly, the acquiring firm‘s communication 
and interactions with its Spanish subsidiary were mostly limited to those between top 
executives. Even CITIC HIC‘s middle management barely had any direct contact with 
the acquired firm. The reasons for only involving the top management team were 
twofold: in addition to ensuring a high communication quality to minimise potential 
misunderstandings, CITIC HIC also wished to preserve the acquired firm‘s autonomy 
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in its day to day operations, where valuable practices and routines lay. Therefore, to 
act as the main communicators of the acquiring firm, the Chinese executives set up a 
specialised foreign affairs secretariat and employed high quality interpreters to ensure 
the reliability and articulateness of the transferred information. These measures could 
also positively impact the foreign employees‘ perception of the acquiring firm and, in 
turn, improve the quality of future communication.  
 
The Spanish managers also played an intermediary role between acquirer and 
acquired employees. Any information successfully transferred to the acquired firm‘s 
managers could be easily transferred to the latter‘s general employees since they share 
the same institutional and socio-cultural backgrounds. Most importantly, a trustworthy 
intermediary can increase the reliability of the information transferred.  
 
However, on certain special occasions, the Chinese executives also directly 
communicated with the employees of the acquired firm to showcase their attention to 
important issues. For instance, after the acquisition, there was a decline in the order 
volume of the acquired firm, caused by uncertainty about the firm‘s prospects among 
a proportion of its previous customers. In those months, the Spanish employees were 
concerned about losing clients and orders, and worried about the potential for 
decreased workloads and job losses. To solve this problem, Mr Ren chose to visit the 
Spanish subsidiary and talk face to face with the local employees, instead of 
communicating via the Spanish managers. This purposeful visit greatly improved the 
259 
 
corporate identity and feelings of job security among the local employees, and eased 
the tense organisation climate. Therefore, it is very crucial for communication to be 
validated through actions of the executives, as opposed to just their words (Schweiger 
et al., 1993). Moreover, it was even more essential for the acquirer‘s executives to 
keep the promises that they had made. This was because the trust of the acquired 
firm‘s members could have been rapidly built if their new bosses kept their words on 
issues that they cared about. In the same example stated earlier in this paragraph, Mr 
Ren promised not to cut salary and job opportunities in a response to decreasing 
product orders, and asked the employees of the acquired firm to trust that the 
temporary loss in customers would eventually ease over the following months. His 
promise about job security was kept and his prediction was proven right: after three 
months, all customers returned. This instance of successful communication 
dramatically increased Mr Ren‘s credibility as well as that of CITIC HIC‘s executives, 
laying a solid foundation of trust for future communication.  
 
In addition to using Spanish managers as intermediaries forthe communication 
between the general employees of the acquiring and acquired firms, CITIC HIC also 
adopted socio-cultural integration mechanisms, such as short term visits, joint training 
programs, and meetings involving employees of the acquired firm in discussions 
concerning management issues, etc, to facilitate intra-firm communication. The 
general employees attending these activities were mostly trade union representatives 
or technicians who held positions of high prestige among their colleagues. Their 
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perceptions of China and of the acquiring firm could greatly affect those of other local 
employees and potentially improve the appeal of the Chinese acquirer. One CITIC 
HIC executive mentioned: 
 
―Such communication opportunities (the short term visits) were conducted 
three times. The Spanish trade union representatives would communicate 
their experiences to their colleagues who had not been to China. Their words 
were very persuasive.‖ 
 
These informal integration mechanisms not only improved communication quality, 
but also helped to preserve a harmonious organisational climate which could facilitate 
resource transfer, combination and exploitation in the combined entity.  
 
5.4 Individual case report: TCL Corporation M&A with Thomson‟s TV business 
 
5.4.1 Introduction and background 
 
5.4.1.1 An introduction to TCL 
TCL stands for ‗The Creative Life‘. Having been founded in 1981 in Huizhou, TCL is 
now one of the largest consumer electronics enterprises in China with a global 
presence. The TCL Corporation currently boasts four business units in four different 
segments, namely: TCL Communication Holdings (telecommunications), TCL Home 
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Appliances Group (home appliances), China Star Optoelectronics Technology (high 
tech electronics), and TCL Multimedia Holdings (multimedia). The TCL Corporation 
has three listed companies: TCL Corporation (SZ.000100), TCL Multimedia 
(HK.1070) and TCL Communication (HK.2618). After 30 years of consistent 
diligence, TCL has become industry leader in China‘s electronics information sector. 
The brand value of TCL has risen from 70
th 
with 690 million CNY in 1995 to first TV 
brand in China in 2006. In 2014, TCL maintained its number one TV brand position in 
China with a brand value exceeding 63.916 billion CNY (TCL official website, 2013). 
Its TV division is the number one player in the Chinese market.  
 
TCL is an innovation and technology oriented enterprise who has achieved many 
‗firsts‘ in China, such as the first 28 inch colour TV, the first wireless land-line 
telephone, etc. It has established R&D centres and branches in different countries 
such as France, Singapore, and USA (TCL official website, 2013).  
 
TCL began to lay out its internationalisation path in 1999 and aggressively promoted 
its brand internationally from2000. After years of promoting its brands in emerging 
markets and conducting M&A with well-established brands in the Western developed 
markets, TCL became one of the pioneers of Chinese MNEs seeking both domestic 
and international recognition. Nowadays, the TCL Corporation employs over 60,000 
staff and has more than 40 offices around the world. In 2012, the TCL Corporation 
achieved a global sales volume of 60.834 billion CNY, with global sales of 10.86 
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million TV sets. It owns 20 global manufacturing bases, in countries which include 
Poland, Mexico, Vietnam and Thailand (TCL official website, 2013). Table 5.4 shows 
the profile of TCL and relevant details about its M&A with Thomson.  
 
Table 5.4 The acquiring firm‘s profile and M&A activities 
 TCL Corporation 
Time of M&A 28/01/2004 
Core business Colour TV, cellular and mobile phones, 
DVD players. 
Industry status  The largest consumer electronics 
enterprise; industry leader in China‘s 
electronics information sector; industry 
leader in China‘s electronics information 
sector; Number one TV brand in China. 
Motivation of M&A Strategic intent. Seeking technology, 
markets, brand name, and R&D 
capabilities. 
Name and location of 
acquired firm 
Thomson (France) 
Ownership structure Non-SOE 
Annual revenue before the M&A in 
CNY 
25.4.25 billion 
 
Price of M&A in CNY TCL took a 67% equity share by 
investing in assets valued at 600 million 
Euro. 
Sources: Annual reports, corporate documents, and interview data. 
 
5.4.1.2 An introduction to Thomson 
 
Thomson S.A was one of world‘s largest entities in the areas of content creation, 
broadcasting and network operation. It was also the world biggest manufacturer of 
high-frequency tuners, the world‘s number one player in the DVD copier 
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manufacturing industry, and the world‘s second largest CRT manufacturer. With over 
34,000 patents on TV, CRT, digital technology and image display technology, 
Thomson is the second largest global patent owner, second only to IBM. The 
company changed its name several times over the past 100 years. In 2003, Thomson 
held a10.9 % share in the U.S.TV market and 8% shares in major European markets 
(i.e. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) (Lanshizi, 2011). In this 
thesis, the name ‗Thomson‘, which was the one it went under at the time of TCL‘s 
M&A activity, is used . 
 
Before the M&A, Thomson had four business divisions: content and networks, 
components, consumer products, and licensing. Among these four divisions, both 
components and consumer products suffered great losses due to the pressure of 
technology innovation and cost controls (Wu & Zhu, 2010). The TV unit suffered the 
most dramatic loss among Thomson‘s four divisions in the past few years. In 2003, 
Thomson‘s TV market share in the United States decreased from 12.9% in 2002 to 
10.9%. The continuous loss suffered by its TV business placed Thomson under great 
financial pressure. In2004, Thomson chose to drop its TV business and focus on 
media and entertainment activities related to the creation, management and delivery of 
content (Wu & Zhu, 2010). 
 
5.4.1.3 The M&A activity 
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In July 2003, the president and CEO of TCL, Mr Li Dongsheng, received the first 
acquisition offer from Thomson‘s CEO. After four months of negotiation, on the 
28
th
of January 2004, TCL officially decided to merge its multimedia business with 
that of Thomson by setting up a joint corporation, TCL-Thomson Electronics Co., Ltd 
(TTE), TCL took a 67% equity share in the resulting venture by investing in assets 
valued at 600 million Euro. The agreement signing ceremony was attended by both 
the Chinese president and the prime minister of France (China News, 2012).  
 
Based on the M&A agreement, in 2005, TTE would become a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of TCL Multimedia, of which Thomson held 29% equity share. All relevant 
formalities were completed in May 2004. After the M&A, TTE became the world‘s 
largest manufacturer of television sets, with ten manufacturing plants and five R&D 
centres around the world. Thomson would provide exclusive support for TTE‘s 
distribution channel in Europe and North America, as well as value added services 
such as quality certification, after sale services, products design, etc (Lanshizi, 2011).  
 
TTE was officially registered in Hong Kong and started to operate in August 2004. Its 
headquarters were located in Shenzhen. Mr Li Dongsheng was its first board director. 
The previous vice president of the TCL Group, Mr Zhao Zhongyao, was appointed as 
CEO of the new venture. 
 
5.4.2 A strategic intent M&A 
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―Chinese enterprises have to go overseas with a well implemented 
internationalisation strategy. It is the only way in which Chinese enterprises 
can become great global companies. TCL should be a pioneer in Chinese 
firms‘ internationalisation.‖(Mr Li Dongsheng) 
 
The above words clearly demonstrate the strategy-oriented rationale of TCL‘s M&A 
with Thomson. They also imply the personal ambition of Mr Li as a possible rationale 
forthis M&A, which has been criticised by both scholars and practitioners (Rui & Yip, 
2008; Deng, 2009). Apart from Mr Li‘s personal interest in heading the largest TV 
manufacturer in the world, the motivations behind this high-profile M&A were mainly 
twofold. The first was to acquire Thomson‘s R&D intensity and patented knowledge. 
Thomson had accumulated a large number of technology patents on TV 
manufacturing over the past decades. Its R&D centre in the USA was considered to be 
the holy grail of TV technology (Lanshizi, 2011). Mr Li was left in awe of this R&D 
centre the first time he visited:  
 
―I was really overawed. Its technologically infused corporate culture was 
shaped by a long history of accumulation of technological knowledge‖ 
 
Through this M&A, TCL would inherit a world class R&D system. The TV 
manufacturing industry is typically a technologically intensive industry, while 
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Chinese firms are latecomers lacking advanced technological knowledge. Outward 
M&A to industrial giants in developed economies area rapid and effective way of 
improving the technological competence of Chinese TV manufacturers. Therefore, the 
pursuit of technology was the main motive behind TCL‘s execution of this M&A deal. 
 
In addition to seeking advanced technological patents and R&D capabilities, TCL also 
wished to gain access to the European and American markets. After 2001, western 
countries had gradually applied anti-dumping laws against certain Chinese products, 
including TV sets. Under these circumstances, the acquisition of Thomson‘s overseas 
manufacturing plants in Poland and Mexico could have helped TCL to avoid the trade 
barriers of Western countries. Moreover, Thomson possessed a complete sales and 
after-sales service system in the European and American markets. TCL could rapidly 
gain access to these markets through M&A, which would represent a leap forward in 
its internationalisation process. 
 
5.4.3 A problematic M&A 
 
This transaction is now widely considered as a typical example of the failure of a 
Chinese firms‘ overseas expansion (Deng, 2010). Due to the highly problematic and 
value-destroying operations of its European subsidiary, TCL suffered huge losses after 
the M&A deal. The total losses of the TCL Group in 2005 equalled the sum of its 
profits from 2002 to 2004, which had been a golden period for the firm (Zheng, 2009). 
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From 2005 to 2007, TCL‘s total losses amounted to 942 million US dollars. The 
continuous losses resulted in a star sign being added to TCL‘s stock symbol, 
indicating that TCL‘s stock was at risk of being delisted (Deng, 2010). In November 
2007, TCL declared the insolvency liquidation of its European operation unit and 
decided to massively restructure its TV manufacturing operations (Economist, 2008). 
After the restructuring, TCL gave up Thomson‘s original business model, distribution 
channels and even the Thomson brand (Deng, 2010). 
 
5.4.4 Factors influencing the integration process 
 
5.4.4.1 Prior related resources 
 
TCL possessed prior resources related to the internationalisation of its TV business. 
The first campaign of its ‗internationalisation battle‘ had started in December 1998 in 
Vietnam. Since 1999, TCL had gradually exported its private brand products to 
markets in various emerging economies in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Eastern 
Europe and South Africa. At its peak, TCL‘s TV products accounted for 14% of 
Vietnam‘s market and 8% of that of the Philippines during that period (Deng, 2010). 
Through this process, TCL gradually evolved its own overseas market distribution 
channel. In addition to international trade experiences, TCL also tried to build its 
competency through collaborations with well-established corporations from 
developed economies, such as the UK‘s TTP Communication Plc. Table 5.5 shows 
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TCL‘s major internationalisation activities before 2004. 
 
Table 5.5 TCL‘s major internationalisation activities before 2004 
Year TCL‟s major internationalisation activities 
1999 Acquired the Tongnai electronics corporation in Vietnam 
2001 Export of TCL products to India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Russia 
2001 Set up a sales office in the Middle East 
2002 Partially acquired Schneider (Germany)  
2002 Set up a joint venture with Great Wall Cybertech Limited (Hong Kong) 
2003 Built a partnership with TTP Communication Plc (UK) for the development of 
multi-functional handset products 
2004 M&A with Alcatel Mobile Phones Limited (France) 
Sources: Annual reports, corporate documents, and interview data. 
 
However, despite TCL‘s overseas business running smoothly during that period, the 
resources and knowledge it had acquired came only from other emerging markets 
which shared similar characteristics with the Chinese one. When TCL tried to apply 
these prior related resources to its French M&A, it did not work as expected since it 
used Chinese logic, or emerging markets logic, to deal with businesses in Europe and 
North America. In other words, TCL overestimated its capability to manage the 
integration process, lacking the ability to deal with post-acquisition issues in M&A in 
developed economies. 
 
The significance of prior related resources is also evidenced by the way in which 
TCL‘s lack of knowledge about the target firm negatively affected post-acquisition 
performance. Only four months passed between TCL starting to consider the M&A 
and it officially signing the final agreement. A large amount of due diligence and 
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negotiation work was completed within only several months. The vice president of 
TCL comments on the 2004 decision-making process: 
 
―Whether we are willing to admit it or not, the decision-making process was 
too rushed. A great opportunity emerged and we were just too eager to grab 
it.‖ 
 
Although TCL hired BCG and Morgan Stanley to perform professional management 
and financial appraisals, the final decision on the M&A was not fully based on the 
consulting report. According to the Morgan Stanley report, the financial outlook of 
this M&A was ‗neutral‘. BCG‘s even gave a ‗negative‘ appraisal report to indicate the 
risk linked with the deal. Nevertheless, Mr Li chose to follow his personal judgement 
over that of these professional bodies. In fact, TCL had not accumulated enough 
related knowledge on Thomson by carefully examining the acquired brands, products, 
and services (Hirt &Orr, 2006; Deng, 2010). As a result, it overrated the true value of 
the Thomson brand, especially in the Chinese and North American markets. It also 
failed to recognise the competence of Thomson‘s patents and technology to the TV 
sets of the future. After years of loss, Mr Li still does not admit his decision was made 
impulsively. One TCL executive commented: 
 
―Some entrepreneurs in non-SOEs crave greatness and success, and wish to 
gain attention by acquiring high reputation enterprises from western 
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countries. It‘s like a poor boy marrying a rich foreign girl.‖ 
 
Although this comment was made in respect to another CBMA case by another 
Chinese acquirer, it resonates with TCL‘s case.  
 
TCL‘s lack of prior related resources also lay in its weak R&D capacity in that period. 
Despite TCL having long been an innovative enterprise in the Chinese market, its 
R&D intensity was still relatively low compared with that of its global competitors 
(Lanshizi, 2011). Because of its limited R&D capability, TCL could only passively 
accept Thomson‘s technology and patents instead of exploiting the patented 
knowledge. When Thomson‘s CRT and Projection TV technology was quickly being 
replaced by the new market favourites, large screen LCD TVs, TCL failed to react 
quickly. This was considered by TCL to be a major reason of the acquisition‘s failure.  
 
5.4.4.2Degree/level of integration 
 
Ample evidence has shown that the degree of integration significantly affected TCL‘s 
M&A performance. TCL wished to integrate the global operations to achieve synergy. 
It took a series of steps to integrate its business operations globally. First, integration 
of R&D resources. After the M&A, TCL set up four R&D centres located in China, 
Singapore, Germany and the USA. Each centre focused on the R&D of different types 
of products and technologies so as to build a comparative advantage in various aspects 
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of TV technologies and meet the specific needs of customers from different regions. 
Second, integration of procurement. TTE‘s procurement costs in raw materials and 
parts could be ―dramatically reduced by using TCL‘s procurement resources‖ (Mr Li, 
personal interview, September 2012). Third, integration of the supply chain and 
distribution channels. In addition to TCL‘s existing manufacturing  plants in China 
and Vietnam, TTE also owned Thomson‘s plants in Mexico, Poland, Thailand and 
France. A robust global integration of the supply chain could greatly improve TTE‘s 
competitiveness. Besides these main measures, TCL also restructured five profit 
centres, namely: China, North America, Europe, Emerging markets, and strategic 
OEM business centres. It also implemented a multi brand strategy by promoting the 
Thomson and Schneider brands in Europe, the RCA brand in North American, and the 
TCL brand in other markets.  
 
However, the initial integration strategy failed to successfully redeploy the combined 
resources and achieve synergy. The main reason behind this poor performance was the 
distinct integration levels TCL adopted in the North American and European business 
centres. Based on the information obtained and the analysis carried out before the 
M&A, TCL noticed that Thomson‘s primary weakness was in the North American 
market. The annual losses in this market in 2003 and 2004 had been90 million USD 
and 120 million USD respectively, while the European market losses in these two 
years amounted to just 1million USD. In this case, TCL turned most of its attention to 
the North American market and implemented a series of operational integration 
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mechanisms. For instance, Mr Zhao Qisong, the former COO (chief operating officer) 
was expatriated to the USA and Mexico to take charge of the restructuring of the 
North American manufacturing plants and supply chains. To reduce costs, TCL also 
used its cheaper domestic parts to replace some RCA product parts in the North 
American market. The integration and redeployment of resources greatly improved 
the efficiency of the manufacturing plants and reduced procurement costs. As a result, 
the annual losses of the North American market dramatically decreased from 120 to 
45 million USD. 
 
TCL did not specifically integrate the day-to-day operations of the North American 
business centre by posting middle and junior level Chinese expatriates. However, the 
strategic decisions on the integration and redeployment of the combined resources 
were under the purview of Chinese executives, and so were major operational 
activities. In other words, the headquarters held the decision-making power on issues 
that needed to be decided by the acquiring firm. This ‗control over and delegate 
power‘ strategy not only maintained the existing practical routines of the acquired 
units to minimise potential knowledge destruction, but also ensured that the operation 
of the subsidiary would follow the acquirer‘s strategic intent. 
 
However, TCL did not apply this strategy to its ‗optimistic‘ European market. One 
former TCL senior executive said: 
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―Considering the performance of the past couple of years, we did not worry 
too much about the European business.‖ 
 
The CFO of TTE‘s European business centre stated: 
 
―We were too optimistic about the European business after the acquisition. In 
fact, we did not realise the importance of integration at the time.‖ 
 
The executive level of TCL did not put much effort in analysing the business and 
operations of the European unit after the acquisition. Unlike the cautious operation 
and integration of the North American business centre, TCL chose to give the 
European unit a free hand. The CEO of the European business centre even openly 
forecast an expected annual profit of 8 to 10 million USD. 
 
The outcome of both the financial and the integration performance was however much 
worse than expected. In fact, in addition to giving the European business centre 
autonomy in its day to day operations, the headquarters did not keep complete control 
over the European unit in terms of the manufacturing plant, procurement, production 
and R&D. This was mainly the result of neglecting the strategic matters concerning 
the post-acquisition integration of this subsidiary. Despite TCL wanting management 
and hierarchical cultural control of its European subsidiary, it failed to achieve the 
desired degree of integration. 
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The European centre used to be the headquarters of Thomson TV. After the M&A, the 
European unit was supposed to focus more on businesses such as sales, after sale 
services and marketing channels, and take orders from the headquarters in terms of 
procurement, product planning, R&D, etc. However, without a thorough integration, 
both the existing French managers and general employees proved incapable of 
changing their way of thinking from that of headquarters to that of a subsidiary. The 
CFO of the TTE European business centre said: 
 
―Frankly speaking, the French staff did not, and did not wish to adapt to their 
new roles. The orders of the Chinese executives from the headquarters were 
often only partly followed and implemented in the European business 
centre.‖ 
 
Under these circumstances, the integration level was lower than it would have been 
necessary to combine and redeploy resources to create synergy (Zollo & Singh, 2004). 
Thus, TCL partly lost control over its European business centre, much less to integrate 
socio-cultural issues such as cultural differences. For example, the information system 
used by TCL was different from that of the European business centre, which it had 
inherited from Thomson. It is not common for an information system not to be unified 
even as along as one year since acquisition. This resulted in TCL‘s failure to control 
and monitor the business process of its European subsidiary (Lanshizi, 2011).  
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In brief, the level of integration significantly affected TCL‘s M&A performance. This 
is evidenced by the different stories told by the well-integrated North American 
subsidiary and the problematic European business centre.  
 
5.4.4.3 Speed of integration 
 
The differences in the way integration took place in the North American subsidiary 
and in the European business centre also highlighted the key role that the speed of 
integration implementation played in the post-acquisition performance of TCL‘s M&A 
with Thomson. Due to the significant annual losses suffered in the North American 
market before the M&A, TCL was alarmed even before completing the deal. 
Immediately after the acquisition, its first and most important task was the integration 
and restructuring of the North American subsidiary. The CEO of TTE not only 
assigned his top aide, Mr Zhao Qisong, to take charge of the North American business, 
but also combined and integrated resources for the first time to facilitate the reform. 
For example, TCL dramatically decreased the cost of the main product line in the 
North American market by incorporating its own core TV parts into RCA brand 
products (Lanshizi, 2011). The whole process of the programme, which covered steps 
ranging from R&D to operations, was accomplished within only four months. 
Moreover, the revenue was increased by 8 million USD in just five months, which 
was a striking speed. In addition to the rapid product integration, TCL also moved fast 
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in integrating the Mexican manufacturing plants. By improving manufacturing 
efficiency, reducing procurement costs and cutting staff redundancy, the operating 
cost of the Mexican manufacturing plants was reduced from 92 million USD in 2003 
to 45.67 million USD in 2005.In addition to various operational integration 
mechanisms, Mr Zhao Qisong and his integration team also adopted some 
socio-cultural integration mechanisms to smooth out any potential tensions that could 
arise from the rapidly implemented operational integration. For instance, they lived 
with the Mexican employees during the first several months after the acquisition and 
got them involved in discussions over resource redeployment and plant restructuring. 
 
In contrast to the rapid integration of the North American subsidiary, that of the 
European business centre was to a certain extent neglected due to the Chinese 
executives‘ blind optimism towards the European market. Its low integration speed 
led to serious problems. On one hand, the slow speed of integration caused 
uncertainty in the French employees about their role in the combined entity. The 
initial phase of the integration should have provided an opportunity to convert their 
roles from headquarters to subsidiary staff. But TCL failed to grab this valuable 
chance. On the other hand, the integration speed was so slow that there was barely any 
integration actually taking place despite the dramatic market shifts. Since the end of 
2004, LCD panel TV sets had gradually became the favourites in Europe‘s TV market. 
By contrast, the North American market had shown a much slower acceptance of the 
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new LCD TV sets because of different household environments
18
. Unfortunately, the 
European subsidiary had not learned the fast operation system of TCL. Its slow 
response did not fit the requirement of producing and selling LCD TV products. This 
led to a product turnover than took two months longer than that of TCL‘s competitors, 
resulting in huge losses in the European market between 2005 and 2006 
 
Had the combined entity performed well, smooth operation and good prospects might 
have defused the acquired firm‘s employees‘ potential resistance. However, when the 
combined organisation continuously suffered unexpected losses before a certain 
degree of integration had been achieved and an adequate degree of trust had been built, 
great market pressures would trigger conflicts that might not otherwise have emerged. 
A senior management of TCL opined: 
 
―Under the huge pressures of such a loss producing market, our internal 
management problems and cultural conflicts became acute.‖ 
 
Socio-cultural integration was in turn hampered by these conflicts. Consequently, both 
the Chinese employees and French staff worked in a tense atmosphere, which was 
harmful to operational integration and resource redeployment within the combined 
firm. 
 
                                                             
18
Normally, European families live in rooms that are smaller than those of their American counterparts. Compared 
with large screen CRTs and projection TVs, LCD panel TVs have an advantage in image definition over size. 
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5.4.4.4 Staff turnover 
 
The crucial influence of staff turnover on the performance of TCL‘s M&A with 
Thomson was mainly reflected in the changes in the management teams. TCL 
attempted to reduce general employee redundancy in specific divisions. However, as 
the corresponding actions were rather gradual and imperceptible, no resistance was 
met. This was mainly because the redundancy measures were under the expectations 
of the acquired firm‘s employees who were eager for change after years of loss before 
the M&A and expected a certain number of redundancies to boost the company‘s 
performance. For example, during the resource redeployment and restructuring period 
of the North American subsidiary, some redundancy suggestions were actually 
proposed by the existing local managers, which made the TCL executives quite 
‗ surprised and relieved‘ (as was reported by a senior executive).  
 
However, the changes in the TTE management team did not go as smoothly as those 
in the general staff. In addition to appointing Mr Zhao Zhongyao as the CEO of TTE, 
TCL made substantial adjustments to the former Thomson management team. Most 
key positions were taken by new managers appointed by TCL. Although the former 
Thomson managers were still retained in the new firm, some of them were 
substantially demoted and placed under the supervision of Chinese managers. The 
French managers who worked at the Thomson headquarters were highly discontented 
with their demotions. This created a negative organisational climate in the European 
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subsidiary. Moreover, the disappointing performance of the European subsidiary 
caused turbulence in the top management team. A large proportion of the executive 
level staff, including a couple of TCL Group veterans, had left within a few years of 
the acquisition. This not only led to gaps in the firm‘s resource base, but also damaged 
the momentum and morale of the combined organisation. 
 
In addition to being affected by the management team adjustments, the 
post-acquisition performance of TCL‘s M&A with Thomson was also significantly 
influenced by the lack of managerial talents. Like most other Chinese firms, TCL did 
not have sufficient domestic middle management resources capable of managing an 
outward acquisition integration. However, TCL still elected to build its own overseas 
management team, and especially its middle management team, endogenously instead 
of recruiting new external talents. In the first few years of its internationalisation, TCL 
thoroughly trained its prospective expatriates for over three years before sending them 
to work overseas. Nevertheless, as is shown in table 5.5, it finalised so many 
cross-border M&A in only four years that its talent reserves just dried up and middle 
level expatriates, some of them were not even able to communicate fluently in English, 
would be sent to work in the overseas subsidiaries after just one year of training. Long 
term expatriates with such low capabilities not only hampered the intra firm resource 
and knowledge transfer, but also could ignite potential socio-cultural conflicts due to 
their limited communication skills.  
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5.4.4.5Cultural differences and cultural integration 
 
―The most crucial issue that should be particularly emphasised in the 
post-acquisition integration phase is cultural integration‖(in the words of vice 
CEO of the TCL Group). 
 
Unfortunately, TCL was not aware of the significance of the cultural differences that 
existed between the two firms and failed to properly handle the cultural integration 
issues. In fact, very few measures were taken to accelerate cultural integration or 
minimise cultural conflicts. For example, TTE‘s top management team consisted of 
four Chinese managers and three foreign ones from Thomson. Such a diverse newly 
formed management team required particular care in its socio-cultural integration. 
However, TCL apparently overlooked the significance of culture related issues. The 
huge cultural differences at both the national and organisational levels resulted in 
severe conflicts during the post-acquisition integration process, especially in the 
European subsidiary which was the former Thomson headquarters. 
 
At the level of national culture, Chinese firms are more performance driven players 
who do not think much of their employees‘ free time. Like most Chinese 
manufacturing firms, TCL was composed of diligent Chinese staff who viewed 
working overtime and during weekends to be a normal part of the routine. Such firms 
focus on efficiency and motivate their employees by awarding compensation 
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packages for performance. Most TCL employees had wages consisting of a small 
fixed amount and a large reward-based proportion linked to individual or group 
performance. After the M&A with Thomson, a similar performance measurement and 
compensation system was applied to TTE. However, Thomson was a typical French 
company, which was significantly pervaded by a ‗life over work‘ culture. The retained 
French employees in TTE always paid special attention to their quality of life. They 
placed much more emphasis on a more leisurely working pace, adequate rest and 
sufficient holidays. As one TCL executive put it: 
 
―There was this one time when Mr Li Dongsheng, having come to France, 
wished to hold a meeting on a weekend. However, he failed to do so as all the 
French managers‘ mobile phones were turned off. Before this experience, 
none of us ever thought something like this could happen!‖ 
 
Moreover, the former compensation structure in Thomson was quite fixed and stable. 
Even the wages of those employees who worked in the sales department were not 
closely pegged to their performance. This change in the salary system significantly 
damaged the satisfaction level of the French employees, especially the general 
employees. This was because the new compensation system not only increased the 
volatility of the salary and placed the employees under great stress, but also actually 
reduced the salary of most staff as TTE had been suffering losses for a long time since it 
had been established.  
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In addition to national level cultural differences, cultural dimensions at the 
organisational level also affected the post-acquisition integration process. Like most 
Chinese manufacturing firms of that period, TCL occupied a leading position in a 
labour intensive industry, with a competitive advantage in effective management and 
cost control. The TCL‘s corporate culture praised a kind of ‗entrepreneurial‘ spirit, 
which encouraged the management team to show entrepreneurship, be energetic and 
effectively seek performance. Under such a corporate culture, the representatives of 
well-performing departments normally occupied the front row seats in meetings while 
their colleagues from less competitive departments took up seats in the back of their 
own initiative. This way of encouraging short term performance seemed to be too 
aggressive to the French employees. Conversely, Thomson possessed an open culture 
and was run by a well-educated management team. Accordingly, the French 
employees were used to scientific managerial methods. Therefore, the aggressive 
managerial methods adopted by the Chinese managers relocated from TCL could 
hardly establish their authority on their French employees. One TCL executive 
recalled: 
 
―Some French staff elected to leave because they did not like our working 
style and the way in which we issued our orders.‖ 
 
5.4.4.6 Integration process communication 
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In addition to neglecting cultural differences and integration, TCL also suffered from 
communication issues in the post-acquisition integration process. Socio-cultural 
barriers, such as language problems and cultural conflicts, significantly affected 
communication quality between Chinese and French employees. It seems that TCL 
realised the importance of an effective communication, as evidenced in an interview 
given by Mr Li Dongsheng in 2005: 
―Our toughest challenge, as we go through this integration, is how to 
communicate effectively…‖ 
(Knowledge Wharton, 2005) 
However, the implementation of its integration process communication proved to be 
problematic. 
 
On the one hand, TCL failed to build an effective communication mechanism. 
Because of TCL‘s pursuit of Thomson‘s technology and R&D capabilities, the 
communication and integration between R&D and product management employees 
was believed to be crucial to the post-acquisition synergy creation. However, even the 
communication between headquarters and R&D employees was not timely and 
effective. This was mainly because most R&D units were spread around the world, 
while the headquarters of TCL were located in China. With the barriers of time, space, 
and language, an effective and high quality communication can hardly be achieved 
without adequate mechanisms designed to overcome these difficulties. In fact, there 
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were almost no face-to-face social interactions between Chinese and French 
employees(Deng, 2010). TCL failed to adopt any socio-cultural integration 
mechanisms, such as visits and joint training programmes, to improve communication 
quality. The executives of TCL underestimated the level of socio-cultural integration 
needed to facilitate integration process communication. They thought that frequent 
senior management meetings and instructions to Chinese staff members would be 
enough to improve communication quality between Chinese and French employees. 
As Mr Li Dongsheng stated in an interview (Knowledge Wharton, 2005): 
 
―To communicate more effectively, we did a lot of training, and our senior 
management organized a lot of meetings. We believed that, by conducting 
such projects, it would push forward our integration while generating a lot of 
synergies.‖ 
 
On the other hand, a lack of mutual trust also harmed integration process 
communication, especially between the Chinese and French management teams. A 
large proportion of previous Thomson executives were retained after the transaction, 
while TCL chose to use its own executives in most key functions without good 
communication with the demoted French executives. Similar staff assignments also 
took place among the middle management. This generated distrust among French 
employees so that they, in turn, did not wish to communicate their ideas and thoughts 
to their Chinese colleagues (SASAC, 2008). Without mutual trust between Chinese 
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and French employees, the quality and effectiveness of communication could hardly 
be improved and the organisational climate was also hampered, which hindered the 
resource and capability transfer within the combined entity. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented four individual case study reports. Each report started by 
providing an introduction and a background for the transactions. Then the motivations 
of each deal were discussed, as these are vital for their post-acquisition integration 
strategy formulation and implementation of strategic intent M&As conducted by 
Chinese acquirers. After analysing the motivations, the data was analysed and 
presented following the sequence of the research propositions. The results show that 
the data from these four case studies provide repetitive outcomes that can strongly 
support the cross case analysis and the results of this research.  
 
This chapter contributes to answering the first and second research objectives and 
questions. Through the process of individual case analysis, six key success factors 
were identified and the ways in which and reasons why they influence the Chinese 
acquirers‘ integration process were explained. Such identification and explanation will 
be strengthened in the next chapter by means of the pattern matching process. In 
addition to the key factors and in accordance with the research propositions, several 
new factors emerged from the data analysis process. These emerging factors will be 
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analysed and presented in Chapter 6, which presents the cross case analysis and 
results. All factors identified through the data analysis will be discussed and presented 
in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 Cross-case analysis and results 
 
Introduction 
 
The single case analyses detailed in Chapter 5 were followed by the cross-case 
analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2002). This chapter will describe the cross-case 
analysis and present its results. The data analysis was mainly based on the 
propositions analysed in the single case study chapters. Three emerging themes were 
identified from the cross-case analysis. For reasons of convenience, the four studied 
cases, which are YTO-McCormick, CIJIAN-Way Assauto, CITIC HIC-Gandara 
Censa and TCL-Thomson, were coded as A to D, respectively. In section 6.1, nine key 
success factors will be identified from the cross-case analysis; which are prior related 
knowledge, level of integration, speed of integration, key staff turnover and 
management team building, cultural differences and cultural integration, integration 
process communication, home country advantages, complementary resources, and 
acquirer attractiveness. These nine key success factors are divided into status and 
process factors. The unique integration approach of the Chinese acquirers will be then 
summarised in section 6.2. In the end, the relationship between the integration 
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approach and the nine key success factors will be discussed and a newly developed 
model will be introduced to explain the key factors influencing the post-acquisition 
integration process of the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A to developed economies in 
the final summary part of this chapter 
 
6.1 Key factors influencing the integration process 
 
6.1.1 Prior related resources/knowledge 
The results show that the prior related resources of the acquiring firm played an 
important role in the post-acquisition integration process in the Chinese firms‘ 
outward M&A. They provided the knowledge and capability foundation for the firms‘ 
integration activities. These prior related resources included prior international 
business experience, R&D capability and prior performance and industrial status. A 
summary of the Chinese acquirers‘ prior related resources is listed in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1  A summary of Chinese acquirers‘ prior related resources  
Prior related 
resource 
Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Prior 
international 
business 
experience 
Import and 
export; overseas 
construction 
projects; 
ownership of 
overseas offices; 
spare parts 
centres and 
assembly 
factories. 
Import and 
export; importing 
equipment from 
Germany; OEM 
business 
experiences for 
Western firms. 
Setting up 
overseas offices 
and subsidiaries; 
Import and 
export; overseas 
orders 
accounting for 
10.79% of total 
orders 
Import and 
export; setting up 
overseas offices 
and subsidiaries; 
overseas 
acquisition 
experience; 
international 
joint venture 
experience; 
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partnerships with 
Western firms. 
Prior R&D 
capabilities 
An R&D team of 
more than 2;000 
professionals and 
experts; a 
state-level 
technology R&D 
centre consisting 
of 11 advanced 
laboratories; 
ownership of the 
Chinese National 
Tractor Research 
Institute 
(CNTRI).  
Annual R&D 
expenses over 
5% of total sales 
revenues (a top 
level ratio); 
ownership of a 
shock absorber 
academic 
research centre 
with many 
specialists; 
including 
employees of the 
Chinese 
Academy of 
Engineering; 
‗National 
High-tech 
Enterprise‘. 
Being both a 
‗state level 
innovative 
enterprise‘ and a 
‗high-tech 
enterprise‘, it 
runs a national 
level 
enterprise-based 
technology 
centre (ranking 
among the top 10 
of 887 such 
centres in 
China);runs a 
key state 
laboratory; runs a 
post-doctoral 
research station. 
An innovation 
and technology 
oriented 
enterprise that 
had achieved 
many ‗firsts‘ in 
China; one of 
China‘s 
innovative 
enterprises‘. 
Prior 
performance and 
industrial status 
First tractor 
manufacturer in 
China. Number 
one in market 
share. 
One of the 
biggest vehicle 
shock absorber 
producers in 
China. Number 
one in market 
share. 
One of the 
biggest players in 
the heavy 
equipment 
manufacture 
industry; Number 
one mining 
machinery and 
cement 
equipment 
manufacturer. 
The largest 
consumer 
electronics 
enterprise; 
industry leader in 
China‘s 
electronic 
information 
sector; Number 
one TV brand in 
China. 
Prior knowledge 
about the target 
Acquired a high 
level of 
knowledge on 
the target by 
hiring world 
class professional 
agencies before 
M&A. 
Acquired a high 
level of 
knowledge about 
the target by 
hiring world 
class professional 
agencies before 
M&A. 
Acquired a high 
level of 
knowledge about 
the target by 
hiring world 
class professional 
agencies before 
M&A. 
Hired world class 
professional 
agencies before 
M&A, but did 
not take them 
seriously and did 
not really heed 
their advice.  
Sources: Interview data, corporate documents and annual reports. 
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6.1.1.1 Prior international business experience  
 
The Chinese firms‘ prior international exposure is deemed to be a key factor for 
post-acquisition integration success. With the exception of firm D, the firms did not 
have past CBMA experience. Nevertheless, they had accumulated useful resources 
and capabilities through their prior international exposure. These took the form of 
activities other than CBMA, such as running export/import businesses, setting up 
overseas offices and subsidiaries, building overseas factories, acquiring advanced 
equipment from global giants, collaborating with well-established corporations from 
developed economies and doing OEM business for global industrial leaders. A 
detailed comparative list of the prior international business experiences of the four 
acquiring firms can be found in Table 6.1. 
 
Their prior international business experience not only helped the Chinese acquirers in 
accumulating tangible resources and explicit knowledge-based resources, such as 
advanced equipment and technology, but also provided these domestic leaders with 
opportunities to build tacit knowledge-based resources in the process of dealing with 
cross-regional and cross-cultural issues. These resources and capabilities increased the 
knowledge base of the acquiring firms and greatly improved their ability to absorb 
strategic assets from the acquired ones (Deng, 2010). In other words, the absorptive 
capacity of acquiring firms was improved by their prior international business 
experiences.  
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In addition to the firm level absorptive capacity, that at the individual level was also 
enhanced by operating advanced equipment, doing business or collaborating with 
foreigners and working in overseas subsidiaries. Although only a small proportion of 
the Chinese employees and executives who had been directly involved in international 
business activities benefited from these experiences, their improved absorptive 
capacity was clearly valuable for the Chinese acquirers in their management of the 
post-acquisition integration process.  
 
It is worth mentioning that, although prior international exposure was considered to 
be a key factor in ensuring post-acquisition integration success, more prior 
international business experience did not always translate into better acquisition 
integration and performance. In fact, the most experienced firm, firm D, showed the 
worst post-acquisition integration results. The reason was mainly two-fold. First, firm 
D was a pioneer in Chinese firm internationalisation and outward M&A that made its 
acquisition case in early 2004. At that time, firm D could not gain real experience and 
learn lessons from other Chinese overseas acquirers. As the vice CEO of firm D says: 
 
―In those years, Chinese acquirers did not have any idea on how to go about a 
real international acquisition…They (the acquired Western firms) approached 
us and proposed acquisitions. Chinese acquirers, including TCL and Lenovo, 
knew nothing about how to acquire such giants. They (the executives of the 
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acquired firms) taught us how to buy them (the acquired firms), to hire 
internationally renowned agencies, and to take every step… Our 
understanding of integration was too basic: we thought that, if we combined 
their technology with our diligence and low cost, synergies would 
automatically be achieved...We did not expect all those difficulties in the 
post-acquisition integration phase.‖ 
 
Similarly, Mr Li Dongsheng (Lanshizi, 2011) mentioned: 
 
―In the beginning (of the integration), we did not even know what our actual 
mistakes had been.‖ 
 
Conversely, the other three firms, which made their acquisitions seven years later, 
could easily glean direct lessons and experiences from precursors such as firm D. 
These indirect experiences greatly helped late-comers to improve their knowledge 
base on the management of post-acquisition integration, and to form their own 
integration strategies. As the CFO of firm C said, 
 
―You (the author) may hear a lot about how Lenovo made great efforts and 
hit highs and lows during its integration with IBM. However, we were not 
like them. We chose not to go ahead with too much formal integration…‖ 
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Likewise, both firms A and B learned from the experiences of previous high-profile 
cases made by other Chinese acquirers. These lessons were directly related to Chinese 
firms or, more specifically, to manufacturing firms‘ outward M&A to western 
developed countries with the strategic intent to acquire strategic assets (Rui and Yip, 
2008; Deng, 2007). Therefore, such experiences were valuable for subsequent 
Chinese acquirers to improve their methods for the management of the 
post-acquisition integration process. 
 
Secondly, although firm D had accumulated some experience in acquiring a 
Vietnamese manufacturing plant and partially acquiring Schneider, a German 
electronics firm, this had been completely different from the whole acquisition of a 
global giant from a developed country. In addition, these past CBMA experiences 
could even harm Chinese acquirers by instilling in them a false sense of confidence. 
By contrast to firm D‘s overconfidence, the other three acquiring firms were more 
thorough and cautious when they undertook their acquisitions, especially in relation to 
post-acquisition integration. Most interviewees from both the executive and 
management levels of firms A, B, and C clearly mentioned the importance of 
integration, and especially cultural integration, while informants from firm D pointed 
out that they lacked understanding of post-acquisition integration: 
 
―It was totally different (from the experience before the acquisition of 
Thomson). We thought that there would not be too many difficulties…We 
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simply used our Chinese logic (for solving any post-acquisition issues) and 
did not anticipate many potential problems. We did not expect things in 
France to be so different from China. After five years, we were still engaged 
in a lawsuit over labour issues‖ 
 
Therefore, despite prior international business experience being a key factor in the 
management of post-acquisition integration, the relationship between their experience 
and post-acquisition performance still needs to be explored by future research.  
 
6.1.1.2 Prior R&D capabilities 
 
One of the most significant embodiments of the Chinese acquirers‘ prior related 
resources were their R&D capabilities, which were also a key factor in the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process. As shown in Table 6.1, all 
four Chinese acquirers were industry leaders in their respective sectors and possessed 
top level R&D capabilities in the Chinese market. Their leading R&D capabilities in 
China provided most of these Chinese acquirers with sufficient ability to identify and 
understand the advanced technology and other knowledge-based resources of the 
target firms, assimilate and integrate these valuable resources within their existing 
knowledge and resource bases, transform them into combined resources and put them 
to commercial use (Deng, 2010).  
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Insufficient prior R&D capabilities could hamper the realisation of any potential 
synergies by constraining the transfer of knowledge from an acquired firm. This can 
have a particular impact on the transfer of explicit knowledge.  
 
Having an adequate level of prior R&D capabilities, an acquirer can gain explicit 
knowledge directly through documented patents and filed technology. The evidence 
shows that all four Chinese acquirers were able to absorb the technology, patents and 
standards of their acquired firms just by studying their files. In other words, a 
sufficient level of prior R&D capabilities makes the acquiring firms capable of 
absorbing explicit knowledge and resources without the need for any direct coaching 
from the acquired firms. This provided the Chinese acquirers with an opportunity to 
adopt a low level of integration with their partners because the extent of the 
integration needed for the transfer of explicit resources was relatively low. A low 
requirement in terms of the degree of post-acquisition integration can lessen the 
potential value destruction brought about by key staff turnover, organisational routines 
disruption, etc.of a highly integrated acquired firm‘s resources base (Gomes et al., 
2013; Puranam et al., 2003; Puranam et al., 2006; Ranft and Lord, 2002). The issues 
pertaining to the importance of the level of integration will be discussed in section 
6.1.2.  
 
Although the transfer of tacit knowledge and resources still requires a certain degree 
of interaction and integration, that of explicit resources such as patents, production 
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technology, manufacturing lines and overseas plants was more straightforward and 
urgently needed by the Chinese acquirers. All four acquiring firms considered the 
absorption of technology to be one of their most significant M&A motivations. 
Therefore, a high level of prior R&D capabilities was crucial for Chinese firms‘ 
post-acquisition integration success.  
 
However, possessing national top level R&D capabilities may still not be enough for a 
Chinese acquirer to adequately manage its post-acquisition integration with an 
acquired firm from a developed Western economy. If the prior R&D capabilities of a 
Chinese firm were to prove not to be internationally compatible, it might still be 
confronted with difficulties in absorbing, combining and applying the acquired 
resources. Occupying a similar R&D leading position in the domestic industry, firm D 
did not possess the same level of prior R&D capabilities by international standards as 
firms A, B, and C. For a domestic industry leader before the acquisition, firm D‘s 
R&D intensity was still relatively low compared to that of its global competitors. This 
was also partly in line with the global status of China‘s economy and manufacturing 
ability at the time. Due to its limited R&D capabilities, Firm D could only passively 
accept its acquired firm‘s technology and patents instead of exploiting and developing 
them. When those technologies fell into obsolescence due to new market trends, firm 
D failed to use the acquired R&D resources to develop new technologies and products, 
which resulted in years of huge losses. Conversely, firm A‘s R&D capabilities were 
not far behind those of its global competitors, although it barely had any comparative 
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technological advantages. Therefore, firm A successfully assimilated its acquired 
firm‘s advanced technology on some key components and applied it to its existing 
main products.  
 
6.1.1.3 Prior performance and industrial status 
 
Before an M&A deal, an acquiring firm‘s past performance and its current industrial 
status can also influence the integration process. Most Chinese acquirers capable of 
successfully completing an outward M&A normally have years of good performance 
and occupy leading positions in the domestic market (Tan and Ai, 2010). This is 
mainly because, before any M&A, the overall capabilities of a Chinese acquirer are 
examined by both the Chinese government, through a number of bureaucratic 
approval procedures, and the target firm. On the one hand, the Chinese government 
has set up a series of approval procedures to ensure the health of outward M&A 
activities
19
. On the other hand, a target firm would also wish to ensure a promising 
future for itself by selecting a powerful buyer.  
 
A good prior performance and a leading industrial status can help a Chinese acquirer 
to gain trust from the key stakeholders of their target firm, such as the previous 
managers, the local general employees, the trade unions, and the local government. 
The attitude of these stakeholders towards the acquiring firm plays a crucial role in 
                                                             
19Detailed explanations of the approval procedures required before a Chinese firm‘s outward M&A can be found in 
chapter three of this thesis. 
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the post-acquisition integration process because the acquired employees‘ trust can 
lead to a high level of acceptance of the integration changes, intention to stay in the 
job and willingness to cooperate with the Chinese executives (Stahl, et al., 2011). It 
can also lead to a harmonious climate in the combined entity, which can facilitate the 
transfer of resources and knowledge (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Birkinshaw et 
al., 2000). 
 
Moreover, the attractiveness of a Chinese acquirer can also be improved by the target 
firm‘s employees‘ having a positive perception of China‘s economy. China‘s 
economic boom of recent years has been gradually acknowledged by western 
countries, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis and China becoming the 
world‘s second largest economy. The employees of a target firm will thus be more 
likely to believe that their firm could have a better future under the management of 
Chinese industry leaders, which have achieved dramatic economic growth and have 
sailed unscathed through the recent financial crisis. The evidence from cases A, B, 
and C proves that such trust and recognition can easily be observed and greatly helped 
in the post-acquisition integration process. This effect was relatively weak in case D, 
because the reputation of the Chinese economy and firms was still not well 
established at the time.  
 
6.1.1.4 Prior knowledge about the target 
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Prior knowledge about the acquired firm is often believed to be a key factor in 
influencing the post-acquisition integration process (Deng, 2010; Zander and Zander, 
2010). Despite the integration process occurring after the deal, a Chinese acquirer 
must identify the complementary capability that it needs to create synergy, and be 
aware of the potential difficulties it will be likely to face in the pre-acquisition phase. 
Managing the integration processes can be seen as an attempt at unpacking a ‗grey 
box‘ (Zander and Zander, 2010). An acquiring firm cannot know everything about the 
target firm before the deal. In this case, the pre-acquisition due diligence and 
negotiation process provides an opportunity for the buyer to make the target firm less 
obscure. For a Chinese acquirer, it is even more crucial to accumulate prior 
knowledge about a western target firm before the M&A deal; cultural differences, 
language problems and other institutional constraints can all give rise to 
post-acquisition challenges (Luo and Tung, 2007).  
 
The significance of accumulating as much prior knowledge about a target firm is 
evidenced in all the studied cases. For instance, firm C particularly emphasised the 
importance of its assessment of the Spanish management team. Without forming an 
idea about the quality of the management team, firm C would not have conducted the 
acquisition. Firm B ensured it had in-depth knowledge about the Italian labour system 
and redundancy regulations before coming to a written agreement on the recruitment 
of local employees. Having put these terms in writing, firm B could take a reasonable 
position when facing trade union demands for the employment of more local 
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personnel. Conversely, firm D‘s lack of knowledge of its acquired firm‘s legislation 
and of the ‗unwritten rules‘ on redundancy resulted in millions of Euros in 
compensation and years of law-suits. Moreover, firm D also failed to carefully 
examine the acquired brands, products, and services, which led to an overestimation 
of the complementary capabilities that could be acquired from the target firm. When 
an acquiring firm fails to clearly identify the complementary capability and synergy 
potential before an acquisition, it will encounter more difficulties during the 
integration phase. This is because things maybe different from what it expected, and 
any integration strategy based on the knowledge available before the M&A may no 
longer be appropriate.  
 
6.1.1.5 Conclusion 
 
In brief, an acquiring firm‘s prior related resources are a crucial factor influencing the 
post-acquisition integration process. Accumulating an adequate prior international 
business experience, a strong R&D capability, a good performance, a leading 
industrial status, and ample prior knowledge of the target firm would enhance a 
Chinese acquirer‘s ability to identify, understand, assimilate, integrate, transform, and 
apply the acquired firm‘s resources (especially the complementary ones) and 
knowledge. The significant role played by these elements suggests that there is the 
need to prepare well for the post-acquisition integration even before the deal.  
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6.1.2 Degree/level of integration  
 
Evidence suggests that the level of integration plays a significant role in the 
post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A. Post-acquisition 
integration can be fostered at both the socio-cultural and operational levels. This 
section mainly focuses on the operational integration aspects, such as production, 
marketing, procurement, and management system integration. Integration at the 
socio-cultural level will be discussed in detail in the cultural differences and 
integration section 6.1.5.  
 
During the post-acquisition integration process, the acquired firm‘s well-established 
operational patterns and routines are normally changed partially or completely, as a 
newly combined entity is being formed (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Bauer and 
Matzler, 2013). In order to exploit the potential synergies arising from the 
combination of the resources of both parties, a certain degree of post-acquisition 
integration and resource reconfiguration is necessary (Gomez et al., 2013; Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Schweizer, 2005; Bauer and Matzler, 2013). The complete 
absence of integration would eliminate any opportunity for resource combination, 
redeployment and exploitation, which has a positive effect on synergy realisation and 
acquisition success. However, a high level of integration could lead to higher 
coordination costs and more organisational changes, which might result in 
socio-cultural conflicts and employee resistance (Pablo, 1994; Teerikangas and Very, 
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2006; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Bauer and Matzler, 2013). Based on their 
specific characteristics and organisational differences, Chinese acquirers have unique 
ways of dealing with post-acquisition integration level challenges. The data of this 
research indicates that Chinese acquirers adopt differentiated levels of operational 
integration, a low level in the day-to-day management and a medium one in strategic 
issues and in strategically important operational areas. The result shows that the 
choice of the level of integration is a key factor in pursuing post-acquisition 
integration success. Table 6.2 is a summary of the levels of integration in day-to-day 
management, strategic issues, and strategically significant units. 
 
Table 6.2 Level of integration on day-to-day management, strategic issues, and strategic 
significant units 
Level of 
integration 
Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Level of 
integration in 
general 
day-to-day 
management 
Low level of 
formal 
integration in 
day-to-day 
management; 
very few 
long-term 
Chinese 
expatriates; 
French managers 
given autonomy 
in most parts of 
the day-to-day 
operational 
management；
change in the 
formal structure 
of the acquired 
Low level of 
formal 
integration in 
day-to-day 
management; 
only three 
long-term 
Chinese 
expatriates; local 
managers given a 
high degree of 
autonomy in the 
day-to-day 
operational 
management 
decisions in most 
departments; 
very few formal 
Very low level of 
formal 
integration in 
day-to-day 
management (no 
involvement in 
the acquired 
firm‘s day-to-day 
operational 
management at 
all); no 
permanent 
Chinese 
expatriates; little 
formal 
integration in 
certain functions, 
such as 
Low level of 
formal 
integration in 
day-to-day 
management; no 
specific 
integration in the 
day-to-day 
operations of the 
North American 
business centre 
by sending 
middle and 
junior level 
Chinese 
expatriates; 
giving the 
European 
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firm was 
carefully 
controlled：
retainment of the 
French 
management 
team, retainment 
of the existing 
information 
system, 
retainment of the 
former 
performance 
appraisal system, 
recovery of the 
previous 
management 
control system; 
persistence in the 
old compensation 
system. 
structures and 
routines, such as 
the accounting 
and financial 
departments, 
were changed.  
accounting and 
finance system.  
business centre 
autonomy in 
day-to-day 
operations; even 
the information 
system was not 
integrated in the 
European unit. 
Level of 
integration in 
strategic 
issues and 
strategic 
important 
operational 
units 
Medium. 
Chinese 
executives still 
holding the right 
to make 
decisions on 
strategic issues 
and certain major 
operational 
activities, such as 
procurement and 
R&D. 
Medium. 
Chinese 
executives 
holding the right 
to make 
decisions on 
strategic 
decision-making; 
key operational 
management 
aspects, such as 
procurement and 
market 
distribution, to be 
authorised by 
Chinese 
executives at the 
operational 
integration level; 
medium level of 
integration in 
R&D.  
Medium. All 
strategic 
decisions made 
by Chinese 
executives; major 
operational 
activities such as 
procurement, 
marketing, and 
investment, to be 
authorised by the 
acquiring firm; 
monitoring 
mechanism to 
manage risks and 
ensure that the 
operation of the 
subsidiary 
follows the 
strategic intent of 
the acquirer. 
Different levels 
of integration in 
different units. 
For the North 
American unit, 
strategic 
decisions on 
integrating and 
redeploying 
combined 
resources under 
the purview of 
Chinese 
executives, 
together with 
major operational 
activities; For the 
European unit, 
the headquarters 
did not have 
complete control 
of the 
manufacturing 
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plant, 
procurement, 
production and 
R&D. 
Sources: Interview data, corporate documents and annual reports. 
 
6.1.2.1 Level of integration on general day-to-day management 
 
The Chinese acquirers‘ generally low level of integration in day-to-day operational 
management was reflected in the following aspects. First, they allocated local 
managers a high level of autonomy to make day-to-day operational management 
decisions in most departments. In all four cases, most middle managers and some 
senior executives were retained local employees. The acquiring firms‘ top executives 
did not intervene in the decision-making process of most of the day-to-day 
management teams. Even in the acquired firms whose CEOs were Chinese expatriates, 
such as firms A and B, the day-to-day management was overseen by the local vice 
CEO and middle managers. The underlying reasons were twofold. On the one hand, 
the leadership knowledge is a vital part of a firm‘s knowledge base (Angwin and 
Meadows, 2009). The Chinese acquirers believed that the local management teams, 
and especially former managers, knew the acquired firms better than expatriates from 
China in terms of organisational structures, day-to-day work routines, organisational 
cultures, local institutions, and so on. On the other hand, it would have been 
unrealistic to greatly intervene in the day-to-day operations of the acquired firms due 
to limitations in the Chinese acquirers‘ capability. Most Chinese acquiring firms still 
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lacked sufficient pools of suitable talents that could be employed as expatriate 
managers and outperform local ones. A comparably skilled Chinese expatriate could 
hardly be cultivated in a short time period through receiving systematic training, as 
firm D did. Moreover, involving Chinese managers in the day-to-day operational 
management could trigger the potential cultural conflicts which are likely to occur 
during the day-to-day interactions with employees from a different socio-cultural 
background. 
 
Second, very few permanent or long-term Chinese expatriates were appointed to work 
in the acquired firms. For example, firm B only had two permanent expatriates. In 
case C, there were no Chinese expatriates working in the acquired firm. The Chinese 
acquirers believed that sending too many long term expatriates to work in the acquired 
firms could have caused adaptation issues between Chinese and foreign employees, 
which could have negatively affected the transfer of knowledge-based resources. 
From the perspective of senior management, involving too many Chinese managers in 
the day-to-day management process might have led to the disruption of organisational 
routines and to the dissolution of the ties embedded in the acquired firms (Ranft and 
Lord, 2002; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; Gomez et al., 2013). From the 
perspective of the local general employees, hiring long term Chinese workers would 
cause dissatisfaction among those who may have believed their job opportunities to be 
taken by Chinese workers. This would have resulted in a mistrustful organisational 
climate which could have hampered the transfer of resources in the integration 
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process. In addition, appointing too many Chinese expatriates could haveled to an 
increase in integration and coordination costs. The interaction and cooperation 
between the employees of the two parties, with their distinct socio-cultural 
backgrounds, would have naturally increased the potential for conflicts linked to 
cultural differences, the language barrier, communication problems, etc. These 
conflicts would have harmed the organisational climate of the combined organisation 
and could have caused a poor acquisition performance. 
 
Third, most of the formal structures and routines of the acquired firms were retained 
after the acquisitions. The existing operational systems and day-to-day routines of the 
acquired firms had mostly been in place for years. Changing them might have led to 
the impairment of the firms‘ knowledge base. Moreover, although all the acquired 
firms had been sold to their Chinese acquirers because of their decreasing profits, 
their recession had had more to do with strategic issues than with problems in their 
day-to-day operation. However, a complete lack of change could have also caused 
uncertainty and rumours to thrive among the employees of the acquired firms, because 
most of them would have actually been expecting the post-acquisition changes which 
are normally seen in M&A. Moreover, a certain degree of integration is necessary to 
combine and redeploy resources (Bauer and Matzler, 2013; Chatterjee et al., 1992). 
Therefore, the Chinese acquirers still enacted the formal operational integration of 
specific functions, but to a very low degree. Such operational and organisational 
changes were mainly concentrated in the integration of the accounting and financial 
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systems. Some acquiring firms, such as C and D, also changed their information 
systems and made adjustments to their performance appraisal criteria and 
compensation system at the management level. The above operational integration and 
organisational changes were mostly a one-off. In addition, the day-to-day operational 
management of these changed areas still fell under the responsibility of the local 
managers. Therefore, the level of integration in the general day-to-day management 
was still considered to below. 
 
6.1.2.2 Level of integration on strategic issues and strategically important units  
 
Despite the level of integration in most parts of the general day-to-day management 
being quite low, there were still some strategically important organisational 
departments and operational aspects of the acquired firms that were being moderately 
integrated. The evidence suggests that certain crucial operational activities, such as 
procurement, market distribution, investment and R&D, should have been and were 
particularly highlighted and controlled by Chinese executives. Although the 
day-to-day operational management of these units of the acquired firms was still 
under the responsibility of local managers, the Chinese executives took charge of the 
decision-making in their more relevant activities. In fact, the Chinese acquirers 
developed strict monitoring mechanisms to manage risk and ensure that the operations 
of the subsidiaries were in adherence to their headquarters‘ strategic intents.  
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In cases A, B, and C, key operational activities, such as procurement, marketing and 
R&D, were all placed under the control of the Chinese acquirers after a medium level 
of integration. Firm D, however, implemented different levels of integration in two 
major business centres. On the one hand, the degree of integration in the North 
American business centre was firmly controlled at a medium level through the 
restructuring of manufacturing plants, supply chains and market distribution channels. 
Positive results were achieved following these integration activities. On the other 
hand, the integration of the European business centre was neglected. A very low level 
of integration was implemented in all areas of the European subsidiary, including key 
operational activities such as procurement, production and R&D. A result of such a 
low level of integration was that firm D partly lost control of its European business 
centre, making it impossible to even speak of socio-cultural integration issues such as 
the management of cultural differences. Consequently, constant huge losses in Europe 
nearly caused firm D‘s trading in the stock market to be suspended.  
 
Therefore, the vital importance of implementing higher levels of integration in these 
crucial organisational departments and operational aspects, as opposed to general 
day-to-day management activities, is highlighted. Their significance stems from their 
strategic importance, which is reflected in two aspects. First, these business units and 
activities are linked to the strategic intent of the M&A. All four deals are strategic 
intent M&A motivated by a quest for advanced technology and equipment resources, 
as well as overseas market distribution channels. Accordingly, the operations closely 
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related to these issues should have been particularly emphasised and well integrated to 
achieve the knowledge and capability transfer. A higher level of integration in market 
distribution as well as R&D units would have ensured that the operations of the 
acquired firms were following the strategic intents of the acquirers in terms of these 
crucial business units. Second, the higher level of integration in these key aspects is 
linked to their high synergy potential. For example, in the post-acquisition integration 
phase of a Chinese acquirer‘s M&A, synergy is likely to be achieved by integrating 
procurement and reducing costs (Cogman and Tan, 2010; Liu and Woywode, 2013). 
This was proven to be true in all the cases in this research. Therefore, it is crucial to 
ensure that the integration level in these synergy-inducing aspects is higher than the 
required degree of integration necessary to combine and redeploy resources to create 
synergy (Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
 
Using the same logic, it is not difficult to understand the Chinese acquirers‘ decision 
to withhold strategic decision-making rights as a key factor in the pursuit of 
post-acquisition integration success. Despite local managers being entrusted with the 
day-to-day general management, the strategic decisions within the acquired firms 
were all made by Chinese executives
20
. The control of the strategic decision-making 
rights in the acquired firms ensured that post-acquisition integration adhered to the 
integration strategies of the Chinese acquirers. Therefore, a higher level of integration 
was adopted in strategic issues, which enabled the Chinese acquirers to naturally take 
                                                             
20
The advice of the employees of the acquired firms was also taken into consideration.  
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strategic control of the post-acquisition integration process. 
 
It is worth noting that the acquiring firms‘ emphasis on the integration of these crucial 
units does not imply that they were highly integrated. The level of integration was still 
relatively medium. For example, the evidence suggests that firm A integrated 
procurement mainly by sourcing low cost component and part suppliers for its Italian 
subsidiary, instead of deeply integrating supply chains by combining the two units or 
allowing the employees from the two countries to work in conjunction. Similarly, in 
all four cases, the R&D departments of both the acquiring and acquired organisations 
were not completely integrated by adopting formal integration mechanisms, such as 
changing the organisational structures and routines of the R&D centres of the 
acquired firms or sending long term Chinese R&D expatriates to work overseas. 
Instead, the integration of the R&D units was mostly facilitated through various social 
integration mechanisms, such as short term visits, joint training programmes, 
meetings, etc. 
 
The underlying reason for the medium level of integration in these key areas can be 
explained by a well-known quandary in post-acquisition integration (Gomes et al., 
2013): post-acquisition synergies require a certain extent of integration to transfer, 
redeploy and reconfigure resources within the combined entity. Compared with 
tangible resources and explicit knowledge-based resources, tacit knowledge-based 
resources are more valuable. However, the latter are also more embedded, socially 
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complex, and personally bound, making it difficult to transfer them between firms. 
Therefore, understanding, assimilating and transforming tacit knowledge-based 
resources requires a high level of operational and socio-cultural post-acquisition 
integration. However, such a high level of integration is likely to harm the acquired 
firm through key staff turnover, disruption of organisational routines and dissolution 
of embedded ties, all of which may compromise the firm‘s resource base. This is 
particularly true for tacit knowledge-based resources as they are mostly embedded in 
the employees. In this instance, some scholars suggest using contingency approaches, 
involving different integration strategies and synergy outcomes to medium 
organisational differences (Bjorkman et al., 2007; Gomes et al., 2013).  
 
For Chinese acquirers‘ outward M&A to developed countries, there are two specific 
aspects that amplify the negative effects of a high level of integration. First, the huge 
cultural differences increase the difficulty of integration. The higher the level of 
integration, the more likely that cultural problems will emerge from the interactions. 
Second, Chinese acquirers do not have sufficient numbers of suitable talents to handle 
integration issues. Their lack of ability, for instance in communication skills, could 
nullify the value created through deep integration. Therefore, despite a certain level of 
integration being necessary for strategically important organisational departments and 
operational areas, such level needs to be contained by Chinese acquirers to avoid 
potential value destruction.  
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The choice of the level of integration is also a part of the integration approach. The 
detailed findings related to the Chinese acquirers‘ integration approaches and their 
underlying rationales will be discussed in section 6.2. 
 
6.1.2.3 Section conclusion 
 
To sum up, the level of integration is a key factor influencing the post-acquisition 
integration process and M&A performance. The Chinese firms adopted different 
levels of operational integration in different areas. For the general day-to-day 
management activities, a low level of integration was adopted, granting local 
managers a high level of autonomy in making day-to-day operational management 
decisions, limiting the numbers of permanent or long-term Chinese expatriates and 
retaining the formal structures and routines of the acquired firms. For strategic issues 
and in strategically important areas, such as procurement and R&D, the Chinese 
acquirers applied a medium level of integration to facilitate the potential synergies. 
 
This finding is partly different from that of Liu and Woywode‘s (2013), who argue 
that Chinese acquirers adopt very low levels of integration in all areas. They suggest 
that the acquiring firms should only offer strategic advice while bestowing 
decision-making autonomy on the management teams of the acquired firms. The 
possible reasons for such difference will be discussed in the conclusion chapter.  
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6.1.3 Integration implementation speed 
 
All the case studies confirmed integration implementation speed to be vital in the 
post-acquisition integration process of Chinese acquirers‘ outward M&A. From an 
operational integration perspective, a higher speed of integration can lead to faster 
resource redeployment and exploitation, and quicker synergy realisation. From a 
socio-cultural integration perspective, a slow integration speed may reduce the 
likelihood of potential conflicts and build trust among the employees of the combined 
entity (Olie, 1994; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Homburg and Bucerius, 2005, 2006; 
Angwin, 2004). Differing findings on the relationship between integration speed and 
acquisition success led some M&A scholars to call for a contingency approach 
(Angwin, 2004). The evidence in this study has shown that the integration 
implementation speed of the Chinese acquirers was affected by their strategic intent: 
they adopted a fast pace in the functional and operational integration of strategically 
important areas, and a slow one in the strategically less important operational 
activities and socio-cultural aspects. Table 6.3 is a summary of the speeds of 
integrations in the four study cases. 
 
Table 6.3 Speed of integration in the four cases 
Speed of 
integration 
Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Fast functional 
and operational 
integration in 
strategically 
Rapid and 
consistent R&D 
and technology 
integration; A 
Fast integration 
of technology 
and other 
knowledge-based 
Rapid formal 
functional 
integration; fast 
integration of the 
Fast operational 
integration of the 
North American 
subsidiary, for 
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important areas quick start in the 
integration of 
specific functions 
to restart the 
product lines. 
resources; Fast 
integration of 
R&D units; rapid 
integration of the 
manufacturing 
unit. 
strategic 
decision-making 
system; fast 
technology and 
manufacturing 
technique 
integration. 
instance in terms 
of products and 
manufacturing 
plants. 
Medium/slow 
speed of 
integration in 
strategically less 
important 
operational 
activities and 
socio-cultural 
aspects 
Slow integration 
of socio-cultural 
issues; Slow 
general 
operational 
integration. 
Medium 
operational 
integration, 
except for R&D 
and 
manufacturing 
lines; slow 
socio-cultural 
integration. 
Slow 
socio-cultural 
integration. 
Slow operational 
and 
socio-cultural 
integration of the 
European 
subsidiary. 
Sources: Interview data, corporate documents and annual reports. 
 
6.1.3.1 Fast functional and operational integration in strategically important 
areas 
 
The ‗functional integration‘ concept used here refers to the one-off operational 
integration of functional business areas, such as information systems, accounting and 
financial systems, etc. The importance of a high speed formal functional integration is 
evidenced by the studied cases. Formal functional integration was implemented 
rapidly by firms A, B, and C, to maintain the business momentum of their respective 
acquired firms. Firm D did well in its North American subsidiary, but failed to do so 
in its European business centre, resulting in the loss of control of this subsidiary and 
huge losses in the European market within two years of the acquisition.  
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Generally speaking, fast functional integration can be observed in most M&A deals, 
thus it is also expected by most employees of the acquired firms. If the acquiring 
firms do not integrate the functional areas in the post-acquisition phase, rumour and 
uncertainty may thrive among employees of the acquired firms. This is because ―it 
does not look like an acquisition‖ (Liu and Woywode, 2013). A rapid integration in 
functional areas helps to maintain the momentum of the acquired firms‘ business 
operations. When a firm is acquired through a CBMA by a firm from a different 
institutional context, especially one from an emerging economy, its supply chain and 
market distribution might be affected by any uncertainty in the M&A (Homburg and 
Bucerius, 2006). Existing suppliers and buyers might hesitate to confirm their existing 
cooperation levels. For example, both firms A and C faced some challenges 
concerning this issue. In such instances, a quick and smooth integration of the 
functional areas may rebuild the trust of the stakeholders and keep the business of the 
acquired firms on the right track.  
 
Furthermore, in cases in which Chinese manufacturing firms acquired firms from 
developed countries, most of the acquired firms, like the four studied firms, failed to 
operate well or suffered from losses for a long period. Some of them even underwent 
bankruptcy liquidation. Under these circumstances, a rapid organisational change 
through the integration of functional areas is essential for the acquired firms to shed 
their former negative image, and successfully rebrand themselves as new entities. 
 
315 
 
In addition to a rapid functional integration, the Chinese acquirers also undertook a 
fast operational integration in strategically important areas. Similar to the approaches 
used in controlling the degree of integration, the speed of integration in the 
operational management was also diversified based upon the strategic intent of the 
acquiring firms. Specifically, activities and departments related to the main 
acquisition motivations were given top priority in the integration process. Table 6.4 
shows the priorities of acquisition motivations collaboratively confirmed by the CEOs 
and other top executives of all four acquiring firms.  
 
Table 6.4 Priorities of main acquisition motivations
21
 
 
Case Priorities of main acquisition motivations  
Case A  First, technology (to update the acquirer‘s current products); 
Second, establishment of a bridgehead to explore the European market. 
Case B First, technology and R&D intensity;  
Second, equipment and production lines; 
Third, the opportunity to gain access to the European market. 
Case C First, geographical strategic layout (a European manufacturing base near a 
port); 
Second, seeking markets; 
Third, technology and manufacturing techniques. 
Case D First, seeking R&D capability, patented knowledge, and brand name; 
Second, gaining access to the European and American markets. 
Source: interview data collected from CEO/Presidents of all cases, and documentary 
data. 
 
Based upon firm A‘s strategy and acquisition motivations, technology integration was 
                                                             
21The term ‗main motivations‘ implies that there are other motivations which are considered less important.  
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implemented rapidly and consistently from the very beginning of the post-acquisition 
integration phase. Within one year from the acquisition, the advanced technology of 
the acquired firm in specific key components of power-shift transmissions had been 
applied to the main products of firm A. Firm B also emphasised the speed of 
integrating technology-based resources and R&D units. The transfer of 
technology-based resources from the acquired firm was initiated as soon as the 
acquisition was done. The setting up of a European based R&D centre was also 
rapidly implemented. In addition to seeking technology and R&D capability, firm B 
also rapidly implemented the integration of the manufacturing unit because it 
considered acquiring advanced equipment and production lines to be its second most 
significant motivation for the acquisition. Accordingly, immediately after the 
acquisition announcement, firm B started to integrate the manufacturing lines by 
transporting part of the production lines of the acquired firm to China. Firm C 
concentrated on the fast integration of the management decision-making system. After 
the acquisition, it rapidly took the strategic decision-making power away from the 
subsidiary managers and integrated the performance appraisal criteria of the acquired 
firm with its own system. Such a fast integration in the top management 
decision-making system was consistent with the main motivation of this acquisition, 
which envisaged the Spanish subsidiary forming a crucial part of the strategic layout 
of CITIC HIC‘s internationalisation strategy. Unlike the other three firms, firm D 
failed to adopt a fast integration approach in areas relating to its primary M&A 
motivation, which was seeking R&D capabilities and technology-based resources. It 
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acted quickly on integrating the North American subsidiary, which had accumulated a 
huge loss before the M&A, but neglected the integration of the European business 
unit due to the Chinese executives‘ over-optimism for the European market. The low 
speed of the R&D and technology integration in the European subsidiary resulted in 
poor performance when firm D was exposed to a dramatic market change between 
2005 and 2006.  
 
It is not hard to understand that those activities and departments that were in line with 
the strategic intent and main acquisition motivations of the Chinese acquirers were 
given top priority to be quickly integrated. Chinese firms, especially manufacturing 
ones, use outward M&A to seek strategic assets from firms in developed economies 
because they have insufficient resources and capabilities to outperform their 
competitors both at home and abroad (Deng, 2007, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007). These 
are the areas in which potential synergies also lie. The rapidly transfer of resources 
and capabilities after acquisition can instantly improve the Chinese acquirers‘ 
competitiveness and generate synergies in a shorter time period. Therefore, it is 
essential for Chinese acquirers to rapidly integrate the strategically relevant aspects 
related to their main M&A motivations.  
 
6.1.3.2 Medium/low speed of integration on strategically less important 
operational activities and socio-cultural aspects 
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In contrast to the rapid integration of strategically important areas, the Chinese 
acquirers chose to adopt medium or low speeds of integration in other operational 
management aspects. This was mainly because a rapidly imposed operational 
integration might result in acculturating stress, which could lead to hostility and 
resistance from the employees of the acquired firms. A slow integration could help 
reduce potential conflicts between the two parties involved in the post-acquisition 
integration process by facilitating the building of trust among staff employees from 
different cultures (Olie, 1994; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Gomes et al., 2013). Therefore, 
the Chinese acquirers in this study aimed at maintaining the steady operation of their 
foreign subsidiaries and gradually integrated with their counterparts. Considering that 
they had to foster rapid integration in specific strategically important areas to transfer 
complementary resources and capabilities as quickly as possible, integration in 
strategically less important aspects had to be controlled at a relatively slower pace. A 
medium or low speed of integration on these less crucial areas can reduce the 
adaptation issues for the employees of the acquired firms with regard to the changes 
in organisational management and day-to-day routines. It can also lessen any culture 
related challenges that could be exacerbated during the process of operational 
integration. Controlling and reducing these negative factors can help Chinese 
acquirers to create a better organisational climate, so as to facilitate integration in 
strategically important areas and thus create synergies quickly and smoothly.  
 
Similar to the strategy used to medium the pace of operational integration in 
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strategically less important areas, socio-cultural integration was also deliberately 
controlled at a slow pace by the Chinese acquirers. Socio-cultural integration itself is 
deemed to be a complex process that will last much longer than operational 
integration. Its institutionally embedded nature makes socio-cultural integration hard 
to be achieved within a short period of time (Bresman et al., 1999; Teerikangas and 
Very, 2006; Bjorkman et al., 2007; Sarala and Vaara, 2010). This is particularly true 
for Chinese acquirers who bought firms from developed economies with huge 
differences in their institutional environments, such as cultural differences at both the 
national and organisational levels. Due to the complexity of cultural differences 
between the acquiring and acquired firms, a slow socio-cultural integration pace was 
adopted to build trust among employees and solve culture-related problems in a sedate 
atmosphere. Chinese acquirers consider socio-cultural integration to bean aid for the 
integration of crucial resources and capabilities for synergy creation. They require a 
harmonious socio-cultural climate within which the combined organisation can 
operate smoothly and focus on strategically important areas. Therefore, despite 
various social integration mechanisms, such as visits, meetings and joint training 
programmes, being adopted by the Chinese acquirers to foster cultural integration, 
these activities were implemented gradually and slowly. A detailed explanation of the 
Chinese acquirers‘ cultural integration strategies and approaches is presented and 
discussed in section 6.1.5.  
 
6.1.3.3 Section conclusion 
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In brief, speed is a key factor influencing post-acquisition integration and 
performance. On the one hand and in order to focus upon achieving synergies through 
the speedy integration of resources and capabilities in strategically important areas, 
the Chinese acquirers implemented rapid functional and operational integration 
processes relating to their main M&A motivations. On the other hand, they integrated 
slowly and moderately in strategically less important operational activities and 
socio-cultural aspects, so as to foster a better organisational climate and facilitate 
integration in strategically important areas, thus generating synergies quickly and 
smoothly.  
 
The results of this section are in line with the mainstream scholars‘ argument for a 
contingency approach to speed of integration (Angwin, 2004; Inkpen et al., 2000; 
Gomez et al., 2013). Although there is no such thing as the ‗right‘ integration speed in 
a post-acquisition integration process, the strategic asset seeking nature of the Chinese 
acquirers‘ M&A and the huge cultural differences between the two parties determined 
a unique pattern in the post-acquisition integration speed of their outward M&A to 
developed economies. 
 
6.1.4 Key staff turnover and management team building 
 
Human resource related issues in the post-acquisition process, such as the turnover of 
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key staff and management team building in the acquired firms, were shown to be a 
crucial factor influencing the post-acquisition integration process and performance. 
Human resource challenges during the post-acquisition integration process can affect 
the exploitation of potential synergies which may arise from the inter-unit sharing or 
transfer of resources and capabilities (Gomes et al., 2013). On the one hand, the 
turnover of key employees, who possess individual knowledge-based resources and 
contribute to the overall knowledge base on the firm, has a significant influence on the 
Chinese firms‘ outward M&A performance through its impact on resource and 
capability transfer and organisational climate. On the other hand, the significance of 
building an adequate management team within the acquired firms results in a 
sophisticated combination of Chinese and foreign executives at different managerial 
levels. A summary of management team building and key staff turnover during the 
integration process is listed in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 A summary of management team building and key staff turnover during the integration 
process 
Management 
team and key 
staff turnover 
Case A Case B Case C Case D 
General key staff 
retention and 
turnover 
All previous 
French 
employees were 
retained. Some 
key staff left the 
acquired firm 
before the M&A 
Wished to keep 
all key staff, but 
still failed to 
retain a part of 
the technicians 
after the 
acquisition; 
various measures 
were adopted to 
Successfully 
retained the 
entire staff of the 
acquired firm. 
Reduced general 
employee (not 
including key 
staff such as 
R&D staff and 
technicians) 
redundancy in 
specific divisions 
and subsidiaries; 
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retain key 
employees, such 
as improving the 
quality of 
remuneration, 
publicising the 
acquiring firm‘s 
performance, 
promising 
production 
expansion, etc.；
sought new 
technical experts 
from Italy and 
Germany to 
complement the 
R&D team. 
retained most 
key staff 
employees. 
Management 
team building 
The French 
managers were 
all retained; 
some of them 
were even 
promoted; only a 
few long term 
Chinese 
expatriates were 
working in 
France. 
Sent only a few 
long term 
Chinese 
expatriates; used 
short or medium 
term expatriates 
instead of long 
term ones; 
retained the 
previous 
management 
team; Chinese 
executives held 
strategic 
authority. 
Retained 
previous 
management 
team; did not 
send any long 
term Chinese 
expatriates to the 
Spanish 
subsidiary. 
Made substantial 
adjustments to 
Thomson‘s 
existing 
management 
team. Although 
the former 
managers of 
Thomson were 
still retained in 
the firm, some of 
them were 
substantially 
demoted and 
placed under the 
supervision of 
Chinese 
managers. 
Source: interview data collected from CEO/Presidents of all cases, and documentary 
data. 
 
6.1.4.1 Key staff retention and turnover 
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Key staff turnover in the acquired firms is considered to be a critical factor that has a 
decisive influence on post-acquisition performance (Ranft and Lord, 2002; Ahammad 
et al., 2012). M&A, especially CBMA, may instigate employee turnover before or 
during the integration process. This is mainly triggered by any organisational changes 
that may cause in job uncertainty and threaten the identity and status of the employees 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Junni and Sarala, 2013). In the case of firms from 
emerging economies buying firms from developed ones, the departure of key staff 
employees who have the possibility to change jobs may appear more common, 
because of the weaker identity associated with working in a foreign subsidiary of a 
firm from a developing country. These competent employees usually possess valuable 
individual skills and knowledge-based resources. Their leaving may result in holes in 
the acquired firm‘s resource base and hamper the exploitation of synergies which 
could otherwise have been achieved by transferring and redeploying the resources and 
capabilities of the acquired firms. 
 
The negative impact that key staff turnover can have on the resource base of an 
acquired firm is mainly embodied in the influence it has on the inter-unit transfer of 
tacit knowledge-based resources, as opposed to explicit knowledge transfer (Junni and 
Sarala, 2013). This is mainly because explicit knowledge-based resources can be 
transferred through documented patents and filed technology, which is easy for 
Chinese acquirers as they are normally equipped with a prior related knowledge 
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adequate to identify, assimilate and transform explicit knowledge-based resources
22
. 
Conversely, tacit knowledge is embedded in practices, values and norms (Kogut and 
Zander, 1993), and can only be transferred by interacting with the staff that is in 
possession of similar tacit knowledge. The turnover of key staff employees thus posed 
a tremendous challenge to the post-acquisition transfer of knowledge, especially of 
tacit knowledge, to the Chinese acquirers. All four cases were affected one way or 
another by this issue. Both firm A and firm B experienced departures of key 
employees, such as R&D staff and technicians, following the M&A. The CTO of Firm 
A stated: 
 
―[Regarding the technology transfer from the French subsidiary], we didn‘t 
actually have much interaction with the French R&D staff. On the one hand, 
our communication skill was not good. On the other hand, most of their 
technical experts had left [following the M&A].‖ 
 
Similar to Firm A, Firm B also had to find new technical experts from Italy and 
Germany to support their headquarters R&D team since some key staff had left the 
firm before the completion of the acquisition. Such employee turnover does not just 
impair the R&D division, but also other ones. For example, the overseas market 
exploration of Firm A ground to a halt because there were not enough marketing 
talents left in the acquired firm. Accordingly, sufficient marketing related tacit 
                                                             
22For a detailed discussion, please refer to section 6.1.1. 
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knowledge would not have been transferred to the acquiring firm if most of the 
existing employees in the marketing department had left the firm. 
 
Although they successfully retained most of the key employees, firms C and D also 
faced the thorny issue of finding employees of staff suited to handle knowledge 
transfer and localisation. This can be a big challenge for EMNEs, which normally lack 
sufficient highly skilled and well educated home country employees (Luo and Tung, 
2007). The language issue exacerbates the problem as the communication between the 
Chinese executives and their foreign counterparts largely relies on interpreters. 
Although there is an increasing level of international human mobility and many 
highly skilled talents from developed countries go home as returning migrants (Liu et 
al., 2010; Gao et al., 2013), the numbers in this talent group are still not big enough to 
fulfil the needs of most Chinese MNEs, particularly those located outside the top tier 
cities. Among the four cases, none managed to recruit sufficient numbers of skilled 
employees to facilitate knowledge transfer and absorption, especially with respect to 
the transfer of tacit knowledge. This was largely because they suffered from location 
disadvantage – being located in second and third tier Chinese cities still lacks the 
appeal to attract returning talents from overseas. In addition, most firms in the 
manufacturing sector, especially non-SOEs, could not sufficiently incentivise these 
talents in terms of salary and industry attractiveness when competing with financial 
institutions or IT firms. Without the support of both retained key staff from the 
acquired firms and returning overseas talents at home, the transfer of tacit 
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knowledge-based resources from the acquired unit to the headquarters is arduous.  
 
In addition to its impact on the transfer of tacit knowledge-based resources, key staff 
turnover can also influence post-acquisition integration by affecting the organisational 
climate of the combined entity. Key staff turnover is usually triggered by the 
employees‘ uncertainty about their job security, identity and status in the firm, which 
is mainly caused by organisational changes (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Junni and 
Sarala, 2013). The withdrawal and turnover of key staff employees may in turn lead to 
resistance and stress among the remaining employees. This could hamper the 
formation of a harmonious organisational climate in the acquired firms, within which 
resources and capabilities can be transferred smoothly and effectively.  
 
In order to maintain and sustain the momentum of the business and create a 
harmonious organisational climate for integration, firms A and C retained the entire 
staff of their acquired firms. Although this meant missing a great opportunity to cut 
labour costs through the acquisitions, it helped to reduce the discomfort and distrust 
among the employees of the acquired firm and greatly increased their morale. Firm B 
took a variety of measures to retain key employees as opposed to keeping all staff 
employees. The measures it took included improving the quality of rewards, 
publicising its past performance, promising production expansion, etc. Despite firm D 
also attempting to reduce general employee redundancy in specific divisions, it 
adopted gradual and imperceptible actions based upon the permission and suggestions 
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of local managers.  
 
6.1.4.2 Management team building 
 
The management level staff employees of an acquired firm are also key staff. In 
addition to the commonalities they share with other key staff, management team 
building is also crucial for post-acquisition integration and performance because of 
senior management‘s leading roles (Angwin and Meadows, 2009). Being the top tier 
of a firm, the management team should take decisive actions to establish the 
integration strategies and manage the necessary organisational changes during the 
post-acquisition integration process. Moreover, in CBMA, the managers of an 
acquired firm should place a greater emphasis on the maintenance of a peaceful 
organisational climate, so as to create a better socio-cultural context for the transfer of 
resources and capabilities (Bresman et al., 1999; Birkinshaw et al., 2010; Zander and 
Zander, 2010; Verbeke, 2010). Failing to do so would inevitably result in problematic 
integration and poor performance (Schweiger et al., 1993; Angwin and Meadows, 
2009; Vasilaki, 2001; Gomes et al., 2013).  
 
Accordingly, the Chinese acquirers paid particular attention to management team 
building in the acquired firms. In all four studied cases, most local managers were 
retained after the acquisitions. These existing managers possessed a better knowledge 
of the organisational structures, day-to-day work routines, organisational cultures and 
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local institutions. Despite the Chinese acquirers adopting a low degree of integration 
by sending few long term expatriates to work in the acquired firms, these expatriates 
were crucial for management team building as they were all in the middle 
management or executive levels
23
. The careful selection of these expatriates is vitally 
important. On the one hand, they need to possess a strong adaptability to work in a 
different institutional environment with colleagues from distinct socio-cultural and 
language backgrounds. On the other hand, they should be equipped with good 
communication and problem-handling skills to solve the potential socio-cultural 
conflicts that might emerge during their interaction with the local employees, so as to 
maintain and sustain a harmonious organisational climate for effective resource and 
capability transfer. Such demanding requirements result in the Chinese acquirers‘ 
being cautious in posting expatriate managers. The words of firm C‘s CEO, who did 
not send any long-term Chinese expatriates, constitute a very suitable synthesis of the 
management team building issues:  
 
―We needed to pay close attention to the local management team [before the 
acquisition]. You may be able to send one expatriate, or even ten [to do the 
management work], but you cannot send a hundred. In order to do so, you 
would need Chinese talent who can speak Spanish, know international 
conventions, have sufficient managerial experience and have professional 
background in this industry. We can barely find anyone with all these 
                                                             
23
Firm C was the only firm that had no long term expatriates.  
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capacities in China. Therefore, we have to localise the management team by 
retaining the existing managers. In the past, many Chinese firms went 
overseas but [failed to achieve strategic assets and] retained the same status 
after several years. They established or acquired an overseas subsidiary with 
Chinese managers. After several years, these expatriates job-hopped, and left 
nothing to the firm. This is really a normal phenomenon for Chinese firms, 
especially central-SOEs. Therefore, it is vitally important to use the local 
management teams.‖ 
 
Although the Chinese acquirers tended to build localised management teams by 
granting them the handling of the day-to-day operational management, they did not 
neglect their risk management and control system, neither did they waive the strategic 
decision-making powers. This was done to ensure that the Chinese executives in the 
headquarters would retain absolute control over their subsidiaries to transfer resources 
and seek potential synergies effectively and smoothly. Therefore, the management 
team of the acquired firm was mainly a combination of local managers, local vice 
CEOs
24
, and Chinese CEOs. This combination would not only preserve the existing 
resource base and maintain a positive organisational climate in the acquired firms, but 
would also ensure that the process of change was aligned with the firms‘ strategies 
aimed at meeting the need to create synergies. 
 
                                                             
24In case C, the CEO of the acquired firm had already been a Spanish executive. However, he still needed to report 
to and follow the instructions of the executives from the headquarters. 
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6.1.4.3 Section conclusion 
To sum up, key staff turnover and management team building in the acquired firms is 
a key factor influencing post-acquisition integration and performance. The crucial role 
played by key staff turnover lies in its impact on the overall knowledge base, and 
especially on tacit knowledge-based resources, of the acquired firm and on the 
organisational climate of the combined entity. The Chinese acquirers built their 
management team by combining foreign middle managers and vice executives with 
Chinese CEOs and strategic decision-makers. This sophisticated strategy was based 
on the unique characteristics of the Chinese acquiring firms, such as the lack of local 
talents.  
 
6.1.5 Cultural differences and cultural integration 
 
The cultural differences and cultural integration efforts needed during the 
post-acquisition integration process have been pointed out by many researchers and 
practitioners as critical factors for M&A performance (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Weber, 
1996; Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Weber and Tarba, 2013). The critical role of 
culture related issues is particularly significant in cases of international M&A 
(Morosini et al., 1998; Weber et al., 1996, 2009, 2011). When considering outward 
M&A to developed countries conducted by firms from emerging ones, such as China, 
the evidence from this study suggests that cultural integration is the most important 
key factor that influences post-acquisition integration and M&A performance. 
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Defining insights about the importance of culture related issues were provided by the 
CEOs and vice CEOs of three of the studied firms: 
―The true essence of integration is culture integration. All other aspects are 
secondary.‖(Mr. Zhao, CEO of firm A) 
―We believe that the first and foremost reason for most Chinese MNEs 
failing to achieve success in their outward M&A, especially to developed 
countries, is because of the cultural differences and the lack of cultural 
integration.‖ (Mr. Zhao, CEO of firm B)  
―The most crucial issue that should be particularly emphasised in the 
post-acquisition integration phase is cultural integration.‖(Mr. Li, vice CEO 
of firm D) 
 
Being well aware of the existence of the enormous cultural differences and of the 
importance of cultural integration, the Chinese acquirers took a series of measures to 
avoid and reduce culture related issues under their unique cultural integration 
strategies. Table 6.6 shows the measures that the four acquiring firms under study 
applied to reduce culture related issues, and their cultural integration strategies. 
 
Table 6.6 A summary of the measures applied to reduce culture related issues, and of the cultural 
integration strategies 
Cultural 
differences and 
cultural 
integration 
Case A Case B Case C Case D 
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Measures to 
reduce culture 
related issues 
Maintain high 
levels of cultural 
tolerance; 
respect local 
culture and keep 
an open-minded 
attitude;  
invite foreign 
employees to 
visit China to 
reduce cultural 
cognition 
asymmetry; 
use local 
managers; 
avoid using long 
term Chinese 
expatriates to 
reduce 
interaction and 
keep the cultural 
distance; 
use social 
integration 
mechanisms to 
express their 
regard and care 
for French 
employees. 
Pursue mutual 
understanding 
and respect in 
culture related 
issues; deal with 
culture related 
issues with a 
high level of 
tolerance; use 
local managers; 
avoid using long 
term Chinese 
expatriates to 
reduce 
interaction and 
keep the cultural 
distance; 
use social 
integration 
mechanisms to 
achieve mutual 
understanding 
and respect, such 
as visits, joint 
dinner parties, 
tours of China 
and of the 
Chinese 
headquarter, etc. 
Pursue mutual 
understanding 
and respect in 
cultural issues by 
using local 
managers who 
have a good 
understanding 
and acceptance 
of both the 
Chinese culture 
and of the 
organisational 
culture of the 
acquiring firm; 
avoid using long 
term Chinese 
expatriates to 
reduce 
interaction and 
keep the cultural 
distance; deal 
with culture 
related issues 
with a high level 
of tolerance； 
use social 
integration 
mechanisms to 
foster mutual 
understanding 
and respect. 
Overlooked the 
significance of 
culture related 
issues; very few 
cultural 
integration 
mechanisms 
were used to 
facilitate cultural 
integration; the 
corporate culture 
of firm D was 
simply extended 
to foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Cultural 
integration 
strategies 
Take a step back 
and keep 
distance with 
high cultural 
tolerance to 
achieve mutual 
understanding 
and respect. 
Take a step back 
and keep 
distance with 
high cultural 
tolerance to 
achieve mutual 
understanding 
and respect. 
Take a step back 
and keep 
distance with 
high cultural 
tolerance to 
achieve mutual 
understanding 
and respect. 
A high degree of 
cultural 
integration 
through cultural 
convergence25. 
Source: interview data collected from CEOs/Presidents of all cases, and documentary 
                                                             
25In 2007, after several years of huge losses, firm D restructured its European subsidiary. A cultural crossvergence 
integration mechanism was used after the restructuring. However, the time period after the restructuring is not 
covered by this research. 
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data. 
 
6.1.5.1 Cultural integration mechanism 
 
The evidence suggests that the cultural differences between the Chinese acquirers and 
their western acquired firms add value to the combined organisations by increasing 
their resource bases with the transfer of positive knowledge and useful cultural 
diversity. Nevertheless, the enormous differences in both national and organisational 
cultures also pose obstacles for the inter-unit resource and capability transfer. The 
differences in values and norms may result in further difficulties in the development 
of trust, which, in turn, negatively influences the realisation of synergy in the 
post-acquisition process (Stahl et al., 2011).  
 
In addition to the strong influence that cultural fit has on post-acquisition performance 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1992; Chatterjee et al., 1992), it is paramount for both 
scholars and practitioners to emphasise the cultural integration process (Shrivastava, 
1986; Haspeslagh and Jemision, 1991; Sarala and Vaara, 2010). Sarala and Vaara 
(2010) point out that organisational cultural convergence, which is understood as the 
situation where the culture of the acquired firm becomes similar to the that of the 
acquirer by means of post-acquisition integration efforts, and crossvergence, which is 
a form of cultural integration that results in a new culture to be created out of the 
existing cultures of both parties, are the two main mechanisms through which cultural 
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integration can take place. Both mechanisms can moderate the impact of national 
cultural differences on knowledge transfer, and have a significant positive impact on 
the knowledge and capability transfer within the combined entity.  
 
However, the evidence of this research suggests that the Chinese acquirers, such as 
firms A, B, and C, used neither cultural convergence nor crossvergence as the main 
cultural integration mechanism. The characteristics of Chinese acquirers‘ outward 
M&A of firms from developed economies determine that both the cultural integration 
mechanisms suggested by Sarala and Vaara (2010) are not practicable. This is mainly 
because of the authority asymmetry found in Chinese firms‘ higher formal authority 
and lower cultural authority (Baker et al., 1999; Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Despite 
most Chinese acquiring firms being industry leaders in their domestic market and 
having accumulated a certain prestige overseas, they are still in a weak cultural 
position compared to their acquired firms which had encountered problems in their 
operations in previous years. On the one hand, this position stems from the 
comparative levels of competitiveness between Chinese firms and those from western 
developed countries; although China has become the second largest economic entity 
of the world, on average, its firm level competitiveness is still lower than that of 
western developed countries, especially in the perception of the employees of both the 
acquiring and acquired firms (Deng, 2007, 2009). On the other hand, Chinese 
acquirers use outward M&A to seek strategic assets overseas. Western firms are 
acquired because they possess better resources and capabilities, especially 
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knowledge-based ones. The comparatively high level of knowledge authority of the 
acquired firms can naturally lead to a stronger cultural position.  
 
When integrating a strong culture with a weak one, cultural convergence takes place 
more easily when the weak culture moves more towards the strong one. However, in 
most cases, after the M&A, the cultures of the acquiring firms should be safeguarded 
more than those of acquired ones because the former hold a higher formal authority. 
This causes difficulties and issues when Chinese acquirers try to achieve cultural 
convergence with firms from developed countries after their M&A. Unlike the other 
three cases, which made their M&A in more recent years, Firm D adopted a cultural 
convergence approach to achieve cultural integration. The results were disappointing, 
with most foreign managers leaving the firm within a few years from the acquisition. 
 
Adopting a crossvergent cultural integration approach is also challenging for Chinese 
acquirers. If a new culture is formed after the acquisition, the relatively weak cultural 
position of the Chinese acquirers will probably be perpetuated in this new culture. 
Moreover, the cultural crossvergence process is difficult and time consuming. It 
normally lasts years, during which cultural conflicts, lacking proper ways of handling 
potential culture related issues, can already undermine acquisition performance. Such 
value destruction is much more likely to take place in contexts in which EMNEs 
acquire firms from developed countries, where national cultural differences are more 
significant and acquirers lack the required experience and knowledge to handle these 
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problems (Luo and Tung, 2007).  
 
Another reason for cultural convergence and crossvergence not being suitable for 
Chinese acquirers is because both focus on the integration of organisational culture 
(Sarala and Vaara, 2010). Despite the fact that cultural differences between the 
Chinese acquirers and their acquired firms also exist at the organisational level, the 
interview evidence suggests that these are overshadowed and dwarfed by the huge 
national cultural differences. In other words, national cultural differences are so large 
that most Chinese acquirers do not bother to distinguish between cultural differences 
at the national and organisational level. None of the interviewees differentiated 
between the cultural differences at the two levels, although they all emphasised the 
―cultural differences‖ during their interviews. In fact, most equated the organisational 
culture with the national one. For example, the interviewees from firm A mentioned 
that their French employees keep the good practice of filing all essential 
documentations. This may belong to the organisational culture of the acquired firm, 
but the Chinese acquirer tends to consider it to be a part of the national culture. 
Therefore, Chinese acquirers need a cultural integration mechanism to help them 
solve potential cultural conflicts at the national level. 
 
6.1.5.2 Cultural integration strategy 
 
Unlike mainstream literature, which is based on MNEs from developed countries 
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arguing on cultural convergence and crossvergence (Sarala and Vaara, 2010; Gomes et 
al., 2013), our results reveal that most Chinese acquirers, such as firm A, B, and C, 
chose to deal with cultural differences by keeping their distance and applying a high 
degree of cultural tolerance for their foreign subsidiaries. Drawing from the 
experiences of forerunners such as firm D, the Chinese acquirers were aware of the 
existence of huge cultural differences when undertaking post-acquisition integration, 
and of lacking the ability to solve the complex cultural integration problems which 
arise out of the pursuit of cultural convergence or crossvergence. In this case, they 
followed the ancient Chinese philosophy of ―take a step back to create more space to 
win‖ so as to reduce potential conflicts and establish trust with the employees of the 
acquired firm. Generally speaking, most Chinese acquirers adopted a cultural 
integration strategy which can be described as ―taking a step back and keeping their 
distance by applying a high level of cultural tolerance to achieve mutual 
understanding and respect‖. 
 
Compared with cultural convergence and crossvergence, which entail a high degree of 
cultural integration, ―keeping some distance‖ basically involves low levels of cultural 
integration. The outcome of cultural integration does not need to be a unified culture 
or a closely integrated social community (Bresman et al., 1999; Birkinshawn et al., 
2010; Zander and Zander, 2010; Verbeke, 2010). The general aim of cultural 
integration is to minimise the negative effect of cultural differences and create an 
atmosphere favourable to resource and capability transfer (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
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1991). A light touch cultural integration could also result in a well operating social 
community with a harmonious organisational climate and very few cultural conflicts. 
It is true that such a low level of cultural integration would harm the inter-unit transfer 
of tacit knowledge-based resources. However, the evidence of this research suggests 
that the Chinese acquirers are constrained by their capabilities to neglect the transfer 
of tacit and socially embedded knowledge-based resources, and focus more on the 
transfer of explicit knowledge-based and tangible resources. Such cultural integration 
strategy can help the Chinese acquirers to maintain a harmonious organisational 
climate which can facilitate the transfer of these key resources. This is also in line 
with the integration approach of Chinese firms, which will be discussed and explained 
in detail in section 6.2. 
 
The modesty and humbleness embedded in the Chinese culture helps Chinese 
acquirers to easily adopt such a cultural integration strategy of their own initiative, as 
described by an ancient Chinese proverb: ―take a step back to create more space to 
win‖. They always look to get the most out of what they buy (Birkinshawn et al., 
2010). Therefore, it is not difficult for Chinese acquirers to take a tolerant and 
open-minded attitude of their own initiative towards culture related problems. 
Considering all cultural differences as national culture issues can also increase 
cultural tolerance, because cultural differences at the national level, which have a 
higher communality, are much easier to be tolerated compared with more individual 
ones. Having adopted a stance of high cultural tolerance, the Chinese acquirers took 
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measures to pursue mutual understanding and respect in order to avoid and smooth 
out any cultural conflicts  
 
Despite Chinese acquirers having adopted a low level of cultural integration, and 
having kept a certain cultural distance and a high tolerance to minimise potential 
culture clashes, they still needed to take measures to reduce and solve any emergent 
culture related problems during the post-acquisition integration phase. In order to 
maintain a peaceful and harmonious organisational climate to facilitate inter-unit 
resource and capability transfer, the Chinese acquirers strived to achieve ―mutual 
understanding and respect‖ on culture related issues. This concept was mentioned by 
many informants in the interviews:  
 
―We respect their culture and habits, including the length of the working day 
and their attitude towards overtime work, which is completely different from 
that of employees in China.‖ 
―We seek compromise. We need to follow the local regulations and respect 
their culture.‖ 
(Senior executives of firm A) 
 
―There is no need to deliberately require them to accept our culture, and vice 
versa. The best way to solve this issue is through mutual understanding in the 
course of the day-to-day work and communication‖ 
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(Mr. Zhao, CEO of firm B). 
 
―They (the Spanish visitors) showed a lot of interest in and respect for our 
culture. They attended the flag-raising ceremony with us. They also asked to 
wear our uniform and company badge. This is a strong signal that they 
respect and are willing to accept our culture.‖ 
―Misunderstandings are inevitable. There are even misunderstandings in our 
communications with Chinese managers, never mind with foreign managers 
who have different linguistic and socio-cultural backgrounds. The most 
significant issue in solving these problems is to adopt a tolerant mentality.‖ 
―Tolerance and understanding can be reflected in, for example, choosing to 
repeatedly and frankly talking through any issue they (the Spanish employees) 
do not understand or misunderstand until everything is clear. I think we have 
done very well in this respect.‖ 
(Senior executives of firm C) 
 
6.1.5.3 Measures to reduce culture related problems 
 
In respect to keeping a low level of cultural integration and a certain cultural distance, 
the Chinese acquirers deliberately restricted the day-to-day contact between the 
general employees of the two countries to avoid potential cultural conflicts which 
might emerge during their interactions. An ancient Chinese philosophy states that 
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―distance makes for ideal situations‖. Avoiding the use of long term expatriates is one 
effective example of how interactions in the day-to-day work are limited.  
 
Nevertheless, completely avoiding cultural interaction is also impossible. The Chinese 
acquirers avoided culture related problems by building mutual understanding and 
respect through the use of a series of socio-cultural integration mechanisms. 
Considering their high cultural tolerance, it is not difficult for Chinese acquirers to get 
to actively understand and respect their partners. Most of their attention was 
concentrated on efforts that could earn the understanding and respect of their foreign 
partners. For example, employee representatives from the acquired firms were invited 
to China to deepen their understanding of the headquarters and reduce their cognition 
symmetry about Chinese culture. To provide all employees of the acquired firms with 
opportunity to get acquainted with the current situation of China and of their Chinese 
parent firms, the latter also broadcast promotional videos to foreign employees and 
invited the foreign media to their headquarters. In order to bring the two parties closer, 
the top Chinese executives took every opportunity to show their regard and care for 
their foreign employees by, for instance, sending them electronic greeting cards for 
Christmas, inviting retirees to dinner and giving them Chinese gifts, etc. These efforts 
not only demonstrated the Chinese acquirers‘ respect for the culture of the acquired 
firm and their desire to make themselves known by their foreign partners, but also 
showed the cultural charm of both China and the Chinese acquirers.  
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6.1.5.3 Section conclusion 
 
The result of the analysis suggests that cultural differences and integration are the 
most significant factors in the management of post-acquisition integration and in the 
pursuit of acquisition performance. Despite cultural fit being mostly assessed before 
M&A deals, its impact on post-acquisition performance can be moderated by cultural 
integration strategies and efforts (Sarala and Vaara, 2010). Unlike acquirers from 
developed countries, who normally pursue a high degree of cultural integration 
through cultural convergence and crossvergence, most Chinese acquirers, such as 
firms A, B, and C, chose to adopt a low level of cultural integration and a cultural 
integration strategy described as ―step back and keep some distance with high cultural 
tolerance to achieve mutual understanding and respect‖. The primary underlying 
rationale for such a unique cultural integration strategy lies in the Chinese acquirers‘ 
lower dependency on the transfer of tacit and socially embedded knowledge-based 
resources and their emphasis on the transfer of explicit knowledge-based and tangible 
resources. Such an integration strategy can benefit the Chinese acquirers by lessening 
any potential cultural clashes and creating a harmonious organisational climate to 
facilitate the transfer of key resources. 
 
The findings on the Chinese acquirers‘ integration strategy are coherent with recent 
research on M&A which suggests that aspects of socio-cultural integration, such as 
the emergence of a shared identity and of trust, and the building of an atmosphere of 
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mutual respect can facilitate resource and capability transfers (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; 
Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Stahl et al., 2011) .Taking a step further, the results of 
this study also provide insights into how these socio-cultural aspects are used by 
acquirers from emerging economies to medium the effect of the huge cultural 
differences that exist between the firms. 
 
6.1.6 Integration process communication  
 
The data highlighted that communication during the integration process was a crucial 
factor in the management of post-acquisition integration process and the achievement 
of M&A success. An acquiring firm needs to distribute a large amount of information 
clearly, effectively, and honestly to achieve efficient communication during the 
integration implementation process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Birkinshaw et al., 
2000; Junni and Sarala, 2013). The evidence suggests that the Chinese acquirers were 
aware of the importance of effective communication. On the one hand, integration 
process communication is likely to affect socio-cultural integration through its impact 
on the organisational climate of the combined entity (Bresman et al., 1999). On the 
other hand, it allows for a more efficient transfer of resources, especially 
knowledge-based resources, between firms (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Jansen et 
al., 2005). The quality of the communication is particularly significant for an 
acquiring firm because it is eager to transfer resources and capabilities from the 
acquired firm to its headquarters. An effective and efficient communication can 
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facilitate this resource transfer process. Therefore, the Chinese acquirers took a series 
of measures aimed at fostering inter-firm communication, although not all aspects 
were handled well. These measures involved three dimensions, which I have termed 
communications about the past, the present and the future of the firms. A summary of 
the facilitating measures for inter-firm communication during the integration process 
is listed in the Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7 A summary of the facilitators of communication during the integration process 
 
Integration 
process 
communication 
Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Past An educational 
video was used 
to help the 
employees of the 
acquired firm to 
become aware of 
the past of this 
historically rich 
SOE. 
Information on the 
past of the 
acquiring firm 
was conveyed 
during the foreign 
employees‘ visits 
to the 
headquarters.  
Information on 
the past of the 
acquiring firm 
was conveyed 
during the 
foreign 
employees‘ visits 
to the 
headquarters. 
No specific 
actions were 
taken. 
present The Chinese 
executives 
communicated 
with the general 
foreign 
employees 
through trade 
union 
representatives 
and foreign 
managers; 
communicated in 
a timely and 
proactive 
Emphasised the 
quality of the 
interpreters to 
reduce potential 
misunderstandings 
caused by cultural 
and language 
problems; 
emphasised the 
role of the 
executives as 
mediators 
between the 
acquiring firm and 
Set up a 
specialised 
foreign affairs 
secretariat to deal 
with 
communication 
issues；employed 
high quality 
interpreters to 
ensure the 
reliability and 
articulateness of 
the information 
transferred； 
Organised 
senior 
management 
meetings; 
trained Chinese 
employees in 
communication 
skills. 
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manner; set up a 
supporting 
department in 
China to increase 
the quality and 
efficiency of 
communication. 
the Italian 
employees; 
deliberately 
limited 
communication 
opportunities 
between Chinese 
and Italian 
ordinary 
employees 
Chinese 
executives also 
directly 
communicated 
with employees 
of the acquired to 
show their 
attention to the 
important issues 
on certain special 
occasions. 
Future Made employees 
of acquired firms 
aware of the 
future plans of 
the firm; 
involved foreign 
employees in the 
strategy 
formulating 
process. 
Disseminated 
facts and reasons 
for both strategic 
and practical 
issues. 
Chinese 
executives made 
promises on key 
future issues that 
foreign staff 
were concerned 
with, and made 
sure that these 
promises were 
kept. 
No specific 
actions were 
taken. 
Source: interview data collected from CEO/Presidents of all cases, and documentary 
data. 
 
6.1.6.1 Communicating about the past 
 
Communicating about the past mainly refers to informing organisational employees 
about the acquiring firms‘ history and organisational culture (Schweiger and Goulet, 
2005). Despite the measures used in the four studied cases not being identical, they 
were all aimed at helping the employees of both the acquiring and acquired firms to 
build a better understanding about their new partners and create a harmonious 
organisational climate for the integration implementation process. For example, firm 
A used educational videos to help the target firm‘s employees become aware of the 
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past and current status of this historically rich SOE. Both firms A and C invited 
overseas TV stations to conduct interviews at and report on the headquarters in China. 
Firm B even helped to bring about the twinning of the cities of Nanyang and Asti, the 
respective homes of the acquiring and acquired firms. In addition, all four cases 
adopted socio-cultural integration mechanisms to facilitate intra-firm communication, 
such as short term visits, joint training programmes, and meetings in which employees 
of the acquired firm were involved in discussions concerning management issues, etc. 
The representatives attending these activities usually enjoyed a high level of prestige 
among their colleagues. Their perception of the acquiring firm could greatly affect the 
cognition of other foreign employees, and consequently improve the quality of future 
communication between the firms. 
 
6.1.6.2 Communicating about the present 
 
Communicating about the present focuses on how Chinese firms promoted inter-firm 
communication on current integration practices. Some specific issues in CBMA, such 
as national cultural differences, the time zone difference, the language barrier, etc. 
increase communication difficulty. These obstacles may hamper communication 
between acquiring and acquired firms and result in misunderstandings. Moreover, the 
employees of the acquired firms can easily feel stressed and confused when faced 
with ineffective communication, because they are in a relatively lower position of 
power and require a greater sense of job security. The interview data shows that the 
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Chinese acquirers adopted various measures to improve their communication skills 
and mechanisms, such as hiring high-quality interpreters with host country 
backgrounds, setting up specialised communication support departments and foreign 
affairs secretariats in China, emphasising the mediating role of the executive level 
staff between the acquiring firm and its subsidiary employees, deliberately reducing 
communication opportunities between Chinese and Italian ordinary employees, 
communicating with foreign general employees through the mediation of trade unions 
and foreign managers, involving Chinese top executives in communication with 
employees of the acquired firm to show regard for important issues on certain special 
occasions, etc. 
  
6.1.6.3 Communicating about the future 
 
Communicating about the future refers to informing employees about the strategy and 
future plans of the combined organisation (Schweiger and Goulet, 2005). This is 
particularly significant for Chinese acquirers who wish to absorb knowledge-based 
resources from their acquired firms. Despite explicit knowledge-based resources 
being easily transferrable to the acquiring firms without much support from the 
employees from the acquired firm, the transfer of tacit knowledge-based resources, 
which are embedded, context-specific, and personally bound, requires the cooperation 
and willingness of those persons in whom such knowledge is embedded. However, the 
staff of an acquired firm may refuse to actively transfer their knowledge to their 
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Chinese colleagues for fear of losing their jobs. Should the acquiring firms help the 
employees of the acquired firms realise how important the transfer of knowledge was 
for the strategy and future of the combined entity, these employees would be 
motivated and be more willing to transfer the knowledge they possess. In addition, 
letting the employees of the acquired firms become aware of the future plans of the 
firm and involving their representatives, such as the trade unions, in the strategy 
formulation process helped the Chinese acquirers to solve many tough problems 
arising from insufficient and ineffective communication.  
 
6.1.6.4 Section conclusion 
 
To sum up, communication during the integration process is a key factor for the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process and in the pursuit of M&A 
success. It can foster the transfer of knowledge through its impact on socio-cultural 
integration. The quality of communication is particularly significant for Chinese 
acquirers as they consider the sourcing of resources and capabilities to be one of their 
most important M&A motivations.  
 
6.1.7 Emerging factor: Home country advantage 
 
After cross-analysing all the data, three emerging factors were identified as key 
factors in the management of the post-acquisition integration and in the pursuit of 
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M&A success. One is the home country advantage held by the Chinese acquirers. The 
term home country advantage here refers to the positive effects and advantages of 
being a MNE based in the Chinese market.  
 
The existing research generally accepts resource seeking to be one of the most 
significant motivations of EMNEs‘ outward FDI and M&A in particular (Buckley et 
al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2008; Rui and Yip, 2008; Deng, 2004; Deng, 2007). Deng 
(2009) claims that the Chinese MNEs‘ strategic asset seeking M&A is the product of 
the unique Chinese institutional environment at the national and organisational levels. 
Rui and Yip (2008) also suggest that their home country‘s institutional incentives and 
constraints initiate the Chinese firms‘ CBMA. As an important rationale underlying 
Chinese firms‘ outward M&A, their home country institutions could have an impact 
on the resource and capability transfer after the M&A deals are completed. Luo and 
Tung (2007) argue that EMNEs‘ international expansion is linked to their home 
country. They believe the post internationalisation performance of EMNEs to be still 
highly dependent on their home market performance, as they would not ignore their 
fast-growing home market, in which they hold a ‗home court advantage‘. For EMNEs 
seeking investment opportunities around the world, their home country institutions 
allow them to outperform MNEs from developed countries in their home markets, as 
the latter face liabilities of foreignness.  
 
The evidence suggests that the Chinese firms‘ resource and knowledge seeking 
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outward M&A are not only motivated by exploring overseas markets, but are also 
driven by the opportunity to improve their own competitiveness against foreign 
entrants in their home market. In fact, for most Chinese acquirers, gaining the 
resources and capabilities of the acquired firms to enhance their own competitiveness 
in their home market was the most important reason to initiate outward M&A, at least 
at the initial post-acquisition stage. A senior manager from Firm A commented: 
 
―Even the overseas R&D centre was not the central point of this acquisition. 
The key point was to acquire and assimilate advanced technology and 
combine it with our existing products to upgrade our production line, so that 
we could improve our competitiveness in the Chinese market.‖ 
 
Most Chinese MNEs are still highly dependent on their home market performance in 
sales volumes and reputation, not only due to the difficulties of true 
internationalisation, but also because the Chinese market is to big too to be ignored 
(Luo and Tung, 2007). Even the first batch of successfully internationalised Chinese 
firms, such as Lenovo, Haier, and firm D, still enjoy more home market sales than the 
sum of those in both their European and American markets. For example, the overseas 
business revenue of firm D accounted for 38% of its total sales in 2012, the highest 
overseas sales ratio among all Chinese manufacturing firms, including the cases in 
this study. As a senior executive from Firm A stated: 
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―Our main aim is to combine their (the acquired firm‘s) technology with our 
products so as to enhance our product lines. To be honest, in terms of sales 
volume, it is not vital to us whether we own this subsidiary or not. The 
biggest contribution the acquired firm makes to us is to improve our 
competitiveness in the home market.‖ 
 
With the crucial resources and capabilities transferred from the acquired firms, the 
Chinese firms can improve their competitiveness in the domestic market. Moreover, 
their home institutional advantages, such as governmental support policies, financial 
support, distribution channels, and existing tacit knowledge-based resources derived 
from the Chinese market, help the Chinese acquirers make the most of the transferred 
resources.  
 
The significant role played by their home country advantage in the post-acquisition 
integration process is mainly reflected on its impact on the integration strategies of the 
Chinese acquirers. One of the most important rationales behind the Chinese acquirers‘ 
adoption of such integration strategies is the huge home country advantage they 
possess. Without this home market advantage, many aspects in the integration process 
could prove to be problematic. Most Chinese acquirers do not require immediate 
returns from their acquired firms. They unanimously view outward M&A 
opportunities as long term investments (Liu and Woywode, 2013), which will provide 
them with growth potential in the long run. One important foundation that allows 
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them to adopt such a long term orientation perspective is that they have a strong 
domestic business performance to support them and have their home country 
institution advantage for the utilisation of the resources and capabilities acquired from 
their foreign subsidiaries. Without this home country advantage, Chinese acquirers 
might not be able to support the operations of their acquired firms by money 
injections in the first couple of years after the deal. In addition, the sense of security 
of the employees of the acquired firms and the high cultural tolerance of the Chinese 
staff employees also partly rely on the good performance of the acquiring firm in the 
Chinese market. Therefore, the home country advantage not only provides huge 
institutional support for the utilisation of the acquired resources and capabilities, but 
also facilitates the building of a harmonious organisational climate.  
 
The key role of the home country advantage was evidenced in all studied cases. For 
example, the acquired firm in case B sold less than 30 thousands products in the two 
years after the acquisition, and survived on the investment of the headquarters. 
However, its operation was still considered to be very successful by both its Chinese 
shareholders and the Chinese government because it greatly improved the 
technological capabilities of the acquiring firm and enabled an increase in its product 
sales. Similarly, although the acquired firm in case C performed well in terms of sales 
volumes, its biggest contribution was that it had won several big overseas orders for 
its acquiring firm, which could never have been achieved without the help of the 
overseas subsidiary. Without the profit earned in the Chinese market, acquiring firm D 
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could have been delisted from the stock market and gone bankrupt in 2006 based 
upon the dreadful performance of its European subsidiary. 
 
6.1.8 Emerging factor: Resource complementarity  
 
The results of this cross-case analysis suggest that resource complementarity between 
acquiring and acquired firms is also one of the key factors in the management of 
post-acquisition integration and the pursuit of M&A success. The traditional research 
on the potential of M&A focuses on the relatedness of firms in terms of their 
similarity of knowledge and operations (Singh and Montgomery, 1987). Recently, a 
growing argument has been made stating that the complementarity of the firms‘ 
resources is more crucial for M&A success (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; King et al., 
2004; Bauer and Matzler, 2013). Both the resource similarity and complementarity of 
the acquiring and acquired firms are deemed to be key components of the strategic fit 
of M&A. Although they both create value through the realisation of synergies, their 
value creation mechanisms are actually different. Resource similarity normally creates 
synergies on an efficiency base by achieving economy of scale and scope only, while 
resource complementarity also provides enhancement based synergies and creates 
value from mutually supportive differences (Bauer and Matzler, 2013). Larsson and 
Finkelstein (1999) capture the important role played by resource complementarity and 
argue that the synergy potential of M&A is affected by both the similarities and 
complementarities of the two parties. Recently, more and more scholars have 
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suggested that complementarities outperform similarities as contributors of superior 
M&A performance (Harrison et al., 2001). Bjorkman et al. (2007) argue that M&A 
value creation is not based on the cost saving and restructuring potential arising from 
overlapping resources and activities, but rather on the complementarity of knowledge 
and capabilities. Makri et al. (2010) extend this further by arguing that both 
complementary technological knowledge and complementary scientific knowledge 
contribute to the post M&A performance of highly technological firms. If the two 
parties involved in M&A have a different knowledge stock, they are more likely to 
have a high complementarity of knowledge between them, which could increase the 
potential for post-acquisition knowledge transfer (Shenkar, 2001; Bjorkman et al., 
2007; Sarala and Vaara, 2010).  
 
Despite the importance of resource complementarity having been emphasised by 
M&A scholars in recent years, it is mainly considered only as a static factor in the 
pre-acquisition phase (Bauer and Matzler, 2013; Gomes et al., 2013). Its importance 
in relation to the post-acquisition integration process has hitherto been neglected. In 
addition, the key role of resource complementarity in EMNEs‘ M&A to developed 
economies has not yet been explored. Acquiring firms from emerging economies 
normally have different resources, routines and knowledge from their target firms 
from advanced economies, which lead to the possession of different resource stocks. 
Consequently this may result in vaster resource complementarities and increase the 
potential for resource and capability transfer (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; 
355 
 
Bjorkman et al., 2007; Sarala and Vaara, 2010). For example, Chinese firms usually 
have an advantage in their labour cost and in their knowledge of emerging market 
institutions, but lack brand reputation, advanced patented technology, R&D 
capabilities and overseas market distribution channels (Deng, 2004, 2007). 
Conversely, their target western firms normally fail to grasp the opportunities 
presented by fast-growing emerging markets and are weak in cost reduction, although 
they are historic western market competitors equipped with world class technology 
and mature regional market distribution channels. Being late-comers on the global 
market, EMNEs normally have weak existing resource bases, which they are eager to 
swiftly complement with the resources of the firms they bought through CBMA. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that resource complementarity may be an even 
more crucial factor in the context of EMNEs‘ outward M&A to developed countries. 
 
The data from this research clearly evidence the importance of resource 
complementarity in Chinese acquirers‘ outward M&A, especially in the 
post-acquisition integration process. Despite being industry leaders in their domestic 
market, many manufacturing Chinese MNEs still lack resources and knowledge assets, 
such as brand, patented technology and advanced manufacturing techniques. This is 
exactly why most of them consider the pursuit of technology as a key M&A 
motivation. Acquiring such knowledge-based resources can directly complement their 
existing assets and improve the competitiveness of their products in both the global 
and domestic markets. The CEO of Firm A explained: 
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―The power-shift transmission system of our French subsidiary meets the 
prevailing mainstream international standards. Although we have a nationally 
advanced laboratory working on this technology and have made huge 
progress, we are still far behind our competitors from the West. It is a good 
complement to our existing product line and can significantly improve our 
competitiveness in the high power segment when competing with foreign 
providers in the home market.‖ 
 
Such knowledge-based resource complementarity is vital to all the studied cases. Loss 
of complementary resources would directly lead to problematic integration outcomes 
and failed acquisitions. The acquisition failure of firm D is a good example to 
demonstrate how the loss of complementary resources destroyed the acquisition. The 
world leading technological resource of acquired firm D, which laid mainly in CRT 
and rear-projection TVs, was the major motivation for the M&A. However, CRT and 
rear-projection TVs were quickly replaced with the flat screen revolution in the global 
TV market. This meant that a large proportion of complementary resources in terms of 
technology and production lines simply disappeared. As the vice CEO of firm D said: 
 
―We did not think we would face too many problems in the operation of the 
M&A itself (pre-acquisition phase)…The main problem was the change in 
the market…All the technology-based resources of Thomson were in the 
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rear-projection TVs .‘ 
 
Another reflection of knowledge complementarity is that all the four acquired firms in 
this case study owned established manufacturing factories in their home countries, 
which could help the Chinese acquirers break down technical barriers and enhance 
their European market distribution channels. Compared with setting up factories by 
green-field entry mode, M&A area faster and lower risk way to own factories 
overseas. This was particularly emphasised by the CEO of Firm C, who even 
estimated the geographical location of the acquired firm‘s production base to be the 
most important motivation for the acquisition. 
 
On the other hand, the Chinese firms’ unique knowledge can also complement the 
existing knowledge base of the acquired firms by improving their manufacturing 
efficiency, saving on costs and dealing with institutional barriers in emerging markets. 
However, these positive effects on the acquired firms are not as strategically 
significant as is the impact of their complementary resources on the acquiring ones.  
 
To sum up, it is clear that a huge resource complementarity lies in the transfer of 
explicit knowledge-based and tangible resources. These complementary resources 
between the Chinese acquirers and their acquired firms led to an enormous synergy 
potential that could be pursued in the post-acquisition integration process. Such 
complementary resources are not only ample, but also crucial for the Chinese 
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acquirers‘ future strategies, because they are the main key motivations of the strategic 
intent M&A. Therefore, the Chinese acquirers do not even need to explore the 
opportunity for further synergies through the transfer of tacit knowledge-based 
resources, because they can achieve their objectives through the transfer of 
complementary resources, which are mostly explicit knowledge-based and tangible 
ones. 
 
Resource complementarity is also the foundation of the Chinese acquirers’ home 
market advantage. Without their huge resource complementarity, the Chinese 
acquirers could not make full use of their home market advantage to increase the 
competitiveness of their previous products within a couple of years. Consequently, 
their current integration strategies would not be practicable. Therefore, resource 
complementarity between the acquiring and acquired firms is a crucial factor for 
M&A success not just due to the importance of its ―strategic fit‖, but also because of 
its impact on the post-acquisition integration process.  
 
6.1.9 Emerging factor: Acquirers‟ attractiveness  
 
The results of the cross-case analysis suggest that the Chinese acquirers‘ attractiveness 
was also a crucial success factor in the post-acquisition integration phase. Stahl et al. 
(2004) proposed that the greater the perceived attractiveness of the acquiring firm, the 
higher the level of social integration following the acquisition. They believed social 
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integration to be positively associated with the transfer of capabilities from the 
acquiring firm to the acquired one, thus determining the performance of M&A. Based 
on their argument, the employees of an acquired firm would welcome the acquisition 
because of the acquirer‘s superiority in some key determinants of acquirer 
attractiveness, such as innovation capability, business model, financial results, history 
of inter-firm contacts and cooperation, etc. Therefore, the acquiring firms could 
increase their attractiveness by cultivating these key determinants, so as to facilitate 
socio-cultural integration in the post-acquisition integration phase and promote 
resource and capability transfer.  
 
This does not seem to be a challenge because, generally speaking, the acquiring firms 
normally hold a higher position of power compared to the firms they acquire in terms 
of both formal authority, with reference to organisational hierarchy, and informal 
authority, such as resources and capabilities. In fact, an excessive power disparity 
between the acquiring and acquired firms could harm their integration, because the 
needs of employees of the acquired firms might be overlooked or trivialised by the 
management of the acquiring ones due to former‘s lower levels of formal and 
informal authority (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Stahl et 
al., 2011). Stahl et al., (2011) proposed that the relationship between acquirer and 
target, and the power differential in particular, can influence the synergy realisation of 
M&A through its impact on the acquired firm‘s employees‘ trust in the acquiring 
firm‘s management. In an M&A deal, the acquired firm, which is the weaker party, 
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often becomes distrustful because the more powerful acquiring firm has no need to 
gain trust and can simply use its relative power to obtain cooperation (Anderson and 
Weitz,1989; Stahl et al., 2011).  
 
However, in the cases of firms from emerging economies buying firms from 
developed economies, things are different because the informal and formal authority 
of both parties are not unified. The evidence suggests that there are authority 
asymmetries between the acquiring and acquired units. Despite Chinese acquirers 
possessing formal authority in the post-acquisition integration phase according to the 
organisational hierarchy, their informal authority, defines as the authority of 
knowledge-based resources and culture, is in a lower position (Aghion and Tirole, 
1997; Baker et al., 1999). As discussed in section 6.1.5, the cultural position of 
Chinese acquirers is normally lower than that of acquired firms from western 
developed countries, although the former hold a higher formal authority. Similarly, the 
knowledge authority of Chinese acquirers is lower than that of their acquired firms. 
This is not surprising because seeking advanced resources, especially 
knowledge-based resources, is one of the most important motivations for Chinese 
acquirers‘ outward M&A in developed countries. Moreover, the Chinese firms‘ strong 
demand for knowledge from the acquired firms even enlarges the impact of the 
knowledge authority disparity.  
 
The weak informal authority of Chinese acquirers leads to an authority asymmetry 
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which may exert a negative influence on the post-acquisition integration process. It 
could affect the foreign employees‘ willingness to transfer knowledge to their new 
owners, as they might enjoy and wish to retain their knowledge authority. In order to 
compensate for this imbalance, Chinese acquirers have to take measures to improve 
their attractiveness to achieve a better outcome in socio-cultural integration
26
. The 
data suggest that various socio-cultural integration mechanisms were adopted by the 
Chinese acquirers to increase their attractiveness. For example, the perceived 
attractiveness of the acquiring firms is strongly influenced by their reputation and 
performance. An educational video was then used to make the target firm employees 
aware of the past and current status of their new headquarters. The respectable history 
and outstanding current performance of their Chinese acquirers greatly improved their 
attractiveness. This was described by some senior executives of firm A: 
 
―They showed a keen interest in our history because they also have a history 
of more than 100 years… Most common people in most countries have a 
common feature; they don‘t really know much about the conditions and 
cultures of other countries. Therefore, it is significant that we make them 
aware of our past and current statuses, show our goodwill, and express our 
attitude and willingness to be responsible for the future of the firm.‖ 
―The reception of this film was very good. Most French people did not 
expect the parent firm to be so big and powerful, with so many plants, 
                                                             
26
As discussed in section 6.1.5, socio-cultural integration here means maintaining a harmonious organisational 
climate. 
362 
 
equipment and laboratories.‖ 
 
In addition, the perception of the of the culture of the acquiring firm by the acquired 
firm‘s employees is also an important factor to improve its attractiveness. For instance, 
the CEO of firm C visited the homes of some foreign employees and gave them 
Chinese gifts. When some of the French employees retired, the executive staff of firm 
A invited them to dinner at French restaurants. One of the executives of firm A 
confirmed the result of these socio-cultural integration mechanisms: 
 
―They were moved, and they really liked this aspect of the Chinese culture.‖ 
 
Furthermore, all four firms invited foreign employees to visit China. Some firms, such 
as firm C, even implemented quite a number of such visits. The perception of the 
Chinese acquirers by the acquired firms‘ employees was dramatically changed after 
seeing first hand ‗real‘ Chinese socio-cultural institutions. As one senior executive of 
firm C said: 
 
―The understanding that most Spaniard‘s had of China still rested on an 
impression dating back over 20 years. They may have been aware of the 
economic development of China in recent decades, but still had no idea about 
the contemporary socio-cultural environment of the real China. Inviting them 
to visit China helped them to become acquainted with the headquarters, 
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Chinese culture, and our organisational culture…They were shocked to find 
out China‘s development. They attended the flag-raising ceremony with us. 
They also asked to wear our uniform and company badge. This is a strong 
signal that they respected and were willing to accept our culture.‖ 
 
Moreover, the Chinese acquirers also gained the respect of their foreign employees by 
displaying their technological abilities. For example, during the process of 
transferring some production lines to China, the Chinese engineers of firm B 
accomplished the installation and trial run procedures without any direct guidance 
from the Italian technologists, which greatly impressed the employees of the acquired 
firm. When the Italian engineers came to China to visit the parent firm, the Chinese 
R&D staff posed some technological challenges for them to solve together with the 
Chinese team. This was to demonstrate to the Italians the R&D competency of the 
Chinese. It greatly changed the perception of the Italian employees towards their 
acquirers in terms of the latter‘s technological ability. As some senior executives of 
firm C commented: 
 
―Initially, most of them (the Italian employees) believed that Chinese firms 
were just rich buyers without any technology and management skills.‖ 
―If our Chinese employees were to show them their sophistication and 
capabilities, the ‗superiority complex‘ of some of the Italian employees 
would be reduced and they would become convinced of our competency and 
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truly respect us.‖ 
 
Other approaches were also adopted by the Chinese acquirers to improve their 
attractiveness; these included providing quality post-acquisition rewards, promising 
job security, maintaining the good post-acquisition performance of the acquiring firm, 
etc. These approaches effectively reduced the knowledge authority gap and helped to 
increase the foreign employees‘ willingness to transfer resources and capabilities to 
the acquiring firms. The organisational climate of the combined entity was also 
greatly enhanced by the improvement of the acquiring firms‘ attractiveness. 
 
6.1.10 Key factors influencing the integration process: section conclusion 
 
All the themes that emerged from the data analysis are organised to define the key 
success factors influencing the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms‘ 
outward M&A to developed countries. These factors include both those proposed in 
Chapter 3 and those that newly emerged from the data analysis. As shown in Figure 
6.1, these key factors can be divided into two themes: status factors and process 
factors, according to their dynamics and M&A phases (Stahl et al., 2011). Status 
factors are those key factors related to the status of the acquiring firm, or to the 
acquirer-acquired relationship. They exist before the deal while also having a 
significant impact on the integration process in the post-acquisition phase. Status 
factors include the prior related knowledge of the acquiring firm, home country 
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advantages, resource complementarities, cultural differences and the acquiring firms‘ 
attractiveness. The process factors are those key factors related to the acquirer‘s 
integration approach. They act in the post-acquisition integration process. They 
comprise key staff retention and turnover, integration process communication, 
integration speed, level of integration, cultural integration, and the acquiring firms‘ 
attractiveness. Table 6.8 shows the categories of status and process factors in the 
post-acquisition integration process. 
 
Table 6.8 A summary and category of key factors in the post-acquisition integration process 
Status factors Status factors& 
Process factors 
Process factors 
Prior related knowledge; 
Home country advantage; 
complementary resource. 
Cultural difference and 
cultural integration; 
Acquirers‘ 
attractiveness. 
 
Key staff turnover and                               
management team building; 
Integration speed; 
Level of integration; 
Integration process communication. 
 
The findings support and extend the ―process perspective‖ on M&A (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991), which suggests that, while pre-acquisition factors, such as strategic, 
organisational, and culture fit, may determine the synergy potential, the extent to 
which these synergies are realised depends on the ability of the acquirer to manage the 
post-acquisition integration process. The current understanding of the process 
perspective neglects, to a certain extent, the relationship between pre-acquisition 
factors and post-acquisition integration strategies, tactics, and practices. Based on the 
result of this study, it seems to be true that the integration approach and management 
practices adopted by the acquirer during the post-acquisition integration process affect 
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the extent to which the synergy potential is realised. However, how to formulate the 
correct integration approach and choose adequate management practices is determined 
by the pre-acquisition status factors
27
. This is also why it is suggested that some key 
integration issues, such as the level, speed and strategy of integration, are solved by 
means of contingency approaches (Angwin, 2004; Weber and Tarba, 2013; Gomes et 
al., 2013). Therefore, integration success is not only determined by the process factors 
in the post-acquisition integration phase, but is also affected by the relevant 
pre-acquisition status factors by way of their impact on the post-acquisition approach. 
 
It can be observed that two factors, culture and acquiring firms‘ attractiveness, are 
included in both themes. Although cultural difference is a status factor, the way in 
which to moderate the negative effects of cultural difference on M&A integration, 
which is the cultural integration strategy, is a process factor. Similarly, despite the 
acquiring firm‘s attractiveness existing before the deal, it can be proactively improved 
by adopting various operational and socio-cultural integration mechanisms. The 
existence of these two cross-theme factors led to an important finding of this research: 
‗post-acquisition integration‘ does not merely happen in the post-acquisition phase. It 
starts even before the deal. On the one hand, the acquiring firm‘s attractiveness can be 
gradually built through interactions and negotiations before the M&A deal is done. 
This is significant for Chinese acquirers, whose attractiveness is relatively low 
compared with that of acquiring firms from developed countries. On the other hand, 
                                                             
27
How the status factors affect the formulation of the integration approach is explained in section 6.2.4. 
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an adequate cultural integration strategy can also be, and should be, formed before the 
acquisition through interactions between the management teams. This is also vital for 
the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A because they do not have enough domestic talents 
suitable to form the management teams of their acquired firms. If they believed that 
cultural integration could not be implemented smoothly in the post-acquisition phase, 
they might even give up the target firm. 
 
6.2 Integration approach 
 
6.2.1 Integration approach revisited 
The execution of a well-designed post-acquisition integration process which can 
enhance a firm‘s ability to acquire and assimilate new resources and capabilities, 
while minimising interpersonal and intercultural friction, is critical to capturing 
synergies and pursuing M&A success (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Schweiger, 2002, 
Bjorkman et al, 2007). An effective integration execution and effort matter to Chinese 
acquirers (Deng, 2011), but the integration strategy matters more, as it provides 
guidelines for M&A undertaken within different contexts, with specific features and 
for different reasons (Gomes et al., 2013). Despite the possibility that different 
acquiring firms may adopt distinct integration strategies in their M&A deals due to the 
uniqueness of each case, these integration strategies may be synthesised by different 
integration approaches. 
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Scholars have developed many contingency frameworks or typologies for M&A 
integration approaches (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Gomes et. al, 2011; Angwin, 
2012). The most famous and widely cited post-acquisition integration framework is 
represented by Haspeslagh and Jemison‘s (1991) four integration approaches, namely 
absorption, symbiotic, preservation and holding. Recent research revisited this 
essential topic and added new elements into the integration approach framework of 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), such as cultural dimension, synergy potential, 
cultural differences, etc. (Gomes et al., 2011; Almor et al., 2009; Angwin and 
Meadows, 2009; Weber et al., 2009). A very recent research on Chinese firms‘ 
outward M&A to Germany integrates synergy potential, cultural influences, and 
learning perspectives (Liu and Woywode, 2013). They suggested a unique integration 
approach supported by empirical evidence in the context of Chinese M&A in 
Germany called the light-touch integration.  
 
6.2.2 The „Unbalanced Strategic resource focused‟ integration approach 
The data of this research indicate that the integration approach of firm D can be 
accommodated within the widely used framework of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) 
in terms of the symbiotic acquisition. This type of acquisition integration approach 
presents the most complex managerial challenge because it involves both strategic 
interdependence and organisational autonomy. In a typical symbiotic acquisition case, 
the two firms first coexist and then gradually become increasingly interdependent. 
This integration approach simultaneously requires boundary protection and 
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permeability. ―These needs can be kept in balance by protecting the boundary between 
both firms that shields the broad identity and character of the acquired firm at the 
same time that it is becoming increasingly permeable to a whole series of interactions 
aimed at functional as well as general management skill transfer.‖ (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991, pp149) However, this approach is extremely difficult to be adopted by 
Chinese firms in their M&A deals with firms in developed countries. It requires a 
deep level of integration in both explicit knowledge-based and tacit knowledge-based 
resources. After a problematic integration, firm D failed in its acquisition and was 
forced to restructure its European subsidiary.  
 
Unlike firm D, the other three firms adopted the same integration approach. To the 
best of the author‘s knowledge, this did not fit any existing integration approach 
developed by researchers (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Gomes et al., 2011; Almor 
et al., 2009; Angwin and Meadows, 2009; Weber et al., 2009; Angwin, 2012; Liu and 
Woywode, 2013). It is labelled as the ―Unbalanced strategic resource focused‖ 
integration. Table 6.9 illustrates the profile of this unique integration approach for 
Chinese acquirers. In the next section, the characteristics of this unique integration 
approach will be discussed in detail.  
 
Table 6.9 The Unbalanced Strategic Resource Focused integration approach 
Integration approach Unbalanced Strategic Resource Focused 
Purpose  To transfer key resources and capabilities from 
the acquired firm and enhance the competitive 
advantage of the acquiring firm 
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Synergy potential Very high 
Cultural differences Very high 
Boundary conditions Maintain 
Operational characteristics  Focussing upon transferring strategically 
important explicit knowledge-based resources 
while deliberately neglecting the transfer of tacit 
knowledge-based resources. 
 
 Granting autonomy and decision-making 
authority in day-to-day operations to the acquired 
firm; adopting a lower level and speed for the 
operational integration in most aspects while 
using a higher level and speed of operational 
integration in strategically important areas. 
Strategic decision-making powers are held by the 
acquiring firm. 
 
 Low level of cultural integration; a cultural 
integration strategy that can be described as 
― taking a step back and keep some distance with 
a high cultural tolerance to achieve mutual 
understanding and respect‖; use various 
socio-cultural integration mechanisms to maintain 
a harmonious organisational climate. 
 
6.2.3 Characteristics of the integration approach of Chinese acquirers 
The integration approach of Chinese acquirers‘ outward M&A to developed 
economies can be characterised by the following aspects: 
 
First, the purpose of adopting such integration approach is to transfer key resources 
and capabilities from the acquired firms and enhance the competitive advantage of the 
acquiring ones. It is in line with the Chinese acquirers‘ main motivation for acquiring 
firms overseas, which is to seek strategic assets (Deng, 2004, 2007, 2009; Rui and Yip, 
2008). These strategic assets are the key resources and capabilities that need to be 
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transferred in the post-acquisition integration phase. 
 
Second, Chinese acquirers focus on the transfer of strategically important explicit 
knowledge-based and tangible resources, while deliberately neglecting the transfer of 
tacit knowledge-based resources. 
 
Third, Chinese acquirers adopt a low level and speed of operational integration in 
most aspects. In relation to operational integration in strategically important areas, a 
higher level and speed of operational integration is adopted. Acquired firms are 
granted a high level of autonomy and given decision-making authority in day-to-day 
operations. Chinese executives take responsibility in monitoring key operational 
activities and making strategic decisions. 
 
Fourth, Chinese acquirers adopt a low level of cultural integration. Their cultural 
integration strategy can be described as ―taking a step back and keep some distance 
with a high cultural tolerance to achieve mutual understanding and respect‖. They use 
various socio-cultural integration mechanisms to maintain a harmonious 
organisational climate to support the transfer of key resources and capabilities. 
 
Based on the above characteristics, this integration approach is deemed to be a novel 
post-acquisition integration approach. The M&A purpose of a very high synergy 
potential and pursuit is reminiscent of the features of the absorption approach of 
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Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), while having huge cultural differences, maintaining 
the firms‘ boundaries, and granting autonomy to foreign managers reconciles the 
features of the preservation approach. It is also different from Liu and Woywode‘s 
(2013) finding of a ―light-touch integration‖ approach, which argues that Chinese 
acquirers do not take any part in either the strategic or operational decision-making of 
their acquired firms. 
 
Among the above four characteristics of this unique integration approach, the most 
extraordinary feature, which is also the key one, is that Chinese acquirers emphasise 
the transfer of key explicit knowledge-based and tangible resources, while 
deliberately neglecting the transfer of tacit knowledge-based ones. This is why this 
integration approach is referred as an ―unbalanced strategic resource focused‖ 
integration approach. The post-acquisition implementation strategy adopted by 
Chinese firms in key process factors, such as the level and speed of integration, is 
affected and guided by this integration approach. In the next section, the rationale 
underlying this unique integration approach will be discussed based on the key status 
factors summarised in section 6.1.  
 
6.2.4 The rationale behind the Chinese acquirers‟ integration approach 
The results of this research reveal that there is an imbalance between the transfer of 
explicit knowledge-based and implicit knowledge-based resources in the 
post-acquisition integration phase of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A. Although Chinese 
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acquirers do want to learn both ‗hard‘ technologies, to catch up and even overtake 
global competitors from developed economies, and ‗soft‘ knowledge, such as 
managerial skills, corporate culture, organisation capabilities, to increase their 
potential embeddedness when competing in the global market (Luo and Tung, 2007; 
Liu and Woywode, 2013), they choose to focus more on the hard part of the resource 
and capability transfer when implementing their post-acquisition integration strategy. 
 
The interview data indicates that the resources transferred in these cases were mostly 
tangible ones, such as manufacturing lines, good-locating factories, etc., and 
knowledge-based resources in articulated form, such as patented technologies. When 
talking about the transferred knowledge-based resources, most interviewees only 
mentioned the transfer of explicit knowledge-based resources. Although some CEOs 
did imply that the transfer of implicit knowledge-based resources had been part of 
their plan, it had not actually been implemented. Explicit knowledge-based resources, 
such as patents and production and manufacturing technology are more 
straightforward and urgently needed by the Chinese acquirers. All the studied 
acquiring firms considered the transfer of technology (especially patented, production 
and manufacturing technology) as one of their most significant M&A motivations. 
This formed the core of the Chinese acquirers‘ post-acquisition integration strategy. 
The significance of explicit knowledge-based and tangible resources is evidenced in 
Table 6.4, which shows the sequence of acquisition motivations confirmed by CEOs 
and other top executives of all acquiring firms. Therefore, compared with tacit 
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knowledge-based resources, explicit knowledge-based and tangible ones are deemed 
to be strategically significant for Chinese acquirers.  
 
In addition to the strategic importance of explicit knowledge-based and tangible 
resources, the underlying logic of this unique integration approach is affected by static 
factors in the post-acquisition integration process. These are: prior related knowledge, 
complementarity of resources, home country advantage, cultural differences and 
acquirer attractiveness. 
 
First, the reason for focusing on the transfer of explicit knowledge-based and tangible 
resources can be explained by the nature of knowledge and by the prior related 
knowledge of acquiring firms (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Deng, 2011).The nature and 
attributes of knowledge determine that explicit knowledge-based and tangible 
resources are easier to be transferred compared with tacit knowledge-based resources. 
Although, in some cases, transferring explicit knowledge may require the support of 
tacit knowledge transfer to help the knowledge recipients, most Chinese acquirers 
accumulated ample prior related knowledge, such as a leading domestic prior R&D 
capability, so as to successfully accomplish such explicit knowledge transfer. 
Moreover, the articulateness of knowledge also facilitates explicit knowledge transfers. 
Chinese acquirers managed to transfer a great amount of explicit knowledge-based 
resources in terms of documented patents and filed technology within a short period 
of time because they were all well documented.  
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Second, The rationale for transferring explicit knowledge-based and tangible 
resources lies in the resource complementarity between the acquiring and the acquired 
firms. Despite being industry leaders in the Chinese domestic market, many 
manufacturing MNEs still lack resources and knowledge assets, such as brand, 
patented technology and advanced manufacturing techniques. This is exactly why 
most of them consider the pursuit of these strategic assets to be one of their main 
M&A motivations. The acquisition of these resources can directly complement their 
existing assets and improve the competitiveness of their products in the global and 
domestic markets. Another reflection of resource complementarity is that all four 
acquired firms in our case study established manufacturing factories in the host 
country, which could help Chinese acquirers break down technical barriers and 
enhance their European market distribution channels. Therefore, it is clear that there is 
a huge resource complementarity lying in the transfer of explicit knowledge-based 
and tangible resources. This complementarity of resources between the Chinese 
acquirers and their acquired firms led to an enormous synergy potential that could be 
pursued in the post-acquisition integration process. Such synergy potential was so big 
that Chinese acquirers did not even need to explore further synergies through the 
transfer of tacit knowledge-based resources.  
 
Third, the importance of the transfer of explicit knowledge-based and tangible 
resources is built on the home market advantage of Chinese firms. Their resource and 
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knowledge seeking outward M&A are not only motivated by the exploration of 
overseas markets, but also driven by the opportunity of improving their 
competitiveness against foreign entrants in the home market. Most Chinese MNEs are 
still highly dependent on their home market performance in sales volume and 
reputation (Luo and Tung, 2007).With the complementary explicit technology-based 
resources transferred from the acquired firms, Chinese firms could rapidly improve 
their competitiveness in the domestic market. Moreover, their home country 
institutional advantages, such as governmental support policies, distribution channels, 
and their existing tacit knowledge derived from the Chinese market, would help 
Chinese acquirers make the most of the transferred explicit knowledge and tangible 
resources. Given the huge benefits linked to the transfer of explicit knowledge-based 
and tangible resources from the acquired firms, based on resource complementarity 
and home market advantage, Chinese acquirers are likely to overlook tacit knowledge, 
which is of less strategic importance and harder to transfer.  
 
Fourth, the Chinese acquiring firms‘ need for attractiveness is linked to their forced 
neglect of the transfer of tacit knowledge-based resources. Tacit knowledge-based 
resources are embedded in practices, values and norms (Kogut and Zander, 1993), and 
can only be transferred by the interaction between staff who possesses similar tacit 
knowledge. In order to guarantee the quality and efficiency of tacit knowledge-based 
resource transfer, Chinese acquirers need to equip themselves with a high level of 
attractiveness to retain key staff who is in possession of such tacit knowledge-based 
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resources, such as R&D staff, technicians, and local managers. Despite the Chinese 
acquirers in the studied cases having adopted various measures to this end, they still 
could not retain all the acquired firm‘s key staff. Moreover, although some specific 
key employees were successfully retained, the Chinese firms also faced the thorny 
issue of finding adequate members of staff to handle knowledge transfer and 
localisation. This was mainly because of their lack of sufficient numbers of highly 
skilled and well educated home country employees despite the increasing level of 
international human mobility and the many highly skilled Chinese talents who move 
back as returning migrants from developed countries (Liu et al., 2010; Gao et al., 
2013). In addition, most firms in manufacturing sectors, especially non-SOEs, are not 
attractive enough to be favoured by these talents in terms of salary, location and 
industry attractiveness. Without a high level of attractiveness, Chinese firms can 
hardly get enough human resources from either home or abroad to transfer tacit 
knowledge-based resources from the acquired unit to the headquarters.  
 
Five, the huge cultural differences between Chinese acquiring firms and acquired ones 
from western developed economies forces the former to neglect the transfer of tacit 
knowledge-based resources. Knowledge transfer, especially tacit knowledge transfer, 
can only be undertaken based on an intensive interaction between the transferring and 
recipient units (Buckley et al, 2009). This requires the mutual understanding of values, 
norms, practices and routines. Achieving mutual understanding calls for a high degree 
of integration and the creation of a combined social community (Bresman et al., 1999), 
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which also implies the need for high levels of cultural integration. Nevertheless, such 
operational and cultural integration may ultimately lead to conflicts, loss of autonomy, 
key employee resignations and disruption of organisational routines (Gomes et al., 
2013). This is particularly true in the context of EMNEs acquiring firms from 
developed countries, where cultural differences are bigger and acquirers lack 
sufficient experience and knowledge to handle these problems.  
 
In brief, the unique characteristic of the integration approach of Chinese firms lies in 
the imbalance between the inter-firm transfer of strategic resources. The emphasis 
placed on the transfer of explicit knowledge-based and tangible strategic resources, 
while neglecting that of tacit knowledge-based ones, is a function of key static factors 
in the post-acquisition integration process, which are the acquiring firm‘s prior related 
knowledge, resource complementarity, home market advantage, scarcity of acquirer 
attractiveness, and cultural differences.  
 
6.3 Developed new model and chapter summary 
 
Based upon the cross-case analysis results, this study developed a new explanatory 
model to explain the key factors influencing the post-acquisition integration process 
of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A in developed economies. This new model is shown 
in Figure 6.1.  
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It consists of nine key success factors, which are listed below, together with the 
explanation of their influence on the post-acquisition integration process: 
 
1. Prior related knowledge. 
The accumulation of an adequate prior international business experience, strong 
R&D capabilities, good performance and leading industrial status, as well as 
ample prior knowledge about the target firms, would enhance the ability of 
Chinese acquirers to identify, understand, assimilate, integrate, transform and 
apply the knowledge and other resources, especially complementary ones, 
acquired from their acquired firms. 
2. Level of integration. 
Chinese acquirers should adopt distinct levels of operational integration: a low 
one at the day-to-day management level, and a medium one on strategic issues 
and in strategically important operational areas. 
3. Integration speed. 
Chinese acquirers should adopt speeds of integration implementation as a 
function of their strategic intent: they should effect the functional and operational 
integration of strategically important areas at a fast pace, and integrate slowly in 
strategically less important operational activities and socio-cultural aspects. 
4. Key staff turnover and management team building. 
The crucial role played by key staff turnover lies in its impact upon the overall 
knowledge base, especially on tacit knowledge-based resources, of the acquired 
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firm and upon the organisational climate of the combined entity. Chinese 
acquirers should build their management teams by combining foreign middle 
managers and vice executives with Chinese CEOs and strategic decision makers. 
5. Cultural differences and integration. 
Having a clear awareness of the existence of enormous cultural differences and of 
the importance of cultural integration, Chinese acquirers should take a series of 
measures to avoid and reduce culture related issues based upon a unique cultural 
integration strategy, which can be described as ―taking a step back and keeping 
some distance with a high cultural tolerance to achieve mutual understanding and 
respect‖. 
6. Integration process communication. 
Integration process communication not only affects socio-cultural integration 
through its impact on the organisational climate of the combined entity, but also 
allows for a more efficient transfer of resources, especially knowledge-based ones, 
between firms. Chinese acquirers should take a series of measures to foster 
inter-firm communication about the past, present and future of the firm. 
7. Home country advantage. 
Absorbing resources and capabilities from their acquired firms so as to increase 
their competitiveness in their home market is the most important reason for 
Chinese firms to initiate outward M&A. The home country advantage of Chinese 
acquirers not only provides them with huge institutional support for the utilisation 
of any acquired resources and capabilities, but also facilitates the building of a 
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harmonious organisational climate. It is one of the most important rationales for 
the unique integration approach of Chinese acquirers.  
8. Resource complementarity. 
A huge resource complementarity lies in the transfer of explicit knowledge-based 
and tangible resources. These complementary resources between Chinese 
acquirers and their acquired firms lead to an enormous synergy potential that 
should be pursued in the post-acquisition integration process. The significance of 
resource complementarity between acquiring and acquired firms is not just down 
to the importance of the ―strategic fit‖, but also because of its impact on the 
post-acquisition integration approach. 
9. Acquirers‘ attractiveness. 
The weak informal authority of Chinese acquirers leads to an authority 
asymmetry which can have a negative influence on the post-acquisition 
integration process. In order to compensate for this imbalance, Chinese acquirers 
should take various measures aimed at improving their attractiveness, so as to 
increase their foreign employees‘ willingness to transfer resources and 
capabilities to them. The organisational climate of the combined entity would also 
be greatly improved by enhancing the acquiring firms‘ attractiveness. 
 
These nine key success factors are divided into status and process factors, according 
to their dynamics and M&A phases. Based upon the results of this study, it is evident 
that the integration approach and management practices adopted by the acquirers for 
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the post-acquisition integration process affect the extent to which the synergy 
potential is realised. Nevertheless, the way in which to formulate the right integration 
approach and choose adequate management practices is determined by the 
pre-acquisition status factors. The relationship between the integration approach and 
the pre-acquisition status factors is shown as the arrow from left to right at the top of 
Figure 6.1. The arrow pointing from the integration approach to the post-acquisition 
process factors implies that the best way to manage the key process factors in 
post-acquisition integration implementation phase is determined by the integration 
approach of the acquiring firm. This model suggests that the integration success is not 
only determined by the process factors in the post-acquisition integration phase, but is 
also affected by the relevant pre-acquisition status factors through their impact on the 
post-acquisition approach. 
 
Among the nine key factors, cultural differences and integration, and acquirer 
attractiveness are part of both the status and process factors. This leads to another 
finding of this model: ‗post-acquisition integration‘ does not merely take place in the 
post-acquisition phase. The integrative interaction starts even before the deal.  
 
A newly emerged integration approach of Chinese acquirers is found in this research 
and is labelled ―Unbalanced strategic resource focused‖ integration. It suggests that 
Chinese acquirers focus on the transfer of strategically important explicit 
knowledge-based resources and tangible resources, while deliberately neglecting the 
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transfer of tacit knowledge-based ones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Model of key factors influencing the post-acquisition integration process of 
Chinese firms‘ outward M&A to developed economies (Constructed by the author) 
 
Based on key status and process factors, and on the novel integration approach, 
Chinese acquirers pursue both socio-cultural and strategic assets integration outcomes 
in their post-acquisition integration process. The former is achieved by maintaining a 
harmonious organisational climate in the combined entity, while the latter is achieved 
by the successful transfer of resources and capabilities from the acquired firm. The 
arrow pointing from the socio-cultural integration outcome to the strategic assets 
integration outcome indicates that the ultimate aim of socio-cultural integration is to 
Integration Approach: 
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Focused Integration 
Socio-cultural 
integration 
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facilitate the resource and capability transfer. Through an effective resource and 
capability transfer from the acquired firm, synergies and M&A success can be 
achieved. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the cross-case analysis based on the results of the single 
case analyses chapters. Nine key success factors were identified; six addressed in the 
propositions and three emerging from the data analysis. These nine factors are: 
 prior related knowledge; 
 level of integration; 
 speed of integration; 
 key staff turnover and management team building; 
 cultural differences and integration; 
 integration process communication; 
 home country advantages; 
 complementary resources; 
 acquirer attractiveness. 
 
The key factors identified in this study directly influence the post-acquisition 
integration process of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A in developed economies.  
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According to their dynamics and M&A phases, these nine key success factors are 
divided into status and process factors. The relationship between these factors 
promoted a newly emerged integration approach by Chinese acquirers, labelled as 
―unbalanced strategic resource focused‖ integration. Based on the relationship 
between these factors and the integration approach, a new integrative model was 
developed to contribute to the theory of EMNEs‘ outward M&A. Chapter 7 will 
discuss the implications of this research, clarify its contributions, suggest future 
research and draw the final conclusions. 
 
 
Chapter 7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 
Following the cross-case analyses and results presented in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 
comes to the discussion and conclusions. This chapter will firstly summarise the 
research questions and corresponding findings by discussing how the results of this 
study answer the research questions. Then it will deal with the summary and 
discussion of the main findings following the sequence of the research propositions. 
Next, it will discuss this research‘s contributions and implications, including 
theoretical, managerial and policy implications. Finally, it will come to limitations of 
the research and suggest a possible future research agenda before drawing the final 
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conclusions. 
 
7.1 Summary of the research questions and corresponding findings 
This chapter starts with by revisiting the research questions and their corresponding 
findings. The main objective of this research was to explore the key success factors in 
the management of the post-acquisition integration process in Chinese firms‘ outward 
M&A to developed economies. Based on this research objective, three research 
questions were raised: 
 
1. What are the key factors in the management of the post-acquisition integration 
by Chinese firms?  
 
2. How and why do these factors impact the post-acquisition integration process 
and M&A performance? 
 
3. How do the explanations of the identified key success factors contribute to the 
theory building related to post-acquisition integration in outward M&A by firms 
from China and other emerging economies? 
 
All three research questions are addressed through the process of data analysis and 
discussion. The first question regarding the identification of the critical factors 
influencing the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A 
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was answered based upon the single case studies and cross-case analysis. The results 
of the data analysis identified nine key success factors, which are: 
 prior related knowledge; 
 level of integration; 
 speed of integration; 
 key staff turnover and management team building; 
 cultural differences and integration; 
 integration process communication; 
 home country advantages; 
 complementary resources; 
 acquirer attractiveness. 
 
These nine key factors are divided into status and process factors, based on their 
dynamics and M&A phases. Among these critical factors, the first six were drawn 
from the existing research and proposed before analysing the data, while the last three 
are emerging factors identified through the data analysis process. 
 
The second research question of how and why these key success factors impact the 
post-acquisition integration process and M&A performance was answered through the 
process and results of the data analysis of this research. Both the single case pattern 
matching analyses and the cross-case analysis explained how these factors were 
identified. In accordance with their strategic motivations, Chinese acquirers pursue 
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post-acquisition synergies and M&A success through effective resource and capability 
transfers from their acquired firms. Such resource and capability transfers can be 
facilitated by creating and maintaining a harmonious organisational climate in the 
combined entity. All nine key success factors affect post-acquisition integration and 
M&A success by means of their impact on the maintenance of a harmonious 
organisational climate, which facilitates the capability transfer, and the capability 
transfer itself. 
 
The third question related to how the explanations of the identified key success factors 
contribute to the theory building of post-acquisition integration in outward M&A by 
firms from China and other emerging economies and was answered by the final model 
provided in Figure 6.1. Drawing from the data analyses and results of this study, this 
dynamic model not only identifies the key success factors and their categories, but 
also reveals the relationship that exists between these factors and the integration 
approach of Chinese acquirers. It contributes to the knowledge construct of Chinese 
firms‘ outward M&A by exploring and explaining the critical success factors in the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process. The model not only enriches 
the understanding of Chinese outward M&A by amplifying the existing research, but 
also provides implications for acquirers from other emerging economies. When 
examining the value creation of outward M&A conducted by EMNEs, this model 
needs to be considered. Moreover, the newly emerged factors in the model also 
provide insights into the mainstream M&A literature which is still incomplete in its 
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understanding of M&A success factors (King et al., 2004; Gomes et al., 2013). 
 
7.2 Discussion of the main findings 
 
This section discusses the main findings of this study, based on the result of the data 
analyses and on the final integrative model. The sequence of the discussion follows 
that of the research propositions. 
 
7.2.1Prior related resource/knowledge  
 
The research findings indicate that the prior related resources and knowledge 
influencing the post-acquisition integration process in Chinese firms‘ outward M&A 
include their prior international business experiences, R&D capabilities and prior 
knowledge of the target firms, as well as prior performance and industrial status. All 
these ingredients are crucial for Chinese acquirers‘ post M&A success.  
 
The findings relating to prior international business experiences show that Chinese 
acquirers‘ post-acquisition integration success can benefit from any prior international 
exposure, regardless of whether or not the acquirers have any past CBMA experience. 
Chinese acquiring firms accumulate useful resources and capabilities from their prior 
international exposure, such as running export/import businesses, setting up overseas 
offices and subsidiaries, building overseas factories, purchasing advanced equipment 
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from global industry leaders and collaborating or doing OEM business with giants 
from developed economies. These resources and capabilities, including both explicit 
and tacit knowledge-based resources, cannot only increase the overall knowledge base 
of the acquiring firms, but also greatly improve Chinese acquirers‘ ability to absorb 
strategic assets from their acquired firms at both the firm and individual levels. This 
supports the findings of Deng (2010), who argues that absorptive capacity is an 
important determinant of the performance of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A.  
 
It also needs to be noted that the findings indicate that having more prior experience 
of international business does not always result in achieving better acquisition 
integration and performance. Similarly, even past outward M&A experience may not 
benefit future M&A performance. In fact, TCL, being the only acquiring firm 
equipped with past outward M&A experience, failed dramatically in its later M&A 
deal, while the other three Chinese acquirers performed well although they lacked 
previous international M&A experience. Therefore, besides identifying the critical 
role of prior international business experience, the results of this study suggest the 
need to further explore the relationship between past M&A and international business 
experiences and post-acquisition performance. A very recent study conducted by 
Buckley et al. (2014) developed and tested a framework regarding prior investment 
experience in acquisitions by EMNEs. Their results demonstrated that not all types of 
resources and investment experience are equally beneficial to the performance of the 
target firms. 
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The findings on Chinese acquirers‘ R&D capabilities indicate that domestic leading 
and internationally compatible R&D capabilities can provide Chinese acquirers with a 
sufficient ability to identify and understand valuable advanced technology and other 
knowledge-based resources of the target firms, assimilate and integrate them within 
their existing knowledge and resource base, transform them into combined resources 
and apply them to commercial use. For strategic asset seeking M&A conducted by 
Chinese acquirers, an insufficient prior R&D capacity could hamper the realisation of 
post-acquisition synergy by constraining the transfer of knowledge, especially explicit 
knowledge, from the acquired firms. This finding also illustrates the significance of 
Chinese acquiring firms‘ absorptive capacity their outward M&A, since some 
traditional mainstream absorptive capacity researchers generally equate absorptive 
capacity with a firm‘s prior R&D capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Tsai, 2001; 
Schildt et al., 2012; Junni and Sarala, 2013).  
 
The findings also suggest that Chinese acquirers‘ prior performance and industrial 
status are critical to their post-acquisition integration process and M&A success. Good 
prior performance and a leading industrial status can facilitate the formation of a 
harmonious organisational climate in the combined entity by fostering trust in the key 
stakeholders of the acquired firms, such as previous managers, local general 
employees, trade unions and local governments. In recent years, such trust was also 
inspired by the boom of China‘s economy. The idea of trust building is in line with a 
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recent study by Stahl et al. (2011), which suggests that the establishment of trust 
between the two parties mediates the effects of the integration process variables and 
post-acquisition integration outcomes. 
 
It has been shown that Chinese acquirers‘ prior knowledge of their targets is also 
critical for managing the post-acquisition integration process. Acquiring firms not 
only need to identify the complementary capabilities that they require to create 
synergy, but should also be aware of the potential difficulties they are likely to face 
before the transaction. Specifically, accumulating prior knowledge of target firms in 
western developed countries before initiating M&A deals is even more critical for 
Chinese acquirers, considering that cultural differences, language problems and other 
institutional constraints can all give rise to post-acquisition challenges.  
 
7.2.2 Level of integration 
 
The results of this study show that Chinese acquirers‘ choice of the level of 
integration is a key factor in pursuing post-acquisition integration success. Based on 
their specific characteristics and organisational differences, Chinese acquirers adopt 
distinct levels of operational integration; a low level of integration at the day-to-day 
management level and a medium one on strategic issues and in strategically important 
operational areas. 
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The findings show that Chinese acquirers‘ generally low level of integration in 
day-to-day operational management can be reflected in their allowing local managers 
a high level of autonomy in making day-to-day operational management decisions in 
most departments, appointing very few permanent or long-term Chinese expatriates to 
work in the acquired firm, and retaining most of the existing formal structures and 
routines of the acquired firms. Through these measures, Chinese acquirers can not 
only retain the advantages of the localisation of management, but also minimise any 
potential shortcomings in their managerial capabilities and the liability of foreignness. 
On the one hand, local management teams, especially existing managers, know the 
acquired firm better than expatriates from China in terms of organisational structures 
and culture, day-to-day work routines, and local institutions. Moreover, changing the 
existing operational system and day-to-day routines of the acquired firms may lead to 
the impairment of such firms‘ knowledge-based resources, which is what Chinese 
acquirers mainly wish to gain through their M&A deals. On the other hand, 
limitations in Chinese acquirers‘ capabilities, especially the lack of availability of 
suitable talent to be employed as expatriate managers, determine that it would be 
unrealistic for them to greatly intervene in the day-to-day operations of their acquired 
firms. In addition, involving Chinese managers in the day-to-day operational 
management may trigger potential culture conflicts which are likely to occur as a 
result of their interactions with employees from different socio-cultural backgrounds. 
Such conflicts could be exacerbated if too many long term expatriates were posted to 
the acquired firms, because local employees might perceive their career opportunities 
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to be blocked by Chinese workers. This would result in a distrustful organisational 
climate which could hamper the transfer of resources in the integration process. 
Compared to firms A, B, and C, firm D intervened too heavily in the day-to-day 
operations of its acquired firm and employed many more Chinese expatriates, which 
triggered severe cultural conflicts, a poor resource transfer and a disappointing 
integration outcome.  
 
Despite a low level of integration in most aspects of general day-to-day management 
having been shown as critical for managing Chinese acquirers post-acquisition 
integration process, the findings of this study also indicate that some strategically 
important organisational departments and operational aspects in acquired firms were 
subject to a medium level of integration. This part of the operational integration 
included certain crucial activities such as procurement, market distribution, 
investment and R&D. In the major activities of these crucial units, Chinese executives 
with held decision making powers by getting directly involved in or setting up strict 
monitoring mechanisms to manage risk by ensuring that the operation of these crucial 
operational units of their acquired firms was carried out in adherence to the strategic 
intent of the headquarters. The relatively higher level of integration implemented in 
these crucial organisational departments and operational aspects was a consequence of 
their strategic importance, which was reflected in both the strategic intent of the M&A 
deals and the synergy potential. Those operations closely related to the motivations of 
the M&A, such as gaining technological resources and overseas market distribution 
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channels, should be particularly emphasised and adequately integrated to achieve 
resource and capability transfer. For example, a higher level of integration of market 
distribution and R&D units could ensure that the operations of these crucial business 
units of the acquired firms follow the strategic intents of their acquirers. Such 
motivation-related issues are also where potential synergies are realised. In addition, 
synergies can also be captured by integrating procurement and reducing costs. This is 
in line with the finding of a previous research on Asian firms‘ CBMA conducted by 
Cogman and Tan (2010), who suggest that Asian firms tend to make CBMA to capture 
synergies in areas such as procurement.  
 
Through revealing these two magnitudes of integration levels, i.e. those of the general 
day-to-day operational management and strategically important operational aspects, 
this study finds the Chinese solution to the post-acquisition integration dilemma 
(Gomes et al., 2013). In the context of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A to developed 
economies, the negative effects of an excessively high level of integration would be 
amplified by the huge cultural differences and by the Chinese acquirers‘ lack of 
suitable talents to handle integration issues. Therefore, despite strategically important 
organisational departments and operational areas requiring a high level of integration, 
Chinese firms still need to keep it at a moderate level to avoid the potential value 
destruction that could otherwise occur.  
 
7.2.3 Integration implementation speed 
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Integration implementation speed has been confirmed to be a key success factor in the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process in Chinese firms‘ outward 
M&A. The role of integration speed is still an under-researched area in the study of 
M&A integration in mainstream research (Stahl et al., 2013). Relevant research in the 
context of emerging economies, and of China in particular, is still undeveloped.  
 
The contradictory empirical findings on the relationship between integration speed 
and acquisition success led some M&A scholars to call for a contingency approach 
(Angwin, 2004; Gomes et al., 2013). The findings of this study support this argument 
by arguing that the integration speed implemented by of Chinese acquirers was 
affected by their strategic intent: they adopted a fast pace of functional and 
operational integration in strategically important areas and integrated slowly in 
strategically less important operational activities and socio-cultural aspects. 
 
Because most of the acquired firms had suffered losses for a long time before being 
acquired by the Chinese firms, the findings suggest that a rapid organisational change 
through the integration of functional areas was essential to rid them of their former 
negative images and successfully rebrand them as new entities. A similar fast 
integration speed was adopted for activities and departments that were in line with the 
strategic intents and main acquisition motivations of the Chinese acquirers, such as 
the transfer of technology from the acquired firms. This logic is similar to that 
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underlying the medium degree of integration adopted for strategically important 
operational aspects. The rapid transfer of the required resources and capabilities 
instantly improved the competitiveness of the Chinese acquirers and precipitated 
synergies in a shorter time period. 
 
Conversely, strategically less important operational areas were integrated relatively 
slowly in order to contain the potential stress on the employees of the acquired firms, 
because a swiftly imposed change in the day-to-day management could have led to 
acculturating stress, which might have generated resistance and hostility on the part of 
the local employees. In the same manner, the speed of socio-cultural integration was 
also deliberately controlled at a slow pace by the Chinese acquirers. The aim of these 
efforts was to maintain a harmonious socio-cultural climate within which the 
combined organisation could operate smoothly and focus on strategically important 
areas to enable the swift and smooth transfer of key resources and capabilities. 
 
7.2.4 Key staff turnover and management team building 
 
Among human resource related issues, key staff turnover and management building in 
acquired firms have been found to be critical to the management of the 
post-acquisition integration process and performance of Chinese firms‘ outward 
M&A.  
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The findings indicate that the turnover of key employees, who possess individual 
knowledge-based resources and significantly contribute to the overall knowledge base 
of the acquired firms, has a significant influence on the Chinese firms‘ outward M&A 
performance through its impact on resource and capability transfers and 
organisational climate maintenance. Such influence is mainly embodied in the transfer 
of tacit knowledge-based resources from the acquired firms. Thus, the retention of key 
staff, such as technical experts and marketing talents, is critical to post-acquisition 
management. Even successfully retaining most key employees, finding adequate 
members of staff to handle the knowledge transfer and localisation was also a thorny 
issue for Chinese acquirers, which lack sufficient highly skilled and well educated 
home country employees to manage the integration process. In addition to its impact 
on the transfer of tacit knowledge-based resources, key staff turnover can also 
influence post-acquisition integration by affecting the organisational climate of the 
combined entity, because the withdrawal and turnover of existing staff can lead to 
stress and resistance among remaining employees. Therefore, although the retainment 
of most local employees involves missing an opportunity to reduce labour costs 
through M&A, it can help Chinese acquirers to improve their ability to transfer 
resources and capabilities and reduce any discomfort and distrust among the 
employees of the acquired firms. 
 
Despite the commonality of the roles they share with other key staff, management 
level staff members of acquired firms are also crucial for post-acquisition integration 
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and performance because of the leading role of senior management. The Chinese 
acquirers paid particular attention to management team building in their acquired 
firms and chose to retain most local managers after the transaction. Some of them, 
such as CITIC HIC, even considered the retention of the top management team as one 
of the prerequisites for conducting the M&A. Not only did the existing managers 
possess a deep knowledge of organisational structures and culture, day-to-day work 
routines and local institutions, but they could also contribute to the maintenance of a 
harmonious organisational climate to facilitate the resource and capability transfer 
between firms. Despite their tendency to build localised management teams by 
granting them the responsibility of day-to-day operational management, the Chinese 
acquirers did not neglect the significance of risk management and strategic 
decision-making rights, which ensured that Chinese executives would retain absolute 
control over their subsidiaries to effectively and smoothly transfer resources and seek 
potential synergies. Therefore, the typical management team of a firm acquired by 
Chinese MNEs is mainly a combination of a Chinese CEO and a foreign vice CEO 
and managers. 
 
7.2.5 Cultural differences and integration 
 
The findings of this study indicate that cultural integration is the most important key 
factor that influences post-acquisition integration and M&A performance. Despite 
cultural differences and cultural fit being mostly assessed before M&A deals, their 
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impact on post-acquisition performance can be moderated by cultural integration 
strategies and efforts. Having a clear awareness of the enormous cultural differences 
and of the importance of cultural integration, the Chinese acquirers took a series of 
measures to avoid and reduce cultural related problems under their unique cultural 
integration strategies. 
 
Unlike developed countries, which normally pursue a high degree of cultural 
integration through cultural convergence and crossvergence, most Chinese acquirers, 
such as firms A, B, and C, choose to adopt a low level of cultural integration with a 
strategy described as ―taking a step back and keep some distance with a high cultural 
tolerance to achieve mutual understanding and respect‖. Drawing from the experience 
of forerunners such as firm D, most Chinese acquirers realise that they lack the ability 
to solve the complex cultural integration problems that could emerge from the pursuit 
of cultural convergence or crossvergence. The primary underlying rationale for this 
unique cultural integration strategy lies in the Chinese acquirers‘ lower dependency on 
the transfer of tacit and socially embedded knowledge-based resources and emphasis 
on the transfer of explicit knowledge-based and tangible resources. Such an 
integration strategy can benefit Chinese acquirers by containing potential cultural 
clashes and creating a harmonious organisational climate to facilitate the transfer of 
key resources. 
 
Although a low level of cultural integration was adopted by Chinese acquirers to keep 
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a certain cultural distance with a high tolerance, they still needed to take measures to 
reduce and solve emergent cultural related problems during the post-acquisition 
integration phase. This included using local managers, avoiding the use of long term 
Chinese expatriates, using socio-cultural integration mechanisms such as visits, joint 
dinner parties, tours of China and of the headquarters, etc. These measures were taken 
to achieve mutual understanding and respect on cultural related issues, so that a 
harmonious organisational climate could be maintained to facilitate inter-unit resource 
and capability transfer.  
 
7.2.6 Integration process communication 
 
Most Chinese acquirers are aware of the significance of effective communication and 
consider communication during the integration process to be a key factor in the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process and to achieve M&A success. 
On the one hand, effective communication allows for more efficient transfer of 
resources, especially knowledge-based ones, from the acquired firms. On the other 
hand, high quality communication can also foster socio-cultural integration through 
its impact on the organisational climate of the combined entity. Therefore, the Chinese 
acquirers adopted a number of measures to improve the quality of inter-firm 
communication about the past, present and future of the firm. 
 
Communicating about the past mainly refers to informing the employees of the 
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acquired firms about their new parent firms‘ history and organisational culture, so as 
to help them to build a better understanding of them and create a harmonious 
organisational climate for the integration implementation process. 
Communicating about the present focuses on taking measures to promote inter-firm 
communication on current integration practices by overcoming communication 
difficulties such as cultural differences, language barrier, time zone difference, etc. 
These measures include hiring high-quality interpreters, setting up specialised 
communication support departments, emphasising the executive level staff‘s role of 
mediators, deliberately containing the communication opportunities between ordinary 
Chinese and foreign employees, communicating with foreign general employees 
through the mediation of trade unions and foreign managers, involving Chinese top 
executives in the communication with the employees of the acquired firms to show 
regard for important issues on certain special occasions. These efforts can promote 
inter-firm resource and capability transfers by improving communication efficiency 
and reducing misunderstandings with foreign employees. 
Communicating about the future refers to informing foreign employees about the 
strategy and future plans of the acquired firm and of the combined entity. The foreign 
employees‘ willingness to transfer tacit knowledge-based resources to their 
headquarters would be improved if the Chinese acquirers could help them realise how 
important transferring these resources was for the strategy and the future operation of 
the combined firm.  
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7.2.7 Home country advantages 
 
Home country advantages are an emerging theme that was not proposed in the 
research propositions. The findings of this study indicate that the home country 
advantages of Chinese acquirers is a key factor in the management of the 
post-acquisition integration process as they affect the formation of the integration 
approach. 
 
It has been shown that most Chinese acquirers seek the resources and capabilities of 
foreign firms to increase their competitiveness in the home market. Improving their 
competitive advantage on their domestic rivals is one of the most important reasons 
for Chinese firms to initiate outward M&A to developed economies, at least at the 
initial post-acquisition stage. They are still highly dependent on their home market 
performance in both sales volume and reputation, not only due to the difficulties of 
true internationalisation, but also because the Chinese market is too big to ignore. In 
addition, their home institutional advantages, such as governmental support policies, 
distribution channels and the existing tacit knowledge-based resources derived from 
the Chinese market, can help Chinese acquirers make the most of the transferred 
resources. The significant role played by home country advantages has a great impact 
on the Chinese acquirers‘ integration approach. Equipped with huge home country 
advantages, Chinese firms can view CBMA as a long term investment and do not 
expect immediate returns from their acquired firms because they have a strong 
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supporting domestic business performance and have the home institution advantages 
to utilise the resources and capabilities acquired from their foreign subsidiaries. 
Moreover, the good performance of the acquiring firms in the Chinese market can also 
provide the foreign employees with a sense of security should the acquired firms fail 
to make profit, and help Chinese staff members to adopt a stance of high cultural 
tolerance. Therefore, not only do home country advantages provide a huge 
institutional support for the utilisation of acquired resources and capabilities, but they 
also facilitate the building of a harmonious organisational climate. 
 
7.2.8 Resource complementarity 
 
As an emerging factor found in the data analysis process, the resource 
complementarity between the two parties is evidenced to be a key factor in the 
management of the post-acquisition integration and in the pursuit of M&A success. 
The significance of resource complementarity lies in its influence on the decisions 
relating to the post-acquisition integration approach.  
 
The findings indicate that a huge resource complementarity lies in the mutual transfer 
of explicit knowledge-based and tangible resources from the foreign acquired firms to 
their Chinese acquirers. These complementary resources include some that are 
valuable and vital to Chinese firms, such as brand, patented technology, and 
geographic distribution, and others that can benefit western acquired firms, such as 
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cost saving materials and mechanisms. Such complementary resources lead to an 
enormous synergy potential and are crucial for the Chinese acquirers‘ strategic intent. 
Therefore, Chinese acquirers do not even need to source more synergies through the 
transfer of tacit knowledge-based resources, because they can gain what they are 
eager to acquire from the transfer of complementary resources, which are mostly 
explicit knowledge-based and tangible ones. This provides Chinese acquirers with the 
opportunity to apply novel integration approaches and socio-cultural integration 
strategies based on their own characteristics. In addition, resource complementarity is 
also the foundation of Chinese acquirers’ home market advantages. Without this huge 
resource complementarity, Chinese acquirers could not make full use of their home 
market advantages to increase the competitiveness of their existing products within a 
relatively short time period. 
 
7.2.9 Acquirers‟ attractiveness 
 
The findings of this study also suggest that the attractiveness of Chinese acquirers, 
being another key success factor that emerged in the data analysis process, influences 
the post-acquisition integration phase of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A to developed 
countries. The research shows that there are authority asymmetries between the 
Chinese acquirers and their western acquired firms. Although Chinese firms possess a 
higher formal authority in the post-acquisition phase because of their organisational 
position as headquarters, their informal authority, i.e. the authority deriving from 
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knowledge-based resources and culture, is actually lower. This is relevant to Chinese 
strategic asset seeking firms since their most important motivation for conducting 
CBMA is to seek advanced resources and capabilities from their targets.  
 
Such authority asymmetry could have a negative impact on the Chinese firms‘ 
post-acquisition integration process as foreign employees might stand on their high 
informal authority and show a low level of willingness to transfer their knowledge to 
their Chinese bosses. In these cases, Chinese acquirers need to take measures to 
improve their attractiveness and compensate this imbalance in authority. Various 
socio-cultural integration mechanisms can be adopted by Chinese firms to increase 
their attractiveness, such as using educational videos to make their target firm 
employees aware of the history and current leading status of their new headquarters, 
showcasing positive aspects of Chinese and firm organisational culture, exhibiting the 
technological abilities of the Chinese employees, providing quality post-acquisition 
rewards, promising job security, maintaining good post-acquisition performance in the 
acquiring firm, etc. Through these socio-cultural integration mechanisms, the 
organisational climate of the combined entity can be greatly improved through the 
enhancement of the acquiring firms‘ attractiveness. 
 
7.3 Contributions and implications 
 
7.3.1 Research contributions 
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This research makes a contribution to knowledge by providing a better understanding 
of the management of the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese firms‘ 
outward M&A to developed economies, which helps to develop the body of 
knowledge on the theory of international M&A, and EMNEs‘ CBMA in particular. In 
addition to its theoretical contributions, this study also provides significant managerial 
implications for Chinese firms to operate successfully in their post-acquisition phase 
in developed economies.  
 
This study contributes to the knowledge construct of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A by 
exploring and explaining the key success factors in the management of the 
post-acquisition integration process, which is the central part of the M&A value 
creation mechanism (Haspeslagh and Jemission, 1991). Its major contribution consists 
in the newly developed model, which can be used to explain key issues and processes 
in the management of the Chinese acquirers‘ post-acquisition integration in developed 
economies. The previous literature is incomplete and insufficient in explaining this 
phenomenon. The new integrative model, which includes nine key success factors and 
an integration approach, not only indicates how these factors influence the integration 
process of Chinese firms, but also illustrates the relationship between these factors 
and the Chinese acquirers‘ choice of integration approach. It enriches the 
understanding of Chinese outward M&A by expanding the existing research and 
provides implications for acquirers from other emerging economies.  
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Despite this study exploring research questions pertaining to the outward M&A of 
Chinese firms‘, its propositions and proposed framework are set up on mainstream 
theories and empirical findings on M&A. In addition to its contribution to Chinese 
outward M&A research, it also formulates important findings which provide valuable 
implications for mainstream M&A research. On the one hand, this study contributes to 
the knowledge of M&A by unfolding EMNEs‘ outward M&A to developed 
economies. It reveals that the post-acquisition integration process of Chinese acquirers 
is influenced by some new factors that had not been uncovered in the existing 
mainstream literature. These newly emerged factors may provide implications for 
mainstream research on identifying new determinants of M&A success. In addition, it 
has shown that Chinese acquirers adopt a novel integration approach to help manage 
their post-acquisition integration process. This integration approach is generally 
consistent with, but actually different from, researchers‘ current perception and 
understanding of EMNEs‘ integration approaches and strategies. As a significant part 
of this unique integration approach, a novel cultural integration strategy is articulated, 
which contributes to M&A researchers‘ current understanding of cultural differences 
and integration in international M&A, and EMNEs‘ outward M&A in particular. On 
the other hand, the new integrative model provides a consistent link between the 
existing literature, which is mostly focused on the M&A key success factors in a 
single phase, and future research, which needs to emphasise the holistic value creation 
mechanism of M&A phenomena (Gomes et al., 2013). The model indicates that 
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despite M&A creating value in the post-acquisition integration phase, an examination 
of the determinants of M&A integration should also incorporate those pre-acquisition 
factors which influence the integration process through their impact on the formation 
of the integration approach. The relationship between pre- and post-acquisition factors 
and the integration approach have never been clearly identified. The further 
exploitation of these relationships will benefit our current understanding of the M&A 
performance determinants. In some very recent papers, scholars have begun to realise 
the importance of using holistic models comprising both pre- and post-M&A phase 
issues to unravel the M&A performance puzzle (Bauer and Matzler, 2013; Gomes et 
al., 2013). 
 
In addition to its contributions to theory, this study also makes managerial ones. The 
post-acquisition overseas management by Chinese acquirers has been proven to be 
problematic. This is particularly true of those pioneers who effected outward M&A 
before the 2008 financial crisis (Tan and Ai, 2010). It is true that latecomers can gain 
useful knowledge from the valuable experiences of their forerunners, but such 
knowledge is often mainly fragmented and intuitive. This study identifies the key 
factors that potential Chinese acquirers should take into account in their future 
post-acquisition integration processes. Chinese acquirers ought to choose a suitable 
integration approach based on their motivations and specific pre-acquisition key 
factors, and take measures to adequately handle the post-acquisition key factors 
during the integration implementation process, so as to directly foster the transfer of 
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resources and capabilities from the acquired firms, or create and maintain a 
harmonious organisational climate to facilitate such transfer. 
 
7.3.2 Theoretical implications 
 
In addition to the contributions discussed above, this study also provides several 
theoretical implications for the existing research streams in relation to M&A. 
 
First, the findings in relation to the prior related resources of Chinese acquirers as a 
key success factor support Deng‘s (2010) argument of the absorptive capacity of 
Chinese firms being an important determinant of their performance in outward M&A, 
and their prior related knowledge being a significant antecedent of their absorptive 
capacity. Moreover, the prior related resources in this study extend Deng‘s (2010) 
scope of prior knowledge, and include prior international business experience, R&D 
capability, prior knowledge about the target firm, as well as prior performance and 
industrial status. This finding can amplify the existing knowledge about the 
antecedents of the absorptive capacity of acquiring firms from China or other 
emerging economies and provide implications on how such absorptive capacity 
influences Chinese acquirers‘ post-acquisition integration process.  
 
Second, this study suggests that Chinese acquirers adopt different levels of 
operational integration; a low level of integration at the day-to-day management level 
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and a medium one on strategic issues and in strategically important operational areas. 
The optimal level of integration is still a dilemma in M&A research. Current empirical 
research can only prove that implementing at least some degree of integration is 
decisive for M&A success (Bresman et al., 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Vaara et al., 
2012; Bauer and Matzler, 2013). For example, Bauer and Matzler (2013) empirically 
test a sample of 106 SME transactions in the German-speaking areas of Central 
Europe and find a positive relationship between the degree of integration and M&A 
success. Vaara et al. (2012) find that the level of operational integration is positively 
associated with capability transfer, suggesting that at least a moderate level of 
integration is a prerequisite for post-acquisition synergy realisation. Remaining 
consistent with these previous analyses, this study also argues not to view the level of 
integration as a uniform issue and suggests the adoption of different levels of 
integration in different operational areas. The differences need to be reflected in the 
acquirers‘ integration approach and be based on their specific characteristics, 
motivations, and organisational differences. In this research, Chinese acquirers use 
different levels of operational integration due to their strategic intent, huge cultural 
differences, lack of managerial talents, etc. This finding may be applicable to other 
emerging economies, or even provide implications for the mainstream M&A research. 
 
Third, this study firstly explored the speed of integration in the context of emerging 
economies and of China in particular. Even in the study of M&A integration in 
mainstream research, the speed of integration is an under-researched area (Stahl et al., 
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2013). The findings of this study support the mainstream argument for the use of a 
contingency approach to M&A integration speed (Angwin, 2004; Gomes et al., 2013). 
Building on this consensus, this study provides implications for research on 
integration speed and suggests that the integration speed implemented by Chinese 
acquirers is affected by their strategic intent, so that functional integration and 
strategically important areas in operational integration need to be implemented fast, 
while strategically less important operational activities and socio-cultural aspects need 
to be integrated slowly. The findings not only uncover the speed of integration in the 
context of CBMA conducted by acquirers from China and from other emerging 
economies, but also extend the knowledge of integration speed by introducing a 
possible strategy for the formulation of the appropriate speed of integration. 
 
Fourth, the findings of this study provide implications for research in relation to the 
role played by top management teams in the management of post-acquisition 
integration. No relevant research had ever been done in the context of EMNEs‘ 
outward M&A to developed countries before this study. Traditional mainstream M&A 
scholars often suggest that the general employees of acquired firms are more likely to 
benefit from M&A by a healthy acquirer, while the prospect of being acquired may be 
threatening to the top managers of target firms (Stahl et al., 2011). This is because the 
poor performance of a firm is normally attributed to its top executives. The findings of 
this study show different results and explanations. Chinese acquirers pay particular 
attention to management team building in their acquired firms and tend to retain most 
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local managers after the transaction. This is because the latter not only possess better 
knowledge about the firms and local institutions, but can also contribute to the 
maintenance of a harmonious organisational climate to facilitate inter-firm resource 
and capability transfer. This finding can help further research analyse the relationship 
between top management building and M&A performance in Chinese firms, or 
EMNEs‘ outward M&A in developed economies. 
 
Fifth, as an important part of the informal institutional environment, culture has long 
been considered a crucial issue in analysing international business phenomena in the 
context of emerging economies (Wright et al., 2005; Luo and Tung, 2008). It is 
surprising that Deng‘s (2010) framework of using an organisational learning 
perspective to explain the outward M&A performance of Chinese firms does not 
include cultural issues. Liu and Woywode (2013) made some progress by building an 
integrative model comprising both the organisational learning perspective and cultural 
differences to explore the integration approach in Chinese acquirers‘ outward M&A in 
Germany. However, their work only considers the influence of national and corporate 
cultural differences as static factors. This study makes further progress and suggests 
that despite cultural differences and cultural fit being mostly assessed before M&A 
deals, their impact on post-acquisition performance can be moderated by cultural 
integration strategies and efforts in the post-acquisition integration process. The 
findings on the Chinese acquirers‘ cultural integration strategy is coherent with recent 
research on M&A which suggests that aspects of socio-cultural integration, such as 
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the emergence of a shared identity and trust, and the building of an atmosphere of 
mutual respect and trust, can facilitate resource and capability transfers (Larsson and 
Lubatkin, 2001; Stahl et al., 2011; Stahl et al., 2013).Taking a further step, the results 
of this study also provide insights into how these socio-cultural aspects are used by 
acquirers from emerging economies to moderate the effects of the huge cultural 
differences between firms (Bjorkman et al., 2007). 
 
Sixth, the unearthing of three emerging key factors, which are home country 
advantages, complementary resources and acquirer attractiveness, enrich scholars‘ 
current understanding of these factors and of the post-acquisition integration process. 
The existing literature examined the role played by home country institutions in 
explaining the rationale of Chinese firms‘ outward M&A (Rui and Yip, 2008; Deng, 
2009). However, their impact on the post-acquisition integration process had never 
been explored before this study. Similarly, complementary resources had long been 
studied as determinants of M&A success because they represent the strategic fit of 
two parties (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Nevertheless, very few researchers 
realised their impact on the capability transfer process in the post-acquisition phase 
(Bjorkman et al., 2007). This study uncovered that these two factors are significant 
foundations of the unique integration approach and novel socio-cultural integration 
strategy of Chinese acquirers. It is reasonable to believe that these two factors could 
shed more light on the research of EMNEs‘ outward M&A. The first time that 
acquirer attractiveness received interest was at the 2004 Academy of Management 
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Conference. Stahl et al. (2004) proposed that the greater the perceived attractiveness 
of the acquiring firm, the higher the level of social integration following the 
acquisition. They also believed social integration to be positively associated with 
capability transfer from the acquiring firm to the acquired one. Despite their proposal 
of some key determinants of acquirer attractiveness, such as prior inter-firm contacts, 
quality of post-acquisition rewards, the perceived quality of the human resource 
management practices of the acquiring firm, etc, their arguments were just based on 
literature review and were not backed up by any empirical evidence
28
. This study has 
empirically examined the impact that acquirer attractiveness has on post-acquisition 
performance, which provides implications for understanding the role that acquiring 
firms play in the management of the post-acquisition integration process. The above 
three key factors deserve future attention not only in studies regarding EMNEs‘ 
international M&A, but also by mainstream M&A researchers to uncover the 
incomplete key success factors of M&A performance. In addition, these three 
emergent factors also provide potential contributions to established mainstream 
theories on MNEs. For example, the impact of home country advantages on the 
post-acquisition integration process suggests that Chinese acquirers generally tend to 
exploit resources and capabilities acquired from their western partners in the home 
market. This contributes to Dunning‘s OLI paradigm by expanding the scope of its 
Ownership and Location advantage, and is in line with, and further extends Child and 
Rodrigues (2005)‘s argument that the internationalisation of Chinese MNEs is aimed 
                                                             
28 Moreover, the authors eliminated this part of the argument when their paper was finally published in the Journal 
of International Business Studies in 2007. 
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at addressing their competitive disadvantages. 
 
Seventh, despite this study being in favour of the process perspective of Haspeslagh 
and Jemison (1991) and their proponents, the results show that post-acquisition 
integration implementation is not only affected by those process factors which occur 
during the post-acquisition phase, but is also influenced by pre-acquisition status 
factors. Such status factors could affect post-acquisition integration and performance 
through their impact on the formation and implementation of the acquiring firms‘ 
integration approaches. This important finding has implications on the scope of the 
process perspective and brings the attention of researchers back to pre-acquisition 
factors and to the linkage between them and post-acquisition ones.  
 
Eighth, although some recent papers have drawn the attention of M&A scholars to the 
important role played by the integration approach in achieving post-acquisition 
integration success and good performance (Weber et al., 2009; Weber et al., 2011), 
research on the integration approaches of acquirers from EMNEs is still very scarce 
(Liu and Woywode, 2013). Liu and Woywode (2013) shed some light in a recent 
paper by uncovering the light-touch integration approach of Chinese acquirers in 
Germany, which is characterised by a combination of Haspeslagh and Jemison‘s 
(1991) preservation and symbiotic approach. However, their results were based on 
data collected only from the executives of acquired firms, which limits their strategic 
position and comprehensiveness. The reliability of their study may be hampered as 
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German managers might not have been aware of the strategy of the combined 
organisation and could only deliver one-sided information. This study compensates 
this methodology short coming by conducting interviews with top executives and 
even CEOs of both the acquiring and acquired firms. The findings in relation the 
integration approach are partly different from those of Liu and Woywode‘s (2013) 
work, which argues that Chinese acquirers only offer strategic advice while bestowing 
decision-making autonomy onto the acquired management team. In fact, Chinese 
acquirers only grant autonomy for less strategically important issues, while firmly 
withholding decision-making rights on strategically important areas. The findings 
enhance the general understanding of the impact of pre-acquisition strategic intent on 
the post-acquisition integration approach, and fill a research gap in the integration 
management of EMNEs‘ outward M&A. 
 
Ninth, the role of culture in the post-acquisition integration phase has been an 
important standpoint for seeking explanations for M&A performance (Stahl et al., 
2013). While there is a general acceptance that cultural differences matter, how 
cultural differences affect post-acquisition integration in international M&A, and in 
EMNEs‘ outward M&A to developed economies in particular, is still unclear (Sarala 
and Varra, 2010; Vaara et al., 2012; Birkinshaw et al., 2010). As an important 
underpinning of the integration approach, a novel cultural integration strategy for 
Chinese acquirers is found in this study. Such cultural integration strategy is different 
from the cultural convergence or crossvergence which are normally adopted by 
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acquirers from developed economies to pursue a high degree of cultural integration 
(Sarala and Varra, 2010). The main aim of the cultural integration strategy of Chinese 
acquirers is to contain cultural conflicts and create a harmonious organisational 
climate to support resource and capability transfer. This novel cultural integration 
strategy provides significant implications for research on the effect of cultural 
differences and integration of acquiring firms from other emerging economies by 
suggesting that the main role of culture related issues is to foster capability transfer 
from acquired firms.  
 
Tenth, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) claim that integration is an interactive and 
gradual process in which individuals from the two organisations must learn to work 
together and cooperate to create value through capability transfer. ‗‗Creating an 
atmosphere that can support it [the integration] is the real challenge‘‘ (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991, p. 107). Despite some previous research having focused either on the 
capability transfer or on the atmosphere of the combined firm (Bresman et al., 1999; 
Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Stahl et al., 2011), very few studies have tried to integrally 
combine these two essences. By revealing the key success factors in the management 
of post-acquisition integration, this study finds that some key factors can facilitate 
both socio-cultural integration by maintaining a harmonious organisational climate, 
and strategic asset integration by transferring resources and capabilities from acquired 
firms to acquirers. This provides implications for future studies to examine M&A 
performance indicators through more comprehensive models which cover both 
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capability transfer and socio-cultural integration.  
 
Eleventh, although, due to the nature of case study research, the results of this study 
should not be simply generalised, they provide implications for acquirers from other 
emerging economies. Specifically, on the one hand, the integration approach applied 
by Chinese acquirers may also be suitable for acquiring firms from other emerging 
economies, since the latter may possess similar pre-acquisition status factors. On the 
other hand, the three emergent factors may provide implications for deductive 
research in the context of other emerging markets on identifying key determinants of 
M&A success. 
 
Twelfth, the results of this study suggest that the Chinese acquirers‘ ownership 
structure in terms of SOEs/non-SOEs does not exert any significant influence on 
post-acquisition integration in Chinese firms‘ outward M&A. The impact of the 
Chinese acquirers’ ownership structure on post-acquisition integration has never 
been empirically explored. The CEOs from both SOE acquirers considered that they 
had not faced any obstruction linked to their ownership structure. This extends the 
findings of Zhang et al. (2011), who argued that the likelihood of a Chinese firm 
succeeding in an overseas acquisition is lower if the acquiring firm is a SOE. Despite 
the ownership structure of Chinese acquirers being able to potentially affect the 
completion of their outward M&A, as was claimed by Zhang et al. (2011), this study 
suggests that a state-owned structure is not a key factor for integration once the 
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transaction proceeds to its post-acquisition phase. The most likely possible 
explanation is that, in the post-acquisition integration phase, the differences in the 
Chinese acquirers‘ ownership structures are primarily embodied in their organisational 
culture differences (Liu &Woywode, 2013), and the impact of the latter on the 
Chinese acquirers‘ post-acquisition integration is overshadowed and dwarfed by the 
huge national cultural differences. 
 
7.3.3 Managerial implications 
 
This study provides several managerial implications for both Chinese acquirers and 
western acquired firms.  
 
Chinese acquirers ought to choose a suitable integration approach based on their 
motivations and specific pre-acquisition key factors and take measures to adequately 
handle the post-acquisition key factors during their integration implementation 
process, so as to foster the transfer of resources and capabilities from the acquired 
firms directly to the acquirers, or create and maintain a harmonious organisational 
climate to facilitate such transfer. The novel integration approach found in this study 
can help Chinese firms which intend to make strategic intent M&A to better manage 
their post-acquisition integration process. 
 
Nevertheless, it must be noticed that the current integration approach adopted by 
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Chinese acquirers sacrifices the transfer of tacit knowledge-based resources, which is 
normally the most valuable resource for a firm‘s competitive advantage. Despite such 
sacrifice being able to compensate the disadvantages of Chinese acquirers in the 
management of post-acquisition integration, such as the lack of talents and the cultural 
differences, and contribute to their focus on the transfer of strategic important explicit 
knowledge-based resources, this might be only a temporary solution involving short 
term gain, whereas it would be harmful to firm competitiveness in the global market 
should such a focus persist long term. Most Chinese manufacturing firms, even 
industry leaders, still lack innovative capabilities, which are considered to be one of 
the most significant components of a firm‘s dynamic capabilities (Wang and Ahamed, 
2007). This needs to be addressed, among other measures, by transferring tacit 
knowledge from the acquired firms. Therefore, Chinese acquirers need to explore new 
modes for the management of post-acquisition integration without sacrificing the 
transfer of tacit knowledge-based resources, which is more valuable and much harder 
to transfer across firms. 
 
Specifically, the role played by key staff in influencing a firm‘s resource base needs to 
be emphasised. On the one hand, in the pre-acquisition phase and to minimise 
potential key staff turnover, Chinese acquirers should properly consider ways of 
improving their reputation and attractiveness. On the other hand, Chinese executives 
must be prepared to locate skilled employees to enable capability transfer before 
opening the grey box of the post-acquisition integration process (Zander and Zander, 
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2010). This is particularly difficult due to the information asymmetry suffered by the 
executives of the acquiring firms. To partly overcome this difficulty, acquirers from 
China and other EMNEs can start building personal relationships with the 
management teams of the target firms in the pre-acquisition due diligence and 
negotiation phase of M&A. Working with a competent management team before the 
announcement of the proposed M&A can help build trust with the target firm and ease 
the communication difficulties of the post-acquisition integration phase.  
 
As for target firms from developed economies, the ―unbalanced strategic resource 
focused‖ integration approach of Chinese acquirers provides the former with high 
levels of autonomy and job opportunities in their home country. When western firms 
seek Chinese strategic intent buyers due to their financial needs or potential market 
seeking, they need not worry that Chinese acquirers would intervene too much, nor be 
afraid of being taken over by the new boss. This cognition could stimulate more future 
cooperative opportunities for both parties.  
 
Moreover, this study suggests that professional institutions may provide value-added 
potential for Chinese acquirers in the post-acquisition integration phase. Professional 
service institutions, such as accountants, consultants and law firms have long been 
widely used by acquiring firms around the world and have been involved in 
international M&A transactions. Nevertheless, their effects are limited to the 
pre-acquisition phases, such as the due diligence and negotiation processes. When the 
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deals are settled, these professionals generally leave the case and are seldom involved 
in the post-acquisition phase. This study suggests that there are potential advantages 
in involving professional institutions in the integration process of Chinese firms‘ 
outward M&A. These professional firms possess a better understanding of the host 
institutional environments, including both formal institutions, such as local 
regulations and laws, and informal ones, such as culture. Through a more active 
participation in the operational management of the acquired firms, professional firms 
could improve the knowledge base of Chinese acquirers and help them handle 
post-acquisition integration difficulties (Liu and Woywode, 2013).  
 
7.3.4 Policy implications 
 
In respect to policy implications and to enable Chinese acquirers to focus on the due 
diligence and negotiation processes before the M&A deal, it would be necessary for 
the Chinese government to simplify the time and bureaucratic procedures needed for 
pre-acquisition approval. On the other hand, the findings of this study suggest that a 
good past performance and high R&D capabilities can facilitate the post-acquisition 
integration and performance of Chinese acquirers. Therefore, the Chinese government 
could partly control the post-acquisition performance of SOEs by screening their 
performance and R&D capabilities.  
 
In addition, the support of the Chinese government in terms of both policies and 
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M&A guidelines is totally focused on the pre-acquisition phase. Chinese acquirers 
hardly receive any support from their home government after the deal, although the 
post-acquisition integration phase is where value is created and the real problems lie. 
Therefore, a variety of home country intermediaries, such as educational institutions, 
governmental agencies and industrial associations, could substantially contribute to 
the handling of post-acquisition challenges (Liu and Woywode, 2013).  
 
7.4 Limitations 
 
While the author claims that this research is the first step towards the understanding of 
the key factors in the management of the post-acquisition integration process in 
Chinese firms‘ outward M&A to developed economies, several limitations are present 
in it. 
 
First, the case study research strategy adopted is mainly based on qualitative methods 
and data. The nature of case study research indicates that the final model of this study 
should not be simply generalised. Moreover, the results of this study are developed 
from the analysis of China‘s manufacturing sector. Results drawn from one sector of a 
representative emerging economy should not be generalised without restriction to 
other emerging economies. Further comprehensive or disaggregate analysis in other 
sectors (such as services) and in different emerging economies (such as India) should 
be conducted to enrich or modify our findings. 
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Second, although interviews were conducted with top executives in both acquiring 
and acquired firms, most interviewees in this research were Chinese due to their high 
management positions in the post M&A hierarchy. The author believes that these high 
level informants are knowledgeable of both the acquiring and acquired firms‘ strategic 
decision-making in the post-acquisition integration process. Although this method is 
supported by other scholars (Junni and Sarala, 2013), including more foreign 
interviewees from the acquired firms could provide a more balanced view on the 
socio-cultural issues in the post-acquisition integration phase. 
 
Third, the data of the studied cases was collected after 18 months and 24 months from 
the deal, respectively. Although enough time had elapsed to allow the firms to 
integrate, the key success factors of post-acquisition integration may vary with time. A 
longitudinal research could greatly add to the quality of this research and to the 
validity of its findings. Due to the limitations of the PhD study period, a longitudinal 
study was not feasible. Moreover, the relatively short history of EMNEs‘ outward 
M&A to developed countries increases the difficulties in conducting a longitudinal 
research.  
 
Fourth, the saturation level of the interview data of TCL‘s case is rather modest. This 
is because the deal had taken place ten years before, so a large proportion of the 
parties involved had left the firm. Moreover, as it was a failed M&A, some of the 
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senior executives did not wish to talk too much about this unsuccessful past event. 
Therefore, although the author was introduced to TCL‘s senior management by a vice 
CEO of the group, it was still difficult to persuade them to take the interview. 
Nevertheless, the availability of external documentation was very high because this 
had been a hot issue and a very high-profile case representing China‘s ‗go global‘ 
approach. There are numerous news items, commentaries, interviews, speeches, and 
case studies available in relation to this deal. In this case, the modest saturation level 
of the primary data was compensated by the combination of different sources of 
secondary data 
 
Fifth, the appropriate number of the studied cases needed is debatable. It is always 
difficult to answer how many cases should be included in a case study research. 
Although the study of multiple cases can make the research findings more robust, it 
requires extensive resources and time, which could be beyond the means of a PhD 
student. The difficulties linked to conducting a multiple case study in exploring 
international business questions have been experienced by the author of this research. 
It was not easy to arrange the data collection for all four cases, especially as the 
acquired firms were not in the same country. In the data collection period, five cases 
were approached. Ultimately, the author decided to include four cases in this research 
because of saturation considerations and case selection criteria.  
 
Sixth, the results of this study are mainly based on related acquisitions. This is in line 
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with the prevalence of related growth motives in contemporary M&A. Moreover, 
related acquisitions dominate the past and present of the outward M&A of Chinese 
firms. However, it is possible that the results would be different if unrelated M&A 
were focused upon (Junni and Sarala, 2013).  
 
7.5 Future research outlook 
 
This study also provides possible pointers for future research.  
 
Most of the existing research on the outward M&A of Chinese firms has concentrated 
on pre-acquisition motivations, rationales and possible performance determinants. 
This thesis is the first to research the Chinese EMNEs‘ post-acquisition integration 
process. It calls for more systematic research on the post M&A phase, where value is 
created.  
 
Moreover, this study has identified and explained some key success factors in the 
management of the post-acquisition integration process and in the achievement of 
M&A success. The evaluation of the causal relations between these key factors and 
M&A performance could be further strengthened by a quantitative approach. This is 
currently very difficult to realise due to the relatively short history of Chinese firms‘ 
outward M&A. When more cases will be available and Chinese managers will be 
more comfortable in cooperating with researchers, the author suggests using 
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quantitative methods, such as surveys, to test the final model of the study. 
 
In addition, the findings of this study also indicate that these key factors are not 
isolated. So far, there is still lack of connection between M&A performance 
determinants. The inter-relationships between key success factors recently received 
attention from mainstream M&A scholars (Gomes et al., 2013). Therefore, it is crucial 
to examine the relationships which exist between the key factors identified in this 
study, especially between pre-acquisition status factors and post-acquisition process 
factors. For example, the findings suggest that the Chinese acquirers‘ cultural 
integration strategy is affected by their attractiveness, human resource related issues 
and the resource complementarity between the two parties. Such relationships require 
further exploration in future research. 
 
Furthermore, the results of this study may face certain difficulties when generalised to 
other emerging economies due to certain specific characteristics of Chinese acquirers. 
For example, there is some evidence that the way in which the acquirers approach 
integration and that in which the acquired firms respond are contingent on their 
national origins (Stahl and Javidan, 2009; Stahl et al., 2012). Acquirers from different 
countries may have different perspectives on how post-acquisition issues should be 
dealt with (Stahl and Javidan, 2009). Therefore, despite this study having uncovered a 
novel integration approach, which may provide implications for other emerging 
economies, this integration approach should not be simply generalised to acquiring 
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firms from other emerging economies. Similar research is suggested to be conducted 
in the context of another emerging country to enrich the generalisability of the 
developed model. 
 
Finally, this study has identified some key factors that have seldom, if ever, been 
noticed by mainstream M&A research, such as acquirer attractiveness and home 
country advantages. These factors may contribute to the knowledge of M&A 
performance determinants and require further attention in future research. 
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Appendix 1: The approval procedure of China‟s outward M&A 
 
Step one: Foreign exchange registration with SAFE 
 
Based on “Regulations for foreign exchange administration of domestic institutions overseas 
direct investments” 
 
1. Chinese investors should explain the source of funds to local Administration of Foreign Exchange 
when registering.  
2. After examining the application documents submitted by investors, local Administration of Foreign 
Exchange will issue ODI registration IC card (started from January 2009) 
 
Step two: Obtaining approval from NDRC (including provincial DRC) 
 
Based on “The interim administrative measures of examination and approval of overseas 
investment projects” 
 
1. Investors should report to corresponding Development and Reform Commission (State or provincial 
level) and receive the confirmation letter before applying for approval of DRCs. 
2. Different kinds of projects should be examined by different governmental authorities. All projects in 
Taiwan and countries which have no diplomatic relations with China should be approved by NDRC. 
 
 <30m USD > 30m USD<200m 
USD 
>200m USD 
Natural Resource 
Exploitation Projects 
Local DRCs NDRC State Council 
 
 <10m USD > 10m USD<50m 
USD 
>50m USD 
Non Resource 
Exploitation Projects 
Local DRCs NDRC State Council 
 
3. Investors are not allowed to sign any documents with legal validity before the approval of NDRC. 
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Step three: To be authorized by MOFCOM 
 
Based on ―Regulations on overseas investment administration‖ 
 
1. Once decided to conduct outward M&A, investors should report to MOFCOM and SAFE (state or 
provincial) and submit the form entitled ―Report Prior to Enterprises‘ Overseas M&A‖. 
2. After the approval of NDRC, investors should apply to the MOFCOM (state or provincial) for 
―Enterprises‘ Overseas Investment Certificate‖ under the following conditions 
Projects that should be authorized by MOFCOM Projects that should be authorized by provincial 
commerce authorities 
Projects in countries which have no diplomatic 
relations with China; 
Projects in specific countries which are 
indentified by MOFCOM; 
Projects over 100m USD; 
Projects involving multi-countries; 
Projects with special aim; 
Projects invested by Central Enterprises. 
Projects between 10m and 100m USD; 
Natural Resource Exploitation Projects; 
Projects that need to attract investment at home. 
 
Other Steps of Government Administrative Control: 
 
1. The approval of  fund to conduct feasibility study (By SAFE) 
After submitting application of the overseas investment project, investors can apply to the local 
Administration of Foreign Exchange for fund to cover the cost of conducting feasibility study. 
 
2. The Foreign Exchange Registration Certificate (By SAFE) 
After the approval of NDRC and MOFCOM, investors should obtain Foreign Exchange Registration 
Certificate from SAFE before exchanging the fund in RMB Yuan into foreign currency. 
 
3. Obligation of being supervised and reporting (By MOFCOM&SAFE) 
Investors should cooperate with the joint annual inspection of overseas investment by MOFCOM and 
SAFE and submit quarterly ODI statistics report to help MOFCOM build a national statistics system of 
overseas investment. 
 
Special steps for SOEs: 
 
Central SOEs and Local SOEs should report to corresponding State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council before applying to other governmental 
authorities. 
Source: MOFCOM (2010), NDRC (2010), SAFE (2010) 
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Appendix 2: Official Regulations on Chinese Outward M&A 
 
Issuing 
Date 
Notification and regulations Enunciator Description 
July 1988 Regulations governing the approval of setting 
up trade-related enterprises overseas 
MOFCOM Overseas profits should be remitted to China. 
March 1989 Measures for governing the foreign exchange 
of overseas investment 
SAFE The first regulation on governing the foreign 
exchange for overseas investment. 
June 1990 Detailed rules for implementation of measures 
for governing the foreign exchange of overseas 
investment 
SAFE Detailed rules for applying foreign exchange 
for overseas investment. 
March 1991 Opinions of State Planning Commission 
(previous name for current NDRC) on 
enhancing the administration of overseas 
projects 
NDRC The first regulation about overseas 
investment by NDRC. 
August 1991 Provisions on establishment and approval of 
overseas investment project proposal and 
feasibility study report. 
NDRC The first document that formulate the 
approval procedures by NDRC. 
September 
1993 
The standards of examining and approving the 
source of foreign exchange for overseas 
investment 
SAFE Source of fund for overseas projects should 
be examined and approved before making 
applications to other governmental 
authorities. 
September 
1995 
Supplementary circular to measures for 
governing the foreign exchange of overseas 
investment 
SAFE Investors are allowed to purchase foreign 
exchange. 
September 
1999 
Circular concerning certain projects exempted 
from paying deposits for overseas profits 
SAFE The requirement for security deposit charge 
of certain projects is loosened. 
October 
2002 
Circular concerning applying the 
comprehensive performance appraisal system 
for overseas investment 
MOFTEC 
(predecessor 
of MOFCOM) 
Performance appraisal system of overseas 
investment established. 
October 
2002 
Tentative measures for the joint annual 
inspection of overseas investment 
MOFTEC 
(predecessor 
of MOFCOM) 
SAFE 
The first regulation on post-investment 
inspection. 
November 
2002 
Circular concerning relevant issues on 
removing repatriation requirement for the 
overseas profits made by Chinese acquirers 
SAFE Removal of the need to repatriate overseas 
profit in the future. 
December 
2002 
Circular concerning printing and distributing 
the statistic template for overseas investment 
MOFCOM Preparing for publishing the Statistical 
Bulletin of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment 
March 2003 Circular concerning relevant issues of 
simplifying the examination of the source of 
foreign exchange for overseas investment 
SAFE Industrial investment projects, foreign aid 
projects and strategic investment projects 
authorized by the State Council no longer to 
be examined. Foreign exchange obtained 
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abroad will not be examined any more. 
July 2003 Circular concerning relevant issues of 
returning the deposit of overseas investment 
profit 
SAFE Overseas profit deposit not required anymore. 
October 
2003 
Circular concerning relevant issues of further 
deepening the reform of foreign exchange 
administration for overseas investment  
SAFE Relevant approval process simplified. 
November 
2003 
Circular on establishing information database 
for potential firms of making overseas 
investment 
MOFCOM To detect the willingness of potential 
investors into overseas market. 
April 2004 The tentative administrative rules of approving 
overseas investment projects 
NDRC Outward M&A investors are not allowed to 
sign any documents with legal validity before 
the approval of NDRC. 
July 2004; 
October 
2005; 
January 
2007 
 
The guidance catalogue of countries and 
industries for overseas investments (1, 2, 3) 
MOFCOM; 
MFA 
(Ministry of 
Foreign 
Affairs); 
SAFE 
Investment into listed countries and industries 
are encouraged and incentivised.  
October 
2004 
Circular concerning policy of granting credit 
aid to key overseas investment projects 
encouraged by the state 
NDRC; 
China EXIM 
Bank 
Providing financial support to key M&A 
projects that can strengthen international 
competitiveness and market development. 
 
October 
2004 
Interim administrative measures of the 
examination and approval of overseas 
investment projects 
NDRC Investment projects should be approved by 
NDRC or provincial DRC according to the 
category and bid value. 
October 
2004 
Decision on the examination and approval of 
established overseas investing enterprises 
MOFCOM Feasibility study report is not required 
anymore. 
March 
2005 
Circular on reporting before making overseas 
M&A 
MOFCOM; 
SAFE 
Once decided to carry out overseas M&A, 
investors should report to corresponding 
MOFCOM and SAFE and submit the ―The 
reporting table before overseas M&A‖ 
May 2005 Circular concerning relevant issues of 
expanding the trial regions of foreign exchange 
administration for overseas investment 
SAFE The scope of the trial regions is expanded to 
the whole country; available foreign 
exchange is increased for investors; the 
approval authority of local SAFEs is 
expanded. 
July 2005 Circular concerning relevant issues of 
establishing a risk guarantee mechanism for 
key overseas investment projects 
NDRC; 
CECIC 
Providing risk management and investment 
consulting to key projects encouraged by the 
state. 
September 
2005 
Circular on adjusting the administration of 
overseas financial guarantee provided by 
domestic bank 
SAFE Applying balance administration instead of 
examining each transaction. 
October Detailed regulations on the examination and MOFCOM Specific regulations based on ―Decision on 
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2005 approval of established overseas investing 
enterprises 
the examination and approval of established 
overseas investing enterprises‖ 
June 2006 Circular on adjusting certain foreign 
administrative polices concerning overseas 
investment 
SAFE Investors can purchase foreign exchange with 
CNY for overseas investment without upper 
limit. 
June 2006 Circular on establishing the statistic 
examination system of overseas investment by 
destination 
MOFCOM To ensure the accuracy and completeness of 
the statistical data of China‘s OFDI. 
November 
2006 
Urgent circular on enhancing the statistic 
system of outward foreign direct investment 
MOFCOM To emphases on building a sound statistic 
system for overseas investment. 
January 
2008 
Circular concerning relevant issues of 
adjusting the examination and approval of 
overseas investment 
MOFCOM Expanded the authority of provincial 
Commerce Bureau. 
December 
2008 
Circular concerning relevant issues of 
implementing the overseas investment module 
of information system on foreign direct 
investment 
SAFE Use IC card to manage foreign exchange of 
overseas investments. 
May 2009 Regulations on overseas investment 
administration 
MOFCOM Simplified the approval procedures of 
overseas investments and expanded the 
authority of provincial Commerce Bureau. 
June 2009 Circular concerning relevant administrative 
issues of the overseas loan by domestic 
enterprises  
SAFE Enlarged funding source of overseas loans. 
Simplified the examination and approval of 
overseas loans. 
June 2009 Circular concerning relevant issues of 
strengthening the administration of overseas 
investment projects  
NDRC Investors should report to NDRC before start 
substantive work in outward M&A projects. 
August 2009 Circular on regulations of foreign exchange 
administration of domestic institutions in their 
overseas direct investment 
SAFE Changed the examination and approval of 
overseas investment funding source, 
December 
2009 
Circular concerning relevant issues on joint 
annual inspection of overseas investment 
MOFCOM; 
SAFE 
Comprehensive performance appraisal will no 
longer be taken as part of annual inspection. 
December 
2009 
Circular concerning relevant issues on tax 
credit of offshore income 
MOF 
(Ministry of 
Finance); 
SAT (State 
Administration 
of Taxation 
Regulation on tax credit of offshore income. 
Source: MOFCOM (2010), NDRC (2010), SAFE(2010), and Voss et al., (2008).  
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Appendix 3:Two sketches (examples of the evolvement of the final model) 
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Appendix 4:Research background-China as a new emerging market 
 
With its 1.36 billion people, China is the world‘s most populous country, making up 
about 20% of the world population (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013), and 
is therefore potentially the world‘s largest market. It is also one of the world most 
fast-growing countries. According to the preliminary accounting of the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, the gross domestic product (GDP) of China reached 
56,884.5 billion Yuan in 2013, a year-on-year increase of 7.7% at comparable prices. 
Since the start of the new century, China has achieved an average annual GDP 
increase of over 10%, which helped to keep China‘s at the top in the world‘s GDP 
table. In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world‘s second largest economy. In fact, 
over the last two decades, China has been the world‘s fastest growing economy based 
on GDP growth (China Statistical Yearbook, 2013; National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2014). 
 
China‘s GDP has been growing significantly since the country started to open up in 
1978. The country performed even more strongly during the course of my research. 
This growth has been attributed to its political stability, market liberalisation policy, 
social stability and the development of both inward and outward investment (Siebers, 
2011). Although the 2008 global financial crisis hampered the world economy, owing 
to a series of economic stimulation policies issued by the central government, China‘s 
GDP growth suffered less compared with that of developed countries (Tan and Ai, 
2010).  
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In China, GDP is divided into primary, secondary and tertiary industry sectors. The 
primary industry sector includes farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries, 
and accounts for around 10.1% of GDP. The secondary sector, which includes 
industry and construction is the most important and accounts for 45.3% of GDP. The 
tertiary sector accounts for the remaining 44.6% of the total output and consists of 
wholesale and retail trading; transport and storage; financial intermediation; real 
estate; hotel and catering services and others (Siebers, 2011; China economy, 2013; 
Trading Economics, 2014). Despite the tertiary industry‘s contribution to the GDP 
having increased dramatically in recent years
29
, the secondary sector remains at the 
heart of China‘s economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
29
The recent growth of the tertiary sector is largely attributed to the dramatic increase of the real estate industry 
(NetEase, 2014).  
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